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

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

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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXIV SEPTEMBER, 1970 NO. 3

KENYA'S AFRICANIZATION PROGRAM: PRIORITIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY*

DONALD ROTHCHILD
University of California, Davis

Africa's postindependence leaders are under enormous pressure. They must assume such new functions as the conduct of foreign relations and military defense and must expand developmental activities greatly, all at a time of falling world commodity prices, population explosion, and increasing indifference to foreign aid on the part of the wealthier countries. Local African expectations are rising, even though such requisites for satisfying these aspirations as capital, skills, and initiative remain in short supply. Nationwide linkages and a national identity must be built in the face of quickening ethnic anxieties and inward-lookingness. The functional benefits offered by a continued non-African presence must be secured without causing deep-seated popular frustrations; such frustrations could clearly jeopardize the regime's legitimacy should they become too extreme. The need for schools, hospitals, and welfare activities are juxtaposed against such pressing requirements as the development of power facilities, irrigation schemes, road networks, and industries. The choices are difficult and the demands heavy. No wonder Aristide Zolberg remarks that the "governments with the lowest load capability have assumed the heaviest burdens."[1]

If these restrictions of international environment and resources did not impose sufficient constraints upon governments as they attempt to cope with developmental needs, their flexibility of movement is further constricted by the pulls of ideology. African countries, fresh from an encounter with powerful, privileged European states, carry over a wide range of liberal commitments into the postindependence period. They are naturally determined to continue the struggle against any remaining manifestations of colonialism on the continent—white settler oligarchies, neocolonialist military and economic arrangements, or politically-inspired alignments with powers outside of Africa. Their leaders proclaim both nationalist and pan-Africanist objectives and call simultaneously for a leveling egalitarianism and rapid economic growth. The extent to which they can reconcile these somewhat overlapping, and even conflicting, goals with the compelling claims implicit in nation-building remains a crucial question with broad implications for regime stability.

This essay focuses upon the role of the non-African communities in Kenya's economic life and concentrates upon national policy with respect to the Africanization of the public and private sectors of the economy. Conflicts in two demand situations—for Africanization on the one hand and for economic development on the other—are analyzed in the context of Kenya's politics and related to the government's present values and priorities. The likelihood of increased or decreased responses to these sometimes conflicting demands is examined with a view to pointing up possible directions which changing governmental priorities might take and their implications for the European and Asian minorities residing in the country.

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* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Alexander Groth and Larry Wade for helpful comments on the original manuscript.

[1] "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968), p. 73. Also see Rupert Emerson's discussion in *Political Modernization: The Single-Party System,* University of Denver Monograph No. 1 (Denver: University of Denver, 1964), pp. 9–10.

I. INPUTS: EQUITY DEMANDS

Africanization involves a large set of demands upon government in Kenya. During colonial times, Africans performed most of the unskilled jobs in the country, Europeans held many of the management, professional, and higher technical posts in the public and private sectors, and Asians were predominant in middle-level clerical, technical, and commercial positions. The inequalities of opportunity of the colonial period appeared at every age level. Using 20–29 year-old males as a basis of comparison, the 1962 census showed 63 per cent of the Europeans having secured nine or more years of schooling, 59 per cent of the Asians, and four per cent of the Africans.[2] Whereas the statistics on Europeans in the key occupational groups showed 42 per cent in professional and managerial posts and 17 per cent in technical and supervisory posts, those for the Asians were 23 per cent and four per cent respectively and for Africans were approximately one per cent in the two categories combined.[3] As to the distribution of earnings, a similar lopsided pattern was evident; in 1962, the small Asian and European communities earned £46.8 m. in a total annual wage bill of £88.8 m. In the private sector, 29 per cent of the regularly employed European males earned more than £1,800 per annum and another 29 per cent earned between £1,200 and £1,799. Comparative statistics for the other communities showed 18 per cent of Asian males earning £720 and over, and one per cent of the African males earning £600 or more in the 1962 period.[4] Such glaring inequities naturally provoked African claims to greater opportunity. Jomo Kenyatta's appeal to European goodwill in 1943 was a remarkably restrained expression of African feelings on the subject:

> Let the Africans have equal educational facilities with the Europeans, and leave them free to make the best use of them. Give them an equal chance of economic enterprise, equal opportunity in business and the professions, and a say in the Government of the country. If they then show themselves unequal to the strain of Western civilization, they will have no right to resent being treated as a backward race.[5]

Not surprisingly, the marked inequalities of opportunity among races in colonial times carried over into the period following the transfer of power. The three-tier pyramidal structure of Europeans at the top followed lower down by Asians and then Africans was too firmly entrenched in such areas as education, welfare, and incomes policies to give way rapidly or easily to a change in the governmental power structure. The Ministry of Education, in an effort to correct the imbalances of the past, announced that by 1967 all schools which were formerly for non-Africans must enroll not less than 50 per cent Africans (increased to 65 per cent in 1968); even though the long-run implications of such a policy are great, the transformation of the skilled manpower situation is certain to be gradual.[6] Nevertheless some significant modifications became evident at the time of independence with regard to recruitment policies. Africans quickly came to man most of the positions in parliament and government as well as the policy-making posts in the civil service; even so, the racial structuring of opportunity persisted in the technical and professional fields and in private commerce and industry generally. Data on civil service personnel as of July, 1967 showed 91 per cent of the highest administrative posts Kenyanized; however, only 24 per cent of the posts in the professional cadre, 46 per cent of the higher executive cadre, and 65 per cent in the lower executive cadre had been taken over by Kenya citizens.[7] Moreover, as the comparison in Table 1 brings out in strong relief, the proportion of jobs held by Africans in the public sector greatly exceeded those in the private sector.

Clearly, then, non-African control over investment capital and skills was too complete to erode with the first flush of political independence. As a result, many Kenyans, perceiving little apparent change in the distribution of goods and opportunities in the society, felt dissatisfied with the status quo. No doubt the aspirations of rural Africa are more limited than in urban and peri-urban areas; yet the cumulative pressure of these claims on government is enormous.[8]

---

[2] *Kenya Population Census, 1962,* Vol. III (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1966), p. 45, and *ibid.,* Vol. IV, pp. 22, 51.

[3] *Ibid.,* Vol. IV, pp. 27, 53, and Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1965* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1965), p. 115.

[4] *Statistical Abstract, 1965,* p. 153.

[5] Jomo Kenyatta, *Suffering Without Bitterness* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 40.

[6] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 19, 1968), col. 929.

[7] Data supplied by the Directorate of Personnel.

[8] Colin Leys, *Politicians and Policies* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 52.

TABLE 1. OCCUPATIONAL AND RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA, 1964*

Occupational Group	Proportion of Jobs Held by Africans		
	Public Sector Per Cent	Private Sector Per Cent	Ratio Public to Private
Professional and Technical	40.6	10.7	3.79:1
Administrative, Executive and Managerial	53.4	21.9	2.44:1
Teachers	95.9	31.5	3.04:1
Clerical	70.6	33.7	2.09:1
Sales	38.0	44.7	0.85:1
Transportation and Communications Workers	90.1	89.9	1.00:1
Service, Sport and Recreation Workers	98.1	97.0	1.01:1
Craftsmen, Production Process and Skilled Workers	91.0	88.9	1.02:1
Unskilled Workers and Laborers	99.9	98.5	1.01:1
Total Wage and Salaried Employment	92.6	82.4	1.12:1

* Source: Republic of Kenya. *Kenyanization of Personnel in the Private Sector* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1967), p. 2.

The demand for Africanization was part of a larger nationalist drive for equality. Since Kenyan nationalism sought to eliminate the privileges implicit in the racial stratification of the old order, it placed greater weight upon egalitarianism than upon individual freedom and constitutional rights.[9] As Ali A. Mazrui noted, "black people are the most aggrieved of all races in moral terms, even if they are better off economically than many Asians [in Pakistan and India]."[10] The African struggle against colonialism was essentially a fight for human dignity as expressed in the form of equality between races. Thus nationalism became the battering ram of African group rights; if a conflict took place between the privileged minorities' demand for rights under the constitution and the African community's claim to corrective equity, nationalism was drawn instinctively to the African call for group rights. Nationalists might well have felt restrained in their actions by the important economic role played by minority peoples in the life of their country, but only reluctantly did they subordinate racial interests to the requirements of economic interests.

A survey of Kenya African attitudes toward minority groups I conducted in 1966 revealed the public to be nationalistic about its Africanization objectives and at the same time cognizant of the contribution of out-groups to the developmental process.[11] When asked what changes were desired in the conduct of retail trade in the country, a majority of respondents advanced various proposals for securing increased African management and ownership: more than 29 per cent of the total responses maintained that the government should hand over Asian businesses to Africans, another 23 per cent held that the government should give loans on easy terms to enable Africans to form their own businesses in order to compete with established Asian entrepreneurs, and yet another 4 per cent affirmed that businesses owned by Asian noncitizens should be requisitioned and assigned to Africans. Since nearly one-third of the total responses favored a take-over of Asian businesses, a cross-tabulation of these respondents yields an interesting insight into the nature of the grass-roots demand for Africanization. The pressures for such an approach came most emphatically from older, less educated Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luhya males. Although 43 per cent in the 36–46 year-old bracket, 36 per cent of those completing primary school, 60 per cent of the elders, and 34 per cent of the males responded in this manner, only 33 per cent in the 18–35 year old age group, 28 per cent of those who completed secondary school or more, and 23 per cent of females did likewise. Moreover, responses by tribal group varied significantly. Whereas a high percentage of Kamba (48 per cent), Kikuyu (45 per cent), and Luhya (44 per cent) agreed to a take-over, the Luo (20 per cent) seemed not to feel as strongly the need for such a strategy.

---

[9] These points are discussed at length in Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 99. Kenyan and Tanzanian nationalists tended to focus upon the common goal of equality in different ways. Kenyans frequently stressed the central objective of equality between races while their Tanzanian counterparts talked of achieving equality by eliminating class exploitation. For the latter, see President Julius Nyerere's remarks as reported in the *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), August 27, 1968, p. 1.

[10] Ali A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1967), p. 242.

[11] Results are based upon 680 returned questionnaires out of a total sample of 730, or a return rate of 93 per cent. Twenty-seven of the 680 interviews were rejected as incomplete or dishonest. The interviews were conducted by 20 African men in the fall and winter of 1966; the place of interview was divided roughly evenly among urban (Nairobi), periurban, and rural areas throughout Kenya. Although this sample deliberately overrepresents urban dwellers (because I was interested in opinion data from the more politically mobilized sectors of the population), the sample nonetheless includes a more substantial proportion of rural respondents than are normally interviewed in public opinion research in Africa. Among those interviewed, 237 had completed primary school, 170 had completed secondary school, 152 had some secondary school, 47 had attended a university, and 47 were tribal elders. The following occupational categories were included: 183 teachers or students, 73 farmers, 63 government employees, and 334 non-government workers. For an emphasis on the important role of the "politically relevant strata of the population" in the political process of the African states, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, LV (September 1961), 497–498. Also see James S. Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 535–536. For companion articles based on the same survey, see Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Minorities and the African Crisis over Citizenship," *Race*, IX (April 1968), 421–437; and "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII (December 1969), pp. 689–711.

Some typical expressions of opinion indicate the nature of African feelings on the question of a take-over of Asian businesses:

> The only thing is to ask these Asians to leave by force and then the government should give the Africans loans to build such shops.
>
> Well what I can say about it is that these retail trades should only be held by Africans and Asians to be under Africans.
>
> Some Asians who have been trading for a long time and getting rich from Africans and other people, should leave such trades to Africans to manage. The government should give loans to Africans and the person concerned should mention the particular shop he wishes to buy and the owner should be persuaded to sell it. If they refuse to sell they should be forced or else they can start the business together.
>
> Indians have not changed to know that we have Uhuru. They should be asked to leave the retail trade to Africans, I mean they should be bought over as European farms.
>
> I think some of the big shops in town (Nairobi and other towns) should be given to Africans who can do the same thing. The government should ask some of the Asians to quit their shops to be taken over by the Africans. The government can use force in the matter.

Even while some Africans were expressing strong sentiments on the need for rapid Africanization, they were also mindful of the contribution which non-Africans were making to economic development. The African majority's sophistication on this matter emerged clearly from two related questions raised in the same survey as above (see Tables 2 and 3).

TABLE 2. AFRICAN ATTITUDES: PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO REPLIED THAT EUROPEANS AND ASIANS AS A WHOLE HELPED TO DEVELOP KENYA (N=653)

Community Affected	True	False	Don't Know; No Answer	Total
Europeans	88%	11	1	100%
Asians	51%	47	2	100%

What is most striking about Tables 2 and 3 is the divergence in attitude regarding Asians and Europeans. The majority were much more suspicious of the intentions of the middle-level Asians than of the top-ranking Europeans. Superficially one might conclude that increased social distance between groups led to a more positive interpretation of out-group activities. But such interpretations are undercut to some extent by an examinaion of the responses in terms of tribe, age, and education, for in each of these instances proximity led to greater appreciation of the minorities' contribution. Only eight per cent of those who were Kikuyu, had some secondary schooling, or were in the twenty-year-old age group or under replied that Europeans had harmed development. This liberal cluster of responses appeared again in regard to the rôle of the Asians. Here 37 per cent of the Kikuyus, 37 per cent of those who had completed secondary education and above, and 35 per cent in the below-twenty age group viewed Asians as harming the country's economic growth; this was a low percentage relative to the sample as a whole even if not low in absolute terms. Obviously the crucial factor in the determination of group attitudes was the kind of relationship that core group members had with the immigrant communities, not the fact of proximity by itself.

In general, trade union leaders, Kenya People's Union (KPU) spokesmen, and Kenya African National Union (KANU) parliamen-

TABLE 3. AFRICAN ATTITUDES: PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO REPLIED THAT EUROPEANS AND ASIANS HARMED THE DEVELOPMENT OF KENYA (N=653)

Community Affected	True	False	Don't Know; No Answer	Total
Europeans	13%	84	3	100%
Asians	45%	49	6	100%

tary backbenchers were the most prominent champions of the public's equity demands.[12] On frequent occasions they called upon the government to act more vigorously in righting past racial imbalances. To this end, they sponsored a race-conscious definition of Africanization, sought effective controls over employment opportunities in Kenya, and urged the authorities to scrutinize applications for citizenship with greater care. All these objectives were interrelated. As Clement Lubembe, the former secretary-general of the Central Organization of Trade Unions, declared: "It is our contention that granting of citizenship must be made to look as expensive as possible so that, as time goes on, we should be able to adjust the existing imbalance."[13] Thus, the government was constantly exhorted by these parliamentary and trade union leaders to move ahead faster in achieving its Africanization goals; the politically mobilized segments of public opinion remained deeply dissatisfied, and political stability necessitated substantial progress in meeting these African hopes and expectations.

Trade unionists and parliamentary backbenchers and opposition members, articulating their community's egalitarian impulses, tend to be skeptical of the government's more cautious estimation of the need for non-African skills. Although both governmental and nongovernmental spokesmen urge a policy of self-reliance,[14] they differ noticeably when it comes to the practical task of implementing Africanization schemes.

For many an African nationalist, the attack on standards is an attack on the "colonial mentality." It is an attempt to eliminate the artificiality of European values as applied to African circumstances.[15] During colonial times African leaders voiced suspicions of high standards, seeing them as a means of restricting the common man's initiative. Thus, Tom Mboya criticized the standards maintained by municipal councils in the country in 1960 on the grounds that they inhibited healthy competition. He said:

> My contention is that you cannot look forward to standards which you cannot afford, and especially if the policy is to encourage African business, I think we should be much more lenient and consider the nature of the people we are dealing with rather than merely fix standards and hope that everybody will maintain those standards, regardless of the means available and their capacity to achieve those standards. It has come to a point where some of us are convinced that, in fact, the reason for some of these restrictions on African petty traders, vegetable traders, second-hand clothes dealers and so on are being prevented from trade merely in order to meet . . . the interests, of those people who have the bigger voice in the City Council today—the Europeans, and to some extent, the Asians.[16]

And two years later, J. J. M. Nyagah urged a compromise in the standards applied to a veterinary diploma "even if it means we will produce a man who is lower than the present holder of a Makerere diploma . . ."[17] At that time African politicians sought to break the dominance of non-Africans in the bureaucracy, the professions and business and were quite prepared to lower standards in order to increase African opportunity.

With the entrance of a number of Africans into high and middle-level positions after independence, the discussion of standards tended, in official quarters at least, to take greater account of the complexities of the question. African governmental authorities expressed pride in the post-independence period over their standards of excellence in the civil service;[18] in addition, they tended more and more to discriminate between areas requiring and not requiring the highest of qualifications. Even so, trade unionists and parliamentarians continued the frontal assault on colonial-inspired standards. For many of these men, the question of standards was raised as a means of limiting African advance.[19] As G. G. Kariuki told Parliament:

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[12] The Kenya Government proscribed the Kenya People's Union in October 1969 following a violent confrontation in Kisumu and the placing of a number of major party officials in detention or under house arrest.

[13] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), September 20, 1968, p. 17. His successor, Denis Akumu, declared that COTU's newly-elected leadership would resolutely oppose "window Africanization." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), March 5, 1969, p. 17.

[14] For Tom Mboya, "a policy of greater self-reliance must involve the use of Kenyan manpower and enterprise which without too much difficulty can be performed by Kenyans." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), April 11, 1968, p. 5. An important East African statement on this subject appears in *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: Publicity Section, Tanganyika African National Union, 1967), Part III.

[15] Editorial in the *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), August 30, 1968, p. 4, and Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 218. For a discussion of the socially-defined nature of merit, see W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 262.

[16] *Legislative Council Debates* (Kenya), Vol. LXXXV, Fourth Sess. (June 1, 1960), col. 1146.

[17] *Ibid.*, Vol. LXXXIX, Second Sess. (May 9, 1962), col. 51. See also the comments of Senator G. N. Kalya in *Senate Debates* (Kenya), Vol. I, First Sess. (July 25, 1963), col. 493.

[18] In his Jamhuri (Independence) day address of 1967, President Kenyatta proudly asserted that: "Despite this rapid Africanization, there has been no fall in the standards of efficiency." *Kenya Newsletter* No. 25, December 15, 1967, p. 3. See also, Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

> Why can we not give these jobs to Africans? What is the impossibility in Africanizing a clerk? What is the impossibility in Africanizing a job where a person just does nothing except counting motor-cars? Mr. Speaker, Sir, what is there in an executive job? What technicality is there in an executive job? What technicality is there in Africanizing, say, a branch manager of a bank?[20]

These men were impatient to get on with the task of Africanization. They were contemptuous of what they considered as artificial standards set up to inhibit opportunity rather than to guarantee competent service. The "myth" of high standards, as one observer described it, was seen by many as essentially a damper on African aspirations for equity.[21]

On a related question, African nationalists have also attacked lack of experience as a bar to recruitment. Such a requirement is seen as reinforcing the status quo; it leads to an intolerable situation where Africans might be restricted indefinitely from entering certain occupations. Therefore African nationalist spokesmen have been wary of experience as an important prerequisite for a post and have argued that their followers need only learn on the job.[22] "For anyone . . . to imagine that Africanization/Kenyanization should be sacrificed to the bogey of 'experience' . . . is sheer racist economic sophistry," Clement Lubembe has contended.[23]

Government leaders have gone a considerable way toward accepting the argument that experience must not block Africanization programs. In an address to the Association of East African Industries, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mwai Kibaki, requested that local manufacturers appoint distributors who lacked the normal background of experience. The question of "know how" has been exaggerated, he contended; under circumstances prevailing in Kenya, he estimated that Africans could now successfully act as agents for 75 per cent of the distributing sector.[24] Government officials accept the demands of equity with regard to the Africanizing of manufacturers' distributors but at the same time use experience as a basis for refusing to Africanize more specialized activities.[25] Substantial disagreement only arises over the importance of experience in the decision to Africanize high-level positions.

In brief, then, a considerable body of African opinion feels that non-African skills are dispensable. As Africans have moved upwards to compete effectively as civil service employees, shopkeepers, artisans, tailors, and salesmen, they have become fully aware of the fact that competence is not the exclusive preserve of any particular race. This recognition has had the effect of redoubling the demands for equal opportunity in every sphere. And the impact of this egalitarian thrust can be seen both in the crumbling defenses of those seeking to preserve universalistic criteria[26] as well as in the government's sponsorship of such measures as trade licensing, work permits, land transfer controls, and loan schemes, some of which are discussed in Section III.

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[19] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 9, 1965, p. 21. Statement by Senator Lubembe.

[20] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (July 7, 1967), col. 1965. As the chairman of the East African Institution of Engineers (Kenya Division), J. F. K. Kahumbu, remarked over the lack of Asian *fundis* in the building trade, "Surely to train *fundis* will not take years." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 12, 1967, p. 3.

[21] Aggrey S. Awori, "East African University Must be Africanized," *East African Journal*, IV (December, 1967), p. 20. For a criticism of standards by a non-African, see Jill Wells, "An Original Signatory Reconsiders the Kenyanization Paper," *East African Journal*, V (May, 1968), pp. 10–11.

[22] Statement by George O'Newlaw, general secretary of the African Kenya Civil Servants Union, *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 29, 1962, p. 4.

[23] *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), June 2, 1968, p. 8. Also see his comments in *ibid.*, May 5, 1968, p. 4.

[24] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), June 14, 1968, p. 1.

[25] See the reasons given by the Minister for Power and Communications when he refused to replace the Chairman of the Transport Licensing Tribunal Court with an African. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (June 22, 1967), col. 1272.

[26] In the period prior to and immediately after independence, non-Africans generally urged a policy of equal treatment under the law for all citizens. They rejected preferential treatment for the less favored majority community and pressed instead for property safeguards and recruitment policies which emphasized individual merit and achievement. By 1967, however, a significant minority had come to accept the logic of corrective equity. This conclusion is based on a separate survey of Asian businessmen conducted by this author and Peter Marris in Nairobi, Kiambu and Limuru in June 1967. Results are based on 281 completed questionnaires out of a total sample of 301, or a return rate of 93 per cent. In Nairobi and the Nairobi Industrial Area, a 10 per cent sample was obtained by means of street counting; in Kiambu and Limuru,

II. INPUTS: DEVELOPMENT DEMANDS

It is time now to turn to demands which not only act as supports for the political system but are also an essential concomitant of the drive for rapid economic growth. Because the effects of past racial inequalities of opportunity are still evident on the Kenya economic scene, these development demands are largely advanced by European and Asian businessmen and professionals. Nevertheless, this point must not be overstressed; many Africans are now assuming positions of importance in the private sector and these men are often just as aggressive as their non-African counterparts in pressing developmental priorities. Consequently, the conflict between equity and development demands is increasingly one of class interests, not simply of racial interests.

Not surprisingly, Kenya's lack of capital and skilled manpower has caused those concerned with development to be cautious about proposed schemes for rapid Africanization. They seek an expanding economy; any possibility that hasty or ill-conceived measures will be put into effect gives rise to anxieties, such as that the existing economic structure might suffer damage and the country's potential for expansion might be dimmed. Africanization is viewed as a desirable objective—even a sound business practice; yet in the eyes of these men it must remain compatible at all times with developmental goals. Sir Colin Campbell, the president of the Federation of Kenya Employers, has stated these general sentiments as follows: "We as a Federation wholeheartedly support the principle of citizens receiving job preference. . . . Our principal concern is that this process should be carried out with the minimum disturbance to the economy and without diminishing confidence in Kenya abroad."[27] Another employer, also espousing the cause of Africanization, doubtlessly expressed the uneasiness of many colleagues when he referred simultaneously to "inefficiencies resulting from haste, emotion, and the throwing about [of] bad words."[28] Africanization, then, was considered a political necessity for business leaders. They sought to accommodate the grass-roots pressures for equity within a framework of high standards and efficiency—in other words, to bring Africans into the cosmopolitan world of industry rather than to adapt industry to African values and circumstances.

The limited nature of skilled manpower resources for developmental purposes is evident to most observers of Kenya. That country's modernization, like that of the third world generally, is held back by what the late Tom Mboya described as "a gigantic shortage" of trained and experienced personnel.[29] Kenya's manpower shortages do not exist in every category; a substantial balance (or surplus) between supply and projected demand exists in such occupations as forestry officers (technician level), agriculture and livestock technicians, medical technicians, and radio communications operators.[30] However, as Table 4 indicates, shortages of middle and high-level manpower are significant, particularly in such occupational categories as engineers, doctors, teachers, librarians, lawyers, geologists, pharmacists, surveyors, accountants, and architects.[31] Kenya lags behind such countries

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the whole business population was used for purposes of a sample. When asked whether it is sometimes fair for government to give special preference to Africans over other citizens, or not, 28 per cent of the total responses to this multicoded question were in the affirmative, 66 per cent in the negative, and 6 per cent had no opinion or didn't know.

[27] Speech to the annual general meeting of the Federation of Kenya Employers as quoted in the *East African Standard* (Nairobi), March 23, 1968, p. 4. In 1968 he was a director of 20 companies. National Christian Council of Kenya Working Party, *Who Controls Industry in Kenya?* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 145.

[28] Statement by the general manager of East African Cargo Handling Services, Ltd. as reported in the *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), June 20, 1968, p. 24.

[29] See Republic of Kenya, *A Development Strategy for Africa: Problems and Proposals* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1967), p. 23. Also see a report of his remarks to a Kenya Institute of Administration course at Kabete in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), September 20, 1968, p. 9.

[30] Republic of Kenya, *High Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Kenya, 1964–1970* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1965), p. 15.

[31] Estimates of the imbalance between projected demand and supply in these occupations are given in *ibid.*, p. 14. For critical analyses of the shortcomings of this report, see Republic of Kenya, *Kenya Education Commission Report,* Part II (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 38–40, and E. R. Rado, "Manpower Planning in East Africa," *East African Economic Review,* Vol. III (new series), No. 1 (June, 1967). Another set of projections appeared in Guy Hunter, *Education for*

TABLE 4. HIGH LEVEL MANPOWER—DEMAND AND SUPPLY 1962–70***

		Category I*	Category II**
ESTIMATED NEEDS			
Required in 1970		24,042	103,958
Available in 1962		10,434	30,639
Net Additional Needs		13,608	73,319
Estimated Wastage		4,917	12,267
Gross Number Required by 1970		18,525	85,586
ESTIMATED SUPPLY			
Form VI Output 1963/70	7,251		
Less University Entrants	4,000		
	3,251		
Universities Output	6,300		
Total Category I Supply	9,551	9,551	
Form IV Output, 1963/70	59,416		
Less Those Continuing in School	12,812		
Total Category II Supply	46,604		46,604
SHORTAGE		8,974	38,982

* Professional men and technologists whose work clearly requires a university degree or equivalent training, or senior administrators and managers carrying considerable policy and financial responsibility.

**Technicians, teachers with secondary education, junior administrators and managers, supervisors of clerical staff, supervisors of skilled men, fully trained nurses, senior members of the extension services with diploma or post-school certificate qualifications or experiences and ability to hold equivalent posts.

*** Source: Government of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1964–1970* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), p. 136.

as Nigeria where a surplus of civil engineers, lawyers and accountants is anticipated by 1970 but well ahead of a number of countries in tropical Africa whose projected out-turn of secondary school and university graduates is so small as to leave them extremely dependent on nonindigenous skills.[32]

Although Kenya's manpower gaps may be filled in time by the educational system, the process is likely to be influenced by a variety of factors: the rate of the economy's expansion, the adequacy of the educational system to deal with future needs, the willingness of the population to support the necessary educational system, the level of wastage, and so forth. Clearly non-Africans, citizens and noncitizens alike, will be essential in many industries, for the foreseeable future. A premature departure of expatriates would retard development and create additional unemployment. An inkling of this came in the fall of 1967, when the exodus of many Asian artisans at the time of a building boom added to costs and caused delays. Asian artisans had been leaving Kenya since 1960 in order to find better employment opportunities elsewhere; this steady manpower drain, intensified by fears in 1967 over an early end to any chance to enter Britain, caused a drop in the numbers of skilled construction workers from 21,120 in 1960 to a low point of 9,000 in the fall of 1967.[33] As a result business firms and home builders waited longer and paid higher prices for construction.

Moreover, any future employment policy which might distinguish between citizens on racial grounds would prove expensive in terms of economic growth. Not only do non-Africans long resident in Kenya have a substantial share of existing skills, but present educational trends indicate that their potential role remains large in the highly-skilled occupations. Only 38 out of the 98 Kenya students graduating from the University College, Nairobi, in the years 1963–1966 were of African origin, the remainder consisting of 59 Asians and one European. Asian preponderance was particularly noticeable among those receiving degrees in engineering, for 88 per cent of those receiving degrees from this faculty were of Asian origin.[34] Statistics compiled by the University College on student distribution by race in 1967 show that 180 of the 557 students from Kenya (32 per cent) were Asians and 29 (5 per cent) were Europeans. A breakdown of these figures by faculty (Table 5) gives some insight into the important part non-Africans will play in the years ahead in such fields as design, land development, engineering, and the sciences. When the number of Kenyans of European and Asian origin studying abroad is added to those at the University College, a picture of significant non-African contribution to the country's manpower supply situation is evident. Under such circumstances, any change in recruitment policies that would make it less feasible for locally

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a Developing Region: A Study in East Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 64.

[32] National Manpower Board, *Nigeria's High-Level Manpower, 1963–1970,* Manpower Study No. 2 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1964), p. 19.

[33] *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), October 22, 1967, p. 1. See also *East African Standard* (Nairobi), November 10, 1967, p. 17; *Reporter* (Nairobi), November 29, 1968, p. 29; and *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (June 28, 1967), col. 1533, remarks by A. J. Pandya.

[34] Statistics compiled from a written reply by the Minister for Education, J. J. Nyagah, to a parliamentary question, *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. X, Fourth Sess. (December 7, 1966), cols. 2523–2524.

TABLE 5. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI DISTRIBUTION OF KENYA STUDENTS BY FACULTY AND RACE ON FEBRUARY 18, 1967*

Faculty	Number of Africans	Number of Asians	Number of Europeans	Number of Arabs	Total
Architecture, Design and Development	26	18	14	—	58
Arts	124	61	2	—	187
Commerce	60	15	3	—	78
Engineering	58	43	3	1	105
Science	55	38	4	—	97
Veterinary Science	22	5	3	2	32
Totals	345	180	29	3	557

* Source: University College, Nairobi, *Student Distribution by Country, Course, Year, Sex, and Race as on 18th February, 1967* (Mimeo.).

and overseas trained out-group members to participate fully in nation-building would obviously involve a significant economic cost.[35]

Leaders in government and industry, aware of the scarcity of manpower resources, have taken development demands into account in formulating policy. Highly-placed persons in business and commerce, most of whom are non-Africans, have naturally found it relatively easy to argue for a nonracial hiring policy. But African politicians, torn by their desire to represent the wishes of their constituents and by their recognition of the need to cushion the impact of Africanization, have reluctantly become the proponents of prudence and responsibility. Noting that the paucity of scientific, technical, professional, and managerial skills constitutes a major handicap to Kenya's development efforts at this stage, Tom Mboya, for example, argued for a selective and detached approach to the problems of manpower planning.[36] Similarly, the paper on African Socialism is most sensitive to the problems of manpower shortages:

> As with capital, we can grow rapidly now only by supplementing our meagre supply of domestic, trained manpower with large numbers of skilled people borrowed from abroad. It is a choice between rapid growth and little or none, not between rapid growth and a little less.[37]

Despite the genuineness of their nationalistic inclinations, therefore, Kenya's rulers went far toward accepting the development demands on the utilization of non-African manpower; as indicated below, they have moved cautiously to implement the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1967, encouraging the continuing expansion of the economy by a policy which assures a ready supply of trained and experienced personnel. The alternative was seen as an equity of the many poor where Africanization would take place at the expense of growth—a situation regarded as thoroughly undesirable.[38]

African leaders outside government were also highly sensitive to the constraints of the supply situation. Many parliamentarians of both parties recognized that a "skill drain" would intensify existing personnel shortages, thereby delaying development. An outspoken critic of the government's policies aimed at driving out the Asian middle class was the militant nationalist and leader of the Opposition, Oginga Odinga. He charged that the government's policies were "sacrificing the Asian" to relieve economic and political pressures on itself; the struggle for economic independence, he said, would require full use of all the manpower available in East

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[35] E. R. Rado and A. R. Jolly, "The Demand for Manpower—An East African Case Study," *Journal of Development Studies,* I (April, 1965), p. 243.

[36] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), December 5, 1966, p. 7. For comments on the need for expatriate teachers, see Eric Khasakhala's remarks as reported in *ibid.,* March 6, 1968, p. 9.

[37] Republic of Kenya, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 21.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 18. In reconciling African Socialism with the ownership of a Mercedes-Benz, Tom Mboya spoke as follows: "If we are going to have African managers and professionals, we have a responsibility to create the atmosphere in which they operate. There has always been serious misunderstanding by those who think that African Socialism means equitable distribution of poverty. To me, however, it means equitable distribution of wealth." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), May 26, 1969, p. 5.

Africa.[39] Odinga expressed anxiety over the exodus of Asians from Kenya, fearing that it would leave a trail of African unemployment in its wake:

> The Asians might be leaving today, but do we have any plans in connection with this, because the Asians who were here were employing some Africans? When they leave, these Africans will also be jobless men in the streets, and who is the person who will take the chance? It may be some of the non-Africans who have, by chance, become citizens of this country, who will take the chance of filling these places, because they have the funds to expand in business. It will only be the big salaried African, who also has money, probably only Africans who have farms, who will also fill these places. Such a person may be able to employ those Africans who are now jobless as a result of these people going, but will it really solve the problem of the jobless people who are roaming our streets?[40]

In making this statement, Odinga had not altered his position regarding the need for rapid Africanization or preventing exploitation by foreigners;[41] rather he was pointing to the Africans' economic interest in keeping skilled non-African manpower available for Kenya's uses. He stressed the desirability of creating a planned, socialist society, not the replacement of a non-African by an African privileged elite.

In brief, then, it is an oversimplification to contend that the demand for non-African skills is exclusively a non-African one. Africans in government and its opposition as well as in business and the professions urge the exercise of considerable discretion in determining immigration and recruitment priorities. They recognize that non-African manpower makes an important contribution to development, and, in many cases, shun Africanization programs which would jeopardize economic growth. Thus Africans also press support for development demands; however, they tend to deem that a mutuality of racial interests is present where the employment of highly skilled non-Africans does not delay Kenyanization and where it increases economic opportunity for the people of the country as a whole.

Another of the development demands involves the conditions for the use of private capital. Not surprisingly, such support demands come mainly from the communities having private capital at their disposal—the Europeans and Asians. Here European leadership is particularly noticeable. The presence during colonial times of a sizable European population devoted primarily to agriculture and administration created the basis for a viable manufacturing sector; because of this concentration of European expatriates, the British invested more substantially in Kenya's large-scale industries than they did in most of their other tropical African dependencies. This process led ultimately to a tight British hold over Kenya's industrial life which remained in effect even after independence had been granted. The extent of this hegemony is revealed by the preponderance of European (mainly British) capital invested in previously registered companies. In the years 1963–64, for example, European-controlled companies increased their capital by £11,091,670; comparable statistics for the other communities were £920,250 invested in Asian firms, £26,000 in African companies, and £3,481,000 in partly European, partly Asian, and partly African-controlled companies.[42] A large amount of European capital was also invested in newly incorporated companies around the time of the transfer of power and after. From 1963 to 1966 the nominal capital each community invested in companies under its control was as follows: European, £9,150,440; Asian, £5,329,625; African, £1,788,325; and mixed, £4,616,250.[43]

In addition, as a report prepared by the Working Party of the National Christian Council of Kenya demonstrated impressively, British capital is heavily entrenched in the most crucial industries in the economy.[44] A high proportion of major Kenya companies are subsidiaries of London-based companies which are on the London *Times* list of the 300 largest British firms of 1967. The London-based firms with subsidiaries in Kenya include such well known industrial names as Unilever, Dalgety, Mitchell Cotts, Brooks Bond, J. Lyons, Glaxo, Great Universal Stores, Unigate, British Leyland Motors, International Computers, "Shell" Transport and Trading, British Petroleum, Metal Box, I.C.I., British Oxygen, and a number of others. Kenya's association with such powerful industrial giants gives it an important potential source of development capital—a decided advantage at a time when this factor of production is in scarce supply. However, such an advantage may involve risks for a new nation determined to pursue a course of nonalignment. Moreover, the demands of large industry to repatriate profits, locate plants, set prices, and bring mergers into effect may run counter to the objectives of a nationalist regime. Those who control capital clearly make heavy demands upon government for a favorable climate for their investments.

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[39] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 23, 1968, p. 17

[40] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIV, Sixth Sess. (March 5, 1968), col. 386.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 7, 1967), cols. 1809–1810, and *ibid.*, Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (July 28, 1967), cols. 2927–2930.

[42] Republic of Kenya, *Registrar-General Annual Report, 1964* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 13.

[43] *Registrar-General Annual Reports*, 1964–1966.

[44] National Christian Council of Kenya Working Party, *Who Controls Industry in Kenya?*

Government, for its part, has given every consideration to the demands made by investors. It has given repeated assurances against appropriation and nationalization;[45] of particular significance in this regard is its enactment of the Foreign Investments Protection Act of 1964 which guarantees that:

> No approved enterprise or any property belonging thereto shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over such enterprise or property shall be compulsorily acquired, except in accordance with the provisions concerning compulsory taking of possession and acquisition and the payment of full and prompt payment of compensation contained in section 19 of the Constitution of Kenya. . . .[46]

In addition, it has placed minimal controls upon investors and has promptly issued Approved Status Certificates to legitimate foreign companies seeking permission to repatriate profits.[47]

Kenya's governmental leaders, then, are fully alert to the needs and demands of the investor community. Unlike neighboring Tanzanians who assume that Africa must create most of its own capital out of its own resources,[48] they place great store by foreign private investment as a catalyst of development. The *Development Plan, 1966–1970* projects that private capital formation will consist of £180 million out of a total £325 million during the period from 1965–70, the larger percentage of these private development funds coming from foreign sources.[49] In certain areas (manufacturing, mining, electricity and water, hotels and restaurants, and nonresidential construction) the dependence on the private sector is virtually complete.[50] For KANU spokesmen, private capital is an essential requisite of economic opportunity in their country. They seek to deal with the problem of unemployment through the long-term process of expanding commercial and industrial opportunity. Private capital is welcome provided that it actually fosters the development process. "If we have [and attract] capital," reasoned Kenyatta, "we shall have more business opportunities and employment in the country for our people."[51] He and his colleagues were willing to accept the risks implicit in close links with the Western capitalist economy in order to achieve the necessary framework within which a meaningful self-reliance will be possible.

In various quarters in Kenya, suspicion is rife of this close connection with international capitalism. The debate in parliament over the Foreign Investment Protection bill showed many members to be uneasy over the possibility of manipulation by foreign capitalists and resentful of the need to give broad assurances to foreign interests. Bildad Kaggia, who subsequently became Deputy President of the Kenya People's Union until he left the party in August 1969, was particularly outspoken on this occasion. The right of certain firms to repatriate profits under the provisions of this bill would mean, he said, "that we are not getting investment in this country for our own benefit, but we are only becoming some economic colony for America and Britain."[52] In its 1966 election manifesto, KPU went on to condemn "the Government's and KANU's capitalist policies" and promised to "extend national control over the means of production and break the foreigners' grip on the Economy."[53] Since such a world view has attracted much support in other lands, it stands to reason that the government's extensive reliance upon private capital's contribution to economic progress must demonstrate results or other approaches, such as radical nationalization, may be seen as more desirable by the uncommitted citizen of present times.

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[45] Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Nationalization, contended S. M. Balala, the Assistant Minister for Finance, would be merely to misuse scarce capital resources. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 4, 1968), col. 166.

[46] No. 35 of 1964, p. 4.

[47] Such certificates signify that an investment is contributing to Kenya's economic development.

[48] See President Julius Nyerere's interview with George Githii in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 7, 1968, p. 11

[49] Government of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1966–1970* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 44, 118.

[50] In the manufacturing sector, for example, £53 million out of a total of £61.7 million is to come from private sources. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[51] Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 344. Also see his remarks in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 19, 1968, p. 5

[52] *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. III, Second Sess. (October 7, 1964), col. 3246. Also see Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's remarks at the time of his resignation from KANU in C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt, and D. Rothchild, *Government and Politics in Kenya: A Nation-Building Text* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), p. 145.

[53] Kenya People's Union, *K.P.U. Manifesto* (Nairobi: Kenya People's Union, 1966), pp. 3–4. Also see Kenya People's Union, *Wananchi Declaration* (Nairobi: KPU, 1969), p. 5. Nevertheless

III. THE DETERMINATION OF POLICY

In a modernizing state such as Kenya, government inevitably plays an active role as it goes about the task of processing the equity and development demands. Like other governments the world over, its freedom of action is circumscribed. The limitations of Kenya's resources and environment as well as the somewhat conflicting pressures of ideology make the processing of these inputs a sensitive and complicated affair. Yet despite the impact of these factors, the Kenya government still retains considerable capacity to make independent decisions with respect to Africanization goals, costs, and regulations.[54] As a consequence the political elite is in a position to exercise some discretion in determining Kenya's priorities on equity and development. How has it used its power?

To answer this question it is necessary to look at policy. The objective of eventual Africanization is adhered to uniformly across the continent, but the policies of the different African regimes have sanctioned varying priorities and controls. African regimes may be dichotomized crudely but usefully in terms of their characteristic policy-making processes. One type would consist in regimes such as Kenya with reforming policy-making styles; another type would include regimes such as Tanzania with radical policy-making styles.[55] Although a greater difference is often evident in the ideological orientations of these African regimes than in their actual performance in the face of similar environmental constraints, the ordering of priorities still has considerable significance for their developmental programs.

The Kenya government's great emphasis upon developmental objectives was made explicit in its White Paper on African Socialism. The "most important" of governmental policies, this paper asserts, "is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanization for the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth."[56] In order to secure development, they plan to harness the world economy to their immediate need for capital and skilled manpower.[57] They are convinced that for the time being at least their nation's developmental interests are best served by preserving close links with international (especially British) Capitalism. As President Jomo Kenyatta has stated so clearly, "My Government has now no intention of amending or disrupting a system which is working well."[58] Such a heavy stress on

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KPU's militancy did not blind it to the contributions of immigrants capital and skill. In 1966, KPU President Oginga Odinga stressed that in the process of transforming Kenya's economy, KPU would try to see that justice was done to those immigrants who arrived in Kenya with the capital and skill which developed "the islands of prosperity already described." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), August 10, 1966, p. 3.

[54] For David Apter, government can be treated as an independent variable insofar as it changes the character of modernization. He observes: "It is in industrial societies as distinct from modernizing ones that government as an intervening variable comes to prevail." See his book, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 252.

[55] For variants of the radical-reforming dichotomy, see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 5–6; Robert C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations," this REVIEW, LVII (September, 1964), 632–634; Samir Amin, *Le Developpement Du Capitalisme en Cote D'Ivoire* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967), p. 265; Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Random House, 1967), Ch. XI; and Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 77, 99–117.

[56] *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya,* p. 18. "Rapid economic growth, in all countries," commented Tom Mboya, the late Minister for Economic Planning and Development, "is a prerequisite to the extension and intensification of welfare services and to the provision of greater employment opportunities." *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IX, Second Sess. (May 4, 1965), col. 1794.

[57] Speaking of the overseas investor, Kenyatta observed: "We must continue to merit and to encourage these injections of capital in the private sector. . . ." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), May 2, 1968, p. 5. See also J. G. Kiano's statement in *ibid.*, September 19, 1966, p. 4; and Tom Mboya's in *ibid.*, January 19, 1968, p. 1.

[58] *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), February 18, 1968, p. 1. According to a former consultant to the Kenya government, ". . . the private sector has exceeded

developmental objectives has not been without its effects. Kenya, with an average annual growth rate at constant prices of over five per cent, has achieved a level of economic development which is admired in much of independent Africa.

It must be stressed, however, that a policy of extensive reliance upon foreign resources does not imply satisfaction with the status quo. Such is not the case. Kenya leaders are reform-minded, intent upon applying humanistic values to the capitalistic system. They seek to use the strengths developed under a capitalist order to advance African opportunity, not be used by the system. Hence they have made what could be described as a calculated "time-investment" in the existing order. They are deferring some of the equity demands until a later date, hoping through this sacrifice to achieve a more favorable future reconciliation between equity and development.

Kenya has given expression to its reforming approach in its policy of African Socialism. The Kenya interpretation of African Socialism seeks to join the nationalist demand for African opportunity with the continuation of the capitalist system. It is a reformist doctrine because it attempts to Africanize capitalism, not to proceed toward classical socialism. Although future programs involving the nationalization of commerce or industry are not ruled out, such programs are delayed in order to spur present growth objectives. "It should be recognized," reasoned the White Paper on African Socialism, "that if the nation's limited domestic capital is used to buy existing land, livestock, buildings, machinery and equipment, the nation has no more productive assets than before—only their ownership has changed. What may be lost are the new resources that could have been purchased instead. . . ."[59] Of course such an interpretation could change with new and different ways of perceiving priorities.

For the time being at least, government is determined to bring about a smooth and effective transfer of economic power into African hands.[60] "In general," remarked the late Tom Mboya, ". . . Africanisation of the various sectors of the economy will be pursued through a framework of growth, i.e., by enabling Africans to own new assets."[61] The emphasis is upon steady and continuous progress toward "substantive rewards."[62] Clearly the present administration does not intend to force the pace of Africanization beyond the point which the public or private sectors can absorb without a loss in efficiency or productivity.

Evidence of such pragmatism is readily at hand. One example may be inferred from the implementation of the Trade Licensing Act of 1967 which imposed some restrictions on noncitizen commercial activities. In the debate on the bill, Mwai Kibaki, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, stated that the government would consider scheduling a township under the Act when, after consultations with the county council, administration and local leaders, it had determined that there were enough local people ready to take over the businesses presently run by noncitizens.[63] The emphasis was upon "phasing out" the change so as to avoid costly disruptions.

When the new law came into effect, government leaders continued to stress that the transition to African dominance in the field of trade would have to take place gradually. Kibaki told a press conference in January, 1968 that the law would be applied "in a reasonable manner." Noncitizens would be removed from areas only as quickly as Africans were prepared to assume the new responsibilities.[64] In subsequent months,

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expectations in both capital spending and self help effort." Edgar O. Edwards, "Development Planning in Kenya Since Independence," *East African Economic Review*, 4 (New Series) (December, 1968), p. 9. The percentage rates of growth of the gross domestic product in the 1963–67 period were estimated as 7.4 per cent at current prices and 5.3 per cent at constant prices. Republic of Kenya, *Economic Survey 1968* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1968), p. 7.

[59] *African Socialism* . . . , p. 26. Also see Duncan Ndegwa's argument in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 1, 1968, p. 13.

[60] *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IX, Fourth Sess. (July 15, 1966), col. 1904. Also see Republic of Kenya, *Kenyanization of Personnel in the Private Sector* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1967), p. 3.

[61] "Speech by the Hon. T. J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development—Introducing the Development Plan 1966/1970," Nairobi Press Conference, May 5, 1966, p. 43. (Mimeo.). For his discussion of the limited utility of nationalization under Kenya circumstances, see *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IV, Second Sess. (May 4, 1965), cols. 1803–1806.

[62] For the distinction between symbolic and substantive rewards, as used in a different context, see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics: An Analysis of the American Political System* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 26, 68–69.

[63] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 9, 1967), col. 1972.

[64] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), January 12,

as members of the Kitale Municipal Council sought to include their township as one of the general trading areas open to noncitizen businessmen, the Minister issued a statement reassuring peoples dependent upon non-African services that no arbitrary or ill-conceived actions were contemplated.[65] Even as a stricter application of the regulations was considered in the latter part of the year, the government remained determined to see that non-Africans stayed on in their shops until an "efficient African" became available.[66] In principle, the government preferred to delay Africanization objectives where these clashed head on with business efficiency. To the extent that the priorities seemed to have changed in early 1969, this may be attributable as much to a judgment about the manpower supply situation as to the political objectives involved.

Not only are governmental officials pragmatic in their implementation of the Trade Licensing Act, but they are also careful to delineate the kinds of activities affected by the Act. As Kibaki noted in the debate on the bill, the Trade Licensing Act would apply only to trade licenses, not to manufacturing licenses.[67] His comment is indicative of the tendency on the part of government to give greater encouragement to African commerce than to African industry.[68] Apart from restrictions on noncitizen trading licenses, African traders have also been helped by redirection of commodity distribution through the Kenya National Trading Corporation. By contrast, African industrial businesses receive no preferential treatment. African sawmills have great difficulty in getting any timber allocations from the Forest Department, which gives them mostly to Asian and European mills. Government departments put their requirements out to tender with strict impartiality, and they drop African firms if they obtain a more competitive bid elsewhere. Government does nothing to restrict competition from European and Asian companies, even when they threaten to drive African firms financed by government loans out of business. Clearly the government regards industrial growth as too urgent a matter to compromise growth rates by favoring, too strongly, the small beginnings of African entrepreneurship. It wants overseas private firms to invest large sums, thereby helping to build an industrial base. Government is then likely to Africanize gradually, perhaps pressuring firms to sell shares to the public or to appoint African directors and senior employers.

Finally, pragmatism is evident in the way in which government issued work permits. Following the passage of the 1967 Immigration Act, officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs gave assurances to noncitizens that they need not panic about securing the new work permits. No abrupt changes were intended; the Immigration Department would not act with undue haste as it called classes of people forward to apply for work permits.[69] Other signs of governmental caution came to light in the following year. Immigration officials announced further periods of grace in regard to work permits, allowing employers who had not been informed of the results of work permit applications to continue to employ their staff until informed otherwise.[70] In addition, the Minister for Home Affairs, D. T. arap Moi, gave assurances to international companies about their key employees, and farmers were told by various officials that their applications for permits would be processed swiftly.[71] By September, 1968, it was announced that 8,000 of the first 9,000 applications submitted had been approved—a proportion sufficiently generous that the U. K. Citizens Committee could talk of evidence of a slackened speed of Africanization![72] Thus the government's over-

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1968, p. 1. See also *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIV, Sixth Sess. (April 9, 1968), col. 1794.

[65] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 24, 1968, p. 5. For articles dealing with Kitale fears over the effects of the Trade Licensing Law, see *ibid.*, February 23, 1968, p. 8.

[66] *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), August 18, 1968, p. 1, and *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 19, 1968, p. 3. It is important to note that no guidelines as to competency were set.

[67] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 9, 1967), col. 1968.

[68] I am grateful to Peter Marris for bringing most of the points in this paragraph to my attention.

[69] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), November 15, 1967, p. 9, and November 16, 1967, p. 4.

[70] *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), June 8, 1968, pp. 1, 24, and June 10, 1968, p. 6.

[71] Republic of Kenya, *Statement on Application of the New Immigration Act in Relation to "Work Permits" and Kenyanization* by D. T. arap Moi (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1968), p. 2; *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), February 15, 1968, p. 6 and February 16, 1968, p. 4; and *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 15, 1968, pp. 1, 4, 5.

[72] Letter from G. S. Sandhu to J. Callaghan (Nairobi: U. K. Citizens Committee, May 29, 1968), p. 1. (Mimeo.). The government's generosity is underlined by the fact that the following middle-level categories were involved: secretaries, artisans, masons, carpenters, cashiers, office machine operators, shop assistants, and salesmen. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess.

riding concern with the health of the economy led to only a gradual implementation of the regulations on work permits in the early period after the passage of the immigration law.

In contrast, Tanzanian leaders placed great stress upon equity objectives in the period following the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The principles set out in the second five-year development plan—social equality, Ujamaa (familyhood), self-reliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration—indicate the strength of their commitment to egalitarian objectives.[73] Such priorities coincide with doubts about attracting sufficient external resources for rapid industrialization. "We are mistaken," observed President Julius K. Nyerere, "when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries; firstly because to say the truth we cannot get enough money for our development; and secondly, because even if we could get it, such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country."[74] Continued reliance on Western finance is seen as offering no escape from colonial inequities, for development along capitalist lines will result at best in marginal benefits for the great majority of the impoverished local population. To end the drift toward what they see as "economic dependency,"[75] the Tanzanians have adopted a policy of socialism and self-reliance. They have created a sense of crisis in the populace by focusing on the unpredictability and unfriendliness of the international environment in order to mobilize the populace and reduce their dependence on external sources of capital and manpower. Nyerere's formula runs as follows:

> . . . And the truth is that our United Republic has at present a poor, undeveloped, and agricultural economy. We have very little capital to invest in big factories or modern machines; we are short of people with skill and experience. What we do have is land in abundance and people who are willing to work hard for their own improvement. It is the use of these latter resources which will decide whether we reach our total goals or not. If we use these resources in a spirit of self-reliance as the basis for development, then we shall make progress slowly but surely. And it will then be real progress, affecting the lives of the masses, not just having spectacular show-pieces in the towns while the rest of the people of Tanzania live in their present poverty.[76]

Nyerere is willing if necessary to accept slow progress for the sake of independence from the grip of Western capitalism. To this end, he calls for rural development, a complete overhaul of the educational system, and a variety of puritanical measures aimed at eliminating luxury and ostentation. He rejects industrial development based essentially upon foreign initiative even while welcoming alien capital and skills which are willingly contributed toward fulfilling the government's objectives of building a socialist state. The 1969–1974 Development Plan reflects these priorities by forecasting a private sector investment of diminishing importance relative to other sources, crucial only in housing, road transport and construction.[77]

Ultimately, African radicals such as Nyerere can be said to value collective action and equity more than economic growth. They and their supporters ridicule what they describe as "perverse growth," namely economic expansion on African soil which benefits international capitalism more than the local economy of the developing state.[78] Their radicalism lies in altering their relationship to the international order that they inherited and in attempting to mold an economic arrangement geared to circumstances of

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(September 23, 1968), col. 1071. In July, 1969, J. H. Gitau, the director of the Kenyanization of Personnel Bureau, commented that more than half of the 18,000 applications for work permits received from noncitizens had been approved. *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 4, 1969, p. 5.

[73] The United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969–30th June, 1974*, Vol. I (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 1.

[74] *The Arusha Declaration*, p. 11. See also his *Freedom and Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 166–167, and his interview with George Githii in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 7, 1968, p. 11.

[75] *Freedom and Socialism*, p. 263. For discussions of how gifts and loans endanger independence by Tanzanians and others, see *The Arusha Declaration*, pp. 9–10, and *Wanachi Declaration*, p. 9.

[76] *Education for Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), p. 6.

[77] The sources of investment capital during the Second Plan period are projected as follows: central government, shs. 3,055 m.; parastatal organizations and cooperatives, shs. 2,300 m.; private, shs. 2,150 m.; East African Community, shs. 580 m., United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan . . .*, p. 210. On the slow growth in total number of employed people, see Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (April, 1969), p. 549.

[78] Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VI (August, 1968), pp. 150–151.

their own making. Their stress upon rural development and Ujamaa villages as well as their deemphasis of wealth are indications of this new assertiveness.[79] In seeking to determine their own order, they naturally rule out or greatly minimize such reminders of old times as extensive concessions to the development demands put forth by foreign interests.

IV. POSSIBLE CHANGES IN KENYA'S PRIORITIES

Kenya's attempt to strike a balance between demands for Africanization and for optimum economic development was one among several strategies for building a political order in the immediate period after independence. For Kenyans, an imbalance of emphasis in the direction of racial equity might have achieved social justice at a possible cost in growth. An imbalance in the direction of all-out economic development would have involved social costs in terms of African opportunity; the class-racial gap between the privileged non-Africans and the underprivileged Africans might have widened, leading to a dramatic escalation of frustrations in the period just after the transfer of power had occurred. The reconciling of somewhat conflicting demands was a delicate operation at best, but it seemed to Kenya's rulers to promise significant advantages in securing a balanced development.

The transfer of political sovereignty had little initial impact upon non-African hegemony in the economic sphere; Europeans and Asians continued to predominate as a consequence of their hold upon essential skills and capital. Conscious of the increased exposure of their position resulting from the loss of political power, however, they were prepared to accept—even help guide—a limited adjustment in the economic order. They sought to co-opt some trained Africans into the free enterprise system, thereby cooperating with the government's goal of creating African opportunity within the inherited capitalistic arrangement.

Nevertheless the relationship of a strategy of development to intergroup relations must be viewed in a larger perspective than the unique response to post-*uhuru* circumstances. Development inevitably involves adjustments to changing internal conditions, specifically and currently increasing African pressures for equity at a time of moderate economic progress. With the passing of the initial postcolonial phase, unemployment has increased generally, dissatisfaction with income differentials has become more and more apparent, and the demand for Kenyanization, if not "blackenization," has become pronounced. "The people are unemployed everywhere," warned Masinde Muliro, "and this is material for disgruntled politicians. . . . Today we have revolutions in Africa because of disgruntled millions, and as long as ours is not yet disgruntled we should try to see how best we can remedy the poverty which is in our country."[80] The former Opposition party's, KPU's, attempts to capitalize upon such popular sentiments did not lead to major electoral successes; yet the appeals of its radical approach were evidently seen as a challenge during the Little General Election of 1966 and the 1969 by-election in the Gem constituency of Siaya District.[81] Thus Africanization demands are being pressed with increasing intensity, and governments in developing countries, which have limited capability to cope with conflicting internal pressures, must make concessions to racial equity demands in order to ensure the persistence of the system.

Governmental priorities are likely to reflect changes in inputs in the years ahead. As equity demands grow, governments may be compelled to move in one of two main directions: to the "right" in the form of additional coercion or to the "left" in the form of more appealing radical strategems ranging from heavier taxation to nationalization. The first alternative would be evidence of the current elite's investment in the present order. It would attempt to secure a firm hold on the present situation by combining the necessary elements of force with a policy of coopting as many able African graduates into high-level positions as the nation's development would permit.[82] This approach would mean a continuing emphasis upon growth over social justice; the nation's development would be used to implement Africanization objectives to the extent compatible with development objectives. The second alternative, and one that appeals in Kenya to some KANU backbenchers as well as the detained KPU parliamentarians, involves a move to the "left" to preserve the government's legitimacy. This would entail a change in the existing balance in favor of racial equity demands, reducing growth rates for the sake of social justice. Such an approach would subordinate "economic interest," defined in terms of total growth rates, to "political interest," defined in terms of broadening and deepening the regime's base of legitimacy. This would be a not unlikely response to the changing nature of political pressures in the period after the victories of independence have been consolidated.

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[79] Editorial, *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), May 8, 1969, p. 4, and *Reporter* (Nairobi), November 14, 1969, p. 27.

[80] *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 3, 1968), cols. 98–99. See also *East African Standard* (Nairobi), October 4, 1968, p. 17. For a discussion of Kenya's unemployed as a political pressure group, see Peter C. W. Gutkind, "The Poor in Urban Africa," in *Power, Poverty and Urban Policy*, ed. by Warner Bloomberg, Jr. and Henry J. Schmandt (Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. II; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968), pp. 388–392.

[81] For a discussion of parochial as well as class factors in the Gem by-election, see John Joseph Okumu, "The By Election in Gem: An Assessment," *East Africa Journal*, VI (June, 1969), pp. 15–17.

[82] This point was clarified in discussions with Professor Michael Lofchie. Moreover, as Ted Gurr notes, a regime's attempt to use coercive measures in dealing with widely perceived feelings of deprivation will necessitate the commitment of a high level of resources. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New In-

The implications of such revisions of priorities for racial minorities can be suggested only tentatively. A move toward the maintenance of the present system through additional coercion would likely mean that rich or highly-skilled non-Africans would continue for the time being to perform a vital role in achieving the country's economic objectives. Their security of mind might be lessened by the administration's increasing reliance upon the instruments of coercion and the steady inroads on the membership of the non-African communities brought about by accelerated Africanization policies. The functionally-significant Asian or European would still have an important contribution to make to economic growth. However, a shift from present Africanization programs and reliance upon non-African capital to a radical formula more in line with the aspirations of the politically mobilized segments of public opinion would weaken the minority hold on economic life. It would divest them of a number of presently performed functions, and thereby undermine vital immigrant claims for inclusion in African polities.

In the large, the non-Africans' increasing marginality would be a consequence of the egalitarian tendencies implicit in the industrial-commercial ethos they helped to carry into Africa. And the race-consciousness that they fostered would further weaken their position by undercutting the kind of legal-contractual environment essential to their survival on the perimeters of primarily African communities.

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dices," this Review, LXII (December, 1968), p. 1124.

THE ROLE OF THE M.P. IN TANZANIA*

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The study of politics in "developing" countries has tended to focus on the less formal organs of government, such as political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, and even the educational system.[1] National legislatures have often been ignored or rated of little significance in the political processes of these states.[2] This practice contrasts markedly with the attention paid to legislatures in Western states. The most obvious explanation for it is that legislatures in new states tend to have little influence. Important decisions and shifts in power are usually made or recorded elsewhere in the political system.

The *Bunge,* or National Assembly, of Tanzania is no exception to this general phenomenon. Nevertheless, an examination of the role of M.P.'s in Tanzania can be illuminating.[3] The *Bunge* contains most of the major political leaders and has, at least constitutionally, broad authority. As a consequence, if the Assembly is to be only a weak political body, then informal norms limiting the powers of the M.P.'s role must exist. Moreover, these norms should prescribe authority relationships between the legislature and other policy shaping bodies in the political system, particularly the Party. Thus, an analysis of the roles of these men can provide important insights not only into the functions of the *Bunge,* but also into the elite political culture of Tanzania and the pattern of politics which this culture supports.

I. POLITICAL ROLES

Roles are basic analytical units of political systems.[4] Political roles consist of a pattern of expected behavior for individuals holding particular positions in a system. In order to understand how a political culture operates so as to regulate not only overt activity but also to influence the pattern of ideas and subjective behavior, I have focused on a political role as the key agent of translation between the broad characteristics of culture and the discrete set of acts that constitute the political process. While some role expectations are always *ad hoc* and issue centered, others are of a general nature. The latter define general boundary rules of political roles, certain acts that are clearly wrong in the minds of most individuals. The institutionalization of rules in the political system is evidenced by a structured and interrelated set of norms for role behavior. Where these norms are weak or ambiguous, institutionalization not only of political roles, but of the political system itself, is at a low level.

The norms or rules shaping durable political roles involve system-level or macro processes. These norms determine the style and stability of politics in the system. This research, however, focuses heavily upon individuals and what has been termed microscopic role analysis.[5] Carefully examining the norms for an M.P. allows us to combine a micro analysis of a role in which the behavior of individuals can be studied, with a macro political analysis since the norms which operate to constrain the actions of the elite in this role are major components of the political culture and constitute some of the "rules of the game."

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* This is a revised and shortened version of a paper read at the African Studies Association meetings in Los Angeles in October, 1968. I am grateful to several colleagues at Swarthmore and elsewhere whose comments have been most helpful.

[1] See for example the six volumes edited by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics (published by Princeton Press, 1963–66) and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968).

[2] One exception to this trend is Frederick W. Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, 1965).

[3] The concept of role, as used here, refers to all the principal aspects of a role: the expectations of others, the orientations of the individual occupying the position, and the actual behavior of the individual. The congruence and consensus among these role aspects is a major focus of my investigation. This essay assumes the reader is generally familiar with the concept of "role" as used in this sense. See for reference, Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, editors, *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York, 1966). One example of a study of legislative behavior which relied heavily upon role analysis as a tool of research to reveal patterns of politics in four state legislatures is John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962).

[4] See David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 39–57.

[5] See Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), Chapters 10–12.

This study is based on interviews with M.P.'s and an analysis of their behavior in Assembly debates. It is divided into four sections: an examination of Assembly behavior, a characterization of various types of legislators, an exploration of role expectations for M.P.'s, and a conclusion. In the final section, four rules which emerge as basic norms for the role behavior of legislators are described and discussed. These rules elucidate a pattern of "closed" politics which characterizes the style of national politics in Tanzania.[6]

II. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

In 1961 Tanzania (then Tanganyika) became independent. Its constitution, modeled on the Westminster system, was replaced in 1962 by a new republican form of government with a popularly elected President. Again, in 1965, a year after the union with Zanzibar which officially formed Tanzania, another constitution was adopted. These changes brought formal legal codes closer to the actual patterns of decision-making which evolved after independence. A strong presidency has been established, and the Tanganyika African National Union, TANU, is now officially recognized as the only legal party.[7] The National Executive Committee of TANU (NEC) and the President's Cabinet are the main decision-makers in Tanzania; however, many members of these bodies are also M.P.'s.

The National Assembly, though originally modelled on the British parliamentary system, has never evidenced similar patterns of legislative functions. The most important reason for this is that no significant opposition organized along party lines ever existed in the legislature. From the first elections in1958/59, a *de facto* situation of one party dominance has existed. Party control was initially exercised through prior meetings of Parliament at closed sessions of the TANU Parliamentary Party (TPP). Since all members of the National Assembly were in the TPP, these closed meetings were often the real legislative forum.[8] In 1965, therefore, following the introduction of the one party state, the TPP was dissolved. Sensitive issues, however, are still discussed privately with legislators, and the government has not relinquished the notion of party discipline.

Assembly Behavior. Although their work in informal discussions, committee meetings (which are private), tours of their districts, meetings with constituents, and collaborations with members of the government are all important aspects of legislators' behavior, Assembly speeches are the only aspect of role behavior readily susceptible to systematic study. Assembly voting is only recorded following a call for a division, and there was only one division—on a trivial matter—called in the first five years of independence (through July, 1966). Voting behavior, consequently, is not a fruitful field for research.

Therefore, in order to understand the role of legislators within the assembly, a content analysis of the actual debates was made. Speeches for five one-year periods beginning with October, 1961 (just prior to independence) and ending with the June budget session in 1966 have been coded. In all, 15,421 speeches were analyzed. Each speech was coded according to five characteristics: subject, national or local orientation, position vis-a-vis the government, language, and length.[9] Since many short speeches were quick

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[6] This pattern of "closed" politics and the process by which it has developed are described in Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: A Study of Politics in Tanzania* (dissertation, Yale, 1968; Yale Press, forthcoming). References are to pages in the dissertation.

[7] For a readable review of the national political history of Tanzania, see J. Clagett Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika* (Stanford, 1963); and for an insightful analysis of the party and state machinery see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, 1967).

[8] One member, Chief Masanja, resigned from TANU to join the ANC in 1962. But this exception has proved unimportant.

[9] All speeches in the 1961/62 and 1965/66 periods have been coded; approximately 50% of the speeches in the intervening three years have been coded. Twenty-eight different subject categories, many related to ministerial divisions, such as agriculture or education, were used in coding subjects. Orientation was either national or local. The position of a speech could be one of four types: supportive (of the government's position), critical, neutral (if the speech was balanced or there was no official government position), and "demand" question-answer. This last category was used for many of the short questions and answers expressing and responding to demands or problems, usually local, raised by backbenchers. The language was Swahili or English (or in a few instances, mixed). Three length categories were used: short (0 to 1½ minutes), medium (1½ to 7 minutes) and long (more than 7 minutes). The coding procedures and tests for reliability are reported in



FIGURE 1. USE OF SWAHILI

questions and answers, and, therefore, different in quality from longer, more substantial contributions, speeches were also "weighted" for length, eliminating short speeches and counting long ones twice. Patterns among speeches document the trends in Assembly debate since independence.

Trends in Behavior. One striking trend is the introduction of "national" traditions. The quaintly irrelevant powdered wigs, still found in some African legislatures, were discarded in Tanzania in 1962. The Speaker, Chief Adam Sapi, adopted a traditional costume which he wore as Chief or Sultan of the Hehe. Western business suits have generally been abandoned in favor of more functional attire known as "national dress," which is a collarless shirt often worn with matching slacks. More important than these changes in dress has been the introduction of the national language, Swahili. Figure 1 charts the conversion of debates from English, originally the only official language, to Swahili, which became an additional official language in 1962. The use of Swahili has allowed many less well educated legislators to demonstrate articulateness and express their feelings in an idiom familiar not only to themselves but also to the vast majority of Tanzanians.

A second trend is the decline of speeches dealing with National issues. At the time of independence, a vast amount of legislation was placed before the Assembly. Major legislation in agriculture, education, local government elections, taxes, citizenship, and the new republican constitution were all discussed and passed by the Assembly in the first year of independence. Ninety-six government bills were passed, forty-four based on certificates of emergency which allowed the requirements for prior publication to be waived. In the midst of these efforts, little time was left for discussions or questions related to local or regional problems. But as the pace of legislation slackened, discussion of local issues

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Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 399–410. Intercoder reliability indicated an average of over 92% agreement.



FIGURE 2. DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL ISSUES



FIGURE 3. SUPPORTIVE SPEECHES

increased. Figure 2 illustrates that while the large majority of speeches are still nationally oriented, there has been a fairly steady decline in the per cent of speeches on national issues, except for a slight upswing in 1963/64, possibly explained by a renewal of national concerns following the army mutiny in January, 1964, and the Federation in April 1964.

Coincident with the changes in nationally oriented speeches has been the decline in both supportive and critical speeches. Among "weighted" addresses, however, there has been a general increase in support for the government from 1961 until 1965 followed by a marked decline after the 1965 elections. This pattern in supportive speeches is exactly the reverse of the pattern for critical speeches (Figure 4). Criticism of government policies, particularly among long speeches, was frequent in the early debates of the Assembly. It dropped steadily after independence and by the 1963/64 session it reached a nadir, probably reflecting the emphasis on unity following the army mutiny and the sudden events surrounding the union with Zanzibar. Assembly debates, although never marked by an active or systematic opposition, reached a point



FIGURE 4. CRITICAL SPEECHES

during this period where the absence of criticism made sessions largely ceremonial, and, as one Member described it, "rather boring."

An important conclusion which may be reached by examining the careers of those M.P.'s who were most critical is that no Member should become identified with a pattern of opposition. Only a few Members during the first two years of independence gave critical speeches 50% or more of the time. None has since. Those who did included Tumbo and Mkello, labor leaders who were subsequently placed in detention; Masanja, who, never a serious influence in the Assembly, defected to the A.N.C. (a miniscule opposition party) and has since retired from politics; and Siyovelwa and Mbogo, who, though loyal TANU members, did not stand for reelection. Both were appointed Area Commissioners, but Mbogo has been removed and imprisoned for theft. Thus none of those who were clearly and consistently critical or who opposed the government in the first five years has survived as a popular politician or M.P. Comparatively frequent criticism by an M.P. is often an indication of political ambition. For example, three M.P.'s who were initially quite critical, Mtaki, Wambura and Mponji, were made Junior Ministers and regularly entrusted with defending the government. In 1966, all expressed satisfaction with their careers and hoped to continue in their positions.[10] Two Englishmen, Short and LeMaitre, were also frequent critics. Both lost their seats in 1962 because they were not citizens.

In the new and expanded *Bunge*, elected in 1965, discussions have become considerably more lively. About every fourth or fifth speaker in the new Assembly who made a lengthy contribution was critical of the government. However, over twice as many speeches have been supportive. On balance, the legislative arena is still a forum in which the government's ideas and proposals are largely praised or defended and criticism is not systematic, let alone organized. Among those M.P.'s who were most critical according to the analysis of speeches in the 1965/66 period, nine had lost their Assembly seats for political reasons by December, 1968, either by virtue of having been expelled from the Party or due to political detention or exile.[11] Mwakitwange, for example, in July, 1968, accused the government of "tribalism," "nepotism" and slowing the pace of Africanization. He was expelled from the Party three months later.[12] Eli Anangisye, former Secretary of the TANU Youth League, and F. L. Masha, who had been national publicity secretary for TANU, were among those expelled.

The analysis of Assembly behavior indicates that while M.P.'s have adopted national dress and speech, thereby making the *Bunge* more of an indigenous institution, the role of the M.P. in the actual legislative process is quite minor. Seldom is legislation altered by committee or Assembly action. Although criticism of the government has increased following the 1965 elections, it tends not to be directed toward critical or sensitive matters,[13] and those M.P.'s who have been noticeably or consistently critical tend to have had their political careers shortened.

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[10] Mtaki, however, who had attracted attention by his flamboyant style and recitation of Marxist principles, retired from politics in 1967 to enter private business. Another frequent critic, Buhatwa, was also made a Junior Minister but he lost in the 1965 elections and became an administrator in the Ministry of Housing.

[11] Anangisye and Kambona lost their seats due to missing three sessions of the Assembly. Anangisye was in detention and Kambona in political exile. Kambona was not an Assembly critic, but in private he was often highly critical.

[12] See *The Nationalist,* July 11, 1968, and December 10, 1968, p. 1.

[13] An analysis of topics discussed in the 1965/66 Assembly revealed that criticism and support were not evenly distributed. For instance, on many of the twenty-eight subjects into which speeches were categorized, not a single critical speech was given. The most heavily criticized legislative topics (in over ten per cent of speeches) were elections, housing and labor unions. In contrast, military affairs received no criticism and was supported in 76% of the speeches on the subject. This is in marked contrast to the first year of independence when only 40% of the speeches supported military policy and 28% were critical. The lack of criticism in these areas reflects pressures, not organized by any individual or even by the Party, but rather, generated by latent political norms which dictate that delicate and controversial subjects are either best avoided or commented upon only in a constructive manner.

A factor analysis of these debates in 1965/1966 revealed the most prominent dimension as a "Security-Sovereignty" factor including issues such as foreign policy, Party, constitutional matters, the military and questions of national unity. This factor explained 27.8% of the variance among the 28 subject variables. High loading subjects accounted for 20% of all speeches. The factor scores for legislators on this dimension correlated highly, .68 with a high frequency of supportive speeches. See Hopkins, *op. cit.,* pp. 229–230.

III. LEGISLATIVE TYPES

Individual attitudes of M.P.'s are, perhaps, the most instructive evidence as to the role which the political system in Tanzania is creating for legislators. In order to investigate the attitudes relevant to the legislator's role, a random sample of Tanzanian political elite was interviewed: 58 *Wabunge* (out of 184 then in the Assembly) and 50 high level government administrators. These interviews were conducted between April and August, 1966. The interviews with M.P.'s averaged about two hours each and covered a variety of topics, including the individual's background, his attitudes toward democracy and African socialism, his conception of his job as an M.P., and his expectations about what he or others would do in a number of hypothetical role situations.[14]

During the course of interviewing, I began to recognize several types of legislators. Later, by analyzing the sample carefully, four "types" of legislators were identified, based largely upon differences in career length, mode of selection, and the special obligation of those in government posts. Eighteen of the fifty-eight M.P.'s interviewed held positions as Ministers, Junior Ministers, or Regional Commissioners. Of these eighteen government members, fifteen began their political careers prior to 1958. This long involvement and the relative success of this group in politics resulted in my labeling these fifteen "Politicos." All but one served in the first parliament of independent Tanzania from 1960 to 1965.

The forty-three other legislators interviewed fell largely into three groups—"Locals," "Intellectuals," and "Silent Partners." Intellectuals were better educated, more widely read, more interested in politics as a profession and career, seem more intellectually involved with questions of national policy. Ten legislators met these criteria and nine were categorized as "Intellectuals."[15] Of the remaining 33 legislators in the sample, 26 were constituency representatives. Twenty-five were categorized as "Locals."[16] Locals represented a constituency, were often from the majority tribe of their area and were usually born in their constituency. Six of the remaining seven legislators, three of whom are government members with short careers, have been labeled "Silent Partners." All of these members were appointed rather than elected to the Assembly. Their experience in the Assembly and in TANU (though not necessarily Zanzibar) politics was short, and one may conveniently think of them as quiet (for, as will appear shortly, they seldom spoke) supporters of the government, hence the title "Silent Partners." If more Zanzibaris had been sampled, this group would be larger.[17]

Table 1 contains basic background information on these legislative types. Differences in education, newspaper reading, type of membership, career length, and position in the government, all of which are quite different among the groups, illustrate the distinctions among these four types of legislators. Politicos and Intellectuals are the best educated and read. Except for the distinction of government membership, these two groups are the most alike. Politics is especially important for individuals in both of these groups. The greatest portion of their life activity is taken up with public matters, particularly meeting other politicians, talking and dealing with them. In contrast, Locals spend a greater portion of their time in home constituencies, often travelling and speaking with their fellow citizens or tending farms or businesses. Many Locals, while active in politics, were also occupied with some other employment prior to their election for the first time in 1965. Most Locals were born in their constituency while Politicos tend to be born outside of their constituency and not to be members of the major or majority tribe. Locals also tend to have won their seats by a narrower margin than either Intellectuals

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[14] Informal interviews with a number of other National Assembly Members, including Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa and Assembly Speaker Adam Sapi Mkwawa, were also used in this study. A statement of the interview format used in the interviews may be found in Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–375. Those interviewed are not identified since anonymity was promised.

[15] The term "intellectual" is applied in the general sense suggested by Edward Shils in his article, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of New States," *World Politics*, XII (April, 1960), 329–368. In order to operationalize these distinctions, which emerged initially from subjective analysis of the interviews, legislators with college degrees or post-secondary education and who read widely were selected as "Intellectuals." One M.P. with a college degree has been excluded from this typology because he did not fit the basic characteristics of either "Intellectuals" or "Locals." He did not represent a constituency, had not given a single speech in the National Assembly and had no interest in a political career. His work, in fact, often kept him out of the country.

[16] The twenty-sixth, the Deputy Speaker, is the only nongovernmental member in the sample serving his second term. He was excluded from the typology.

[17] The seventh legislator remaining, a National Member, did not fit this or any other category.

TABLE 1. BACKGROUNDS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=6$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s Interviewed ($N=58$)
Age:					
35 or under	44%	48%	17%	13%	34%
36–40	11	16	0	33	19
41–45	11	24	17	47	28
46 or over	33	12	67	7	19
Religion:					
Protestant	44%	44%	50%	47%	45%
Catholic	44	20	0	27	24
Muslim	11	24	50	27	26
Education:					
Less than secondary school	0%	64%	50%	27%	41%
Secondary school	0	20	33	20	19
Post-secondary	56	16	0	20	21
College or better	44	0	17	33	19
Newspaper Reading:					
High	100%	20%	50%	100%	59%
Low	0	80	50	0	41
Terms Served:					
One	100%	96%	67%	7%	67%
One and part of second	0	4	33	0	5
Two	0	0	0	93	28
Locals/Politicos $X^2=35.9$*					
Career Length:					
Began political activity—1958 or before	44%	20%	50%	100%	47%
After 1958	56	80	50	0	53
Locals/politicos $X^2=20.9$*					
Type of Membership:					
Elected	67%	100%	0%	60%	71%
National Member	33	0	0	0	9
Nominated	0	0	17	7	3
Zanzibar—Appointed	0	0	33	0	3
Zanzibar—Rev. Council	0	0	17	0	2
Regional Commissioner	0	0	33	33	12
Member of Government:					
Yes	0%	0%	50%	100%	31%
No	100	100	50	0	69
Party Position:					
N.E.C.	11%	4%	50%†	47%	21%
Party office or job	22	48	0	53	38
Just member	67	48	0	0	36
Locals/Politicos $X^2=15.8$*					

* These Chi-squares (X^2) are significant at the .01 level.

† Two of three Members from Zanzibar had high posts in the ASP equivalent to N.E.C. positions; if these three Zanzibaris are included, the column reads: 83, 0, 17.

TABLE 2. ECONOMIC VIEWS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=6$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s Interviewed ($N=58$)
Pace of Change:					
Too fast	11%	20%	0%	20%	16%
About right	44	72	100	47	66
Too slow	33	8	0	33	17
African Socialism as a Concept:					
Misleading	89%	4%	17%	20%	22%
Uncertain	11	36	17	33	28
Good expression	0	32	33	47	33
African Socialism Defined:					
True socialism—Good thing	56%	8%	0%	47%	26%
African tradition—Good	0	64	33	27	38
True socialism—Bad thing	33	0	0	7	7
African tradition—Bad	11	4	0	7	7

Locals/Politicos $X^2=10.2$*

Percentages do not add to 100%, indicating some respondents did not answer.

* This Ch-square is significant at the $p<.05$ level.

or Politicos. Silent Partners have no established constituencies. Outside the Assembly their efforts are largely administrative, either as agents of the government or as Party officers.

Economic Views. The responses of the various legislative types toward questions about economic issues are reported in Table 2. Intellectuals and Politicos were least content with the preesnt rate of change. Relatively large numbers in these groups favored either a slower or faster rate of change.

Moreover, not one of the Intellectuals expressed satisfaction with the term African Socialism as a "concept"; eight out of nine disliked it. In contrast, the other three groups indicated ambivalent support for the idea. Forty-seven per cent of the Politicos, two of the six Silent Partners, and thirty-two per cent of the Locals felt the term was a useful, helpful or clear expression.

The evident distaste among Intellectuals for "African Socialism" is reflected in the different emphasis with which they defined the term. Five out of nine defined it as true or scientific socialism and saw this as a positive or desirable goal; three interpreted it similarly, but evaluated it negatively. Only one Intellectual understood African Socialism as an outgrowth of traditional African practice and he opposed such a policy. Locals, in sharp distinction to Intellectuals, tended to hold the view that African tradition is the basis for socialism and they looked favorably on this idea. Only two of the Silent Partners elaborated their views on African socialism—largely an indication of their unwillingness to assert themselves on ideological matters. Definitions among Politicos varied widely, but were closest to those held by Intellectuals.

These "economic" attitudes among legislators further indicate the similarity among Intellectuals and Politicos. Sentiments of dissatisfaction were expressed most often by individuals in these two groups. Thus, Intellectuals and Politicos differ largely in that Politicos are the successful politicians in high government posts while Intellectuals, as openly indicated by several, are eager to acquire the power of Politicos. Such ambition can have important consequences. Since these interviews were completed, *four of the Intellectuals have been expelled from the Party and three have been promoted to ministerial positions.*

Assembly Behavior of Legislative Types. The performance of these four legislative types in the Assembly provides further clues into the role behavior of various members. Different types of members behaved differently and this suggests they were responding to different expectations—fostered either by their own personality, by differentiated socialization or by special external constraints such as apply to Politicos who are in the government.

The distribution of legislative types according to the per cent of their own Assembly speeches

TABLE 3. ASSEMBLY BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES†

	% of each legislator's speeches in 1965/66				
	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=15$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s Interviewed* ($N=56$)
Nationally Oriented:					
0 to 59.9%	0%	36%	20%	27%	25%
60% to 79.9%	44	40	20	33	36
80% and above	56	24	60	40	39
Total $X^2=6.8$					
Supportive:‡					
0 to 9.9%	0%	32%	0%	53%	30%
10% to 19.9%	67	32	0	27	32
20% and above	33	36	100	20	38
Critical:‡					
0 to 4.9%	0%	12%	60%	80%	36%
5% to 9.9%	33	40	40	7	28
10% and above	67	48	0	13	36
Locals/Politicos $X^2=18.6$**					

† Speeches were broken into three roughly equal intervals *among all 184 M.P.s.*

* Two M.P.s interviewed gave no speeches.

** This Chi-square is significant at the $p<.001$ level, but see footnote 18.

‡ Supportive and Critical are only two of four possible categories for speeches with respect to the government's position. The other two are neutral and non-neutral question-answer.

which were nationally oriented, supportive and critical are reported in Table 3. Intellectuals are the most nationally oriented in their speeches, Locals the most locally oriented. Both Silent Partners and Intellectuals were supportive compared to Politicos who devoted the least per cent of their speaking time to defending or supporting the government. This relatively small proportion of time given by Politicos to government support is a strong indication of the generalized support which is expected and received from other M.P.'s, and which relieves Politicos of the need continually to defend government policy.

While the per cent of critical speeches given by M.P.'s is low among all legislators,[19] Intellectuals were the most critical group. Locals were also critical; few Politicos and Silent Partners were ever critical. However, two Politicos, both Regional Commissioners (a high Party and government post), are found in the highest third of those giving critical speeches. This deviation is one of the most striking instances of role ambiguity to be found among legislators. Most Regional Commissioners, including these two high scorers, were Members of the Assembly elected in 1960. As constituency representatives originally, their initial role behavior included making frequent critical comments on government positions. However, following their appointment as Regional Commissioners, a new set of role expectations was imposed. Ambiguities about their role were reflected in the differing interpretations given by the several Regional Commissioners interviewed. Four saw their principal function as legislators as similar to Ministers and Junior Ministers, namely, explaining and defending government policy. Two emphasized their spe-

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[18] In most cases the N was too small to meet the standard requirements of an expected frequency of five in each cell for the X^2 test. Rather than collapse cell categories to avoid this, it seemed better to keep distinctions which I believed had analytical importance and to present only the appropriate X^2's. However, many differences are large enough to be statistically significant if the cell size requirement were relaxed. See Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), p. 221.

[19] Members were divided into three roughly equal groups. To do this, it was necessary to collapse critical percentages so that all those for whom 10% or more of their speeches were critical became the "most critical" group.

cial responsibilities as representatives of the region for which they were Commissioner. One of these suggested his job was to "help the M.P.'s from my region explain our needs and problems." Finally, one Commissioner confessed that he felt unsure about his role obligations as an Assembly Member and simply did not know to what extent he was free to express his own opinions.

These ambiguities explain why the pattern of Assembly criticism among legislators is not more symmetrical. Although Intellectuals and Locals tend to be the most critical and Silent Partners and Politicos the least critical, personal predilections, previous role experience as a legislator, and ambiguity of role definitions—most noticeable among Regional Commissioners—account for interesting variations from this pattern. Deviants are frequently found in legislative assemblies; what is interesting is how well they fare.[20] In the case of the two Politicos who occasionally made critical speeches, both have lost their Assembly membership, though the shift of one of these men from his role as Regional Commissioner was into another important post.

IV. ROLE EXPECTATIONS

The role orientations of an M.P. in Tanzania are affected by both official statements and by the subjective views of other *Wabunge*. These role expectations form the norms which shape role behavior. Consensus among these expectations strengthens norms. Agreement between the dominant expectations among M.P.'s and the views expressed by government officialdom would indicate low conflict over "rules of the game." In order to explore the degree of agreement or conflict between official expectations and those subjectively held by M.P.'s, official statements and interview responses have been examined and compared.

Official Expectations. The role of a Member of Parliament as envisaged by President Nyerere involves three tasks: "1) To act as a bridge . . . between people and government for transmission of ideas; 2) to deliberate on new legislation; 3) to keep the government actively devoted to the people's interest by intelligent criticism."[21] These views, as expressed by Nyerere in a speech to the newly elected National Assembly in October, 1965, represent one important change in the official description of an M.P.'s responsibilities outlined by Nyerere in September, 1960, prior to independence: the abandonment of a right to criticize government policy at public or private meetings in his constituency.[22]

Members have been criticized by national leaders for failing to play effectively at least two of the three aspects of their role. Nyerere reminded new legislators that one of the obvious lessons in the defeat of many incumbents in the 1965 elections was their failure to keep in touch with their constituencies, to find out what their problems were, and to help people to understand what was being done and why.[23] The other criticism directed toward Members by official channels has been their failure to make more than minimal use of their prerogative to criticize in the Assembly. The Commission which studied the establishment of a one party state, for example, wrote:

> With a few notable exceptions, debates in the National Assembly have tended to be lifeless and superficial. Legislation of the most complex and far reaching kind is passed rapidly through all the stages without challenge to basic principles or careful examination of detailed provisions.[24]

Nyerere felt it was "fortunate" that a few Members disregarded the 'Party line' from time to time to express their own views, even though they were rebuked for their lapse from Party discipline. According to his conception, questions of detail, timing and priority should be openly discussed and debated in a one party state.[25] Intelligent criticism, according to Nyerere, "is vital." It is possible for Nyerere to envision circumstances in which the National Assembly might disagree with the National Executive of TANU or the government.

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[20] Ralph K. Huitt has analyzed the costs of deviancy in the U.S. Senate. See his "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 566–575.

[21] J. K. Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly after the General Election," (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, October 12, 1965), no pagination.

[22] As cited in Tordoff, "Parliament in Tanzania," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (July, 1965).

[23] Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly."

[24] The report blamed practices inherited from the British more appropriate to a two party system for the lack of vigor in Assembly debates. In the British party system, private party caucuses and party whips to enforce discipline were accepted procedures essential to maintain the unity upon which the party in power depended for its control of the legislative process. Thus the TPP and the National Executive Committee provided private forums for prior discussions of policy and legislative matters. These prior discussions, the report concluded, inevitably have "inhibited subsequent discussion on the floor of the house." *Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 20, 21.

[25] Julius K. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System" (Dar es Salaam: the Standard Press, 1963), p. 6.

> Occasionally there will be a division of opinion about the desirability of a particular piece of legislation. In such cases, provided that both sides are honest and are able to advance arguments to support their views, people will be better served by reconsideration of the proposal than by an automatic affirmative vote.[26]

This view, however, leaves ambiguous the question of in what situations opposition would be legitimate. Moreover, Nyerere himself has affirmed that broader questions of policy should be the responsibility of the National Executive of the Party, and not subject to legislative debate.[27] Thus, according to "official" views, although the legislator may express criticism, it must be constructive, and not be in opposition to policies already decided upon by the NEC.

Legislators' Expectations. In order to see how close legislators' own role expectations were to the "official" ones, the sampled M.P.'s were asked to describe their responsibilities as a Member of the National Assembly. Their responses emphasized all the role duties contained in official expectations. A few even made specific reference to speeches by Nyerere or Second Vice-President Kawawa about their duties. One M.P., for example, an Intellectual, gave this explanation about his role:

> For an M.P., there are three tasks, as the President stated in his speech last October. First, I must represent the electorate, get their ideas and bring these views to the Parliament and advise the government. Second, I must get something from the government for the people. And third, I can advise the government on my own ideas and criticize constructively.

This interpretation of the President's expectations is not quite complete, since it omits the obligation of an M.P. to work in his constituency explaining government policy, but it indicates the process whereby official expectations shape expectations of role incumbents.

Most respondents mentioned several different duties. The most frequently mentioned, by 77% of the legislators, was work within the constituency. Bringing constituency needs and demands before the government was the second most frequently mentioned role task. Two other aspects of the legislator's role, as lawmaker and as critic of the government, were mentioned rather infrequently by only 21% and 17% respectively. The different frequency with which these four tasks are mentioned is an indicator of the emphasis which the political system tends to place on these duties. Participating in the legislative process or being a gadfly of the government is seldom a part of legislators' own conceptions of their role. Much more important is their work in the constituency, explaining government policy, encouraging and helping in nation building activities, and carrying problems and complaints from constituents to the government. The role emerging for an M.P. in Tanzania emphasizes his function as a communicator rather than either a deliberator or law-maker.

Those M.P.'s who participate in decision-making do so largely in their special position as members of the government. Ministers, for example, are normally involved in the preparation of legislation which is fully drafted and published before most members ever see it. In response to the question: "What is the *most important* aspect of your work?," most Politicos and Silent Partners cited either being members of the government and hence involved in planning and directing government activity, or being high officials in the Party, responsible for organizing and directing Party affairs (see Table 4). Locals tended to stress their work with their constituents; 52% felt that explaining to their constituents government policy and national affairs was their most important task, while 24% mentioned promoting their constituency interests to the government. Even among Intellectuals, five out of nine (56%) mention constituency related activity, but of these, the emphasis is on promoting constituency needs rather than on defending government policies. Intellectuals also emphasized legislative work and criticism. The following are typical replies of *Wabunge* concerning the most important aspect of their role.

The pattern of expectations and role emphasis in these responses is generally compatible with official expectations. The lack of expertise and specialization among legislators and the weakly articulated performance of legislative committees was reflected by the few legislators who emphasized legislation or criticism as the main aspect of their role.

Role Consensus. Three open-ended questions about political contingencies were used as a measure of role consensus. Each question explored some aspect of a legislator's relationship to the total political process. Responses to these questions (by both the M.P.'s and high-level ad-

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[26] Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly," p. 6.

[27] Julius K. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

TABLE 4. ROLE DEFINITION OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=5$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s Interviewed ($N=58$)
Most Important Aspect of Role:					
Promote Constituency	33%	24%	0%	0%	16%
Legislate	22	4	17	0	7
Criticize	11	4	0	0	3
Explain to Constituency	22	52	17	13	33
As Member of Government	0	8	33	53	21
Party Activity	0	0	17	33	10

Promoting Constituency:

To take the people's problems and difficulties to the government and get the government to solve them. (A Local)

Legislate:

Keeping the pressure on the government for development and making sure that we go ahead. (An Intellectual)

Party Affairs:

To see that the Party is well organized, administered, and its committees are functioning well, and that people are participating. (A Politico)

Explaining Government Policy:

To tell the people government policy and make them understand. (A Local)

To get the people to obey the government and to let them know the government policy. (Silent Partner)

ministrators who were interviewed) have been grouped into three categories from weak to strong. Written responses by Tanzanian University students to the same questions are reported in conjunction with this discussion.[28]

In an open competitive political system, controversial questions and policies may be subject to widespread debate and criticism. There is a public character to discussion, debate and political differences, and instances of corruption or internecine feuding regularly take place on a public stage in which the principal performers appeal for support for their views or findings. The extent to which politics is open and public is an important variable in Tanzanian politics. Norms which prescribe the boundaries within which the legislator may pursue his own or his constituents' interests are investigated by these three questions. The extent to which a legislator is expected to voice opposition publicly, to denounce instances of corruption, and to feel capable, in a controversy with TANU leaders, to carry the disagreement into broader national arenas are indicated by the legislators' responses.

The first question asked: "If the government introduces a measure before the legislature which you are personally against and which you feel your constituents would not like, what would you do?"[29] Examples of the different types of response selected from interviews are:

Weak: He should go to see the Minister concerned and talk with him. Possibly he hasn't seen the measure correctly or perhaps people at home have concocted a story to give people fear. In this case he must explain it to them. (A Politico)

Moderate: I would oppose it, but if the majority are in favor of it I'll throw in my lot with them and then I will tell my constituency that I, with the rest of the Parliament, passed it, and give them reasons why we did so. (A Local)

Strong: Go to the relevant committee; try to stop it by convincing other M.P.'s. Then raise hell in the Parliament if I have to. Perhaps I would try to make an amendment. (An Intellectual)

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[28] See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 376–384 for information about the questionnaire and sample.

[29] For legislators who were members of the government, and hence constrained in their M.P. role, these questions were phrased in the third person and their expectations about the behavior of a backbencher were solicited. Written versions, shown to administrators, were similarly in the third person.

TABLE 5. ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=6$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s ($N=58$)	Administrators ($N=50$)	Total Elite ($N=108$)	University Students ($N=112$)
Response to Government Bill Felt Wrong:								
Weak	11%	8%	33%	20%	14%	12%	13%	6%
Moderate	22	72	67	60	57	38	46	5
Strong	67	20	0	20	29	48	38	89
			Leg/Adm $X^2=3.9$ Elite/Students $X^2=61.8$*					
Response to Corruption:								($N=102$)
Weak	11%	4%	0%	0%	4%	4%	4%	26%
Moderate	44	68	67	73	66	80	72	39
Strong	44	38	17	20	28	14	21	35
			Leg/Adm $X^2=3.1$ Elite/Students $X^2=31.2$*					
Response to Party Ouster:								($N=91$)
Weak	22%	40%	17%	33%	31%	18%	25%	20%
Moderate	56	40	83	67	52	46	50	13
Strong	22	20	0	0	17	34	25	67
			Leg/Adm $X^2=4.6$ Elite/Students $X^2=39.5$*					

* These Chi-squares (X^2) are significant at the .05 level.

The second role question asked what an M.P. would do if he suspected corruption was occurring in some Ministry. Responses to this question tended to fall into categories of passivity or hesitancy to act (weak); reporting the suspicion privately to a Minister, the President or the Commission of Inquiry (moderate); or willingness to raise the issue openly in the Assembly (strong). There was a high degree of consensus on the "moderate" response.

Party membership is a requisite of membership in the Assembly. The third question asked: "If local TANU leaders disagreed with you and informed you they had expelled you from the Party, what would you do?" In fact, local Party officials do not, according to the TANU Constitution, have the authority to expel Party members. A bare majority of legislators (52%) gave moderate responses indicating that local officials did not have this power. Nearly a third felt that they would have to accept the Party's decision, perhaps even resign (indicating a weak response). A small group (17%) gave a strong response and indicated they would fight out their differences with local officials or would publicly appeal the decision to higher and broader arenas in the national Party.

The distribution of responses to these three questions suggests at least partial agreement among elites on these important role aspects. By calculating the variance of responses on these items, a rough indication of the degree of consensus among elite was obtained. The variances of the three items were .458, .224, and .500, indicating greater consensus than a situation of role ambiguity in which there would be equal distribution of responses and a variance of .670.[30]

The responses for these three questions among legislative types are contained in Table 5. Intellectuals, followed by Locals, consistently gave "stronger" responses than Silent Partners or Politicos. Legislators' and administrators' role expectations were distributed in a fairly similar fashion, while students were more aggressive in their definitions of the role. The students expected a stronger, more assertive role for M.P.'s than current members of the political elite. This difference in attitude may have also been reflected in the willingness of Tanzanian students to publicly protest National Service legislation which affected them. Six months after the responses were recorded, in October, 1966, 393 students (mostly from the University College) were expelled as a result of the protest demonstrations. These students were readmitted only after several steps had been taken to insure students would conform to the prevalent political norms.[31]

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[30] See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, for the use of variance as a measure of consensus, pp. 393–94. This measure has been recommended by Neal Gross, *et al.*, p. 107.

[31] See Raymond F. Hopkins and Neal Sherman, "Students and Politics in Tanzania," in Seymour M. Lipset and William J. Hanna (eds.), *Students and Politics in Africa* (forthcoming Basic Books).

TABLE 6. ROLE CONGRUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals ($N=9$)	Locals ($N=25$)	Silent Partners ($N=6$)	Politicos ($N=15$)	All M.P.s ($N=58$)	Administrators ($N=50$)	Elite Total ($N=108$)
Legislative:							
High	22%	16%	33%	60%	29%	38%	33%
Medium	33	64	50	13	41	24	33
Low	44	20	17	27	29	38	33
Locals/Politicos $X^2=11.1$*							
Average: (Three roles)							
High	22%	28%	33%	53%	33%	34%	33%
Medium	11	60	50	20	37	36	37
Low	67	12	17	27	30	30	30
Locals/Politicos $X^2=6.1$*							

* These Chi-squares are significant at the $p<.05$ level. (See footnote 18).

The question on party expulsion revealed that legislators were not clear about the possible consequences. Some felt expulsion would not affect one's status as an M.P.; others correctly foresaw this as one method to remove a deviant M.P. from the Assembly. The confusion is illustrated in the response of a Politico:

> A branch official can't expel him. Expulsion is only by the National Conference and he would still be an Mbunge, although he should resign due to the lack of confidence in him. But the National Conference can't expel him from the Parliament.

This is not quite accurate since the NEC has expelled members from the Party and this does result in loss to an M.P. of his seat. However, such responses indicate that some M.P.'s conceived of an independent status for *Wabunge*—an importance apart from that of the Party. The consequences of Party expulsion were not well understood, even by some important political leaders. This confusion serves to underline ambiguity in role expectations in a new state like Tanzania. The subsequent expulsion of nine members in October-December, 1968 has no doubt clarified these expectations considerably.

Role Congruence. Average standard scores have been used as a measure of the congruence (C) of each legislator's expectations on these three items. Legislators whose expectations are near the mean of expectations among all elite received high C scores.[32] Table 6 shows the relative congruence among legislative types. It also presents their congruence on ten role expectation items, which include five items relating to Presidential role behavior and two items about administrators' behavior. *Intellectuals are the least congruent in their expectations; Politicos, the most congruent.* Locals are somewhat less congruent in their expectations than the average. Differences among the groups are significant. As mentioned earlier, of the nine Intellectuals interviewed, four—*all* with low congruence—have been removed from the National Assembly by means of expulsion from the Party.

The responses of those who are high on both legislative and average role congruence express expectations which, according to our analysis, are "normative." These expectations clearly tend to prevent the M.P. from acting in a divisive manner. The response of one Politico with a very high C score is illustrative.

> If an M.P. dislikes a particular piece of legislation, he should first see the Minister and tell him; try to get it altered. The Minister may work through the Cabinet until all are prepared to accept some other version. Finally, and only if necessary, he should raise it in Parliament. If it is passed, however, he'll just have to support it or resign.

Such expectations tend to conform to the official expectations outlined earlier. This similarity

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[32] This is accomplished by the formula

$$C_i = \sum_{j}^{NI} [2 - |(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_j)| / S_j]/NI$$

where

NI = the number of items

S_j = the standard deviation of the jth item, and

X_{ij} = 0, 1, or 2 according to a weak, moderate, or strong role expectation by the ith respondent.

suggests that institutionalization of a pattern of closed politics is occurring, and that there is little conflict over rules of the game for legislators.[33]

In fact, "congruent" expectations are not only close to "officially" stated expectations but also contain somewhat more restrained role boundaries for the public behavior of M.P.'s than those outlined by the President.[34]

V. RULES FOR LEGISLATORS

Four rules or norms for legislative behavior, based on my analysis of the role expectations for legislators, can be stated which make clear some of the major characteristics of the Tanzanian "style" of politics. These rules, along with others governing the political action of government administrators, journalists, party bureaucrats and other political actors, tend to support the emergent elite political culture of "closed politics."[35]

RULE 1: A legislator may express criticism or opposition to a government policy only on practical grounds, not on principle.

This rule stresses the maintenance of unity and ideological solidarity. It represents a point made by Nyerere in several of his speeches. It was affirmed by a number of the legislators during their interviews, most notably the Politicos.

RULE 2: An M.P. may not publicly oppose a policy decision decided in the Party's National Executive Committee (NEC).

This rule, though closely related to the first, is an important addition. Distinguishing between practical opposition and opposition which has an ideological bent and is flatly contradictory to government policy is not an easy task. For example, in June, 1966, the question of nationalization was suggested by several Members. In a brief debate, at least one Member who argued against nationalization pointed out that it was the policy of the government to "encourage more the establishment of private industries."[36] However, in January, 1967, the NEC adopted the Arusha Declaration which called upon the government to further implement "the policy of socialism," by extending its control of the major means of production.[37] Two weeks later, when Parliament was asked to vote on five bills which would effect the recommended nationalization, these bills received the unanimous support of Members "who, one after another, took the floor to deliver militant speeches commending the Party, the government and the correct leadership of President Nyerere."[38] Rule 2, moreover, is not only visible in practice but several M.P.s explicitly articulated this obligation. "If the NEC has passed it, then the Members must support it," stated one Politico.

This second rule has an important effect upon the style of Tanzanian politics. Critics of government policy who want more rapid change and abandonment of present policies are enabled to announce publicly their views. For example, Michael Kamaliza, then Minister for Labor and Secretary-General of the government-regulated national trade union, NUTA, in addressing the fifth general council on December 27, 1966, made a strong plea for the government to move forward in the study of socialism and criticized high salaries in private industry and government's policy of encouraging private investment.[39] His speech was a full month before the Arusha Declaration which moved the country in this direction. Once policy has been decided in the NEC, however, and specific statements are endorsed, then criticism or opposition such as Kamaliza and others declared publicly, would be considered a violation of this rule. This tends to rule out almost all criticism by "conservative" spokesmen since prior NEC decisions tend to foreclose future options in this direction. When the closed, though by all accounts stormy, NEC meetings resolve an issue, this at once becomes a signal for the end of further controversy or discussion and the initiation of praise and rededication to the Party's policy decisions.

A corollary also follows from this rule, namely, that the M.P.'s role as legislator is subordinate to his role as Party member. "TANU is supreme—even above the government," Second Vice-President Kawawa told Parliament.[40]

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[33] Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, Chapter One, discusses the importance of coherence for political institutionalization. Congruence between sets of expectations should be an important indicator of institutionalization. See Raymond F. Hopkins, "Political Roles and Political Institutionalization," an unpublished paper read at the American Political Science Association Meetings, September 2, 1969. Moreover, the variance indicative of consensus among role expectations for M.P.'s was markedly lower, .394, than among elite role expectations for the President (.519) or for administrators (.521).

[34] One M.P., an Intellectual, now expelled from the Party and the Assembly, claimed that Nyerere's expectations created opportunities for dissent. He stated: "You know, I like to make a lot of noise in the Assembly and I often disagree. President Nyerere is the only one who understands the need for this. If it weren't for him, they'd never let me get away with it."

[35] See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, for rules regarding the role of President and administrator.

[36] *Standard*, June 24, 1966.

[37] *Nationalist*, February 6, 1967.

[38] *Nationalist*, February 15, 1967.

[39] *Nationalist*, December 28, 1966. Kamaliza has since been dropped from his post.

One illustration of the Party's potency compared with that of the Assembly is through a specific comparison of the NEC with the *Bunge*. In a survey among the Dar es Salaam electorate, people were asked: "Which do you think has more influence in the way our government is run: the National Assembly or the National Executive Committee of TANU?" Thirty-four per cent said the *Bunge*, 40% the NEC, and 11% felt they were about equal.[41] The same question, when asked of twenty-nine M.P.'s during their interviews, revealed that every member of the government (eleven) stated that the NEC was the more important organ. One Politico, a member of the NEC, replied to this question:

> It's hard to say. Legally, I suppose, the National Assembly is, but in fact, I think the NEC. These fellows can discuss and air their views here and are free to speak inside the hall; but once they step outside these four walls, they will learn that there are others who have more power. If M.P.'s aren't careful, the Party can discipline them. And they'll have to recall their decisions since the Party has control over them.

Among those not in the government, sixty-seven per cent (12 of 18) felt the National Assembly was more powerful. Reluctance to acknowledge the paramountcy of the NEC was predominantly found among Locals.[42]

RULE 3: An M.P. may oppose government policy in Party discussions or within the Assembly before the Assembly votes, but if the policy is passed, he must support it among his constituents.

This rule emerged directly from the role expectation concerning opposition to a government policy. It closely resembles the classic formulation by Lenin of "democratic centralism." The rule encompasses the many bills whose details have been drawn up by the government, and not the NEC. Discussion of this sort of legislation, as well as numerous embarrassing questions, may be raised in the Assembly, and, following the election of September, 1965, criticism of this nature has increased.[43] But once the measure has passed, the M.P. must support it. He may not publicly voice his criticism to his constituents. The possible consequences for M.P.'s violating this formal dictum were outlined by Second Vice-President Kawawa in Parliament itself. He discussed legislation which would make it unlawful for a person to foment discontent or ill will for "unlawful purposes" and pointed out that such criticisms as those contrary to government plans would "be going against TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party. . . . All members here are members of TANU and Afro-Shirazi Party, and there is a special procedure of dealing with any problem in a Party way."[44]

Withholding one's own views, if they conflict with a decided policy, amounts to a type of secrecy. Thus, a necessary adjunct to Rules 2 and 3 is that information about political cleavages ought not to be discussed publicly. This secrecy is an important norm for not only legislators, but all elite.

A revealing instance of how this rule works is the case of Oscar Kambona, former Minister and Party Secretary-General. Although Kambona fled Tanzania in July, 1967, and apparently engaged in actions of a questionable nature, it was not until weeks later, when he publicly attacked other TANU and government officials, that President Nyerere and the Party press took open action against him. The sin by which Kambona finally apparently triggered official counter attacks was his public discussion of political cleavages.

Unfortunately there is an almost irrational quality to these prescriptions for a closed politics. Leaders are warned that it is sinful to reveal Party or state secrets; articles in the *Na-*

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[40] *Nationalist*, June 12, 1966.

[41] This study is reported in Lionel Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy* (Nairobi, 1967) in chapter 12 by Kenneth Prewitt and Goran Hyden.

[42] A revealing incident occurred on one occasion when I raised this question subsequent to an interview (since the question was added part way through the interviewing process) in the presence of another Tanzanian. When the M.P. (a Local) declared that the Bunge was more powerful than the N.E.C., the other Tanzanian burst forth with, "No, no! That's the wrong answer." This other Tanzanian later took me aside and explained, "Some of these M.P.'s just don't understand the way things are." The deviance of Locals underscores the often unexpressed desire among Locals to increase the power and importance of the Assembly and, as a consequence, their own power and importance.

[43] Debate and criticism in the Assembly meetings which occurred after the period covered by the content analysis, for at least the period of September-October 1966 until July, 1968, seem to have continued these trends. Policy initiative and criticism, judging by newspaper accounts only, appear to have increased somewhat in these sessions.

[44] *Nationalist*, June 29, 1966. The Afro-Shirazi Party is the only party on Zanzibar; it is not yet integrated with TANU.

tionalist stress the presence of Western spies eager to pry secrets from gullible leaders and civil servants and to foment divisions.[45] In contradiction to this, there are equally frequent statements by leaders that people should have nothing to fear, and that criticism is welcomed. As a consequence of these apparently contradictory norms, there amounts to what is, at least collectively, a schizophrenia about revealing information related to policy disputes. For example, committee meetings of the *Bunge* are held in camera. Some members interpret this to mean that they are forbidden to mention or discuss what occurs in these meetings. Others talk freely about committee activity, including the procedures, participation and substantive issues discussed. On a few occasions, members have even raised details of committee work in Assembly debates. This need for secrecy which arises from Rules 2 and 3 is a problem in Tanzania and a source of anxiety for at least some elite members because it is not clear what constitutes private Party or state matters.

RULE 4: An M.P. not a member of the government must consider constituency work his most important obligation.

Many members from constituencies take this dictum seriously. When Parliament is not in session, a typical M.P. spends two to three weeks each month traveling in his constituency. One M.P. estimated that he met or addressed 10,000 constituents each month. The M.P. often has a secretary, sometimes shared with another M.P. or the district Party office. Either the M.P. or his secretary is available each day to hear complaints or problems of constituents. The most frequent complaints were for better agricultural prices or involved misunderstandings between a citizen and government officialdom. The role of the M.P. in his constituency is an important extension of his general function as a legitimizer of the political system. As one legislator remarked, "People most often come to me because they think of me as their man in the government."

These four rules dictate that the M.P. who is not a member of government is above all else a communication link, a popularizer and legitimizer for the Party and the government. He is not a lawmaker. In a few rare instances, notably among Intellectuals, he may become a lobbyist.[46] For instance, some M.P.'s articulate the interests of various groups such as workers and farmers. In an even more general sense, an M.P. may affect policy-making by his independent and uncoordinated criticism (as opposed to organized criticism). When such individual efforts multiply, as has occurred on a very few occasions, it has proven effective. For instance, numerous criticisms of affluence and arrogance were leveled toward Regional Commissioners and other Party leaders in mid-1966 Assembly sessions. These pressures were quite important in affecting changes such as the "voluntary" salary reduction of Ministers and higher civil servants, the withdrawal of government Mercedes-Benzes from personal use or assignment, and the stiff new rules limiting accumulation of wealth among leaders which were contained in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.

VI. CONCLUSION

This examination of the role of the M.P. reveals two things about Tanzanian politics. First, the role expectations among elites contain rules which support a pattern of closed politics. Major policy cleavages or serious leadership splits, such as the one between Nyerere and Kambona, are contained normally within the private arena of the Party structure, indeed, within the upper echelons of the Party structure. The continually stressed theme of unity both helps contain cleavages and is preserved by their containment. This fundamental principle of unity is stressed by all leaders, including Nyerere. This unity is supported by a set of rules channeling political cleavages into the Party structure to be absorbed and eventually resolved by the Party executive. These rules emerge from an analysis of aspects of the elite political culture. The role of the Assembly in this framework has been principally that of legitimization of government and Party decisions within the constitutional framework which gives Parliament supremacy over legislation.

The second conclusion which this study suggests is that in spite of "rules of the game" which foster closed politics, the National Assembly is not anachronistic or a mere showcase for propaganda purposes as may have occurred in Ghana under Nkrumah, for example.[47] M.P.'s play an important role as links between the government and the countryside, and their criticisms in the Assembly have affected some policies. The ability of the Tanzanian government to remain "responsive" depends in part on their activity.

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[45] See, for example, statements of the Mwanza Area Commissioner, *Nationalist,* April 28, 1966, and frequent columns of "Pressman's Commentary" in the *Nationalist.*

[46] This term was actually used by one Intellectual describing his efforts to pressure the government on insurance regulation.

[47] Professor Henry L. Bretton in a private communication, February 22, 1969, suggested that in Ghana "Parliamentary proceedings were a form of shadow-boxing" and the institution was "impotent."

Finally, one may ask, if M.P.'s were to exercise greater influence, comparable to the collective authority of the NEC, for instance, what effect might this have? By most criteria it would make Tanzania more democratic since it would increase the strength of the elected representatives of the people. However, it would also have, I believe, other effects which would probably be detrimental to democracy in the long run.

Frederick Frey has noted that "lawyers tend to be the largest single occupational group in parliament after parliament all over the world."[48] Yet, the Tanzanian parliament contains only two lawyers, one of whom is the Attorney-General, appointed by the President. The requisite level of legislative sophistication and skill is simply not generally found among Tanzanian M.P.'s in a degree sufficient to warrant their increased participation in law-making. The expression of provincialism, idiosyncratic to legislators, is often in evidence in Tanzania, and is a singularly inappropriate goal. Increasing legislative power in Tanzania would, I believe, result in heightening regional and ethnic differences, encouraging pork-barrel bargaining and deals, and increasing the possibilities for corruption. Moreover, such a trend, although appearing to be a move toward promoting democratic practices, would eventually alienate intellectuals, technocrats and others, and spur the demise, not the growth, of representative procedures in the national governing system. Given the background and skills found in the National Assembly and the rules for role behavior embedded in the elite political culture, many M.P.'s perform an important function in the political system already as the people's surrogates, who meet in common with the governing elite and serve as a cathartic and legitimizing force in Tanzanian politics ameliorating the otherwise closed politics of the one Party system.

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[48] Frederick W. Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

PLURALITY MAXIMIZATION VS VOTE MAXIMIZATION: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS WITH VARIABLE PARTICIPATION*

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Spatial models of party competition constitute a recent and incrementally developing literature which seeks to explore the relationships between citizens' decisions and candidates' strategies.[1] Despite the mathematical and deductive rigor of this approach, it is only now that political scientists can begin to see the incorporation of those considerations which less formal analyses identify as salient, and perhaps crucial, features of election contests.

One such consideration concerns the candidates' objectives. Specifically, spatial analysis often confuses the distinction between candidates who maximize votes and candidates who maximize plurality. Downs and Garvey, for example, assume explicitly that candidates maximize votes, though plurality maximization is clearly the assumption which Garvey actually employs, while Downs frequently assumes that vote maximization, plurality maximization, and the goal of winning are equivalent.[2] Downs, nevertheless, attempts to

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[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). The recent theoretical developments based on Downs's work include: Otto A. Davis and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II*, J. L. Bernd, ed., (Dallas: SMU press, 1966); "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science III*, J. L. Bernd, ed., (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967); "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," *Public Choice*, 5, (1969); "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," forthcoming in *Social Choice*, B. Lieberman (ed.), (New York: Gordon and Breach); with Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," This REVIEW, (June, 1970); Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process," *Public Choice*, 7, (1969); "Social Welfare and Electoral Competition in Democratic Societies," (School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969); Peter C. Ordeshook, "Extensions to a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process and Implications for the Theory of Responsible Parties," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, (February 1970); *Theory of the Electoral Process*, (unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Rochester); with Peter H. Aranson, "Spatial Strategies in Sequential Electrons" in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, *Probability Models in Political Science* (forthcoming); Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968); David E. Chapman, "Models of the Working of a Two-Party Electoral System," *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making III*, (Fall 1967) and *Public Choice*, 5, (1969); Gerald Garvey, "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," this REVIEW, LX, (1966).

[2] Downs, *ibid*, confuses vote maximization and plurality maximization in asserting that "each party seeks to receive more votes than any other;" thus the "self-interest axiom [leads] to the vote maximizing government (p. 31)," and that all the actions of the party "are aimed at maximizing votes (p. 35)." Similarly, Garvey, *ibid*, states that "parties shift their platforms whenever such a shift will increase chances to gain a majority. Thus, each party constantly 'mobilizes' to represent the views of a larger portion of society (p. 30)." And while Tullock, *ibid*, initially identifies the *comparative* evaluation of a party's vote (which is implicit in the measure of plurality) as the party's objective by stating that "the party or candidate who receives the most votes will be given control" (p. 51), he apparently assumes throughout his analysis that this implies that candidates maximize votes. Perhaps the most careful investigation of the candidates' objectives is presented by William H. Riker, who offers what appears to be an additional possibility in *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale, 1962). Specifically, Riker argues that rational politicians do not maximize votes (or, conceiv-

disentangle these objectives, observing that plurality maximization is the appropriate objective for candidates in a single-member district, while vote maximization is appropriate in proportional representation systems with many parties. All subsequent spatial analysis research, however, assumes either implicitly or explicitly that candidates maximize plurality. If Downs is correct, therefore, this research may not be relevant for a general understanding of electoral competition in diverse constitutional or historical circumstances. The question then is whether those strategies that maximize votes differ from those strategies that maximize plurality.

To answer this question we extend the basic multidimensional model of the electoral process—a model which assumes that candidates maximize plurality.[3] We formulate, within the structure of this model, the distinction between vote maximization and plurality maximization and we ascertain the strategic differences that the distinction logically implies. We review in Section 1 our assumptions and definitions, and we construct in Section 2 a rigorous distinction between the objective function of plurality-maximizing candidates and the objective function of vote-maximizing candidates. After identifying in Section 3 the optimal strategies for candidates who maximize votes, we conclude that although plurality maximizing candidates converge, vote maximizing candidates do not converge under some identical conditions. We also demonstrate that, for suitable conditions, if candidates maximize votes, the strategies the candidates prefer are sensitive to uniform variations in the cost of voting; if candidates maximize plurality, however, such variations in cost do not affect preferred strategies. We apply our analysis in Section 4 to some hypotheses which Downs proposes concerning the spatial strategies of candidates in multiparty systems. We conclude that the candidates which multiparty systems with proportional representation offer can provide distinct and stable strategies. But if a unimodal density describes the electorate's preference density, only three distinct strategies exist in equilibrium. Finally, we consider in Section 5 those strategies which candidates with mixed motives adopt, e.g., candidates who seek to maximize plurality while simultaneously maximizing a commodity such as financial contributions. We predicate this section of our analysis on two assumptions: (1) candidates require resources, such as finances, to alter their spatial location effectively; and (2) the calculus of voting which governs citizens' decisions is applicable to other forms of participation. We demonstrate with these assumptions that two competing candidates who maximize plurality might diverge from the mean of a symmetric, unimodal preference density. Because the proofs of our theorems are tedious and mathematically complex we relegate them to an appendix.

I. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The model we wish to generalize is a multidimensional extension of Downs's spatial framework. Hence, we assume that any number of "issues" may be necessary to characterize the citizens' preferences. To characterize the fundamentals of this model we require the following multidimensional notation:

$x=(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n)$: the representation (referred to as a vector) of a citizen's preferences for all issues. Thus, x_i is the citizen's preferred position on issue i;

$\theta=(\theta_1, \theta_2, \cdots, \theta_n)$: the positions which candidate 1 advocates. The vector θ is called candidate 1's strategy;

$\psi=(\psi_1, \psi_2, \cdots, \psi_n)$: the positions which candidate 2 advocates. The vector ψ is called candidate 2's strategy.

Several assumptions are either implicit in these definitions or required before the model is complete. Because we discuss these assumptions extensively elsewhere, we review them here only briefly.[4]

Assumption 1: Although an adequate description of the electorate's preferences requires several dimensions, a specific citizen may care about, and consequently estimate, a preferred position only for some of these dimensions. Thus, this citizen does not assign values to all elements of x. Similarly, it is possible that a citizen cannot specify a preferred position although the issue is salient. A citizen's awareness and concern for the issues

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ably, plurality), but that they seek minimal winning coalitions. Observe, however, that if two candidates compete the election is a zero sum game, in which case the maximization of plurality and the formation of minimal winning coalitions lead to identical results—the selection of minimax strategies. Riker's criterion yields the adoption of different strategies only if the position of one candidate is fixed, so that his opponent adjusts his position to suit his objectives with the opponent's strategy a fixed parameter of his calculus.

[3] The model we seek to extend is presented in the references to Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*

[4] *Ibid.*

of Viet Nam and pollution, for example, do not guarantee his ability to identify preferred policies for such issues. We assume, nevertheless, that every citizen acts *as if* he estimates a preferred position on each issue (i.e., that every element of x has a numerical value).

Assumption 2: We assume that the vectors x, θ, and ψ are continuous variables. Obviously, many issues, as well as the electorate's preferences on them, can only be indexed discretely (e.g., religious preference, and partisan identification); many issues are dichotomous. The continuity assumption, nevertheless, is mathematically convenient because it facilitates the use of the continuous calculus.

Assumption 3: The candidates' strategies are not subscripted with an index for citizens: we assume that all citizens act *as if* they make identical estimates of θ. Thus, we interpret θ as the subjective estimate of candidate 1's strategy, ignoring the effects of perceptual distortion, imperfect information, and the possibility that no single measure can characterize a candidate's strategy. This assumption implies, moreover, that citizens estimate a position for each candidate on every dimension. Thus, we ignore the possibility that if a citizen does not care about an issue he does not bother to ascertain a candidate's policy on it.

Assumption 4: A density function, f(x), characterizes the citizens' preferences, and points in the coordinate space of this density can represent the candidates' strategies. Obviously, the number of densities that might characterize preferences is infinite, but the most general results pertaining to candidates who maximize plurality follow from, among others, the assumption that $f(x)$ is symmetric.[5] We assume, additionally, that $f(x)$ is not only symmetric, but unimodal. These assumptions, while not descriptive universally, permit tractable analysis of the strategies which vote-maximizing candidates should adopt, while allowing for conjecture about more general circumstances.

To conduct any analysis, however, we require assumptions about a citizen's evaluations of the candidates' strategies. We express this evaluation in terms of the utility loss which a citizen derives from each candidate's strategy if that candidate is elected. Symbolically, we denote the loss which the citizen associates with candidates 1 and 2 as $\phi(x-\theta)$ and $\phi(x-\psi)$ respectively.

Assumption 5: We assume that $\phi(x-\theta)$ and $\phi(x-\psi)$ satisfy two intuitively reasonable conditions: (1) they are zero if and only if the candidate's strategy and the citizen's preference are identical (i.e., $\phi(x-\theta)=0$ if and only if $x=\theta$); (2) if the citizen's preference and the candidate's strategy do not coincide, the citizen derives some positive loss (i.e., $\phi(x-\theta)>0$ if and only if $x\neq\theta$). A loss function which satisfies these conditions is the quadratic metric $\|x-\theta\|^2_A$, which in matrix notation equals,

$$(1) \qquad \|x-\theta\|^2_A = (x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$$

This formulation implies marginally increasing loss as x and θ become more disparate. We assume, more generally, that a citizen can experience both marginally decreasing and marginally increasing loss. Thus, we allow citizens to become nearly indifferent between strategies that are far from their preferred positions. Symbolically, this is equivalent to assuming that

$$(2) \qquad \phi(x-\theta) = \phi(\|x-\theta\|^2_A)$$

ϕ being a monotonic function of $\|x-\theta\|^2_A$. Since we discuss the properties of expressions (1) and (2) elsewhere, we note the simple example that if $n=2$, then the citizen's indifference contours are concentric ellipses about the point x and that the orientation of the major and the minor axes of these ellipses are all identical. We illustrate in Figure 1 the contours of a typical loss function for $n=2$.

Assumption 6: We assume that all citizens weight the issues in an identical fashion. This, perhaps the model's most bothersome assumption, requires, for example, that a citizen who prefers the mean of the electorate's density, attach the same relative importance to each issue as a citizen who prefers some extreme position. Thus, if $n=2$, then the rotation of the



FIGURE 1.

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[5] By symmetry we mean that if the mean of $f(x)$ is normalized to zero, $f(x)=f(-x)$. This assumption is referred to as *radial* symmetry.



FIGURE 2.

major and the minor axes of the elliptical contours of each citizen's loss function are the same for all citizens. We portray in Figure 2 this assumption of common orientation (common matrix A) for three citizens.

These assumptions and definitions determine that if a citizen votes, he votes for the candidate who yields him the smallest loss. Not all citizens vote, however, and to the extent that the candidates' strategies affect turnout, we seek to express this relationship in our model.

Assumption 7: We assume that a citizen can abstain from voting, and that his probability of voting decreases as the loss he associates with his most preferred candidate increases. Referring to this characterization of a citizen's actions as *abstention from alienation,* we note that the condition of all citizens voting is a special case of this characterization.[6]

To formulate this assumption precisely let a citizen's preferred candidate be θ, and let R represent his reward from voting (expressed in terms of utility). If $R>0$ the citizen votes and if $R\leq 0$ the citizen abstains. Denoting the deterministic components of this reward by $U(x, \theta)$, we assume that $U(x, \theta)$ diminishes as the loss associated with θ increases. Finally, we denote ϵ as a random variable which represents the components of R that are not contained in $U(x, \theta)$.[7] Summarily, we express R as

$$R = U(x, \theta) + \epsilon \tag{3}$$

Hence, if $U(x, \theta)+\epsilon$ is greater than zero, the citizen votes, and if $U(x, \theta)+\epsilon$ is less than or equal to zero the citizen abstains.

Note, however, that with the inclusion of ϵ in (3) the citizen neither votes nor abstains with certainty. Symbolically, we write the citizen's probability of voting as $\Pr[R>0]$. To ascertain the relationship of $\Pr[R>0]$ to θ, observe that the citizen's probability of voting is the probability that $U(x, \theta)+\epsilon>0$; equivalently, this is the probability that $\epsilon>-U(x, \theta)$. Hence, $\Pr[R>0]=\Pr[\epsilon>-U(x, \theta)]$, so that from our assumption that $U(x, \theta)$ decreases as $\phi(x-\theta)$ increases, $\Pr[R>0]$ decreases as $\phi(x-\theta)$ increases.

We require one final assumption about voting and non-voting. Specifically, we wish to generate a function which expresses the probability that a citizen votes relative to any other citizen if we know each citizen's preferred position and the candidates' strategies.

Assumption 8: To simplify the exposition, consider citizens who prefer θ to ψ. We assume that any two citizens vote with equal probability if their preference vectors (x) are equidistant (as measured by the metric $\|x-\theta\|_A$) from the strategy θ. We assume, moreover, that citizen i votes with a greater probability than citizen j if and only if the

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[6] Clearly, alternative assumptions concerning the relationship of turnout to the candidates strategies are possible. For example, in Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . . ," *op. cit.*, abstention from indifference is analyzed. As yet, however, we have not incorporated this alternative assumption into our analysis of vote maximization.

[7] Additionally, we assume that the expected value of ϵ is zero, and that it possesses a continuously differentiable density function defined in the interval $(-\infty, \infty)$. Also, we assume that ϵ is distributed independently of $U(x, \theta)$.



FIGURE 3.

distance between citizen *i*'s preference vector and θ is less than the distance between citizen *j*'s preference vector and θ.[8]

Assumption 8 allows us to define a function in the coordinate space of the electorate's preference density which completely characterizes relative probabilities of voting. We denote this function by $g(x-\theta)$ if θ is preferred to ψ, and $g(x-\psi)$ if ψ is preferred to θ.[9] Thus, for any citizen, $\Pr[R>0]=g(x-\theta)$ or $g(x-\psi)$. We can readily demonstrate two properties of the function g. First, g is symmetric about θ or ψ. This follows from the symmetry of citizens' loss functions. Second, g is monotonically decreasing as we move away from the relevant strategy vector, θ or ψ. This follows from the single peakedness of individual utility functions, and the assumption that $U(x, \theta)$ and $U(x, \psi)$ decrease as $\phi(x-\theta)$ and $\phi(x-\psi)$ increase. We illustrate in Figure 3 a representative form for $g(x-\theta)$ for a single dimension.

Note that the slope of g indicates the rate at which turnout decreases as we move away from the candidate's strategy. Somewhat imprecisely, we refer to this rate as *the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy*. We illustrate in Figure 4 a function for which the sensitivity is greater than the sensitivity corresponding to the function illustrated in Figure 3.

Since sensitivity is an important property of $g(x-\theta)$ we indicate some of its essential features. First, we note that the rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ is not a dimensionless quantity—its value depends on the scales employed to index x. Thus, for a single dimension the magnitude of sensitivity has little meaning since the scales which index an issue are arbitrary. Second, if n is greater than one, sensitivity is a multidimensional concept. But the dimensions can be measured each by a different scale so that the magnitude of sensitivity with respect to one dimension cannot be compared meaningfully to the magnitude of sensitivity on some other dimension.

To facilitate our use of this notion we introduce a mathematical "trick" which renders measures of distance and of sensitivity comparable. This trick consists of transforming the axes of the issue space so that if $n=2$, for example, each citizen's indifference contours are concentric circles (instead of concentric ellipses).[10] Thus, if we make $\phi(x-\theta)$ circularly symmetric, then $U(x, \theta)$, and $g(x-\theta)$ also become circularly symmetric. The rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ with respect to x, then, is the same for all issues in the transformed space.

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[8] This assumption does not imply an interpersonal comparison of utility, but simply that if the preference vectors of two citizens are equidistant from their preferred candidate(s), then the benefits and costs of voting, as well as the density of ϵ, stand in the same relationship to each other for both citizens.

[9] We assume, moreover, that $\lim_{\|x-\theta\|\to\infty} U(x, \theta) + \epsilon < 0$. This insures that $g(x-\theta)$ is integrable. This assumption, however, places no substantive restrictions on our analysis.

[10] Recall that a citizen's loss, $\phi(x-\theta)$, is a monotonic function of the metric $\|x-\theta\|_A$, where A is a positive definite $n \times n$ matrix. If this loss matrix is identical for all citizens (Assumption 6), there exists a linear transformation of the dimensions such that A becomes the identity matrix I. Thus, with no loss of generality we can assume that $\phi(x-\theta)=\phi(\|x-\theta\|)$, where x and θ are now measured in the transformed space. And since $\|x-\theta\|$ is constant on circles, $\phi(x-\theta)$ is constant on circles. Similarly, this transformation can also be designed so that, without any loss of generality, the axes of $f(x)$ correspond to the axes of our coordinate space.

Observe, however, that the transformation of the axes which renders $g(x-\theta)$ circularly symmetric affects $f(x)$: this transformation leaves $f(x)$ *radically* symmetric and unimodal, but $f(x)$ is not necessarily *circularly* symmetric. (We illustrate in Figure 5 some contours for $g(x-\theta)$ and $f(x)$ as they might be before and after the axes are transformed.) That is, the variance of $f(x)$ may be different for each axis. This means that if we measure the rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ for each axis in terms of the variance of $f(x)$ on that axis, then comparative differences in this rate can be observed. And it is differences in these rates which determine differences in the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Specifically, the intuitive idea behind sensitivity is that if it is high (low), the probability of voting decreases rapidly (slowly) as we move, say, one standard deviation (of $f(x)$ in the transformed space for a particular dimension) from θ. (Thus, sensitivity is higher in Figure 5 for issue 1 than it is for issue 2.)



FIGURE 4.

Before considering the candidates' objective functions we note that an important special case of $g(x-\theta)$ occurs if the stochastic factor, ϵ, is not included in expression (3) (i.e., $R = U(x, \theta)$). R is not a random variable in this case, and a citizen either votes with certainty or abstains with certainty.[11] To ascertain whether or not a citizen votes, observe that $U(x, \theta)$ is greatest if $x=\theta$, in which case the citizen votes with certainty. As the disparity between x and θ increases, the citizen's loss increases, and $U(x, \theta)$ decreases. Disregarding those citizens who always vote, $U(x, \theta)$ eventually equals zero if this disparity becomes sufficiently great, say if the distance between x and θ is δ. Thus, if the distance between x and θ is less than δ the citizen votes with certainty; if the distance between x and θ



FIGURE 5.

[11] An interpretation of this special case renders analysis with it less objectionable. Briefly, if the analysis is multidimensional, and if all dimensions of taste are assumed to be identified and measured then there may be little randomness in decision-making.



FIGURE 6.

is greater than or equal to δ, then $U(x, \theta) \leq 0$, and the citizen abstains with certainty. Figure 6 illustrates a representative $g(x-\theta)$ for this special case. This function is a special case which facilitates the derivation of some results. Although we present these results in this essay, we assume the general form for deriving our central multidimensional conclusions.

II. THE CANDIDATES' OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS

We can now define rigorously the candidates' objective functions (i.e., what they seek to maximize) in order to ascertain optimal strategies. To facilitate exposition we relegate the proofs of our results for the general multi-issue case to an appendix, and we restrict our mathematical discussion in the text to unidimensional competition ($n=1$).

The first step in formulating objective functions consists of identifying those citizens who prefer candidates 1 and 2 respectively. For the case of a single dimension, we assume without loss of generality that the candidates' strategies, θ and ψ, satisfy $\theta \leq \psi$. Since the citizens' loss functions are symmetric, and since by assumption, these functions are identical for all citizens (except for the value of the preferred position), all citizens whose most preferred positions fall to the left of the midpoint between the candidates' strategies, $(\theta+\psi)/2$, prefer the first candidate. Similarly, all citizens whose most preferred positions fall to the right of $(\theta+\psi)/2$ prefer candidate 2's strategy.

The second step consists of ascertaining the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for, say, candidate 1. If $f(x)$ is the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position x, and that $g(x-\theta)$ is his probability of voting, then $f(x)g(x-\theta)$ is the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position s, and votes for candidate 1. Hence, by "adding" all those values of $f(x)g(x-\theta)$ for all those citizens who prefer candidate 1 to candidate 2 (i.e., all citizens who prefer a position to the left of $(\theta+\psi)/2$), we represent the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for the first candidate. We denote that probability $V(\theta, \psi)$, and we observe that for continuous variables $V(\theta, \psi)$ is expressed,

$$(4) \qquad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x)g(x-\theta)dx$$

Similarly, $V(\psi, \theta)$, the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for candidate 2, is expressed,

$$(5) \qquad V(\psi, \theta) = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f(x)g(x-\psi)dx$$

Thus, if candidates maximize votes they seek to maximize the value of these functions.

If candidate 1, for example, maximizes plurality, his objective function, $P(\theta, \psi)$, becomes,

$$(6) \qquad \begin{aligned} P(\theta, \psi) &= V(\theta, \psi) - V(\psi, \theta) \\ &= \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x)g(x-\theta)dx \\ &\quad - \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f(x)g(x-\psi)dx \end{aligned}$$

Simply knowing a candidate's expected vote or expected plurality, however, does not reveal whether or not the candidate can find a better strategy. But for either objective function and for any pair of strategies, (θ, ψ), we can ascertain a candidate's incentive to shift towards an opponent's strategy, away from an opponent's strategy, or not move. Specifically, with equations (4) and (6), we can calculate for candidate 1 the rate at which $V(\theta, \psi)$ or $P(\theta, \psi)$ (depending on what he maximizes) changes as θ changes. By convention, we denote these rates as $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$ and $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$, respectively. The notation $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$, for example, reads: "the rate of change of $P(\theta, \psi)$ as θ increases, for the strategy pair (θ, ψ)." Thus if candidate 1 maximizes plurality and if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$, the candidate increases his anticipated plurality by shifting to the right, towards ψ. Alternatively, if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta < 0$, he increases his plurality by shifting away from ψ; and if this rate of change equals zero, he doesn't move.[12] Hence, we have the following decision rules for candidates: If candidate 1 maximizes

$$\begin{matrix} \text{votes, and if } \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta \\ \text{plurality, and if } \partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta \end{matrix} \begin{cases} <0, & \text{shift to the left} \\ >0, & \text{shift to the right} \\ =0, & \text{do not move} \end{cases}$$

Using equations (4) and (6), we find these rates of change by standard mathematical procedures.[13] They are,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta &= \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

$$\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx \tag{8}$$

in which $f'(x)$ is the slope of the density of preferences evaluated at x ($f'(x)$ is written frequently as $df(x)/dx$). The first term on the right of the equality sign of equation (7) is a means for representing "the sum of the slopes of $f(x)$ for all values of x in the range $(-\infty, (\theta+\psi)/2)$, times the respective probability that citizens vote for candidate 1." This term is common to both equations (7) and (8). The term $\frac{1}{2}f((\theta+\psi)/2)g((\psi-\theta)/2)$, which is in (7) but not in (8), is $\frac{1}{2}f(x)$ evaluated at $x=(\theta+\psi)/2$, times $g(x-\theta)$ evaluated also for $x=(\theta+\psi)/2$. This term is always greater than or equal to zero; a subtraction in equation (7); and the only characteristic that distinguishes equation (7) from equation (8). Hence, this term is the first indication that the strategies which vote maximizing candidates and plurality maximizing candidates adopt may differ.

III. MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES

We demonstrate in this section that the preferred strategies of plurality maximizing candidates can differ from the preferred strategies of vote maximizing candidates. Briefly, we: (1) review the proof of a theorem which states that plurality maximizing candidates converge to the mean of a symmetric, unimodal density of preferences if citizens abstain because of alienation; (2) prove that, if both candidates maximize votes, an equilibrium exists in which the candidates might not converge; (3) ascertain the relationship between the location of the candidates' preferred strategies and the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy, and; (4) demonstrate that uniform variations in the cost of voting affect the location of the strategies which vote maximizing candidates prefer, but do not affect the location of strategies which plurality maximizing candidates prefer.

(A) *Equilibrium and Plurality Maximization*: To evaluate a candidate's strategy, we note from equations (7) and (8) that something must be known about the slope of the electorate's preference density. Consider symmetric unimodal densities and, without loss of generality, assume that the mean of $f(x)$ equals 0. Thus, $f'(x) \geq 0$ for all $x \leq 0$, and $f'(x) \leq 0$ for all $x \geq 0$. We can now demonstrate that the best strategy a *plurality maxmizing* candidate can adopt is the mean, 0, if he knows that his opponent will adopt any strategy that might defeat him. Thus, we prove that the mean is a minmax strategy; if both candidates are at the mean they are said to be in equilibrium—neither candidate has any incentive to alter his position. Stated differently, a candidate receives a positive plurality if his strategy is the mean and if his opponent adopts any other strategy; the candidates tie if they both adopt the mean.

Sketching out the proof of this result for one dimension, we set candidate 2's strategy equal to the mean (i.e., $\psi=0$). Since $g(x-\theta)$ is positive and $f'(x)$ is non-negative everywhere to the left of the mean—the range of integration of equation (8)—$\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$ for all $\theta < \psi = 0$.

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[12] This assumes that the candidate's plurality is not minimized if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = 0$. By inspection, however, we can generally eliminate such possibilities.

[13] To differentiate $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ we apply Leibnitz's rule (see Francis P. Hildebrand, *Advanced Calculus for Applications* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 360, or any textbook of advanced calculus) and get,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)\partial\theta &= \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \\ &\quad - \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x)\frac{\partial g(x-\theta)}{\partial\theta} \end{aligned}$$

Integrating this expression by parts yields equation (7).



FIGURE 7.

Thus, candidate 1 increases his plurality by converging to his opponent. And, by symmetry, he obviously increases his plurality to zero so that the mean defeats all strategies that are less than zero. A parallel argument demonstrates that the mean defeats all strategies greater than zero. Elsewhere, we derive the following general multidimensional result:[14]

if both candidates maximize plurality, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal, multivariate density, then a pure equilibrium strategy exists at the mean of $f(x)$, which is to say that the candidates converge to the mean

(B) *Equilibrium and Vote Maximization*: Turning now to the analysis of strategies if candidates maximize votes instead of plurality, we prove that such candidates might not converge. To see this we again set $\psi=0$ and assume that $\theta\leq\psi$. Observe now that, although the first term on the right of equation (7) is positive for all $\theta\leq\psi=0$—we show this in the case of plurality maximization—the second term is a subtraction and might be greater than the first for θ less than ψ. If this occurs, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$ is not positive for all θ, and candidate 1 decreases his total vote by converging to his opponent.

To illustrate more formally that vote maximizing candidates do not converge, that the magnitude of the second term in (7) can exceed the magnitude of the first term, we assume that the abstention function $g(x-\theta)$ is the rectangular function which we illustrate in Figure 6. Second, we set candidate 2's strategy, ψ, equal to 0 (with $\theta\leq\psi$). With these assumptions equation (7) reduces to[15]

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \tfrac{1}{2}f(\theta/2) - f(\theta-\delta), \text{ with } \psi = 0 \tag{9}$$

Thus, if $f(\theta/2)>2f(\theta-\delta)$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta>0$, and the first candidate increases his vote by shifting towards candidate 2. But if $f(\theta/2)<2f(\theta-\delta)$,

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[14] "Abstentions and Equilibrium . . ." *op. cit.*

[15] The rectangular abstention function equals 0 for all x in the intervals $(-\infty, \theta-\delta)$, and $(\theta+\delta, \infty)$ and equals 1 otherwise. Hence, equation (7) becomes,

$$\begin{aligned}\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta &= \int_{\theta-\delta}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)dx \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \\ &= f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)\left[1-\frac{1}{2}g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right)\right] \\ &\quad - f(\theta-\delta)\end{aligned}$$

Observe now that whenever $g((\psi-\theta)/2)=0$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$ is positive. Hence candidate 1 should shift towards candidate 2 at least until $g((\psi-\theta)/2)=1$. This occurs whenever the two abstention functions butt against each other or overlap. We can restrict ourselves then to strategies such that $g((\psi-\theta)/2)=1$, in which case we get equation (9). Note, however, that if $f(x)$ is a uniform density, $f'(x)=0$ in the relevant range of integration. This means that either the rate of change of $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ is zero or that it is negative. It is zero if the abstention functions do not butt, it is negative if they overlap. Thus, if $f(x)$ is a uniform density, the candidates do not converge so closely that the abstention functions of citizens preferring them overlap.



FIGURE 8.

$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta < 0$, and candidate 1 should shift away from candidate 2. Finally, if

$$\tfrac{1}{2}f(\theta/2) = f(\theta - \delta) \tag{10}$$

the first candidate maximizes his total vote. We illustrate in Figure 7 a density, $f(x)$, and a threshold, δ, satisfying equation (10) with the appropriate optimal θ indicated. The pencil exercise of considering strategies to the left of this θ demonstrates that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$, and that strategies to the right of θ yields $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta < 0$. Thus, a value of θ which is not equal to ψ maximizes candidate 1's vote, even though ψ is at the mean.

We are not interested, however, in demonstrating simply that one vote maximizing candidate does not converge necessarily to an opponent's strategy if that strategy is fixed at the mean. The question is whether or not two vote maximizing candidates, who can adopt any strategy, fail to converge and if an equilibrium exists. We prove in the appendix of this essay that:

if both candidates maximize votes, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if $f(x)$ is the multivariate normal density, then an equilibrium exists; and if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently low, the candidates do not converge

Several comments are in order concerning this result:

(1) Equilibrium strategies exist and the candidates fail to converge for a wider class of symmetric densities than the multivariate normal. The proof of our result does not assume the normal form, but its statement is simplified by avoiding complex mathematical conditions and special cases. The theorem, nevertheless, demonstrates the dissimilarities in behavior between vote maximizing and plurality maximizing candidates.

(2) Although "if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently low" is imprecise, we can formulate the condition rigorously. A rigorous formulation, however, is mathematically complex, so we relegate it to the appendix. Nevertheless, the spirit of our result is that vote maximizing candidates may or may not converge—depending on the sensitivity of turnout. We examine this relationship more carefully later in this section.

(3) If $f(x)$ is a univariate density ($n=1$), the candidates align themselves symmetrically on opposite sides of the mean (provided that the candidates do not converge). Hence, if the mean equals zero, and if θ^* and ψ^* are two equilibrium strategies, then $\theta^* = -\psi^* < 0$. We depict this situation in Figure 8 for a rectangular abstention function.[16]

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[16] Additionally, with the rectangular abstention function we can easily illustrate the proof that for $n=1$, only one strategy pair is an equilibrium pair. First, assume that $\theta \neq -\psi$, and that $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial\psi = 0$. Thus,

$$\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial\psi = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\psi+\delta} f'(x)dx + \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = 0$$

or, equivalently,

$$\frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = f(\psi + \delta)$$

Now consider $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$, which we know equals $\tfrac{1}{2}f((\theta+\psi)/2) - f(\theta-\delta)$. Thus, from the condition



FIGURE 9.

(4) If $f(x)$ is a bivariate density ($n=2$), the equilibrium strategies exist on the major or the minor axis of $f(x)$; the candidates align themselves on opposite sides of the mean. We must point out, however, that we establish only that local equilibria exist, and that the location of globally minmax strategies is not rigorously ascertained. Nevertheless, we conjecture that if the candidates fail to converge, they align themselves on opposite sides of the mean on the major axis of $f(x)$ (i.e., the axis of greatest variance). Hence, vote maximizing candidates might converge on one issue and diverge on another. We illustrate this possibility in Figure 9, in which θ^* and ψ^* are two equilibrium strategies, and the candidates converge on the second issue but diverge on the first issue.

(C) *Equilibrium and the Sensitivity of Turnout to Variations in Strategy*: Empirical relevance, however, requires that our result say more than that vote maximizing candidates might not converge. Specifically, if we seek to predict how candidates act, we must know when they converge and when they do not converge. Hence, we must examine the relationship between the location of competitive electoral equilibria and the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy.

We begin by considering again univariate densities and rectangular abstention functions. If $f(x)$ is symmetric, if θ and ψ are in equilibrium, and if the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, then $\theta=-\psi$. Thus if the candidates are in equilibrium, equation (7) becomes,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \tfrac{1}{2}f(0) - f(\theta - \delta) = 0 \tag{11}$$

We readily see from equation (11) that the condition of equilibrium depends on the properties of $f(x)$ and the parameter, δ, of the rectangular abstention function which we termed the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy (i.e., if δ is small sensitivity is high, and if δ is large sensitivity is low). We seek, therefore, to explore the nature of this dependence.

First, we define a distance x^*, measured from the mean of $f(x)$. Assuming that $f(x)$ is symmetric and that its mean equals 0, we select x^* so that $f(-x^*)=\tfrac{1}{2}f(0)$. Figure 10 illustrates this distance, x^*.

We select this distance because, if $\theta-\delta=-x^*$ and if $\psi+\delta=x^*$ (recalling that we are presently setting $\delta=-\psi$), equation (11) becomes,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \tfrac{1}{2}f(0) - f(-x^*) = 0$$

But from the definition of x^*, $f(-x^*)=\tfrac{1}{2}f(0)$, so the candidates are in equilibrium if $\theta=\delta-x^*$ and $\psi=x^*+\delta$.[17] Assuming that x^* is fixed, we

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that $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial\psi=0$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta=f(\psi+\delta)-f(\theta-\delta)$. But, $f(x)$ is symmetric about 0, and $\theta\neq-\psi$, so that $f(\theta-\delta)\neq f(\psi+\delta)$. Thus, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta\neq 0$, which is to say that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$ and $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial\psi$ cannot equal 0 simultaneously for $\theta\neq-\psi$. This proves, for rectangular abstention functions, that only a strategy pair satisfying $\theta=-\psi\leq 0$ is an equilibrium pair. To prove that only one such strategy pair satisfies this condition for a given δ and $f(x)$, we set $\psi=-\theta$ and get,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \tfrac{1}{2}f(0) - f(\theta - \delta)$$

Obviously, this function equals zero for only one θ since $f(0)/2$ is a constant and $f(\theta-\delta)$ is monotonically increasing with θ for all $\theta\leq 0$.

[17] If θ is less than $\delta-x^*$, then $f(\theta-\delta)<f(-x^*)$



FIGURE 10.

can plot the strategy θ which maximizes candidate 1's vote against alternative values of δ—assuming that the candidates are in equilibrium—in Figure 11.[18] (The use of line segments in this illustration derive from the use of the rectangular abstention function. For abstention functions such as those illustrated in


δ
δ > x* and the candidates converge
x*
$\frac{x^*}{2}$
δ < x* and the candidates do not converge
δ = 0 and the candidates converge
equilibrium value of θ(ψ = −θ)
-x*
$-\frac{x^*}{2}$
0

FIGURE 11.

$=f(0)/2$, in which case $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$ from equation (11), and candidate 1 should shift towards the mean. Alternatively, if $\theta > \delta - x^*$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta < 0$, and candidate 1 should shift away from the mean.

[18] Let $\delta > x^*$. Thus, since $f(x)$ is unimodal and $\theta \leq 0$, $f(-x^*) > f(\theta - \delta)$, in which case $\partial V(\theta,\psi)/\partial\theta > 0$ for all $\theta \leq 0$; the candidates converge to the mean. Now consider $\delta < x^*$. From equation (11), the condition for a maximizing value of θ is $f(0)/2 = f(\theta - \delta) = f(-x^*)$. If $2\delta \geq x^*$, an equilibrium is attained by selecting θ such that $-\theta = -x^* + \delta$ (this insures that $f(\theta - \delta) = f(x^*) = f(0)/2$). Clearly, then, as δ diminishes from x^* to $x^*/2$, θ diminishes from 0 to $-x^*/2$. Finally, if $2\delta < x^*$, equation (11) cannot be satisfied without violating the condition that the two candidates' abstention functions at least butt against each other. Thus, an equilibrium is attained by setting $-\theta = \delta$ (observe that for $-\theta < \delta$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$, but for $-\theta > \delta$, this rate of change is negative). Thus, as δ diminishes from $x^*/2$ to 0, θ increases from $-x^*/2$ to 0.



FIGURE 12.

Figures 3 and 4 the relationship of θ to δ is smooth.[19])

Interpreting Figure 11, both candidates converge to the mean of $f(x)$ if $\delta = 0$, or if $\delta \geq x^*$. If, however, $0 < \delta < x^*$, both candidates adopt strategies symmetrically about the mean, and the distance between each candidate increases and then decreases as δ increases. We can give this result quantitative significance by assuming that $f(x)$ is the normal density function, in which case $x^* = 1.2\sigma$ (where σ is the standard deviation of $f(x)$). Thus, if citizens prefer policies greater than 1.2 standard deviations from their most preferred candidate's position vote, the candidates should converge to the mean.

It is unlikely, however, that such mathematical precision exists in reality or in our measurements of it. Nevertheless, we can infer two important conclusions from this result. First, vote maximization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for non-convergence. If the variance of $f(x)$ is sufficiently small (i.e., if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently high) both vote maximizing and plurality maximizing candidates converge. Thus, while the conclusion that candidates *do not converge* if they maximize their total *vote* is intuitively appealing, intuition fails to indicate that conditions exist for which such candidates converge. Consequently, intuition cannot suggest sufficient conditions for non-convergence. Our analysis specifies such conditions, however, and these conditions can be formulated as an empirical hypothesis. Specifically, if turnout falls very rapidly or very slowly as the distance between a candidate's position and a citizen's preference increases (in which distance is measured in terms of the standard deviation of the density of preferences), the candidates should converge. But if turnout falls at some intermediate rate, the candidates should diverge. Thus, we hypothesize that the relationship between sensitivity and the amount of divergence is of the form of an inverted "U"—divergence increases and then decreases.

The interpretation of the relationship between sensitivity and the candidates' strategies can be extended if we consider some of the determinants of sensitivity. We can say, for example, that as the relative saliency of an issue increases the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy also increases. Thus, we can substitute the word saliency for the word sensitivity in our hypothesis. Let us consider in detail, however, a second factor—the cost of voting.

(D) *Equilibrium and the Cost of Voting*: Clearly, politicians can alter electoral outcomes by raising or lowering the cost of voting selectively through such devices as poll taxes, intimidation, and residency requirements. Consider, however, the implications of uniform variations in the cost of voting.[20] Specifically, we wish to know if uniformly varying each citizen's cost of voting can affect electoral outcomes.

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[19] For example, a continuously differentiable abstention function can yield the relationship between δ and the equilibrium value of θ illustrated in Figure 12.

[20] The notion of a "uniform" variation in the cost of voting is defined rigorously in Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium. . . ," *op. cit.* Briefly, if two citizens are the same distance from their preferred candidates, they vote

We approach this query by examining the relationship between this cost and the citizen's utility of voting. Clearly, if cost increases, the utility which a citizen derives from voting diminishes. Thus, $U(x, \theta)$ varies inversely with C, the cost of voting. This means that the disparity between x and θ necessary to set $U(x, \theta)$ equal to zero decreases as C increases. And it is this critical distance—which we denote by δ for the case of rectangular abstention functions—that determines the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Thus, sensitivity increases as C increases, *ceteris paribus.* Hence, one interpretation of our analysis is that, if the relative cost of voting is either high or low, the candidates should converge; but if C assumes intermediate values, the candidates should diverge.

Elsewhere, we demonstrate that for plurality maximizing candidates, if $f(x)$ is symmetric and unimodal, the mean of $f(x)$ is the dominant strategy for all levels of sensitivity.[21] Thus, form our analysis of Figure 11,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if the costs of voting are varied uniformly throughout the electorate, then equilibrium strategies are unaltered if the candidates maximize plurality, but such strategies are altered if the candidates maximize votes

Since a high or low sensitivity of turnout dictates convergence to the mean,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if candidates maximize votes, then the cost of voting can be either uniformly raised or lowered so that the candidates converge to the mean

Thus, the equilibria of elections in which candidates maximize votes demonstrate a greater sensitivity to variations in the cost of voting than is found in plurality elections.

IV. MULTI-CANDIDATE CONTESTS

Thus far we have analyzed only two candidate competition. If candidates maximize plurality this is an admissible assumption, but if candidates maximize votes it is more appropriate to assume that many candidates compete. Hence, we relax our two-candidate assumption, and we consider multi-candidate contests.

Downs asserts that "parties in a multiparty system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible."[22] Clearly, this is only one possibility, since the set of all distinct possibilities is,

(a) all candidates seek to adopt distinct positions,
(b) all candidates seek to converge to a common point,
(c) some candidates wish to converge, but others do not wish to do so.

To examine each of these possibilities we must

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with equal probability; and a variation in the cost of voting is said to be uniform if they continue to vote with equal probability after such costs are altered (and if the abstention function g retains the mathematical properties we assume for it). For example, if g is the rectangular abstention function we can associate a δ with each person's function. We assume in our analysis that the same value for δ is associated with all citizens functions. Changing the cost of voting changes the magnitude of δ; and a uniform variation in the cost of voting change δ equally for all citizens.

[21] *Ibid.* We also demonstrate, however, that if $f(x)$ is not symmetric and if the candidates maximize votes, the location of a dominant strategy is sensitive to variations in sensitivity.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 115, 126–127. Tullock, *op. cit.*, p. 54–56, concludes for two issues, if all citizens vote, and if preferences are distributed uniformly over a rectangle or a circle, that three candidates do not converge. His illustration, however, assumes the consequence: Tullock's Figure XXXIX (p. 55) requires that candidates A and B have not adopted identical positions. If A and B are at the same point, however, then clearly candidate C should converge arbitrarily close to this point since this move maximizes both his plurality and his total vote. A careful scrutiny of this situation, nevertheless, yields some interesting observations. First, if all three candidates converge arbitrarily close to the mean, it is readily verified that such convergence is an equilibrium—no candidate has any incentive to shift unilaterally from the mean. Second, equilibria exist in which all three candidates adopt dissimilar positions symmetrically about the mean. In fact, there appear to be an infinity of equilibria triples—including convergence. This suggests that the final equilibrium triple is a function of initial conditions (e.g., the candidates' initial positions and whatever restrictions on strategies that exist) and their reaction paths. Clearly, then, multidimensional analysis of multiparty systems requires careful analysis, and this analysis undoubtedly will reveal many interesting and nonobvious conclusions. We are not prepared in this essay to conduct such an analysis, however, so we restrict our discussion to undimensional competition.



FIGURE 13.

consider the logic of Downs's analysis. Briefly, Downs asserts that parties do not converge in multi-party systems because they have little to gain by doing so. Parties which adopt positions near the extremes of the electorate's preference density do not converge toward the center because such movement succeeds in alienating voters who prefer these extreme positions. A party near the center has little incentive to converge to another party's position since such movement loses as many votes to one party as another party gains.

Implicit in this reasoning, however, are many assumptions concerning the rates at which the number of votes increases or decreases as strategies change. Specifically, we know from our analysis in the previous section that the strategic incentives of vote maximizing candidates depend upon the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy, or, equivalently, upon the cost of voting and the saliency of an issue. And conditions exist under which all candidates wish to converge to the center. To illustrate this possibility in dynamic terms, assume that three candidates initially adopt the positions α, θ, and ψ. (See Figure 13.) Observe now that if the sensitivity of turnout is sufficiently high or low, the second and third candidates, at θ and ψ, converge to the mean, while the first candidate, at α, seeks to converge to θ.[23] Thus, all three candidates eventually converge to the mean. Vote maximization, then, is not a sufficient condition for distinct strategies.

Our illustration also reveals a potential instability in competition. New parties might form at the extremes of the distribution of preferences after the original three parties converge since no party represents these extremes. With the absence of constraints on strategies, these new parties also seek to converge to the mean, leaving the extremes unrepresented again and the cycle resumes. This is the dilemma of parties in multi-party systems: vote maximization can require converging to the mean, while such convergence leaves the party vulnerable to the formation of new parties on its flank. Clearly, this problem confronts parties in electoral systems employing the plurality formula. The ease of entry and the rewards of new parties, however, are typically greater in systems in which candidates maximize votes than in systems in which they maximize plurality.[24] Thus, if a party maximizes votes, its leadership is more likely to be concerned with balancing its quest for votes and the threat of new parties than is the leadership of parties in plurality systems.

This system, of course, is an idealized construct in which parties and candidates have perfect spatial mobility. Typically, such factors as ideological patterns of recruitment, the historical association of parties with specific platforms, and the preferences of candidates themselves constrain the parties and their candidates. Nevertheless, we can discern some factors for stability in the model by considering intermediate levels of the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy.

We observe, previously, that two vote-maximizing candidates do not converge for such intermediate levels of sensitivity. We conjecture, therefore, that equilibrium is possible under similar conditions if the number of competing candidates exceeds two. To see this, assume that three candidates compete and that

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[23] Throughout this section we also assume that if a citizen votes, he votes for his most preferred candidate. Thomas W. Casstevens attempts to show that this assumption follows logically from the voter's decision theoretic calculus in "A Theorem About Voting." this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968). But Casstevens assumes that if a voter switches from candidate 1 to candidate 2, he does not affect the probability that candidate 3 wins—an assumption which does not follow logically from his structure (see Gerald H. Kramer, letter to the editor, this REVIEW, LXII (September, 1968)). Note however, that we are assuming that the candidates maximize votes, in which case the behavioral proposition that citizens vote for a preferred candidate to increase a candidate's total vote is admissable. For a decision-theoretic analysis of a citizen's calculus in multiparty systems see Richard McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting," (unpublished, University of Rochester, 1970.)

[24] William H. Riker, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Kul B. Rai, "A Theory of the Number of Political Parties" (unpublished, University of Rochester, 1970).



FIGURE 14.

their strategies are α, θ, and ψ. Assume, further that the candidates cannot cross each other (i.e., $\alpha \leq \theta \leq \psi$).[25] Finally, assume that the abstention function, $g(x-\theta)$, is rectangular (see Figure 6). With these assumptions, the necessary condition for an equilibrium in which the candidates do not converge is the system of simultaneous equations,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi, \alpha)/\partial\theta = f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) - f\left(\frac{\theta+\alpha}{2}\right) = 0$$

$$\partial V(\psi, \theta, \alpha)/\partial\psi = f(\psi+\delta) - \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = 0$$

$$\partial V(\alpha, \psi, \theta)/\partial\alpha = \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\alpha}{2}\right) - f(\alpha-\delta) = 0$$

or equivalently,

$$f\left(\frac{\theta+\alpha}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = 2f(\psi+\delta) = 2f(\alpha-\delta) \tag{12}$$

We illustrate a case which satisfies equation (12) in Figure 14. Note that the candidates do not converge, and that they array themselves about the mean of the symmetric density $f(x)$. Additionally, observe that the non-symmetric density $f_0(x)$ also satisfies equation (12) for the same three strategies. This later observation suggests that *similar electoral outcomes may result from dissimilar densities of preference if more than two candidates compete and if the candidates maximize votes.*

This analysis produces one additional result if we consider the effect of a fourth party's formation to the right of ψ. Denoting this new party's strategy by β, the conditions for an equilibrium in which the candidates do not converge are,

$$f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\theta+\alpha}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\psi+\beta}{2}\right) = 2f(\beta+\delta) = 2f(\alpha-\delta) \tag{13}$$

Observe, however, that the first three terms of this equality cannot be satisfied simultaneously for unimodal densities (unless $f(x)$ is a uniform density). This result implies that the two centrally located candidates (at θ and ψ) converge.[26] Stated differently, *if $f(x)$ is unimodal, and if the candidates maximize votes, only three distinct positions are represented in the election.* This result also describes the strategic implication of new parties that form at the extremes of the electorate's preferences. Specifically, *if $f(x)$ is unimodal, and if candidates maximize votes, the formation of new parties at the extremes of the electorate's preference forces the central (and presumably major) parties to vie with each other at the mean.*

Of course, $f(x)$ need not be a unimodal density, in which case many parties presumably can exist in equilibrium without converging. In lieu of pursuing such innumerable possibilities, we summarize our unidimensional analysis of

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[25] The restriction that candidates cannot cross each other is suggested by Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[26] To see this assume that α and θ are fixed and let β form to the right of ψ. The rate of change in votes for ψ becomes,

$$\frac{\partial V(\psi, \alpha, \theta, \beta)}{\partial\psi} = \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\psi+\beta}{2}\right) - \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)$$

Clearly, since $f(x)$ is unimodal and θ is fixed at the mean with $\beta > \psi > \theta$,

$$f\left(\frac{\psi+\beta}{2}\right) < f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right).$$

Thus, ψ converges to θ. It is readily shown that θ has no incentive now to shift to the left, so that with β assuming the old position of ψ the candidates are in equilibrium.

multi-party systems by reformulating Downs's assertion,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if the candidates maximize votes, and if alienation causes abstention, then all candidates converge to the mean if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is either high or low; but if this sensitivity assumes some intermediate value, three distinct strategies exist in equilibrium

V. MIXED MOTIVES

Candidates, however, do not simply adopt a dominant position, or shift about on the issues during a campaign. Candidates bargain, cajole, and compromise as they progress through the maze of individual and conflicting demands present in a plural society. Similarly, voting is only one form of possible citizen participation. Citizens can contribute finances, ring doorbells, provide endorsements, or frequently, nominate a candidate. Thus, candidates must weight some citizens' preferences more heavily than others when formulating campaign strategy. Consequently, the strategies candidates do adopt should reflect the unequal importance of citizens. We seek, therefore, to render spatial analysis compatible with these observations.

As we note elsewhere, however, a single mathematically precise theorem cannot summarize all of the forces which affect a candidate's decision.[27] Instead, we must apply several theorems in concert to the explanation of complex situations. We do not propose, then, to deduce new theorems in this section, but to illustrate the implications of our analysis for the problem of candidates who maximize plurality and who seek resources such as finances to conduct their campaigns.

Considering a simple example, we assume that: (1) the electorate consists of two groups which are differentiated by the resources that their members are able to contribute to a campaign. (2) Members of the first group either vote or abstain from voting. (3) Each member of the second group, in addition to voting, can contribute a commodity, say A, to his most preferred candidate's campaign. (4) A member of the second group contributes A if his expected utility from voting is sufficiently great. (5) Each candidate values the commodity A, and each candidate seeks to maximize his supply of it. (6) The candidates seek to maximize their plurality of votes. (7) The preferences of both groups are distributed symmetrically and unimodally and with identical means.

Ceteris paribus, the candidates should converge to the mean preference of the first group; but, since the candidates maximize A, they may seek to diverge from the mean preference of the second group. Clearly, the candidates' campaigns are simplified if the strategies that they adopt with respect to each group are independent: each group may be concerned with a different subset of issues, or each group might be unaware of the policies which a candidate advocates to the other group. Frequently, however, the concerns of such groups overlap and information cannot readily be controlled. The strategic imperatives of the two groups conflict.

One approach to this conflict is to adopt some simplified decision rule such as selecting a strategy which compromises the optimal strategies of the two groups. The question is, however: What weight should a candidate assign to the demands of each group? Should a candidate adopt a position near the mean of the first group or near the optimal strategy of the second group? To answer such questions candidates must ascertain the relative value of A, which is to say that we must ascertain the rate at which A can be converted into votes. For example, a candidate may be willing to forego a secure spatial position on an issue in order to secure sufficient finances so that he can support a campaign to vary his spatial location on some other issue, or so that he can vary the relative saliency of an issue.

Unfortunately, virtually no systematic knowledge exists concerning either the production possibilities of campaign resources or how candidates calculate these possibilities. Nevertheless, in lieu of such knowledge we propose an hypothesis: The greater the degree of competition the more value a candidate assigns to such resources as finances, endorsements, and the support of activists. The logic of this hypothesis is that as competition increases, a candidate needs more resources to implement an effective campaign. A candidate, for example, might attempt to convince the electorate that his opponent supports some unpopular policy. The greater the threat which such attempts pose, the more resources a candidate requires to counteract it. Thus, in terms of our illustration, the greater the degree of competition the greater the weight a candidate assigns to the strategic imperatives of the second group. Consequently, as competition increases, the distance each candidate's strategy diverges from the mean increases.

This conclusion clearly contradicts the assertion that competition fosters middle-of-the-road candidates. It provides one explanation for Warren E. Miller's observation that "party differences *within* [a congressional] district are heightened when electoral competition is keen and are reduced under single party domination of congressional electoral politics," and that "evenly balanced two-party competition . . . is associated with the reduction if not the total absence of direct representation of constituency policy preferences."[28] Briefly, two candidates may not converge if the citizens' preferences are distributed unimodally—the candidates may be maximizing valuable resources and this maximization can warrant strategies that diverge from the mean preference.

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[27] Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*

APPENDIX

The proof of our theorem consists, first, of demonstrating by a suitable selection of the dispersion of $f(x)$, that an equilibrium exists for n = 1 in which the candidates do not converge. This technique is then applied to the more general multidimensional situation. Without loss of generality we assume that the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, and that $\theta \leq \psi$. The expressions for $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$ and $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi$ become,

$$\text{(A1)} \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx - \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right)$$

$$\text{(A2)} \quad \frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi} = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f'(x)g(x-\psi)dx + \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) g\left(\frac{\theta-\psi}{2}\right)$$

where (A1) is candidate 1's rate of change of vote, and (A2) is candidate 2's rate of change of vote. Setting $\theta = -\psi$, equations (A1) and (A2) reduce to,

$$\text{(A3)} \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = \int_{-\infty}^{0} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx - \tfrac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$$

$$\text{(A4)} \quad \frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi} = \int_{0}^{\infty} f'(x)g(x-\psi)dx + \tfrac{1}{2}f(0)g(\theta)$$

but, since g is symmetric, $g(\psi) = g(\theta)$ so that,

$$\text{(A5)} \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = -\frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi}, \quad \theta = -\psi$$

If $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi = 0$ for $\psi = -\theta \neq 0$, then, from equation (A5), $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = 0$, and the candidates are in an equilibrium in which $\psi = -\theta \neq 0$ (i.e., they do not converge to the mean).

The proof that such an equilibrium can exist consists now of demonstrating that this occurs with a suitable choice of the variance of $f(x)$. Assume that $g(x-\theta)$ goes to zero for some finite x, say x', so that $g(x-\theta) = 0$, $|x-\theta| > x'$. Now by increasing the variance of $f(x)$ in the range $(x', 0)$, $f'(x)$ can be set as close to zero as we wish in this range. Thus, the integral term in equation (A3) can be made as small as we wish without affecting $\frac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$. With a suitable selection of $f'(x)$, therefore, we set,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{0} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx = \tfrac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$$

so that the candidates do not converge and are in equilibrium.

We now generalize our result for multivariate $f(x)$, i.e., x is a vector. We assume that a citizen's loss, $\phi(x-\theta)$, is a monotonic function of,

$$\|x-\theta\|^2_A = (x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$$

where A is a positive definite n$\times$n matrix. If this loss matrix is identical for all citizens, there exists a linear transformation of the dimensions such that A is the identity matrix I in the transformed space. Thus, with no loss of generality we assume,

$$\text{(A6)} \quad \phi(x-\theta) = \phi\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - \theta_i)^2\right)$$

Assume that $f(x)$ possesses major and minor axes such that these axes are represented as straight lines (among the numerous densities possessing this property, for example, is the multivariate normal density function). Suppose, now, that the domain of competition between θ and ψ is restricted to the line,

$$\text{(A7)} \quad \theta = c\psi$$

which passes through the origin and is a major or minor axis of $f(x)$. By a rotation of the axis it is possible to transform this line onto one of the coordinate axes, say x_1. Both candidates, therefore, choose the median preferred position of the population on issues 2 through n (which are normalized to zero for convenience). Let $f_0(x)$ and $g_0(x-\theta)$ be $f(x)$ and $g(x-\theta)$ in the rotated coordinate system, and let x and θ now be measured in this new system. Obviously $f_0(x)$ is symmetric if $f(x)$ is symmetric. Additionally, since the loss matrix is the identity, the rotation of the axis leaves the loss function ϕ invariant, i.e., also in the new coordinate system equation (A6) remains valid. Thus, since $g(x-\theta)$ is a function of ϕ, $g_0(x-\theta)$ depends only on $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i-\theta_i)^2 = \|x-\theta\|$, and is symmetric. Simplifying notation, we drop the subscript "o".

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[28] "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, ed. by E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarch Society, 1964), p. 359, 376.

The vote for candidate 1 is expressed in vector notation now as,

$$\text{(A8)} \qquad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_R f(x) g(x - \theta) dx$$

where,

$$\text{(A9)} \qquad R = \{x : \|x - \theta\| < \|x - \psi\|\} \subset E^n$$

i.e., R is a set in n-dimensional Euclidean space containing the most preferred positions of all citizens who prefer θ to ψ. To facilitate presentation we restrict our analysis now to the case of $n=2$. The method of analysis, however, is easily generalized. Thus,

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad \theta = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_1 \\ \theta_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{and} \quad \psi = \begin{bmatrix} \psi_1 \\ \psi_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Let $y = x - \theta$ and $\xi = \theta - \psi$.

Observe now that $\|x - \theta\| = \|y\|$, and $\|x - \psi\| = \|y + \xi\|$. Thus, $R = \{y : \|y\| < \|y + \xi\|\}$, so that from (A8) and (A9) we get,

$$\text{(A10)} \qquad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_R f(y + \theta) g(y) dy$$

Reexpressing R,

$$\begin{aligned} R &= \{y : \|y\| < \|y + \xi\|\} \\ &= \{y : y_1^2 + y_2^2 < (y_1 - \xi_1)^2 + (y_2 + \xi_2)^2\} \\ &= \{y : 0 < 2\xi_1 y_1 + 2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_1^2 + \xi_2^2\} \\ &= \{y : 2\xi_1 y_1 > -2\xi_2 y_2 - \xi_1^2 - \xi_2^2\} \end{aligned}$$

And, defining,

$$y^* = -\frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_1^2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1}$$

we get for R,

$$R = \{y : y_1 > y^*\}$$

Suppose now, without loss of generality, that $\theta_1 < \psi_1$. Thus, from the definition of ξ, $\xi_1 = \theta_1 - \psi_1 < 0$, so that (A10) can be taken out of vector notation and rewritten as,

$$\text{(A11)} \qquad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{y_1^*} f(y_1 + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) \cdot g(y_1, y_2) dy_1 dy_2$$

Our next step is to differentiate $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ_1. We observe first that,

$$\frac{\partial y_1^*}{\partial \theta_1} = \frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1^2} - \frac{1}{2}$$

Thus, using Leibnitz's rule (see footnote 12), we get,

$$\text{(A12)} \qquad \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta_1 = \int_R \frac{\partial f(y + \theta)}{\partial x_1} g(y) dy + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(y_1^* + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) g(y_1^*, y_2) \cdot \left[\frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1} - \frac{1}{2}\right] dy_2$$

To show that an equilibrium can exist such that the candidates do not converge and that they adopt strategies symmetrically on opposite sides of the mean on either the major or the minor axis of $f(x)$, let $\psi_1 = -\theta_1$ and $\psi_2 = \theta_2 = 0$. Thus, $\xi_1 = 2\theta_1$, $\xi_2 = 0$, and $y_1^* = \theta_1$. Substituting these identities, and $x = y + \theta$ into expression (A12), we have,

$$\text{(A13)} \qquad \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta_1 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{0} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1} g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2) dx_1 dx_2 - \frac{1}{2} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(0, x_2) g(-\theta_1, x_2) dx_2$$

Thus, by increasing the variance of $f(x)$ we can make the first term of (A13) as small as possible without affecting the magnitude of the second term. This proves that an equilibrium exists such that the candidates do not converge towards each other along either axis of $f(x)$. We now show that an equilibrium on an axis of



FIGURE 15.

$f(x)$ is at least a local equilibrium, i.e., that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = 0$. First, we observe that,

$$\partial y_1^*/\partial\theta_2 = -\frac{y_2 + \xi_2}{\xi_1}$$

Thus, again applying Leibnitz's rule, we get from (A11),

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = \int_R \frac{\partial f(y + \theta)}{\partial x_2} g(y)dy$$

$$-\frac{1}{\xi_1}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(y_1^* + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) g(y_1^*, y_2)(y_2 + \xi_2)dy_2$$

Setting $\psi_1 = -\theta_1$, $\psi_2 = \theta_2$, our presumed local equilibrium state, and $x = y + \theta$, we have,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\int_{-\infty}^{0} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2}$$

$$\cdot g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2 - \theta_2)dx_1 dx_2$$

$$-\frac{1}{2\theta_1}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [x_2 - \theta_2] f(0, x_2)$$

$$\cdot g(-\theta_1, x_2 - \theta_2)dx_2$$

Finally, if $\theta_2 = 0$ (i.e., if the axis of $f(x)$ is rotated to correspond to an axis of the coordinate space), we get,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x_2 f(0, x_2) g(-\theta_1, x_2)dx = 0$$

This follows from the symmetry of $f(0, x_2)g(-\theta_1, x_2)$ in x_2. And, since $\partial f(x_1, x_2)/\partial x_2$ is an odd function of x_2,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2)dx_2 = 0.$$

so $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = 0$.

We illustrate in Figure 15 some contours of a symmetric density which is rotated so that the major and minor axes of $f(x)$ correspond to x_1 and x_2. The vector A in this illustration corresponds to $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2$; and B corresponds to $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_1$. The vector C corresponds to the rate of change of candidate 1's vote as θ changes in the direction of C, and the magnitude of C can be expressed as

$$C = \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial\theta_1} \operatorname{Cos}\gamma + \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial\theta_2} \operatorname{Sin}\gamma$$

where γ is the angle between C and B. But we have just shown that both terms of this expression equal zero, so the magnitude of C equals zero. Thus, the candidate's total vote declines if he shifts in any direction from θ, and θ is at least a local equilibrium point.

CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

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Political efficacy, the belief that the ruled in a political system have some capacity for exercising influence over the rulers, has been studied extensively by political researchers. A selected bibliography compiled by Easton and Dennis in early 1967 contains some thirty books and articles which have dealt in one way or another with political efficacy and its correlates.[1] And this bibliography could be updated considerably.

Substantial theoretic import has been attributed to political efficacy. Easton and Dennis consider the SRC sense of political efficacy construct to be an important determinant of the persistence of democratic regimes. They argue that beliefs in political efficacy provide "a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system can automatically draw in normal times, when members may feel that their capacity to manipulate the environment is not living up to their expectations, and in special periods of stress, when popular participation may appear to be pure illusion or when political outputs fail to measure up to insistent demands,"[2] A related construct, termed "subjective competence" by Almond and Verba, is based on different indicators but interpreted as substantively equivalent to the SRC construct. On the basis of their analysis of the Five-Nation data, Almond and Verba arrive at the general conclusion that "the self-confident [subjectively competent] citizen appears to be the democratic citizen."[3] The concept of political competence, as formulated by Barnes, subsumes political efficacy under the aegis of an individual attribute consisting of "political skills plus the sense of efficacy necessary for effective political action."[4] Barnes contends that high levels of political competence dispose individuals to prefer democratic styles of leadership, while low levels dispose individuals to prefer authoritarian styles. On these grounds, he concludes that relatively high levels of political competence are a necessary condition of political democracy.[5]

Although theoretic significance has been attached to political efficacy and to the more general notion of political competence, conceptual ambiguities remain which need to be resolved. Both psychological factors and political skills are components warranting inclusion in any conceptualization of the dimensions of political competence, but the psychological factors, particularly, require careful specification.

Easton and Dennis have observed that "political efficacy appears in three separate although by no means independent guises: as a norm, as a psychological disposition or feeling, and as a form of behavior."[6] Ambiguity has resulted from failure to distinguish between the SRC sense of efficacy construct—"the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change—"[7] and the Almond-Verba measures of competence. The basic thrust of the SRC questions appears to be toward tapping beliefs in the extent to which the *norm* of political efficacy is actualized in a political system: the sense that the government is responsive to citizens *in general*. By contrast, psychological feelings of confidence, or beliefs on the part of the individual that he himself has the *personal* capacity to wield influence, appear to be the common core of the rather bewildering profusion of competence measures employed by Almond and Verba.[8]

Following the formulations of Barnes and

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[1] David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, (March, 1967), p. 27.

[2] Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[3] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 257.

[4] Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political Competence," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 60.

[5] Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–83; see also Ch. 13 of Barnes' *Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

[6] Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[7] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 187.

[8] Their measures of *political competence*—also referred to as *citizen competence* and *subjective civic competence*—and its components of *local* and *national competence*, as well as *local subjective competence* and *national subjective competence*, all include the item pertaining to whether the individual thinks he can personally influence governmental decisions. See Chs. 7–9 in the *Civic Culture*.

Easton and Dennis, political competence will be conceptualized here as involving three basic dimensions: (1) a general belief that government is responsive to citizen influence; (2) skills necessary for effective political behavior; and (3) a psychological disposition or feeling of confidence in one's personal ability to influence salient government decisions.

If political competence is to contribute to the development and maintenance of democratic patterns of government, it would seem important that the dimensions of political competence be *congruent;* that is, a pattern of moderately strong interrelationships ought to obtain among them. Conversely, incongruities, might be expected to function as a potential source of stress on democratic government.

Given some motivation for attempting to influence the political process, such as dissatisfaction with political outputs and/or feelings of socioeconomic deprivation, it would seem likely that individuals possessing the rudimentary skills which are a prerequisite for effective influence would be less likely to withdraw support if they believed the government was patterened such that, over the long run, citizen influence over the behavior of public officials was fact rather than illusion. Also, if possession of skills necessary for effective influence were not associated with personal confidence in ability to exert influence, again it might be likely that perception of lack of opportunity to in fact exert influence would contribute to withdrawal of support. Finally, if citizens did not make any connection between the degree to which the government was responsive to the membership in general and their own confidence in being able to exert influence, either set of beliefs might be more susceptible to fluctuation according to circumstances of the moment, thereby introducing a greater potential for stress, than if beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm buttressed beliefs in personal ability to exert influence.

This research, then, will focus on two major questions. (1) Can political competence be defined cross-nationally by (a) the same general dimensions and (b) equivalent operational indicators of these dimensions? (2) And (most importantly with respect to the relevance of political competence for the functioning of political democracy) is there a cross-national tendency for individuals to generalize from beliefs that the government is responsive to influence from the membership in general, and from possession of political resources necessary for effective influence, to feelings of confidence in their own ability to influence salient government decisions?

The data base for this investigation is the revised 1968 Inter-University Consortium for Political Research issue of the Five-Nation study conducted by Almond and Verba in 1959–60. The Five-Nation interview schedule included numerous items relevant to the measurement of political competence and thus affords a useful extant source for cross-national investigation of the concept.

I. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

In order to answer the question of whether political competence can be defined cross-nationally by three general dimensions consisting of equivalent indicators, a principal components analysis was performed on the same sixteen items from each nation and the resulting solutions were then subjected to Varimax rotation.[9] Of course, the samples available for this test are drawn from nations at the upper end of the socioeconomic development continuum; thus the finding can be considered as generalizable mainly to industrialized societies. Table 1 shows the results of the factor analyses of these items for the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Factor loadings lower than .300 have been excluded in order to facilitate visual interpretation.

It was hypothesized that the first seven items, measuring exposure to political communication in the mass media, attention to political campaigns, political knowledge, and discussion of public affairs, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Political Involvement;* also, it was hypothesized tentatively that items 8 and 9, measuring the individual's beliefs in his ability to understand local and national issues, would load with the first seven items, since these beliefs seem to be concomitants particularly of attention to politics, political knowledge, and political dis-

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[9] Initially, seventeen items were included in the analysis. Variable #127 from the ICPR Five-Nation study issue, measuring respondents' agreement-disagreement with the sense of efficacy proposition, "the way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country," did not load as hypothesized and was dropped from the analysis reported in this paper. Apparently, the belief that voting decides policy is not a component of the political efficacy dimension which is equivalent cross-nationally. The sixteen variable solutions shown in Table 1 were derived by specifying rotation to three factors. The eigenvalue for the third factor in these solutions is quite close to 1.0.

TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE: FIVE NATIONS

	United States			United Kingdom			West Germany			Italy			Mexico		
	(*N* =970)			(*N* =963)			(*N* =955)			(*N* =995)			(*N* =1295)		
	(PI) I	(AIG) II	(PE) III	(PI) I	(AIG) II	(PE) III	(PI) I	(AIG) II	(PE) III	(PI) I	(AIG) II	(PE) III	(PI) I	(AIG) II	(PE) III
1. Follow Govt Affairs Newspapers	.776			.795			.823			.833			.790		
2. Follow Govt Affairs TV or Radio	.733			.747			.792			.824			.673		
3. Follow Govt Affairs Magazines	.701			.493			.628			.839			.661		
4. Pay Attention to Campaigns	.619			.536			.641			.583			.563		
5. Knowledge of Party Leaders	.654			.661			.703			.724			.628		
6. Knowledge of Cabinet Positions	.631			.673			.637			.685			.623		
7. Discuss Govt Affairs	.595	.316		.623			.633			.733			.674		
8. Understand Local Issues	.443			.442			.502			.709			.664		
9. Understand Issues Facing Country	.588	.310	.346	.570	.394		.716			.746			.632		
10. Could Change Bad Local Regulation		.755			.695			.826			.783			.790	
11. Would Act on Bad Local Regulation		.751			.740			.818			.799			.780	
12. Could Change Bad National Law		.690			.715			.647			.793			.801	
13. Would Act on Bad National Law	.335	.703			.733			.680			.774			.838	
14. Average Man Understand Govt			.727			.638	.325		.378	.362		.369			.385
15. Candidates Act After Election			.739			.662			.648			.718			.705
16. People Have Say in Govt		.364	.455			.612			.622			.740			.736

(PI): Political Involvement (AIG): Ability to Influence Government (PE): Political Efficacy

cussion.[10] These rudimentary political skills consist of activities, cognitions, and beliefs which, according to Milbrath's hierarchy of political involvement, define the spectator stratum.[11]

Further, it was hypothesized that items 10, 11, 12, and 13, which formed the core of the various Almond-Verba competence measures, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Ability to Influence Government.*[12] These items are measures of an individual's evaluation of his personal ability to influence local and national government decisions perceived as unjust or harmful.[13]

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[10] The items hypothesized as defining a Political Involvement dimension, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are: #23, Follow Government Affairs in Newspapers: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high; #34, Follow Government Affairs on Television or Radio: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high; #25, Follow Government Affairs in Magazines: 3-point scale, "Once a Week or More"—low, "Never"—high; #81, Pay Attention to Campaign: 3-point scale, "Much"—low, "None"—high; #99, Name Party Leaders: 7-point scale, Seven or Six Correct—low, "None Correct"—high; #135, Name Cabinet Positions: 6-point scale, "Five Correct"—low, "None Correct"—high; #26 (Do You) Talk About Government Affairs With People: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high, #31, Understand Local Issues: 5-point scale, "Very well"—low, "Not at All"—high; #30, Understand Issues Facing the Country: 5-point scale, "Very Well"—low, "Not at all"—high.

[11] The hierarchy of political involvement is presented in Figure 3 at page 18 of Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965).

[12] The items hypothesized as defining an Ability to Influence Government dimension, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are: #39, Could Change Bad Regulation: 5-point scale; #40, Would Act on Regulation: 5-point scale; #43, Could You Change Law: 5-point scale; #44, Would You Act on Law: 5-point scale.

Finally, it was hypothesized that items 14, 15, and 16, similar to the SRC sense of efficacy items, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Political Efficacy*. In contrast to the Ability to Influence Government items, which measure the degree to which individuals believe they could and would try to influence government, the Political Efficacy items are measures of the comprehensibility and responsiveness of government to citizens in general.[14]

On the whole, the factor structures for the five countries are characterized by the rather striking clarity with which the hypothesized dimensions emerge. Those items measuring rudimentary political skills consistently define the first factor. There are a few moderate loadings between .400 and .600—three in the United States, four in the United Kingdom, and one each in the remaining three countries; otherwise, the rudimentary political skills items are strongly correlated with a Political Involvement dimension.

The second factor is especially distinct in each country. Without exception, the items measuring an individual's beliefs in his personal ability to influence local and national government decisions are strongly correlated with an Ability to Influence Government dimension.

The third factor is more problematic. In the United States and the United Kingdom this factor is clearly defined by the items measuring beliefs in the efficacy norm. Among Americans, People Have Say in Government is only moderately correlated with the Political Efficacy factor; otherwise, the comprehensibility and responsiveness of government items are strongly correlated with a Political Efficacy dimension in these two countries. Among Germans, Italians, and Mexicans, the government responsiveness items show consistently strong correlations with a Political Efficacy dimension; however, Average Man Understand Government—the comprehensibility of government item—does not load very well on this dimension, and among Germans and Italians, this item shows almost as much association with the Political Involvement factor as with Political Efficacy.

In general, visual inspection of the factor solutions affirms the hypothesis that political competence can be defined cross-nationally by the same dimensions and that these dimensions are operationally equivalent phenomena. Support for this interpretation is provided by the coefficients of congruence between these factor structures. The coefficient of congruence measures the degree to which factor structures for a fixed set of variables are invariant across different populations.[15] Across the five countries, the congruence coefficients describing the similarity of the Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government factor pairings are quite high: the range for Political Involvement is between .995 and .979; for

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Variables 39 and 43 were recoded as follows: "Very Likely" = 1; "Moderately Likely" = 2; "Likely Only If Others Joined In" = 3; "Somewhat Unlikely" = 4; "Not at All Likely—Impossible" = 5. Variables 40 and 44 were recoded as follows: "Very Likely" = 1; "Moderately Likely" = 2; "Depends on the Issue" = 3; "Somewhat Unlikely" = 4; "Not at All Likely—Impossible" = 5.

[13] A situation was defined as follows: "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (specify most local government unit—town, village, etc.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do." After respondents had reported whether they could do something they were then asked: (1) "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed"; (2) "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually do something about it"; (3) "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision." The initial item in the series (both local and national), whether respondents believed they could do something, was not included in the factor analyses because it formed a 2-point scale; the last item, have you ever done anything, was not included because it is a measure of a more intensive level of participation than Political Involvement, and this level of participation (what Milbrath terms "transitional activities,") is not the subject of this analysis.

[14] The items, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are #29, Average Man Understand Government: 3-point scale; #130 Candidates Act After Election: 3-point scale; #132, People Have No Say in Government: 3-point scale. In order to avoid performing factor analysis on unstable phi coefficients, DK responses to all these items were coded as the midpoint on these scales. These variables were recoded so that all scales would run in the same direction; in these instances "Disagree" is low, "Agree" is high.

[15] See Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, 2nd Ed.), pp. 268–272. The coefficients are shown in Appendix A.

Ability to Influence Government the range is between .988 and .943. The congruence coefficient for the Political Efficacy factor in the United States and the United Kingdom is also quite high, attaining a value of .964. However, the majority of the congruence coefficients for the other Political Efficacy factor pairings fall between .900 and .800, indicating only moderate congruence, a reflection of the fact that Average Man Understand Government is much less a component of Political Efficacy in West Germany, Italy, and Mexico, than in the United States and the United Kingdom.

A criticism levelled at the analysis of these data by the original investigators was that their approach tended to focus exclusively on comparison between nations, leaving open the possibility that relationships found to exist between whole nations might not hold up or might be altered substantially by within-nation variation due to such factors as geographic and level of urbanization differences.[16] If one is interested in examining interrelationships between dimensions of political competence across different nations, substantial within-nation variation by such variables as region and size of place would have to be taken into account in order to develop theoretically useful generalizations.

The statistical technique employed to investigate regional and size of place effects on the distribution of political competence within nations is one-way analysis of variance, useful when testing for a relationship between a quantified (measured on an interval scale) variable and a qualitative—or higher order—variable. Tables 2–4 show the variation in political competence by region and size of place for the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy (Mexico has not been included because the Mexican sample was not coded by region and is unreliable with respect to size of place).[17] Political Efficacy scores range from −11 to 56; Political Involvement scores range from −05 to 72; Ability to Influence Government scores range from 0 to 55. The direction of these scales is inverse to score magnitude: the lower the score, the higher the level of competence; the higher the score, the lower the level of competence.[18] Due to the inflation of F by sample size, the significance level selected for rejection of the null hypothesis is .01.

A statistically significant F indicates that there are nonchance variations between means somewhere among the groups. The interesting question involves determination of which groups are significantly different. Assuming that the estimates of the population variance for each group meet the assumption of homoscedasticity, that is, are equal, then a significant F indicates that the largest difference between group means is necessarily statistically significant. A variety of procedures exist for making other a posteriori comparisons.[19] The method adopted here is that proposed by Scheffé; with regard to Type I error, it is more rigorous than other multiple comparison methods.[20]

Table 2 shows that Political Efficacy is distributed rather evenly by region and size of place in the four countries. Statistically significant regional variation in Political Efficacy appears only among Italians; significant size of place variation appears only among Germans. Italians residing in central Italy manifest a substantially greater degree of belief in the efficacy norm ($\overline{X}=33.65$) than do their compatriots from the north ($\overline{X}=41.16$) and south ($\overline{X}=41.40$). By size of place in West Germany, Political Efficacy tends to be disproportionately located in large urban areas

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[16] See the review of the *Civic Culture* by Stein Rokkan in this REVIEW (September, 1964).

[17] The Mexican sample only included towns with populations of 10,000 or more.

[18] The methodology of scale construction is discussed in Appendix B. The Political Efficacy scales are less equivalent across the samples than the other scales because the contribution of the Average Man Understand Government component is negligible in West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Thus, the equivalence of the Political Efficacy scales for all the countries is mainly in terms of beliefs about the responsiveness of government to the membership in general.

[19] The multiple t test method has the least to recommend it because there is no way to determine how many of the comparisons which achieve statistical significance are due to chance alone, or to the circumstance that, since the t tests cannot be regarded as independent, some results dictate, others. For a useful discussion see William L. Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 375–376 and 471–472.

[20] The Scheffé method is relatively insensitive to departures from normality and homoscedasticity, and is applicable to groups of unequal sizes. Its drawback is that it is probably too conservative with regard to Type I error; as compensation, Scheffé recommends that a significance level of .10 be selected. A brief but lucid presentation is in George A. Ferguson, *Statistical Methods in Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, 2nd Ed.), pp. 295–297.

TABLE 2. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN POLITICAL EFFICACY

MEAN POLITICAL EFFICACY SCORES: BY REGION

					Mean Square	F
	East ($N=249$)	South ($N=312$)	West ($N=409$)			
United States[a]	33.27	36.13	33.05	Between Within	950.41 306.20	3.10 n.s.
	England ($N=811$)	Scotland ($N=94$)	Wales ($N=58$)			
United Kingdom	36.40	39.11	40.26	Between Within	655.95 294.36	2.23 n.s.
	North ($N=210$)	Central ($N=564$)	South ($N=181$)			
West Germany[b]	38.54	37.19	39.79	Between Within	505.34 237.21	2.13 n.s.
	North ($N=470$)	Central ($N=191$)	South ($N=334$)			
Italy	41.17	33.65	41.40	Between Within	4480.56 194.19	23.07 $p<.001$

MEAN POLITICAL EFFICACY SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE

					Mean Square	F
	<20000 ($N=406$)	20000–100000 ($N=142$)	>100000 ($N=422$)			
United States	35.03	30.75	34.32	Between Within	985.97 306.12	3.22 n.s.
	<20000 ($N=240$)	20000–100000 ($N=299$)	>100000 ($N=424$)			
United Kingdom	37.60	35.74	37.33	Between Within	299.34 295.10	1.01 n.s.
	<20000 ($N=354$)	20000–100000 ($N=329$)	>100000 ($N=272$)			
West Germany	40.12	38.15	34.98	Between Within	2043.38 233.99	8.73 $p<.001$
	<20000 ($N=324$)	20000–100000 ($N=544$)	>100000 ($N=127$)			
Italy	39.16	40.24	39.61	Between Within	122.16 202.97	0.60 n.s.

[a] The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

[b] The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

($\bar{X}=34.98$) as opposed to medium-size towns ($\bar{X}=38.15$) and small town-rural areas ($\bar{X}=40.12$).[21]

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[21] For all a posteriori comparisons in Tables 2–4, the obtained F must be equal to or greater than 4.60 if the null hypothesis is to be rejected according to the Scheffé procedure ($\alpha=.10$). In reporting the F values for the comparisons, those which are statistically significant have been italicized. The break in Political Efficacy by region among Italians is obvious. The relevant comparisons on Political Efficacy by size of place among Germans are: <20000, 20000–100000—F = 2.89; 20000–100000, >100000—F = *6.25*.

TABLE 3. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

MEAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT SCORES: BY REGION

	East ($N=249$)	South ($N=312$)	West ($N=409$)		Mean Square	F
United States[a]	29.90	35.72	30.80	Between Within	2988.16 331.63	9.01 $p<.001$
	England ($N=811$)	Scotland ($N=94$)	Wales ($N=58$)			
United Kingdom	36.51	38.16	48.50	Between Within	3922.91 313.66	12.51 $p<.001$
	North ($N=210$)	Central ($N=564$)	South ($N=181$)			
West Germany[b]	28.07	33.80	34.45	Between Within	2871.47 327.62	8.77 $p<.001$
	North ($N=470$)	Central ($N=191$)	South ($N=334$)			
Italy	45.96	47.80	43.33	Between Within	1337.23 300.51	4.45 n.s.

MEAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE

	<20000 ($N=406$)	20000–100000 ($N=142$)	>100000 ($N=422$)		Mean Square	F
United States	34.20	30.11	30.88	Between Within	1491.63 334.72	4.46 n.s.
	<20000 ($N=240$)	20000–100000 ($N=299$)	>100000 ($N=424$)			
United Kingdom	39.61	35.82	37.25	Between Within	963.97 319.82	3.01 n.s.
	<20000 ($N=354$)	20000–100000 ($N=329$)	>100000 ($N=272$)			
West Germany	35.36	31.97	29.96	Between Within	2345.34 328.72	7.14 $p<.001$
	<20000 ($N=324$)	20000–100000 ($N=544$)	>100000 ($N=127$)			
Italy	46.50	44.46	46.85	Between Within	571.75 302.05	1.89 n.s.

[a] The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

[b] The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

The data presented in Table 3 indicate that Political Involvement, like Political Efficacy, is generally homogenous by size of place. Only in West Germany does Political Involvement vary significantly by size of place: Germans residing in small town and rural areas, whose mean Political Involvement score is 35.36, manifest less of these rudimentary skills than do those residing in medium-size towns and large urban areas, whose mean scores are 31.97 and 29.96, respectively.[22] On the other hand, in three of the four countries the distribution of Political Involvement clearly

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[22] <20000, 20000–100000—$F=15.21$; 20000–100000, >100000—$F=1.69$.

TABLE 4. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT

MEAN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT SCORES: BY REGION

	East($N=249$)	South($N=312$)	West($N=409$)		Mean Square	F
United States[a]	30.01	33.96	32.51	Between Within	1089.31 191.63	5.68 $p<.01$
	England($N=811$)	Scotland($N=94$)	Wales($N=58$)			
United Kingdom	33.09	33.46	35.72	Between Within	189.69 180.50	1.05 n.s.
	North($N=210$)	Central($N=564$)	South($N=181$)			
West Germany[b]	37.47	37.25	37.29	Between Within	3.84 141.16	0.03 n.s.
	North($N=470$)	Central($N=191$)	South($N=334$)			
Italy	35.70	41.38	38.25	Between Within	2271.31 140.59	16.20 $p<.001$

MEAN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE

	<20000($N=406$)	20000–100000($N=142$)	>100000($N=422$)		Mean Square	F
United States	34.20	30.11	30.88	Between Within	1491.63 334.72	4.46 n.s.
	<20000($N=240$)	20000–100000($N=299$)	>100000($N=424$)			
United Kingdom	33.88	32.18	33.72	Between Within	263.72 180.35	1.46 n.s.
	<20000($N=354$)	20000–100000($N=329$)	>100000($N=272$)			
West Germany	37.31	37.75	36.90	Between Within	57.13 141.05	0.41 n.s.
	<20000($N=324$)	20000–100000($N=544$)	>100000($N=127$)			
Italy	37.47	37.92	36.95	Between Within	56.44 145.06	0.39 n.s.

[a] The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West south Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

[b] The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

varies by region. Among Americans, the difference occurs between the south and the nonsouth: Political Involvement is lower in the south ($\bar{X}=35.72$) than in the east ($\bar{X}=29.90$) and west ($\bar{X}=30.80$).[23] On the average, in the United Kingdom the English ($\bar{X}=36.51$) and the Scots ($\bar{X}=38.16$) manifest substantially greater levels of the rudimentary political skills which define the Political Involvement dimension than do the Welsh ($\bar{X}=48.50$).[24]

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[23] East, West—F=0.38; South, West—F=*12.96*.

[24] England, Scotland—F=0.74; Scotland, Wales—F=*12.25*.

And in West Germany the level of Political Involvement is greater among Germans residing in the north, whose mean score is 28.07, than among Germans residing in the central and southern regions of the country, whose mean scores are 33.80 and 34.45, respectively.[25]

Turning to Table 4, it can be seen that Ability to Influence Government is homogenous by size of place in each of the four countries. By region, in the United States Ability to Influence Government beliefs appear to be located to a greater degree in the east ($\overline{X}=30.01$) than in the south ($\overline{X}=33.96$) and west ($\overline{X}=32.51$)[26]. The F-ratio for Ability to Influence Government by region among Italians should be regarded with caution, since the condition of heteroscedasticity (unequal variances) obtains between these regions, and may inflate the F-ratio spuriously.[27] Tentatively, then, it may be inferred that in Italy the incidence of Ability to Influence Government beliefs is highest of all in the northern region, where the mean score is 35.70, lower in the southern region, where the mean is 38.25, and lowest of all in central Italy, where the mean is 41.38.[28]

Analysis of variance thus indicates that the three dimensions of political competence are relatively homogeneously distributed by region and size of place in the four countries studied: differences clearly appear, but they do not define consistent disproportionate location of political competence either in certain geographic regions or in certain communities differentiated by degree of urbanization. The regional differences which appear in the United States on Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government are mixed rather than exclusively south versus nonsouth. Among Germans, size of place affects the distribution of Political Efficacy and Political Involvement, but these effects are mixed; the size of place difference on Political Efficacy occurs between small town-rural areas and medium-size towns versus large urban areas, whereas the Political Involvement difference pits small town-rural areas against medium-size towns and large urban areas. Although Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government differ by region in Italy, the effect of region is mixed, levels of Ability to Influence Government appearing to be highest in northern Italy, somewhat lower in the south, and lowest in the central region, whereas levels of Political Efficacy are greater in central Italy, as opposed to the north and south. (The findings that Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government are *not* consistently lower in south Italy than in central and northern Italy and that Political Involvement is *evenly* distributed across the whole of Italy, support Kogan's criticism of the LaPalombara-Tarrow thesis that Italian political culture is sharply divided between north and south; Kogan points out that the Five-Nation data do not show sharp differences on many political culture variables and he argues that, in general, the dualistic political culture thesis is an exaggeration.)[29]

Since consistent regional or size of place imbalances in political competence do not appear within the four countries, subsequent analysis will focus on relationships between the competence dimensions within each country as a whole. The finding of homogeneity with respect to levels of urbanization is interesting from a substantive point of view because it is consistent with Neubauer's thesis that, among nations which have developed beyond a socioeconomic threshold supportive to political democracy (a class which includes each of these nations), factors such as urbanization will have little effect on the development and maintenance of democratic patterns of government.[30] As the growth of political competence generally is considered conducive to political democracy, Neubauer's thesis would imply the lack of relationship found here.

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[25] North, Central—$F=15.21$; Central, South—$F=0.18$.

[26] East, West—$F=5.29$; South, West—$F=1.96$.

[27] Where groups are of unequal sizes and a single test is desired of the hypothesis that $\sigma_1^2=\sigma_2^2= \cdots =\sigma_k^2=\sigma^2$, the appropriate method is the Bartlett test for homogeneity of variance, described at pages 193–194 of Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1953). The test yields a statistic B which has a chi-square distribution with $k-1$ degrees of freedom. The B value for Ability to Influence Government by region is 27.23. This is substantially greater than the chi-square value required for rejection of the null hypothesis at the .001 level, which is 13.8. Therefore, considerable lack of homogeneity is indicated.

[28] North, South—$F=9.00$; Central, South—$F=8.41$.

[29] See Norman Kogan's review of Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) in this REVIEW (December, 1968). Kogan's criticism is confined to Tarrow's presentation of the dualistic culture thesis, but LaPalombara's view is apposite with that of Tarrow; see Joseph LaPalombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, and Alienation," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[30] See Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions

The finding that levels of Political Involvement do vary by region in three of the four countries is also of substantive interest, although explanation of this pattern is not a simple matter. Region is a surrogate variable; factors such as differences in levels of industrialization, communications development, education, and income, as well as differences in political history and traditions, may be reflected in the differential distribution of Political Involvement by region in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Detailed investigation of which factors are responsible for the effect of region is not a purpose of this paper. However, it may be that subcultural attitudes of regional separatism are responsible for much of the effect of region on Political Involvement in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Political Involvement scale measures mainly involvement in national politics. Regions with a history of separatist sentiment such as the southern United States and Wales might be expected to show lower levels of *national* political involvement than regions without such traditions. Separatism is still very much a part of the political history of the American South. And Welsh nationalism is distinctive in the United Kingdom. Alford states that "Welsh nationalism is apparently growing, not dying," and cites evidence pointing to the conspicuousness of Welsh separatism: "If language can be considered a crucial index of the cultural basis for regional separatism, then clearly Wales ranks higher than Scotland; for in 1931, 37 per cent of the Welsh population spoke Welsh, while only 2 per cent of the Scottish population spoke Gaelic."[31]

II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

Circularity of influence surely operates among the three dimensions of political competence. However, the presumption in the following analysis is that Political Efficacy and Political Involvement function largely as antecedents of Ability to Influence Government. Setting Political Involvement prior to Ability to Influence Government entails an assumption which seems plausible enough: that the major path of causation involves a relationship in which the characteristics that define Political Involvement are political resources which should contribute to the individual's development of confidence in his personal ability to wield influence over salient political decisions.

The placement of Political Efficacy is more questionable. Among adults, generalization from confidence in personal political potency to confidence in the overall responsiveness of the government might be expected to occur. However, Easton and Dennis have shown that, in the American political system, a coherent structure of beliefs in the overall responsiveness-nonresponsiveness of the government to citizen influence is inculcated in children (at least white middle-class children) at an early age.[32] On the basis of their findings (admittedly a flimsy empirical base at this stage—but by no means implausible), the assumption adopted here is that the major path of causation between Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government involves a relationship in which beliefs about the extent to which the efficacy norm is a reality in the political system, inculcated in children through processes of conditioned learning, affect adult confidence

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of Democracy," this REVIEW (December, 1967).

[31] Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 143 and 142 note 26, respectively.

[32] Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 29–33. As the authors note at page 31: "The most important conclusion emerging from our principal component analysis is that by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude, as revealed in the five high-loading items, which we could call a sense of political efficacy. This basic orientation is likely to become crystallized early in the life of the individual and to be maintained at least through these grades. This does not say, of course, that the third-grade child has developed a *high* sense of political efficacy, nor does it assert that any particular proportion of them experience this sentiment at any level of intensity. It only says that an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years." Data on the direction (positive-negative) of efficacy beliefs among children in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany is reported in Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in four Western Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* (April, 1968) These authors are concerned with whether there is an upward or downward trend in the aggregate level of positive efficacy feelings among children from youngest to oldest in the four countries. Their study does not focus on the age at which children acquire a coherent structure of beliefs about the efficacy norm.


PI
AIG
PE
PE: Political Efficacy
PI: Political Involvement
AIG: Ability to Influence Govt
Relatively weak impact: .100≤β≤.300
Relatively strong impact: β>.300

$.300 \leq r_{PE \cdot PI} \leq .700$

$.300 \leq r_{PE \cdot AIG} \leq .700$

$.300 \leq r_{PI \cdot AIG} \leq .700$

FIGURE 1. Hypothetical causal relationships between dimensions of political competence

in personal political potency. Also, given that beliefs in the efficacy norm are learned at an early age, it is logical to assume that these beliefs will have an important effect on the degree to which adults become motivated to acquire the rudimentary political skills which are a prerequisite for effective influence. Here, the assumption is that the inculcation of beliefs in the efficacy norm will dispose members to feel that there is some payoff in becoming politically involved.

Thus, in the following analysis a particular causal ordering is *assumed* and the purpose is to discover, given the assumed sequence, the linkages which apply to each of the five nations. Instead of utilizing Blalock's rather tedious search procedure, the method employed here is the more straightforward technique of path analysis.[33] Having assumed causal sequence, unmeasured variables as residual factors, and uncorrelated residuals, path analysis, as Duncan has pointed out, "amounts to a sequence of conventional regression analyses, and the basic theorem becomes merely a compact statement of the normal equations of regression theory for variables in standard form."[34]

The set of relationships between the political competence dimensions which is assumed to be most conducive to the development and maintenance of democratic government is displayed graphically in Figure 1. The upper limit of the hypothesized gross effects between the variables has been set at .700. Beyond this level the competence dimensions would merge empirically.[35] The pattern of net effects, as estimated by the beta weights (β), is hypothe-

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[33] See Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* (July, 1966).

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[35] Presumably, they would all load on one principal component.

TABLE 5. FIVE-NATION INTERCORRELATION MATRICES (r): POLITICAL COMPETENCE

UNITED STATES

	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.406	.337
Political Involvement		.558

UNITED KINGDOM

	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.344	.210
Political Involvement		.330

WEST GERMANY

	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.314	.273
Political Involvement		.380

ITALY

	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.130	.029
Political Involvement		.358

MEXICO

	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.118	−.015
Political Involvement		.354

sized as follows: PE should have relatively substantial impact on PI, PI should have relatively substantial impact on AIG, and the impact of PE on AIG will be largely indirect, through PI.[36] The proposed model is hierarchical.[37] To be sure, a reciprocal model, allowing the competence variables to be both cause and effect of each other, would do better justice to reality; however, estimation of such linkages presents a difficult empirical problem.[38] Presumably, the ordering adopted represents the major causal paths involved.

Table 5 presents the five-nation intercorrelation matrices for the competence variables. In the United States the correlations are relatively strong. The relationship between PE and AIG is rather weak in the United Kingdom; otherwise, a pattern of moderate relationships obtains for the United Kingdom and West German samples. A quite different pattern emerges among Italians and Mexicans. The only substantial correlation in Italy and Mexico is between PI and AIG. PE and PI are related slightly in both countries. There is no relationship at all between PE and AIG.

In the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany the correlations between the competence variables fall, with one exception, within (or almost within in the case of PE and AIG among Germans) the parameters assumed to be conducive to the development and maintenance of democratic government. Among Italians and Mexicans, only the correlations between PI and AIG are greater than the lower boundary of the parameters specified.

The lack of relationship between PE and AIG in Italy and Mexico means that in these countries individuals make no connection between their own sense of political potency and the receptivity of their governments to influence from the general membership. It may be that the phenomenon of *Clientelismo*, discussed by Tarrow with respect to southern Italy, is partially responsible in both countries for the lack of association between PE and AIG (as well as the slight association between PE and PI). According to Tarrow, under the system of Clientelismo "an individual is linked to the authority structure through personal ties of obligation and loyalty, rather than through the merger of his interests with others of the same social group or ideological persuasion. . . . Clientelismo differs from a true system of representation, although it can adapt to an electorial system, and it deals in the satisfaction of personal interests."[39] This type of system, to the extent that it is perceived as operative, would not encourage members to associate their beliefs in the responsiveness of government to the members in general with their perception of their own ability to influence political decisions.

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[36] Indirect effects are computed by multiplying the path coefficients along a given chain of causation. See Duncan, *op. cit.;* also see Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), Ch. 5.

[37] An excellent discussion of hierarchical models, as well as causal modelling in general, is in Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW (December, 1968).

[38] See the discussion in *ibid.*, at p. 1261, note 11 and the literature cited therein.

[39] Tarrow, *op. cit.*, p. 74.


United States (N=970)
PI
.504
.406
AIG
.133
PE
R².326
United Kingdom (N=963)
PI
.293
.344
AIG
.109
PE
R²=.120
West Germany (N=955)
PI
.326
.314
AIG
.171
PE
R²=.171
Italy (N=995)
PI
.361
.130
AIG
−.018
PE
R²=.129
Mexico (N=1295)
PI
.358
.118
AIG
−.058
PE
R²=.128
PE: Political Efficacy
PI: Political Involvement
AIG: Ability to Influence Govt

FIGURE 2. Causal relationships between Political Efficacy, Political Involvement, and Ability to Influence Government: five nations

Figure 2 shows the beta weights, generated from recursive regression equations, which estimate the path coefficients for the simple three variable model in each country.[40] The path coefficient describing the impact of a standard unit PE change on PI is numerically the same as the correlation coefficient between these variables because, for the two variable case, $\beta = r$.

Again, in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany the path coefficients fall within the parameters hypothesized as conducive to democratic political development and stability (the path coefficient of .293 which describes the direct impact of PI on AIG in the United Kingdom is quite close to the .300 value arbitrarily selected as indicative of moderately strong impact). The causal linkages between the competence variables for these three countries fit the hypothesized pattern of net effects. Examing Figure 2 in conjunction with Table 6, it can be seen that the impact of PI on AIG is sizeable and largely direct in all three countries. The net effect of PE on AIG is relatively slight. In the United States the effect of PE on AIG is largely indirect, through PI. The United Kingdom presents a slight exception to the expected pattern, since the indirect and direct effects of PE on AIG are of approximately equal magnitude. Germans are even more of an exception to the expected pattern: roughly two-thirds of the gross effect of PE on AIG is direct. In general, however, the pattern of direct and indirect effects between these variables is consistent with the hypothesized model.

Among Italians and Mexicans only the net effect of PI on AIG is consistent with the parameters assumed to be conducive to democratic development and stability. The impact of PI on AIG is completely direct; PE, of course, has no measurable impact on AIG.

TABLE 6. CALCULATION OF INDIRECT EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ON ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERMENT AND POLITICAL EFFICACY ON ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT: FIVE NATIONS

$$r_{PI\cdot AIG} = P_{AIG\cdot PI} + (P_{PI\cdot PE})(P_{AIG\cdot PE})$$

(gross) (direct) (indirect)
United States: .558 = .504 + .054
United Kingdom: .330 = .293 + .037
West Germany: .380 = .326 + .054
Italy: .358 ≈ .361[a] + .000
Mexico: .354 ≈ .358[a] + .000

$$r_{PE\cdot AIG} = P_{AIG\cdot PE} + (P_{PI\cdot PE})(P_{AIG\cdot PI})$$

(gross) (direct) (indirect)
United States: .337 = .133 + .204
United Kingdom: .210 = .109 + .101
West Germany: .273 = .173 + .102
Italy: .029 ≈ .000 + .000
Mexico: −.015 ≈ .000 + .000

[a] Discrepancies due to rounding error.

Two differential patterns emerge from these data. In the United States PE has substantial direct impact on PI: a unit change in PE (one standard deviation) will produce a .4 unit change in PI. PI has even greater impact on AIG: a unit change in PI will produce a .5 unit change in AIG. Also, PE has a slight direct, and even greater indirect, impact on AIG. Americans learn to believe that their political system is responsive to citizen influence at an early age. As adults, their belief in the reality of this norm encourages them to develop the rudimentary political skills necessary for some degree of effective influence. And possession of these rudimentary skills, as well as beliefs in the responsiveness of their government, dispose them to feel that, in situations where political laws and regulations are being proposed of which they disapprove, they have the personal potential to in some way exercise influence over the outcome of the decisional process.

Basically the same pattern is operative in the United Kingdom and West Germany. The difference between the causal linkages which apply to these two countries and those which apply to the United States is a difference of degree rather than kind. The net impacts between the variables are larger in the United States than in the United Kingdom and West Germany. And the explanatory power of the simple three variable model is considerably greater in the United States than in the other two countries. However, the causal processes are similar and the patterns of effects generally fall within the parameters suggested as supportive of democratic government. The relatively low gross explanatory power of the model among Britons, as well as the lower than expected indirect effect of PE on AIG, through PI, may be attributable in part to attitudes of deference toward political authority which permeate British political culture.[41] The fact that the gross explanatory power of the model *does* attain moderate magnitude among Germans may reflect efforts by German political authorities to promote adherance to democratic norms through political socialization processes. The largely direct, rather than indirect, impact of PE on AIG might be a reflection of the short duration of the socialization process in West Germany: many German adults may not have developed beliefs in the efficacy norm as children and then been motivated by these beliefs to acquire rudimentary skills necessary for influence: rather, their socialization to the norm, having occurred later, at a time when their levels of Political Involvement were more established, might thus have a more direct impact on their perceptions of personal ability to influence salient government decisions.

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[40] The comparability of beta coefficients across different samples, because the beta coefficients share the same dimensionality as correlation coefficients, can be distorted by unequal variances. Some of the estimates of the population variance for the competence scales do show statistically significant differences among the samples, but the magnitude of these differences is not large. Examination of the partial regression coefficients, which are not affected by unequal variances, suggests that the patterns of impact inferred from the beta coefficients (standardized partial regression coefficients) are not substantively affected by any departures from homogeneity of variance among the samples.

The other pattern, which applies to Italy and Mexico, is presumably less supportive of democratic government. Italians and Mexicans who possess the skills necessary for effective influence do tend to believe that they can exercise influence; and this is likely an important linkage—politically involved Italians and Mexicans at least do not feel particularly thwarted with respect to their perception of the potential effectiveness of their own efforts to influence the political process. However, as far as the inculcation of beliefs in the responsiveness of the government to citizen influence is concerned, if the Easton-Dennis findings are not just unique to the American political system, the Italian and Mexican systems are characterized by a discontinuity in the socialization process. Politically involved citizens who feel confident of their ability to influence the political process are little more likely than their apathetic and less confident compatroits to believe in the reality of the efficacy norm. And were the politically involved (and therefore politically relevant) members to find that their Ability to Influence Government beliefs did not match well with reality in specific situations, beliefs in the efficacy norm would provide little amelioration of their discontent.

Of course, actually testing the effect of congruence between competence dimensions on democratic development and stability is not possible with the Five-Nation data. The inferences made about the effects of the different competence patterns must remain speculative. However, if the inferences drawn here are at all plausible, it would be expected that the two different patterns of congruence between competence dimensions would be reflected in rank order differences on measures of political stability-instability for the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany as opposed to Italy and Mexico. Utilizing National Political Instability Profiles for 1948–65 as a measure of stability-instability, these expectations are generally borne out. On the scale constructed by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, which ranges from a score of 1 for the most stable systems to a score of 6 for the least stable, the United Kingdom and West Germany show a score of 3, while Italy and Mexico are in an interval lower at position 4.[42] The exception is the United States, which shows a score of 4, thus falling at the same interval as Italy and Mexico, instead of ranking with the United Kingdom and West Germany, as should be the case if the inferences made here about the effect of congruence between competence dimensions were absolutely correct. Moreover, if the stability-instability scores are averaged so as to produce a more normal distribution, the United Kingdom and West Germany rise to a score of 2 (only Luxembourg and the Netherlands receive a score of 1), Italy and Mexico rise to a score of 3, but the United States remains with a score of 4. Finally, on a cumulative 1948–61 political violence scale developed by Nesvold, West Germany and the United Kingdom rank at the low end of the continuum and Italy and Mexico rank in the middle, as would be expected, but the United States, in contrast to expectations, ranks in the middle with Italy and Mexico. (The scale scores range from 0–113; the scores for the five nations are: West Germany = 8, United Kingdom = 21, United States = 30, Italy = 32, Mexico = 36.)[43]

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[41] See the discussion in Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–494.

[42] See Tables 18–1A and 18–1B at pages 623–25 of Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Violence in America* (New York: Signet Books, 1969).

[43] This scale appears as Table 7 at page 181 of Betty A. Nesvold, "Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence," *Comparative Political Studies* (July, 1969).

The United States is clearly an important deviant case. The closest fit to the hypothesized competence model appears in the American data; yet the inference drawn from the model is not supported by American stability-instability scores. The implication is obvious: variables not considered in the simple model investigated here must be taken into account in future research concerned with the stability-instability of political systems. (Such variables, it is assumed, would not substantially affect the relationships internal to the competence model.) Nevertheless, the stability-instability scores of the other four countries *are* in line with expectations derived from the competence model. This certainly suggests that there is validity in the broad generalization specifying congruence between competence dimensions as conducive to democratic development and stability.

III. CONCLUSION

In this paper three dimensions of political competence have been identified which are distinct and operationally equivalent across five nations.[44] The analytical distinction has been made, and sustained empirically, between an individual's sense of confidence in his personal ability to influence government decisions, and his beliefs in the capacity of members of his political system in general to influence government—beliefs which involve a sense of satisfaction with the responsiveness of political authorities to the membership over the long run. This is a distinction which largely has been overlooked in the research on sense of efficacy and political competence, but it is a distinction which has theoretical and explanatory relevance.

When variation in political competence by region and size of place was examined, it was found that the three dimensions of competence show little tendency toward consistent disproportionate location by these variables within the four nations investigated. The overall impression is one of within-nation homogeneity.[45]

The competence dimensions were found to be moderately to strongly interrelated in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. By contrast, in Italy and Mexico only Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government show sizeable correlation; Political Efficacy and Political Involvement are correlated only slightly and there is virtually no measurable relationship between Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government.

When causal structure is imputed to these dimensions, two different patterns are apparent. One, which applies most strongly to the United States sample, and to a lesser but still relatively substantial degree to the United Kingdom and West German samples, involves a process wherein beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm encourage individuals to acquire the rudimentary political skills and dispositions necessary for the exercise of effective influence; in turn, possession of these political resources affects the degree to which individuals feel confident of their personal ability to influence salient government decisions; and beliefs in the efficacy norm affect sense of personal political potency to some extent directly, but equally or to a greater extent indirectly, through the process of having acquired rudimentary political skills. Presumably, this pattern is supportive of political democracy. The other pattern, presumed to be a potential source of stress on democracy, applies to the Italian and Mexican samples. This pattern is characterized by what may be a discontinuity in the sociali-

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[44] A study utilizing the same data base but with different theoretical concerns is the research reported in two parts by Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I," this REVIEW (June, 1969) and "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," *ibid.*, (September, 1969). The Ability to Influence Government dimension identified here is similar to the construct which they label Political Efficacy; the exception is that the first two items of their scale were found to load on the factor labelled Political Involvement in this analysis. The Political Involvement dimension also includes items which Nie *et al.* used to define measures of Political Information and Political Attentiveness, as well as one item of their Political Participation construct. The fact that their Political Information and Political Attentiveness constructs are unidimensional within each sample is not surprising, and this finding is certainly useful from the point of view of parsimony in causal analysis.

[45] In "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," Nie *et al.* report at page 819 that size of place shows a slight but consistently negative relationship with their attitude items: i.e., the greater the community size the lower the citizen's involvement and sense of personal political potency (see Appendix III). However, most of the path coefficients are less than .100 and are probably not statistically significant.

TABLE A1. COEFFICIENTS OF CONGRUENCE: FIVE-NATION POLITICAL COMPETENCE FACTOR SOLUTIONS

		United Kingdom			West Germany			Italy			Mexico		
		I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
United States	I	*.988*	.440	.392	*.982*	.471	.315	*.980*	.465	.166	*.984*	.455	.223
	II	.499	*.966*	.379	.519	*.977*	.399	.507	*.963*	.197	.531	*.943*	.237
	III	.369	.274	*.964*	.347	.289	*.814*	.369	.208	*.867*	.350	.213	*.847*
United Kingdom	I				*.986*	.377	.355	*.979*	.367	.364	*.984*	.379	.197
	II				.387	*.988*	.292	.384	*.982*	.212	.392	*.975*	.130
	III				.282	.309	*.845*	.150	.101	*.905*	.350	.199	*.876*
West Germany	I							*.986*	.415	.100	*.984*	.406	.163
	II							.405	*.982*	.103	.429	*.968*	.146
	III							.232	.253	*.893*	.222	.233	*.839*
Italy	I										*.995*	.390	.168
	II										.418	*.987*	.051
	III										.090	−.005	*.952*

zation process. The politically involved and personally confident members have not developed beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm in their system; thus, if sense of personal potency were found to match poorly with reality, among these members there would be little potential for amelioration of discontent by beliefs in the long term responsiveness of government to citizen influence.

The model examined included only three variables. Intensive investigation of antecedants and consequences of political competence is beyond the scope of this paper.[46] In general, the data reported here point to the importance, in future research, of distinguishing between beliefs in the regime norm of efficacy, and sense of personal confidence in ability to influence government decisions. Possession of political resources necessary for effective influence may, as would be expected, affect the development of confidence in personal political potency on a cross-national basis. But the development of beliefs in the overall responsiveness of government to citizen influence, presumably an attitude of some consequence for democratic government, particularly in complex modern societies, may be substantially more variable, depending upon the content and timing of socialization processes.

APPENDIX A

The Coefficient of Congruence

The coefficient of congruence ranges from +1 for perfect factorial similarity, through 0 for the complete absence of factorial similarity, to −1 for perfect inverse factorial similarity. Harmon recommends "that each factor of one study be compared with all the factors of the other study, and be paired with the one with which it has the highest coefficient of congruence."[47] The italicized values in Table A1 represent the pairings of factors showing the largest coefficients of congruence. If a set of factor solutions obtained from the same variables for different samples are to be considered congruent, the largest coefficients should appear in the diagonals of the sub-matrices for the pairing of each factor structure against every other.

APPENDIX B

Scale Construction Procedures

Factor analysis is useful not only as a technique for identifying dimensions hypothesized to underlie sets of variables, but also as a data reduction device. Factors can be scored and the resulting constructs are then the kind of multiitem indicators most appropriate for comparative research. The method recommended by Harmon for describing factors in terms of the observed variables is the technique of complete estimation.[48] This procedure has been used here to assign factor scores to each respondent on the dimensions of political competence. The complete estimation approach employs conventional regression methods to obtain estimates of factor measurements. Harmon expressed the basic formula as follows:

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[46] See the two Nie et al. articles for investigation of the social structure antecedants of political competence.

[47] Harmon, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

[48] See *ibid.*, pp. 350–60.

$$\bar{F}_p = \beta_{p1}Z_1 + \beta_{p2}Z_2 + \cdots + \beta_{pn}Z_n$$[49]

where $\bar{F}$ is the factor score on any one factor constituted by p variables; and the β's are standardized factor coefficients comparable to the beta weights yielded by multiple regression. The size of the β's is determined by the loading of the variables on the factor: variables which have the highest factor loadings will contribute the most to an individual's score on that factor, variables which show the lowest loadings will make the least contribution to his score. Such scales should prove quite useful for comparative research because (1) they are multi-item indicators; (2) they are quantitative variables with some degree of discriminatory power; and (3) they are linear combinations of items which take into account the fact that particular items can be expected to relate differentially to an underlying or latent common dimension, i.e., in contrast to such scaling procedures as the Likert method, factor scores obtained by complete estimation are not based on the arbitrary assignment of equal weight to each component item.

If there were reason to believe that, theoretically, the three dimensions of political competence should be uncorrelated, then Political Efficacy, Political Involvement, and Ability to Influence Government could be measured directly from the orthogonally rotated solutions. However, the opposite is the case; theoretically, these competence dimensions should be correlated. Therefore, while orthogonal rotation has been employed to test the hypothesis that political competence involves three distinct dimensions, in order to measure these dimensions, the items which define them have been subjected to principal components analysis separately, with the minimum eigenvalue set at 1.0. This procedure forces a maximum of the variance onto the first factor, which should be (and was in the case of these sets of competence items) the only factor on which the variables load. The result, in each case, is a scale which is a linear combination of only those variables identified as common to one dimension by varimax rotation, and is thus uncontaminated by any secondary loadings from other variables common to other dimensions.

Of course, since it is expected that the competence dimensions will be correlated, a better approximation to simple structure could be obtained by oblique rotation. If, for instance, Carroll's Biquartimin solution had been used, with γ set at .5, the primary loadings presumably would have been somewhat higher and the secondary loadings somewhat lower, thus resulting in factors of even greater clarity. A major drawback to oblique rotation, however, is the fact that sampling fluctuations play a part in determing oblique solutions: "To some extent at least the obliqueness of the axes in any one study is determined by sampling instability and the angular separations can be expected to fluctuate from sample to sample."[50] A further drawback to oblique rotation is that factor loadings, which in the case of orthogonal rotation can be interpreted as measures of the degree to which variables are correlated with underlying dimensions, lack precision of meaning in oblique rotations.[51]

Primarily because of its questionable comparability across samples, oblique rotation was not deemed suitable for the objectives of this analysis. Orthogonal rotation was selected because of its invariance under conditions of sampling instability. However, regardless of which solution were used to identify the common dimensions, the best measurement procedure would still be to develop scales from separate principal components analyses of items common to each dimension; this ensures that each scale is measuring only what it is supposed to measure.

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 350.

[50] Benjamin Fruchter, *Introduction to Factor Analysis* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954), p. 195.

[51] On this point see Harmon's discussion at page 290 of *Modern Factor Analysis*.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND LERNER'S THEORY: FURTHER TEST OF A CAUSAL MODEL*

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A current concern in the theory of political development is the relationship between political democracy and economic and social variables. Various writers have hypothesized, for example, that the development of democratic political institutions is related to increasing levels of education, communications, and urbanization.[1] Daniel Lerner has developed this argument further in stating that a developmental sequence occurs with increasing urbanization leading in turn to higher levels of education, communications development, and finally political development.[2] This theory has been tested and corroborated in research which employed statistical causal modeling methods on contemporary data gathered over a large number of nations.[3] The purpose of this paper is to test the adequacy of Lerner's model with data gathered over time in a single nation, which presents a research situation more congruent with the actual temporal processes of political development.

I. THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Political development will be used here to mean the development of democratic political institutions and processes. This definition is admittedly stipulative, and does not preclude the argument that political development could occur without increasing levels of democracy. By democracy, we will accept Lipset's formulation that:

> Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.[4]

More precisely, democracy will be taken to mean a political system characterized by representative decision-making *institutions*, by mass *participation* in the selection of decision-makers, and by open *competition* in both the electoral and policy-making processes.

The conditions which bring about democratic political development have been the subject of considerable research. Since the development syndrome is exceedingly complicated, various approaches have been taken in an attempt to

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* The theoretical considerations of this paper were discussed, and preliminary data were gathered, by students enrolled in my graduate seminar at McMaster (1968–69). I gratefully acknowledge their stimulation and assistance.

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[1] Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this *Review*, 53 (1959), 69–105; and Daniel Lerner, "Communications Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (1957), 266–275.

[2] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of the Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958). The essence of Lerner's theory can be found in the following quotation:

"The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases—literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies." p. 60.

[3] Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward A Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 72–79.

[4] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 27.

unravel it. For example, a link has been postulated between economic development and political development.[5] Some writers have stressed the attitudinal component of democracy, and argued that a democratic system is produced and maintained through the development of a participant culture.[6] The psychological dimension of development has been explored, with the resulting hypothesis that an increase in the achievement motivation in a society can result in increasing levels of economic growth.[7] Finally certain socio-economic factors such as literacy or industrialization have been singled out as being an important part of the development process.[8]

Given the present rudimentary state of social theory-building, it is difficult to assess which line of inquiry is most useful in accounting for political development. However it appears that development theory has become most refined in dealing with certain socio-economic factors, perhaps because data are most easily gathered on these variables. This emphasis is likely not unjustified, given the concern for socio-economic factors by those who have dealt with the attitudinal components of political development.[9] The remainder of this paper will concern itself with the relationship between three socio-economic variables—namely, urbanization, education, and communication—and democratic political development.

The link between the above variables and political democracy has been systematically tested by Lipset. Lipset divided a sample of 50 nations drawn from Latin America and Europe into two categories: stable democracies, and unstable democracies or dictatorships. By comparing these two groups, he demonstrated that the democratic countries have higher levels of urbanization, educational attainment, and communications infrastructure.[10] Lipset's study is very useful as a preliminary analysis, but it is limited by his operational definition of democracy as a dichotomous variable. According to his scoring system nations are either democratic or they are not, an assumption which goes contrary to the more generally accepted notion of democracy as being on a continuum. Cutright has developed a more useful measurement of democratic political development by assigning points to nations according to whether they fulfill certain criteria for democratic government.[11] This measurement has the advantage of differentiating nations as being more or less democratic. It has the additional advantage of allowing for "backsliding" (i.e., decreases in democracy) which is an important feature when the scale is used to measure the development of democracy over time.

Cutright has correlated his political development scale with various measures of urbanization, education and communications gathered over 76 nations for the year 1960. For two of these measures (i.e., education, communications) composite indicators were used—for example, education was measured by combining the scores of literacy and university students per 1,000 for each nation. All items used by Cutright were T scored, and the composite measures were derived

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[5] *Ibid.*, see Chapter II "Economic Development and Democracy."

[6] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[7] David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961). McClelland makes no mention of political development or democracy in his work; however, if economic growth is related to political development, then the possibility clearly exists of a link between the achievement motive and political development.

[8] The distinction between different approaches in the theory of development, and the relative contributions thereof, was suggested by Harvey Pasis in oral discussion.

[9] For example, Almond and Verba point out the importance of education and industrialization in creating a democratic culture. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

[10] Lipset's indicators for communication (telephones, radios and newspapers per 1,000 persons) were subsumed under his category of "wealth."

[11] Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," in Nelson Polsby *et al.* (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 569–582. According to Cutright's scale nations receive two points per year that a legislature exists in which the lower or only house contained representatives of two or more political parties, with the minority party or parties having at least 30 per cent of all seats. Nations receive one point if the above conditions are met except the 30 per cent rule, and no points if the above conditions are not met. Additionally, one point per nation is awarded for each year that a chief executive is in office by virtue of a direct vote in an open election in which he faced competition; or in office by being chosen by a political party in a two or more party system such as would gain two points on the legislative point assignment scheme. No points are assigned for years in which a chief executive existed by virtue of any other selection process. Cutright's scaling period covered 22 years (1940–1961), and it was possible for a nation to accumulate anywhere from 0 to 66 points.

TABLE 1. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF CUTRIGHT'S MEASURE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.71	.85	.80
2) Urbanization			.75	.64
3) Education				.62
4) Political Development				

Data taken from Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

Figures for levels of agricultural employment are omitted.

by summing the T scores for individual items.[12] The correlations derived in the Cutright study showed a strong relationship existed between the socio-economic variables and political development, as well as a strong interrelationship between the independent variables themselves; see Table 1.

The data generated by Cutright formed the basis for a further refinement in development theory. Working from Lerner's earlier conceptualization of the development of democracy, McCrone and Cnudde applied to Cutright's findings statistical techniques which are designed to test the empirical validity of alternative developmental sequences. In successive tests, these analysts found that the developmental sequence which best fit the data was the causal ordering implicit in the Lerner theory; see Figure 1. Furthermore not only was this sequence the best fit among alternative possibilities, but it was sufficiently close to corroborate the Lerner model.



FIGURE 1

Numbers indicate correlation coefficients. Developmental sequence shown by solid lines.

The entire drift of development theory as outlined above, and particularly in the way it has been operationalized and tested, has been challenged by Neubauer in a recent article.[13] Neubauer objects to Cutright's index of democracy on the grounds that it overweights the institutions of democracy and gives insufficient consideration to certain performance traits of democratic regimes, namely electoral equality and competition.[14] A specific difficulty with Cutright's scale is that it does not adequately differentiate between those nations which receive maximum scores for political development. By employing indicators such as per cent enfranchised, equality of representation, and measures of party competition, Neubauer has developed an alternative index of democracy, one which is capable of differentiating between nations generally considered "democratic."

In statistical tests employing his index of political democracy, Neubauer finds very little correlation between his index and Cutright's (r = .182) which confirms that these two measures are not in fact measuring the same thing. In relating his index to socio-economic variables, Neubauer found virtually no correlation between political democracy and urbanization or education, and a considerably smaller correlation between democracy and communications than reported by Cutright; see Table 2. As pointed out

TABLE 2. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NEUBAUER'S MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.314	.732	.424
2) Urbanization			.578	−.008
3) Education				.016
4) Democratic Performance				

Data taken from Neubauer, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

Figures for levels of agricultural employment are omitted.

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[12] T scoring is a procedure for deriving standardized measures of variables, so that scores on such disparate items as per cent of population in cities over 50,000, number of radios per 1,000 population, and per cent of population literate can be directly compared. See Allen L. Edwards, *Statistical Methods*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), Chapter 4.

[13] Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 1002-1009.

[14] Neubauer's concern for these features of democracy is derived from the definitions of democracy put forward by Downs and Dahl. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 23–24; and Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84.

by the author the latter correlation is very likely inflated since a measure of information equality (i.e., variability of communication sources) is included in the political democracy index. Thus Neubauer's findings introduce a note of uncertainty into an apparently well established social theory.

II. DATA

It appears that for at least two reasons more research is needed on political development and its correlates. First, Neubauer's research opens some question whether there is any association at all between political development and certain socio-economic variables. Second, for purposes of making causal inferences about political development, the data which have been used in previous studies contain certain limitations that have not necessarily been made explicit. Specifically, one characteristic of these studies is that they have all employed data on political development gathered over a large number of nations in the last two decades. This data-gathering process is adequate for correlational analysis in which one compares a present state of development—on which nations can differ—with certain levels of communications, urbanization or education. However to use this data to support a causal model about political development, one must make an inference about a process which occurs over time from data gathered at one point in time. Would not this inference be better supported by data gathered in separate nations over the period of their development?

The logic of the political development model derived by Lerner is that as levels of urbanization, education and communications gradually increase over time, these produce corresponding increases in the level of political development. The causal modeling technique followed by McCrone and Cnudde cannot directly test for this, but rather can only infer it through comparing differing national levels of socio-economic variables and political development in the present. By comparing these same variables in separate nations with data gathered over time, one could determine if this gradual development did in fact occur, or if there are sharp discontinuities in the development process which might not be accounted for in the Lerner theory.

To test Lerner's theory over time, it was necessary to select nations which were already developed, and for which there were sufficient historical data on the variables under consideration. Four nations were originally chosen for analysis: Canada, Great Britain, France, and the United States. These nations all had high scores on Cutright's index, and were also included in Neubauer's index of 23 democratic countries.[15] Only in the United States were data regularly collected over a sufficiently long time span to permit a test of the model.

The index of political development used in the time study attempted to operationalize the definition of democracy given earlier. In practice this index adopted Cutright's basic scoring procedure.[16] A score for democratic political development was assigned to the United States for each decade over the period 1790–1960 (N = 18). The score for each decade was derived by assigning two points for each of the previous ten years that the United States had a directly elected legislature in which the minority party had 30 per cent of the seats; or one point per year if the minority party had less than 30 per cent of the seats. The total sum receivable for the legislature in any decade was 20 points. Similarly one point per year was assigned for a directly elected chief executive, with 10 points being the maximum receivable per decade.

The above scoring procedure accounts for the *institutional* and *competitive* aspects of democracy, but provides no measure of electoral *participation*.[17] Participation in elections, and, more important, the right to participate in elections, is unquestionably a fundamental aspect of democratic political development. In the history of the United States, democratic institutions were established relatively early in the period under consideration, but it can be argued that the franchise has not yet become effective for the whole population. Thus it was felt some measure of participation, and implicitly the right to participate, should be included in the development index.

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[15] Canada, Great Britain and the United States received the top score of 66 on Cutright's index, while France received 59 points. On Neubauer's index Great Britain and France received the highest rankings with 236.3 and 231.4 points each. Canada and the United States were 15th and 16th with 196.8 and 190.9 points respectively.

[16] Cutright's method was used rather than Neubauer's because it seemed most consistent with the definition of democracy provided here. Furthermore Cutright's index appeared more appropriate for differentiating between conditions of low and high democratic development. Finally Cutright's 30 per cent rule does in fact measure competition, which was one of the two major criteria of democratic performance in Neubauer's analysis.

[17] Electoral participation was a feature of Neubauer's index, and has been incorporated in Cutright's later work. See Cutright's communication to the Editor, this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 578–580. See also, Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927–1966," *Studies in Comparative International Development (Monograph Series)* 5 (1969–70).

Participation was accounted for by multiplying the political development score for each decade by a value of one (1.00) plus the percentage (averaged over the previous decade) of the total population who voted for the chief executive. This information was available beginning in 1824, at which time the proportion of the population voting was 3.8 per cent.[18] For the four decades prior to 1824, the figure of 3 per cent was arbitrarily selected. The actual percentage for these decades was very likely less than the 1824 figure, and was obviously greater than zero —hence the figure of 3 per cent was chosen as the likeliest estimate. In any case it is quite improbable that an error here could significantly bias the overall results of this study. The index derived from the above procedures is shown in Table 3.

In deriving the multiplier for electoral participation, a theoretical question arose as to whether one should measure actual participation as evidenced by the percentage of the population voting, or measure the right to participate as indicated by the percentage of the population legally enfranchised. Measuring the right to participate would directly reflect the extent of the suffrage, which surely is an indicator of the democraticness of the system. Measuring actual participation, while it also takes the right to vote into account, tends to be biased by voter interest which can change without regard for the right to vote. It is a contentious normative issue whether actual participation apart from the right to participate is an indicator of a democratic polity. This question aside however, data concerning the percentage of the population actually voting are perhaps a more meaningful measure of the *effective* extension of suffrage than are data on the percentage of persons legally enfranchised. On this point Robert Lane notes that the major increases in voter participation in the United States followed periods when voting restrictions were removed (e.g., property and sex restrictions). Conversely, the enfranchisement of former slaves during the Civil War produced little change in the voting behavior of these individuals, a fact generally corroborated by the findings of historians and by the small change in total participation figures immediately following the 1860's.[19]

TABLE 3. INDEX OF U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1960

Decade	Legislative Score	Executive Score*	Participation Multiplier	Political Development Score
1781–1790	10	4.0	1.030	14.4
1791–1800	20	3.5	1.030	24.2
1801–1810	14	6.2	1.030	20.8
1811–1820	15	5.6	1.030	21.2
1821–1830	15	8.0	1.075	24.7
1831–1840	20	9.6	1.128	33.4
1841–1850	20	9.6	1.158	34.3
1851–1860	20	9.8	1.161	34.6
1861–1870	14	9.9	1.132**	27.1
1871–1880	20	9.9	1.173	35.1
1881–1890	18	10.0	1.189	33.3
1891–1900	20	10.0	1.188	35.6
1901–1910	20	10.0	1.167	35.0
1911–1920	20	10.0	1.197	35.9
1921–1930	20	10.0	1.280	38.4
1931–1940	14	10.0	1.351	32.4
1941–1950	20	10.0	1.340	40.2
1951–1960	20	10.0	1.380	41.4

* Fractional points were assigned on the basis of the percentage of states which chose the chief executive in a direct election over the whole decade. See *Historical Statistics of the United States* (complete citation in footnote 20). Series Y 1–26 "Methods of Electing Presidential Electors: 1788–1936", pp. 679, 681.

** This figure is likely biased downward since the voting total in 1864 did not include the Confederate states.

Data for this table were taken from Robert E. Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 19; World Almanac, 1968; and *Historical Statistics of the United States*. The raw scores for political development were T scored to be consistent with the procedures followed with other variables.

Data were gathered on the socio-economic variables (urbanization, education and communications) in a manner consistent with the Cutright study wherever possible, although data limitations necessitated some alteration on the communications index. Urbanization was measured by the percentage of the population in cities over 50,000. This information was available without omission from 1790.[20] Education was a combined variable and was made up of the summed T scores of the percentage of the population literate and the number of persons enrolled in institutions of higher learning per 1,000 population. Data on this variable were gathered only since 1840, as there appears to be no official record either of literacy rates or university enrollments prior to that date.[21] Figures on enrollments can be estimated to 1790 by multiplying the number of institutions in existence per decade (for which data are available) times the estimated average enrollment per institution over this period. However these data cannot be used in the combined education index without corresponding data on literacy rates, and a thorough search provided no reliable method of estimating such rates prior to 1840. Consequently correlations between education and other variables are derived over the period 1840–1960.

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[18] This information is presented in tabular form in Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 19

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–22.

[20] Urbanization data were taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960).

[21] Literacy rates and enrollment figures since 1870 were taken from *ibid.* Data on enrollments for the period 1840–1860 were taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Report on Education in the United States*, Eleventh Census, 1890.

The communications index was constructed from the summed T scores of the five following indicators: post office expenditures per capita; total number of newspapers and periodicals per capita; and telephones, radios, and television sets per capita.[22] Data on postal expenditures and newspapers and periodicals were available from 1790. For the latter indicator it was necessary to interpolate to derive figures by even decades. The raw figures that were used for total newspapers and periodicals by decade are shown in Table 4. Data on telephones, radios and television sets were available in each case from the date they were invented and first used by the public. In order not to bias the scoring procedure, raw scores of zero were assigned for each indicator for each decade prior to its invention and dissemination (e.g., prior to 1940 in the case of television sets).

III. FINDINGS

The theoretical test which was performed on the U.S. time-series data can be divided into two parts. First is the question whether there is any relationship between urbanization, education, communications and political development. For the causal links of Lerner's theory to be maintained, there must be positive and significant correlations between the dependent variable and the various independent variables. The correlations for this study are shown in Table 5 and accompanying Figure 2.

TABLE 4. TOTAL NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 1790–1960

Decade	Number	Decade	Number
1790	103	1880	11,314
1800	150	1890	17,710
1810	359	1900	24,486
1820	679	1910	28,556
1830	1000	1920	16,346
1840	1403	1930	14,760
1850	2794	1940	14,250
1860	4257	1950	13,845
1870	6314	1960	12,867

Data taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *A Century of Population Growth in the United States: 1790–1900* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 32; and *Historical Statistics of the United States*, p. 500.

TABLE 5. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF U.S. MEASURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.913	.871	.723
2) Urbanization	.001		.975	.711
3) Education	.001	.001		.682
4) Political Development	.001	.001	.05	

Numbers below the diagonal indicate the level at which the corresponding correlation would be statistically significant. For intercorrelations with education. $N = 13$.



FIGURE 2.

The data presented in Table 5 show that there is a strong relationship between the four variables, a finding similar to Cutright's conclusions. What is interesting is the similarity between Cutright's correlations and ours. On each of the three correlations with political development, and on the correlation between education and communications, the difference from Cutright's coefficients is less than 0.1. The remaining two correlations with urbanization (UE and UC) are higher for the U.S. data, a fact which suggests that the hypothesized close interrelationship between these socio-economic variables in the process of development is revealed more clearly in time-series rather than cross-national data.[23] Finally the internal structure of the correlations is comparable between the two studies. Cutright showed the variable most strongly related to political development was communications, with urbanization and education following in order. Data on the United States indicate the same. Similarly the correlation between education and communications was higher than the three correlations with political development in both studies. Only the two correlations with urbanization (UE and UC) reflect any appreciable difference.

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[22] Data on communications were taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*.

The second theoretical question involved the time ordering of the variables. To uphold Lerner's theory, it must be demonstrated that variables he posits as independent precede in time the dependent variable or variables. While conceptually simple, this test is very difficult to apply in the real world, especially when dealing with a complicated social phenomenon for which there is no clearcut beginning or end. In the cross-national data gathered by Cutright there is no way to test for the temporal ordering of the independent and dependent variables. In time-series data, one can approximate a test by introducing time lags into the correlations.

With data collected over time, one variable can be lagged behind another by correlating the score of the independent variable in time t (e.g. 1790) with the score of the dependent variable in time t + 1 (e.g. 1800); and so forth throughout all time periods. If there is a causal relationship between these variables such that an increase or decrease in the independent variable would produce a corresponding change in the dependent variable, this relationship should be reflected in an increasing correlation. Conversely, if the causal relationship as posited is valid, lagging the independent variable behind the dependent variable could be expected to reduce the correlation between these variables. Thus in a multivariate causal model, there are a number of independent tests that can be made for the validity of the model, depending on the number of causal links posited and the number of time lags introduced in either direction.[24]

In the present study, the fact that historical data were available only at ten-year intervals limited the time-lag procedures. Both the established theory on development, and the high correlations achieved here, suggest that the variables in the development syndrome are tightly interconnected—that is, changes tend to occur simultaneously in these variables. If this is the case, one would not expect the time lags in the U.S. data to be very large between an independent and dependent variable. For this reason it would have been useful to have data for periods shorter than even decades, such as five-year intervals. In the analysis here, time lags will be limited to one and two decades in either direction; see Table 6.

The data in Table 6 generally confirm the Lerner theory, but with some reservations. The most striking confirmation is seen in the correlations of political development with education and communications. Lerner held that the independent variable most closely linked with political development was communications, a finding upheld by subsequent studies. This same finding occurs here, as the correlation between development and communications clearly increases as development is lagged, and decreases when communications are lagged. The same result appears generally for the correlation between development and education, although an expected increase in this correlation occurs only after development has been lagged by two decades. It is especially unfortunate that shorter time periods were not possible, since they would provide more correlation coefficients and hence facilitate a more careful assessment of the causal relationship between political development and educa-

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[23] With regard to this close interrelationship, Schnore finds a unidimensional structure emerging from a factor analysis performed on 12 national measures of modernization. Among the variables loading heavily on the single factor were newspaper circulation (.94), literacy (.89) and urbanization (.86). See Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics,* 37 (1961), 229–245.

[24] For further discussion of this method, as well as limiting assumptions, see D. Pelz and F. Andrews, "Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," *American Sociological Review,* 29 (1964), 836–848.

One difficulty with time lag correlation analysis suggested by these authors occurs when variables are highly autocorrelated. By their argument, if lagged self-correlations approach unity, then all lagged inter-correlations approach the same value, thus preventing any causal inference. In this study, autocorrelation was assessed over the two time periods used, and the following coefficients were obtained: DD .698, CC .832, EE .988, UU .524. For at least two variables, autocorrelation was not extreme. One would expect the high autocorrelation for education to restrict analysis on this variable, although this obviously did not prevent the predicted change from occurring in the relationship between education and political development (see Table 6).

TABLE 6. TIME-LAG CORRELATIONS BETWEEN URBANIZATION, EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1790-1960

Variables	$t=0$	$t=+10$	$t=+20$	Variable Lagged	Lerner Prediction
CD	.723	.765	.780	Dependent	Increase
CD	.723	.670	.554	Independent	Decrease
ED*	.682	.647	.723	Dependent	Increase
ED	.682	.575	.581	Independent	Decrease
UD*	.711	.686	.682	Dependent	Increase
UD	.711	.688	.584	Independent	Decrease
EC	.871	.893	.871	Dependent	Increase
EC	.871	.910	.921	Independent	Decrease
UE	.975	.976	.971	Dependent	Increase
UE	.975	.979	.961	Independent	Decrease
UC*	.913	.849	.835	Dependent	Increase
UC	.913	.953	.940	Independent	Decrease

* No direct causal link is posited in Lerner's theory or in the McCrone and Cnudde analysis for the relationships between these variables. However since the theory holds that these variables are related in a developmental sequence, a likely result would be some rise in the correlations as the variable occurring later in the sequence is lagged.

tion. There is an element of randomness in the correlation coefficients produced by any time lag, since each lag reduces the N of the correlation. This is an especially difficult problem when dealing with a low N, since the results can be more easily biased by changes in the data. What was done here is to determine whether the two successive time lags, taken together, confirmed or disconfirmed the hypothesized relationship. The time-lag correlations of political development and education tend to confirm that education is one causal determinant of development.

The relationship between urbanization and development appears less clearcut from time lag analysis than it was from causal modeling procedures. Lagging the hypothesized independent variable does produce a falling correlation as predicted, but there is no increase—rather a decrease—in the correlation when the dependent variable is lagged. Admittedly the decrease is not great, and it remains stable over two lags. One possible explanation is that the effect of urbanization is filtered through other intervening variables, and thus changes in urbanization are not sufficiently closely related to changes in development over time to result in increased correlations when time-lags are introduced.

The time lag correlations of urbanization with education and communications suggest some deviation from the Lerner theory. The correlation for urbanization and education does not react generally the way the theory would predict. However because of the near-perfect linear relationship between these two variables, and the fact that the most substantial change (.961) does occur in the predicted direction, the hypothesized causal relationship between urbanization and education cannot be rejected. However, for urbanization and communications, the opposite is true. The U.S. data unequivocally suggest that the causal path between these variables is from communications to urbanization. This contradicts Lerner and others who posited a developmental sequence from urbanization to education to communications.[25]

Finally, the relationship between education and communications appears indeterminate in the U.S. data. Time-lag procedures do not identify a clearcut temporal ordering between these variables, although it would appear the case is strongest for identifying education as the dependent variable. What is very likely the case, and the same is true for urbanization and education, is that the relationship between these two variables is one of reciprocal causality, where changes in one variable produce changes in the second which then affect the first. The possibility of interaction between variables, which was mentioned by Lerner in the passage quoted earlier, was omitted by assumption in the McCrone and Cnudde analysis, but it is more likely to be the rule rather than the exception when dealing with complex social processes.[26]

IV. CONCLUSION

The findings presented here show that for the United States the Lerner theory is with some modifications essentially accurate in its analysis of political development. Obviously these findings would be more valid were the test performed over more than one nation, but data limitations prevented this. On the other hand, over the period considered the United States was indeed a developing nation, and on some indicators such as participation and direct election of the executive it progressed from relatively low to relatively high development. If the theory

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[25] It should be noted that the variation in the U.S. data may be accounted for by explicit qualifications in the Lerner theory. For example, Lerner suggested that the degree of urbanization affected the relationship between urbanization, literacy rates and media growth. Lerner, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

[26] For a discussion of the limitations of the causal modeling methods applied by McCrone and Cnudde, see Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 1258–1264.



FIGURE 3

were valid, one would *prima facie* expect it to be valid in the United States.

The U.S. findings also tend to uphold the Cutright analysis, which suggests that differences between low and high political development (as measured by Cutright's index) are correlated with certain socio-economic variables. With relatively minor changes to allow for participation, Cutright's index was used for the United States, and similar correlations with socio-economic variables were obtained. Neubauer may have a point that once a certain level of democratic political development is achieved that socio-economic variables are no longer related to political development, but this does not overthrow Cutright's argument that there is a relationship in the earlier stages of development.

Some alteration to the causal links established in Lerner's theory are perhaps indicated by the U.S. study; see Figure 3. The essential links from education and communications to development are maintained by the time study. Also the developmental sequence from urbanization to education to development appears to be upheld. However the findings open the possibility of a reciprocal causal relationship between urbanization and education. This appears to be a reasonable conclusion, since it is probable in U.S. development—and perhaps in development elsewhere—that rural education developed skills and expectations in the population that led people to migrate to urban areas.

The most important revision suggested by the U.S. data is the causal ordering between communications and urbanization. These variables are strongly related but it seems that the independent variable in the relationship is communication, and not urbanization. If so, this makes communication a more isolated variable in the development syndrome than was suggested either by Lerner or by the McCrone and Cnudde study. The question of explaining the causal relationship from communications to urbanization seems somewhat difficult, since Lerner's argument that industrial and urban development enables a society to develop its communications media seems plausible enough. On the other hand, as Lerner himself suggested, communications could have been an agent in the urbanization of society through the process of providing information to rural populations about new opportunities and a new way of life. It is very likely that both the early press in America, as well as personal communications, served this function. Finally, after the development of telephones and radios this function could have been served without the requisite need for literacy, and hence could have operated without further increases in the levels of education. This is an important fact to consider in "developing" nations today, since verbal and visual communications bulk much larger in the total communications process now than they did in the history of the United States.

SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTION OF ELECTIONS BY THE MASS PUBLIC*

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The institution of elections is a significant feature of most present day political systems and is one of the most widely used of all of the political inventions of mankind. Rose and Mossawir have recently remarked that, "Elections are among the most ubiquitous of contemporary political institutions, and voting is the single act of political participation undertaken by a majority of adults in a majority of the nations in the world today."[1] The importance of elections is especially high in democratic systems. Both earlier and more contemporary discussions of the concept of democracy have employed elections as a primary definiendum and requisite feature of democracy.[2] Indeed, if any single institution serves as popular democracy's *sine qua non*, it is that of elections.[3]

The general argument that elections are "those most essential events in the democratic process"[4] is often posed from the perspective of the importance of the functions they perform in the political system. The most widely remarked of these functions is to provide a mechanism by which the great mass of members of the system are able to choose their leaders—thus giving majority approval to the exercise of leadership.[5] This is important both from the standpoint of solving the problem of legitimate leadership succession and as a means of potential relief from abuses or inadequacies of a present set of rulers.[6] Secondly, elections may serve as an indication of public choice among government policies—although this function is probably less frequently performed than once was thought to be the case. In referenda, the function is direct; but even in the elections of candidates for public office there is on occasion a question of public decision among the broader aspects of policy programs.[7] Furthermore, belief by future candidates in the possibility that voters may reject them at the next election because of their policies may lead

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[1] Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies*, 15 (1967), 173–201, at page 173.

[2] See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 73; W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Free Elections* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 11; Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 229; Graeme C. Moodie, *The Government of Great Britain* (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 188; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), 69–105.

[3] This is not to say that elections are sufficient for the maintenance of popular democracy. The many totalitarian regimes where elections are held without free choice belies that judgment. One may suggest, however, that they are necessary to the existence of what is commonly understood by the concept in majoritarian, populistic and participant senses.

[4] D. E. Butler, *Elections Abroad* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 9.

[5] Discussion of this and other system functions of elections is found in Rose and Mossawir, *op. cit.*, and in Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968).

[6] Protection of the people as a central role of elections was put forcefully by James Madison: "As it is essential that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the [legislature] should have an immediate dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which the dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured": *The Federalist*, No. 52, p. 343; quoted in Gerald Pomper, "The Concept of Elections in Political Theory," *The Review of Politics*, 29 (1967), 478–491, at p. 480.

[7] We do not need to go so far as to endorse the idea of "electoral mandates" to observe that in some elections policy issues may be of importance for the outcome. See, for example, Leon D. Epstein, "Electoral Decision and Policy Mandate: An Empirical Example," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (1964), 564–572.

them to anticipate public feeling, thus allowing indirect influence of elections upon policy formation. The latter may operate even in the absence of more direct control by the electorate.[8] A third central function of elections is legitimation of a regime. An election serves as a device of public endorsement—or occasionally, of repudiation—of the system of government. This pertains even in the many nations where leadership choice and policy influence aspects of elections have atrophied.[9] Thus, whether or not an election fulfills other purposes, it may allow the voter to reaffirm his faith in the validity and legitimacy of the political order.[10] Elections therefore link the citizen to his government by involving him in important political choices of leadership and policy and in evoking his attitude toward the wider institutional pattern under which elections are provided.[11]

I. ELECTIONS IN AMERICA

Given such major consequences for the political system—particularly for the democratic system—it would not be surprising to find that elections have become well established in American political practice. There is much that supports such a conclusion. Unlike political parties, elections were given original constitutional status; and the basic principles of the current system of elections date from very early in the life of the nation.[12] Not only have elections existed from the beginning of the republic, but they have penetrated all levels of government and a wide range of offices—from President of the United States to member of the local school board. This has meant very frequent elections and opportunities for voter participation. As Lane has observed, ". . . over a four year period, there are probably more votes per capita cast in the United States than in any other country. . . ."[13] By the criteria of constancy of operation and unchallenged constitutional status, frequency of opportunity for participation, and pervasiveness among types and levels of offices, elections may be regarded as a well-founded, ultra-stable feature of the American political landscape.

What this conclusion leaves out of account, however, is that, like all other institutions of political society, elections are subject to what Huntington has termed "political development and political decay."[14] The experience of the wider world beyond the American system suggests that neither democratic regimes nor their chief institutions should be taken as givens. As Mackenzie has noted: "The world is strewn with the wreckage of electoral systems."[15] Indeed, only a minority of countries today have free and frequent elections based on mass suffrage. "Only about a quarter of the nations of the world hold elections in which the adult population chooses among competing candidates."[16] Even in those nations that have free elections, the scope of the electoral process may be severely limited by those in power or distorted through gerrymandering, malapportionment, suffrage restrictions and the like. Electoral systems often favor those already in power and nearly always favor, for example, stronger over weaker political parties.[17] There are indeed so many types of departures from the norms of free and universally participant elections that one needs a complex set of categories to describe them.

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[8] See, for example, the discussion of the way this "law of anticipated reactions" operates in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes in "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 351–372.

[9] The legitimization function is especially prominent in the elections of Communist nations, See, for example, Z. Pelczynski, "Poland, 1957," in Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–179, at p. 119, where he says that once power has been consolidated, the election's function "is to legitimise the revolution and to secure for the regime a stamp of popular approval." Also see Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 235–251; and Howard R. Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections,"' *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (1961), 129–149.

[10] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 47.

[11] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961) for detailing of this linkage—especially pp. 458–480.

[12] DeTocqueville traces some of these developments to the turn of the nineteenth century. He observes, for example, "The state of Maryland, which had been founded by great lords, was the first to proclaim universal suffrage in [1801 and 1809] and introduced the most democratic procedures throughout its government." *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper, 1966), Vol. I., p. 70.

[13] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (1965), 386–430

[15] Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[16] Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, *The Politics of American Democracy*, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 289.

We thus observe the possibility of variance in the persistence of the institution: external variance in that some systems, offices and matters of policy decision employ elections—more or less frequently—while others do not; and internal variance in the extent to which elections are permitted to operate freely and without distortion within a given system and category of political choice. The purpose of the present investigation is to begin to test this variance: to see how firmly the electoral institution is rooted in American public consciousness, and thus to illuminate its prospects for withstanding future stress. Radical critics of American political institutions have recently called American elections into question as a device of democratic government. The question then is, do elections enjoy sufficient public confidence to be maintained into the indefinite future, even in periods of high stress?

Let us begin this assessment by asking how do elections fare in general on the balance sheet of institutional change? In these terms, there is evidence in the United States to suggest development, failure to develop, and decay. On the side of development, there is a record of progressive removal of suffrage restrictions based on such criteria as property, sex and race. There has been also a vigorous, recent movement to reduce malapportionment among legislative districts and other constituencies on the "one man—one vote" principle. In addition, we are seeing currently new pressures to reform the financing of campaigns, to eliminate the Electoral College, and to lower the voting age uniformly to eighteen.[18] All of these changes, if effected, would generally be regarded as developmental in character, in that they serve to perfect, extend and enhance the political significance of the institution.

Balancing these developmental tendencies, however, are some instances of institutional decay. Pomper observes, for example, that the introduction of the "short ballot," the growth of appointment and merit systems for chief executives such as city managers, the lengthening of tenure of elected officials and declining public trust in the devices of direct democracy such as the initiative, the recall and the referendum, are all instances of electoral-institution decay in America.[19] Thirdly, on the side of retardation of the institution's development, one still observes continuing restrictions on suffrage based on registration to vote, length of residence in the constituency, and age. More generally, it is well known that the diffusion of power through the federal system, separation of powers among the branches of state and federal government, and encouragement of the principle of minority rights to access—manifested especially in the free operation of political interest groups—often upset whatever influence the majority might have had through elections. The forecasts of observers such as De Tocqueville, who believed that elections would lead to unfettered majority rule, are, by American practice, therefore contraverted.[20] Furthermore, as Lane points out, "The Constitution, and the American system of government generally, serve in certain respects, to discourage the electorate from voting. This is not by accident; it is by design of the framers who feared factions and uninhibited majority rule."[21]

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[17] See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 134.

[18] On reform of campaign financing, see, for example, Alexander Heard, *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). Electoral College reform has been proposed anew in the aftermath of the 1968 election. One must bear in mind in classifying this as an area of possible development, however, just how resistant to change this part of the system of elections has been—in spite of wide public support for reform for over 30 years. For example, in answer to a Gallup Poll question, "Do you think the president should be elected by popular vote or by electoral vote as at present?," 63% of a national sample in June, 1936, preferred a popular vote whereas only 37% preferred an electoral vote: Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935–46* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 189. In a 1967 Gallup Poll, 65% of a national sample said they would approve of an amendment to the constitution which would do away with the Electoral College and base the election of a President on the total vote cast throughout the nation. Only 22% disapproved of such an amendment: Gallup Poll Report, *The Capital Times* (Madison, Wisconsin, No. 27, 1967), p. 11. By November, 1968, approval of the latter amendment had risen to 81%: *Gallup Opinion Index,* Report No. 52, October, 1969, p. 22.

[19] *Op. cit.,* p. 7

[20] DeTocqueville's estimates of American hypermajoritarianism can be found, for example, in *op. cit.*, pp. 68–71

[21] Lane, *op. cit.,* p. 317.

Because of such voter discouragement, one might suspect that the system of elections in the United States would be subject to long-term decay on the level of voter participation. The evidence is somewhat mixed and scholarship is therefore not unanimous on this question. Although voter turnout in elections as a proportion of the population has risen with the easing of suffrage restrictions, Burnham's data suggest that the percent of eligible electors who avail themselves of the privilege is lower than it once was, in comparison with voting levels in the nineteenth century.[22] On the other hand, other data, covering 1920–1964, show a distinct upturn in turnout.[23] In an important sense, therefore, the mass public may have withdrawn some of its support from the institution of elections over the long term, but at this point we are uncertain about the overall trends.

This leads directly to the main question of the research to be reported below. If there has been a drop in voting by eligible electors, does this indicate some loss of public confidence in the institution of elections? Do the recent criticisms of the American electoral process by militant students, blacks, and others simply give voice to an erosion of favorable public sentiment that has been in evidence for many years?[24] To begin to answer these queries is the purpose of the present analysis. Before we can proceed, however, we will first need to indicate briefly some categories of appropriate evidence for testing public confidence in the institution of elections.

II. MEASURING SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS

While the extent to which those allowed to vote avail themselves of the opportunity to do so is a possible indicator of the mass public's confidence in elections, it is a not wholly satisfactory one. As the literature on voting has shown, potential electors may participate out of a sense of partisan loyalty, ideological preference, attraction to particular candidates, reaction to immediate social pressure, feelings of contentment or discontent with general socioeconomic conditions, etc. Elections, as noted above, are primary vehicles of mass political choice behavior and manifestation of partisanship; and voting may also be a response denoting approval of the regime at a more general level. Thus, the intention if not the effect of turnout is only in part an expression of approval of the institution of elections *per se*.[25] What is needed therefore is a more direct measure of public feeling about the institution of elections as such.

To measure public sentiment regarding the system of elections, we focus in particular upon what in previous studies of this kind has been referred to as *diffuse support*.[26] Diffuse support is an orientation of good will toward an object which does not depend upon specific benefits derived from the object—in this case, the institution of elections. Because a diffusely supported institution of elections would be calued for its own sake, the effects of displeasure with a particular electoral outcome upon diffuse support would be marginal. Of course, repeated failure of the institution to provide acceptable outcomes is one of the conditions that undermines diffuse support and, in the long run, weakens the institution itself. The data to be presented below result from an initial inquiry into contemporary levels of diffuse support for the institution of elections in the United States.

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–26; and Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 7–28. There is some disagreement about how contemporary turnout levels in the United States compare with other Western democracies. The Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) observes, for example, that, "Even with adjusted figures, the plain fact remains that citizens of other democracies vote in greater relative numbers than Americans. The United States, leader of the free world, lags behind many other free countries in voter participation." [page 8]. By contrast, William G. Andrews concludes on the basis of his calculations that, "This means that about 83.2 percent of the eligible, able electorate voted in 1960—a figure nearly 20 percent higher than the one generally used to indicate voting participation in the United States. One can reasonably conclude that between 80 and 85 percent of the American electorate voted in 1960": "American Voting Participation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19 (1966), 639–652, at p. 651.

[23] William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 16–19.

[24] The kind of observation one meets increasingly in the press and elsewhere is exemplified by this statement on the demonstrations in Chicago at the time of the 1968 Democratic Party Convention: "The protesters never seriously sought to influence events inside the International Amphitheatre. From the start most of them regarded the Democratic Convention as rigged and the entire electoral process as bankrupt": F. Richard Ciccone, "Anatomy of Protest: Daley vs. New Left," *The Milwaukee Journal*, Part I, September 1, 1968, pp. 1 and 4, at p. 4.

[25] Equally, non-voting, abstention, boycotting, elections, voiding ballots, and the like are all imperfect indicators of feeling about the electoral process in that they may as often result from political apathy, disapproval of the regime, disgust with the present party system, the candidates or the issues at hand, than from disaffection from the electoral process.

[26] The concept of diffuse support has been proposed and explicated theoretically by David Easton. See, for example, his *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965). Empirical applications of the concept include: Jack Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 600–615; David

The Data

In an earlier report dealing with levels of public support for the institution of political parties, a number of interview questions were posed to a sample of Wisconsin adults in 1964.[27] Responses to these items were then factor-analyzed to determine the basic attitudinal dimensions which they gauged. In the present investigation, a similar approach is used to measure support for the electoral system, using initially a series of agree-disagree items from a 1966, area-cluster probability survey of Wisconsin adults. Thus, one of the major purposes of this survey is to provide the basis for devising a measure of support for elections similar to that constructed earlier to determine levels of collective support for the party system.

Using such a measure, one is able not only to determine the present levels of support for the institution but also to categorize and compare available collateral data, and thus to see how public support has varied over time and across political cultures. In what follows therefore the steps will be: (1) to test the extent to which there is an empirically definable orientation of diffuse support toward elections which is discriminable from diffuse support for the party system; (2) to present and interpret levels of public support for elections on such a measure or measures; (3) to compare the Wisconsin findings with other relevant data; (4) to investigate the relation of support for elections to other variables, demographic and political.

An Hypothesized Dimension of Support

In order to construct a measure of support for elections that would be meaningful both to the general public and for the theoretical purposes of political science, items of several types were included in the survey. Broadly, these items have to do either with the judgment of the worth of the institution in its own right or with relative approval of the present operation of the electoral process. Let us view each of these in more detail.

One of the most general regime norms of democracy, derived from a belief in consent of the governed, majority rule, and free competition for public office, is that elections are a worthwhile institution of popular participation and that individual members ought therefore to vote. The duty to vote is of special, indeed of paramount, interest in this connection. The expectation that the citizen of a democracy will vote in popular elections is a crucial norm because it links his own behavior directly to the institution. Such an expectation and its corresponding role-behavior has significance in that it gives symbolic expression to the more general principles that undergird the role, for example, belief in the necessity for majority rule.[28] Such an expectation applies, therefore, even when the choice aspects of voting are perceived by the potential voter to be negligible. Internalization of the duty to vote, if not fully synonymous with raising the level of the individual's diffuse support for the institution, is nonetheless one of its necessary ingredients. The member becomes obliged by such a sense of duty to contribute his own resources of time and effort even when particular elections are anticipated to be unfavorable or trivial to his own interests.

But something else is involved. Not only should the member come to have sentiments about the worth of and necessity for participating in elections, but he should also become generally oriented to the way they operate. While he may not like what goes into or results from a particular election, he should, if diffusely sup-

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Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 25–38; G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1968), 163–180; Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court," *Law and Society Review*, 2 (1968), pp. 357–384; David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1969).

[27] Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," *loc. cit.*

[28] That majority rule is endorsed in general by the mass public at a nearly unanimous level is indicated in data found in James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276–294.

TABLE 1. COMPONENTS OF ELECTORAL AND PARTY SYSTEM SUPPORT

Item	Rotated Factor Matrix				
	I	II	III	IV	h^2
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot."	.14	.01	$\boxed{.57}$	−.02	.34
2. "More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exist."	−.10	.06	$\boxed{.67}$	.16	.49
3. "Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the government runs things."	.10	−.10	.24	$\boxed{.72}$	.60
4. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	$\boxed{.52}$	.26	.11	.04	.35
5. "Our system of government would work a lot better if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties altogether."	.13	.36	$\boxed{.52}$	.33	.52
6. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on issues."	.06	.45	$\boxed{.54}$	.11	.50
7. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	.12	.43	.44	.30	.48
8. "Legislators and other elected officials should be held responsible for the promises they make campaigning for office."	−.06	.41	.27	.13	.26
9. "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."	$\boxed{.71}$	.07	.01	.13	.52
10. "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."	.05	−.02	−.14	$\boxed{.73}$	.56
11. "Most of the effort, time, and money spent in political campaigns could be better used some other way."	.12	.67	.12	−.03	.48
12. "I generally get a feeling of satisfaction from going to the polls to cast my ballot."	$\boxed{-.69}$	.01	−.09	.17	.51
13. "We have far too many elections for public office in this country."	.39	.34	.20	−.04	.31
14. "Most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous."	.23	.61	.14	−.03	.45
15. "We should make a lot more of our government officials go before the people as candidates in general elections than we do now."	−.09	.31	−.06	$\boxed{.52}$	.38
16. "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."	$\boxed{.77}$	.10	.12	.11	.63
17. "A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."	$\boxed{.52}$	.15	−.14	.04	.31
18. "It is impossible for most voters to make informed and intelligent decisions when they go to the polls."	.31	$\boxed{.51}$	−.18	−.05	.39
19. "Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections."	.14	$\boxed{.62}$	.08	.10	.45
Percent of total variance	13.3	13.2	9.7	8.7	44.8
Percent of total factor variance	29.6	29.4	21.6	19.3	100.0

portive, be convinced that the overall results of elections are beneficial. On the input side, we ask whether he thinks the campaign process represents a worthwhile expenditure of social resources, for example. On the side of outputs and outcomes, does he regard elections as making a real difference in the way leadership is exercised and policy is directed, or does he perceive that it has only ritual, symbolic functions to perform?

To tap these various aspects of diffuse support for elections a series of agree-disagree items was employed. The hypothesis was that together these items would form an empirically-observable attitude dimension distinct from the orientation of diffuse support for the party system operationalized earlier. If there were such an empirically defined dimension, it would provide a basis for assessing the relative value of individual item indicators in measuring such an orientation; and thus, it would make possible meaningful comparisons with items from other surveys in order to give historical and comparative depth to the analysis.

III. FINDINGS

The Observed Support Dimensions

We find, upon principal component analysis of the matrix of correlations among nineteen items pertaining to the party and electoral systems (reproduced below in Table 1), that three election system components rather than one is the empirical result; and that these three components are distinguished in large part from the dimension of support for the party system.

Factor I defines an area of public feeling having to do with the felt obligation to participate in elections (items 4, 9, 16 and 17) and with the satisfaction that one obtains from discharging such an obligation (item 12). I will refer to this dimension simply as "voting duty"—which I take to be a primary indicator of diffuse support for elections as discussed above.

Factor II concerns broadly the member's reactions on the input side of the electoral process: his relative approval of resources expended in election campaigns (item 11), whether such campaigns are to be taken seriously (item 4), whether the principle of submitting leaders to the test of popular choice is worthwhile (item 19), and whether voters are able to perform their electoral role with competence (item 18). To a lesser degree, some of the items on political parties load on this component (items 6, 7, and 8), a slight overlap in public perception of the two institutions which makes excellent sense given the central role of parties in much electoral competition.

Factor III is support for the party system in that all of the highest loading items (1, 2, 5, 6, and 7) are concerned with the parties; and none of the election system items is weighted above .27 on this dimension. Thus attitudes toward parties are clearly separable from those toward elections in the public mind. This empirical distinction will prove significant when we attempt in a preliminary way to compare below the relative magnitude of public support for the two institutions.

Factor IV concerns mainly the efficacy of elections in giving the people influence in "running the country" (items 3 and 10). It also involves to a lesser extent the idea of extending the principle of electoral competition for public offices (item 15). For sake of simplicity, this dimension will be called "efficacy of elections" in that its main emphasis is upon the belief that elections result in increasing popular influence on government.

Levels of Public Support for Elections

With these dimensions of support thus empirically defined, the discussion can proceed next to assessing the relative degrees of public support for the system of elections. We shall also want to interpret such levels of support or non-support in comparison with public feeling at earlier points in time, with mass opinion in other Western democracies, and with public regard for the party system.

1. Voting Duty. As we turn first to voting duty, we are fortunate in that earlier work in the field of voting behavior has revealed much of interest for present purposes. The work that originally gave clearest empirical expression of the sense of voting duty was *The Voter Decides*. Voting duty was there termed "a sense of civic obligation to vote" or, more simply, "sense of citizen duty."[29] The present terms of measurement draw heavily upon items from that original effort; and the data generated at that time, and in the subsequent national surveys of 1956 and 1960, will be used below to evaluate possible trends in the collective sense of voting duty in the American public. Before viewing these data, however, let us first consider a more general issue.

An impression that one is apt to gain from close acquaintance with American culture is that the duty to vote ranks high among all of the civic obligations recognized by Americans. Some evidence that supports this impression has been reported by Milbrath. A survey conducted among the general citizenry of Evanston, Illinois, in 1960, showed that 79% of the respon-

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[29] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), pp. 86, 194–199.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO VOTING DUTY ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966[a]

Items	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree-Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total %
16. "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."	.77	1%	7	1	68	21	1	1	100%
9. "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."	.71	1	4	2	68	23	1	1	100%
12. "I generally get a feeling of satisfaction from going to the polls to cast my ballot."	−.69	15	71	4	5	1	3	2	101%
4. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	.52	2	17	7	58	14	2	1	101%
17. "A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."	.52	2	27	3	51	14	2	1	100%

[a] Only items with factor weights $\geq$.50 are included. Some rows do not sum to 100% due to rounding error. N =607.

dents agreed that one fulfills his civic duty if he votes regularly.[30] A similar consensus was discovered in data from a later survey in Buffalo, New York. From the latter study, Milbrath reports that:

> Certain inputs are almost universally believed to be a citizen's responsibility: vote (93%), keep informed (80%), teach children good citizenship (87%), pay taxes (98%), have undivided loyalty to the country (93%). The percentage doing each of these things at least "fairly often" holds up quite well: vote (82%), keep informed (72%), teach children good citizenship (75%), pay taxes (93%), have undivided loyalty (93%).[31]

The extent of societal emphasis upon voting duty as a primary civic role is therefore high in America. Indeed, it is probably more highly ranked here than for many other democracies, even those generally regarded as having higher turnout rates than does the United States.[32] That voting duty should be so prominent among expected civic virtues suggests that powerful sources of social reinforcement are present to maintain it, especially political socialization. What Rose and Mossawir observe for Britain and other free societies can probably be applied strongly in America: "In Britain and other free societies, the duty to vote, through a process of

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[30] Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965), p. 62.

[31] "The Nature of Political Beliefs and the Relationship of the Individual to the Government," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 12 (1968), 28–36, at p. 33.

[32] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 171. Their five-nation data show Americans to be especially high relative to Britons, Germans, Italians, and Mexicans in mentioning voting as a response to the question of what role the ordinary man ought to play in his local community. This is not to say that the sense of obligation to vote is not high in these other democracies. Rose and Mossawir found, for example, in their Stockport, England, sample that "82% replied that they thought voting a duty," when asked "whether you don't have to vote unless you feel like it, or whether voting is a duty." [*Op. cit.*, p. 189.]. Edinger presents data, moreover, which suggest that voting is at the top of the list of citizenship obligations felt by West Germans: Lewis J. Edinger, *Politics in Germany* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 106. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that voting is apt to be conceived more as a duty than as a right (and perhaps not as an effective means to influence public policy therefore). Some older American data (1944), showed in answer to the question, "Do you regard voting more as a duty you owe your country, or more as a right

TABLE 3. TRENDS IN VOTING DUTY: COMPARISON DATA

(a) "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."

	U.S., 1952[a]	*U.S., 1956*[a]	*U.S., 1960*[a]	*Wisconsin, 1963*[b]	*Wisconsin, 1966*
Percent Disagree	86%	89	89	89	89

(b) "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."

	U.S., 1952[a]	*U.S., 1956*[a]	*U.S., 1960*[a]	*Wisconsin, 1966*
Percent Disagree	86	89	90	91

(c) "If a person doesn't care (about) how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it."

"A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."

	U.S., 1952[a]	*U.S., 1956*[a]	*U.S., 1960*[a]	*Wisconsin, 1966*
Percent Disagree	45	52	53	65

[a] From the Codebooks of the 1952, 1956 and 1960 Election Studies of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. These data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

[b] From a state-wide survey of Wisconsin adults in April and May, 1963, by the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. The question in this instance was worded: "So many other people vote in presidential elections that it doesn't really matter whether or not I personally vote." Two other surveys conducted by U.W.S.R.L. in spring and fall, 1963, show the collective stability of this sentiment even under different item wording. In the spring, 1963 survey (March and April), 89% disagreed with the statement, "Why bother to vote when you can do so little with your one vote." In the fall, 1963 survey, 88% disagreed that, "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."

socialization, becomes a response to an internal compulsion."[33]

The impression of general public adherence to the norm of voting duty is forcefully reconfirmed when we turn to the 1966 Wisconsin data. Table 2 presents the distribution in response to the five highest loading items on the voting duty dimension.

A very high public endorsement of the duty to vote appears on these items. Diffuse support for elections is on this level, very firmly based. And, when we take account of comparable data from earlier national surveys—where the same or very similar items were used—we reach the same conclusion. Table 3 shows these comparison data.

On the first two items—where the wording is the same as in the present survey—we obtain nearly identical results for Wisconsin and the nation as a whole. The figures are remarkably close, suggesting that Wisconsin is not unrepresentative for items of this kind. On a third, comparable, but not identical item, we find a roughly equivalent level of public endorsement in Wisconsin and the United States as a whole (item c). Furthermore, looking at the national data from a time perspective, one observes that the trends on these three items though slight are up without exception.[34] When we put this small rise together with the fact that the American sense of duty to vote is relatively high, and probably higher than in many other comparable systems,[35] we can infer that a profound resource

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to use if you want to?", that 59% chose *duty* and 36% *right:* National Opinion Research Center national sample; data available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. A quite similar distribution was found in a 1953 national survey in France. See Jean Stoetzel, "Voting Behavior in France," *British Journal of Sociology*, 6 (1955), 104–122, at p. 120.

[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

[34] These trends were pointed out earlier, using the Michigan Survey Research Center election study data, by Robert E. Lane. See "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 874–895, at p. 894.

[35] Present day Americans are high in sense of duty to vote, not only in recent historical, but also comparative, contexts. For data on the latter, see Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–146.

exists on which to base the future of the institution in America.

Before we conclude that the foundations are perfectly sound, however, we should also consider how the general public perceives the institution at the level of its operation, i.e., in terms of Factors II and IV as defined above.

2. Approval of the Electoral Process. Factor II, perception of the operation of elections on the side of electoral input, shows a rather more mixed state of public opinion than is the case for voting duty. Table 4 presents these data.

A majority of the 1966 respondents agree that resources are wasted in political campaigns relative to how such resources could otherwise be expended (item 11). Rather substantial minorities also agree with the other three, negatively pitched items. Only on the proposition that most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous is there a clear majority supportive of the electoral institution at this level.

Other available evidence would tend to support these findings. Data from the Almond-Verba five-nation study suggest a similarly mixed state of opinion in a series of questions on campaigns and voting. Their U.S. sample was highest of all five nations in agreeing that campaigning is needed (74% U.S., 63% U.K., 60% Mexico, 42% Germany, and 39% Italy) and in agreeing that election campaigns are "often" or "sometimes" pleasant and enjoyable (66% U.S., 52% U.K., 38% Germany, 34% Mexico, and 28% Italy). On the other hand, the U.S. sample was also highest in finding elections "often" and "sometimes" silly or ridiculous (58% U.S., 46% Germany, 37% U.K., 32% Mexico, and 19% Italy), and in "often" and "sometimes" getting angry at some of the things that go on in election campaigns (57% U.S., 46% Germany, 42% U.K., 26% Mexico, and 20% Italy).[36] Americans thus give a rather uneven reception to the campaigning aspects of the electoral process—more so than for any of the other four nations.

On the issue of public perception of its own members' electoral competence, there are also a number of suggestive earlier data. Prothro's and Grigg's evidence showed that less than a majority disagreed with the statement, "In a city referendum, only people who are well-informed about the problem being voted on should be allowed to vote."[37] McClosky's 1957–58 national sample revealed that only 48% agreed that "People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intelligently." In addition, 62% of McClosky's general electorate agreed that " 'Issues' and 'arguments' are beyond the understanding of most voters"; and 48% agreed that, "Most people don't have enough sense to pick their own leaders wisely."[38] We find from these earlier studies therefore that a rather high proportion of people are critical of the ordinary man's electoral capacities. That there is a relatively low collective evaluation of voters is confirmed by the 1966 Wisconsin data. Less than a majority disagree that, "It is impossible for most voters to make informed and intelligent decisions when they go to the polls." (Table 4). The public is critical of itself, or more precisely, its members are as often critical of each other's capacities as they are willing to believe in the rationality of the common man.

Our conclusion at this point must therefore be that high support on the plane of civic obligation to vote is not matched by equally high approval of the campaigning and other aspects of the input side of the electoral process, particularly in according one's fellow man any substantial measure of voter intelligence. What then of electoral output?

3. The Efficacy of Elections. Factor IV defines an attitudinal orientation toward the operation of elections with regard to outputs. Are elections perceived as giving the mass public a chance to participate in government? Table 5 presents the pattern of response to the items loading highest on this dimension.

What we observe is a situation of support intermediate between those discussed above. There are clear majorities on each of these items supporting the operation of elections in government. But the level of public belief is considerably lower than for voting duty. While a majority of the public is confident that elections have participatory results, such belief is clearly not consensual.

The first (and best) item indicator on this dimension has also been used in national surveys (and this earlier use inspired its employment in the Wisconsin survey). We observe for the latter indicator some possibility of a decline in this variety of support since 1952. In the 1952 Michigan election study, 77% agreed that "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how

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[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Prothro and Grigg, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

[38] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review, 58 (1964), 361-382, at pp. 365 and 369. For comparative perspective, we might note that Rose and Mossawir's study in Stockport, England, similarily revealed a not high majority (57%) who judged that "most people do think about how they vote": *op. cit.*, p. 187.

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL PROCESS ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966[a]

	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree-Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total Percent
11. "Most of the effort, time and money spent in political campaigns could be better used some other way."	.67	9%	50	22	15	1	2	1	100%
19. "Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections."	.62	4	26	18	40	7	5	1	101%
14. "Most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous."	.61	2	21	18	51	6	1	2	101%
18. "It is impossible for most voters to make informed decisions when they go to the polls."	.51	3	31	17	42	4	2	1	100%

[a] Only items with factor weights ≥.50 are included. Some rows do not add to 100% due to errors of rounding. *N* =607.

things are run in this country."[39] In the Almond and Verba U.S. survey of 1959, however, such agreement was 71%, an ostensible drop in support.[40] We might note also, although the comparison is rather speculative, that only 57% agreed with this statement in the 1966 Wisconsin survey; but a substantial 18% availed themselves of the agree-disagree option. When the latter are partitioned proportionately into agree or disagree categories, agreement then rises to 70%, which is still below the 1952 national figure (unlike the items on voting duty reported in Table 2, where Wisconsin was as high or higher than the national figures).

The evidence at this point is incomplete, but I nevertheless draw the tentative inference that there has been a net decline in valuing elections for their participatory effects. This is contrary to the trend of valuing participation on the level

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO EFFICACY OF ELECTIONS ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966[a]

Items	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree-Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total Percent
10. "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."	.73	5%	52	18	20	2	2	1	100%
3. "Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the government runs things"	.72	9	49	10	26	4	1	1	100%
15. "We should make a lot more of our government officials go before the people as candidates than we do now."	.52	4	61	12	17	—	4	2	100%

[a] Only items with factor weights ≥.50 are included. N =607.

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[39] Codebook of the 1952 Election Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

[40] Codebook of the Five-Nation Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

of voting duty. In comparative context, moreover, both Britain and Germany in the Five-Nation study scored higher than the U.S. on the level of support manifested by the first of these Factor IV items.[41] Thus, belief in elections as an effective instrument of participatory democracy is apparently lower in America than the belief that one should vote—something which would tend to increase the ritual aspects of electoral behavior. The belief in electoral efficacy is also possibly lower than it was in 1952; and it suffers by comparison with some other Western democracies. This is an obvious area for further analysis, using a broader and perhaps more incisive range of questions than was possible in this very limited and preliminary analysis. Before we leave the question, however, there is one further comparison to make and that is with support for the allied institution of political parties.

Support for Elections versus Support for Parties

Popular and representative democracy has generally required that parties and elections should be interdependent. Once elections are allowed under the legal and structural terms of a regime, the stage is set for the creation of political parties to organize and contest elections. Without political parties, elections more often than not become emptied of meaning and the choice situation facing the voter becomes difficult and often uninterpretable.[42] But parties and elections are not necessarily of equal status as institutions. However important might be the interrelationships between the two institutions, elections in America have probably been accorded greater legitimacy than have the parties, particularly at a formal level. Our question then is how legitimate is each in the contemporary public mind? As they are complementary institutions, one might hypothesize that feelings toward the one would spill over to attitudes toward the other; and levels of support would therefore be comparable. Let us look at the available evidence.

Table 6 presents the 1966 Wisconsin data on diffuse support for the party system.[43]

Only on the most extreme of these items—the proposal to strike party labels from the ballot—is there a majority in support of the parties. The remaining four items show that more respondents oppose the parties than favor them, which was also true for a similar survey in Wisconsin in 1964 using the same items. We conclude again that support for the parties is relatively low; and this is especially the case when we compare response on these party system items with the high consensus levels in favor of voting duty (Table 2). On the efficacy-of-elections dimension, public support also appears to be higher than on the political party items (Table 5). Thus, only on the dimension of approval of the electoral process do we find support for elections to dip to levels approaching sentiment about the parties—and even here the comparison favors elections (see Table 4). In no case in Table 4 do those disapproving various aspects of elections outnumber those who favor them—which is not true in the case of the parties (Table 6). These comparisons are indeed very rough, given the differences in object and item content. Yet the general thrust is clear: even on the least favored aspects of the electoral institution, public estimation is higher than for the parties.

Some external evidence from national surveys relevant to this question provides much more direct comparisons and documents the same discrepancy between parties and elections. The Five-Nation study respondents were asked: "We know that the ordinary person has many problems that take his time. In view of this, what part do you think the ordinary person ought to play in the local affairs of his town or district?" The American predisposition for connecting citizenship and voting comes to the fore: 40% of the Americans, but only 18% of the British, 15% of the Germans, 2% of the Italians, and 1% of the Mexicans volunteered "vote."[44] The contrast with "taking part in ac-

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[41] *Ibid.* U.K. agreement is 83%, Germany 78%, U.S. 71%, Mexico 65%, and Italy 62%.

[42] The interdependence of party and electoral systems is seen in such statements as this, by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., in *Political Parties and National Integration in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 3, "As noted elsewhere, however, formal political parties in the narrow sense defined herein did not appear until constitutional reforms were introduced providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently meaningful and attractive measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to convert their movements into political parties and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and procedures, such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible for parties to seek power constitutionally." They add in the footnote to this statement: "The immediate point is, that with few exceptions, African political parties initially emerged through electoral competition."

[43] See Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," *loc. cit.*, pp. 603 and 605, for presentation of the diffuse support for the party system factor in the 1964 study.

[44] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 171. For two

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE ON PARTY SYSTEM SUPPORT ITEMS, WISCONSIN 1966[a]

Items[b]	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree-Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total Percent
2. "More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exists."	.67	9%	60	11	13	—*	6	1	100%
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot."	.57	4	30	8	50	6	3	—*	101%
6. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on them."	.54	6	48	23	18	1	3	1	100%
5. "Our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties altogether."	.52	8	35	11	33	8	3	2	100%
7. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	.44	4	37	17	36	3	3	1	101%

[a] Some rows do not add to 100% due to errors of rounding. N =607.

[b] Items are presented in order of rotated factor weights.

* Less than 1%.

tivities of political parties" is especially great for Americans: only 6% of Americans gave the party activity response, which is not much greater than several of the other countries: 5% Mexico, 4% U.K., 4% Germany, and 1% Italy. In all of these countries, parties are less salient means of participation than elections, but the differential between the two institutions is much the widest in the United States.

The 1964 Election Study by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center posed two further, highly relevant questions to their respondents:[45]

1. "How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?"
2. "How much do you feel that political parties help to make the government pay attention to what the people think?"

Table 7 presents the response to these questions.

We observe a marked difference in the way the mass public attaches representative significance to the two institutions: elections stand considerably higher.

The rough comparisons of public support for parties versus that for elections as derived from the 1966 Wisconsin data are supported therefore by other relevant data; and the conclusion is that the public finds elections more agreeable to

TABLE 7. RELATIVE EFFICACY OF PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, U.S. 1964

Make the government pay attention:	(Percent)	
	Elections	Parties
A good deal	65%	40
Some	25	39
Not much	6	13
Don't know	4	7
Total %	100%	99%
N =	(1450)	(1450)

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other items which show a similar, if less extreme difference among countries, and between elections and parties as a perceived mode of influence, see *ibid.*, pp. 191 and 203. Also see Milbrath, "The Nature of Political Beliefs . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[45] Codebook of the Survey Research Center 1964 Election Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

TABLE 8. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTION OF ELECTIONS

	Factor Score I Voting Duty		Factor Score II Approval of Electoral Process		Factor Score IV Efficacy of Elections	
Independent Variables[a]	r	Partial r	r	Partial r	r	Partial r
Political Party Preference Index	.00	.03	.08	.10[b]	.11	.07
Frequency of Religious Attendance	−.11	−.06	−.08	−.05	.02	−.03
Age	−.22	−.09[b]	−.22	−.08[b]	.15	.01
Race	−.08	−.08	.07	.07	.06	.06
Sex	.00	.01	−.04	−.03	.00	.00
Ideology Index	−.01	.03	−.06	−.02	−.02	−.03
Occupational Prestige Index	.24	.07	.18	.02	−.21	−.03
Education	.31	.18[c]	.26	.15[c]	−.34	−.25[c]
Income	.18	.03	.21	.10[b]	−.18	−.04
Percent of Life Spent in Present Place of Residence	−.01	.01	−.02	.01	.02	−.01
Multiple R	.35		.33		.36	

[a] Political Party Preference is scored as: strong Republican = 1 . . . strong Democrat = 7; Race is scored: black = 1, white = 2; sex is scored: male = 1, female = 2; ideological self-identification is scored: strong liberal = 1 . . . strong conservative = 5; occupational prestige is scored according to the Otis Dudley Duncan Socio-economic Index as reported in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *et al.*, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: The Free Press, 1961). Housewives are given their husband's occupational prestige score.

[b] Significant at the .05 level using the t distribution (two-tailed test); partial correlations reported are controlled for all other independent variables in the series.

[c] Significant at the .01 level or better.

their needs than it does the parties.[46] The average member of the public will more likely have internalized the norms of electoral participation than those of partisan competition. The member's cathexis with each will therefore differ—perhaps along the lines expressed by one of Rosenberg's respondents. When asked what part the average man played in politics, he replied, "not much of a part. The little man votes and that's all . . . the party usually takes over pretty much. They don't think too much about the little man."[47] Voting and elections are "us"; parties are "them."

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[46] This contrast leaves out of account whether or not the two institutions are interrelated in the public mind. To test for such a relationship, a separate factor analysis of the party and electoral support dimensions was performed using oblique rotation. The latter indicates the degree of relationship obtaining among factors, and thus among dimensions of orientation. What we observe is the following set of correlations:

	Party System Support	Voting Duty	Approval of the Electoral Process
Voting Duty	.28		
Approval of the Electoral Process	.46	.36	
Efficacy of Elections	.32	.20	.27

These correlations constitute the oblique primary factor pattern matrix, using an independent cluster solution. Their item definitions vary slightly from those reported above, in that a 28 item matrix was used which included 9 items on general political efficacy and trust. Six factors were obtained in the principal component analysis, including the four above. These data show that there are, to a greater or lesser degree, some mutual effects among these various orientations to parties and elections. For example, party system support and approval of the electoral process covary to the highest degree, whereas voting duty and efficacy of elections are least associated.

[47] Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954–55). 349–366, at p. 356.

Correlates of Support for Elections

One further step of data analysis needs to be taken before we leave this subject. This concerns the question of demographic, political or other correlates of these attitude dimensions. Are there systematic variations on these attitudes among people who differ according to demographic or political attributes of other kinds? Using the 1966 Wisconsin data, we can begin to make some initial estimates. In Table 8, ten independent variables that could be thought to influence the level of affect for elections are correlated with factor scores on each of the election support dimensions.

What we find in general is that the correlations of the independent variables and the factor scores are relatively low. The low magnitude of these correlations means that none is a weighty influence upon support for elections.

A few significant correlations do appear, however, with education being the most prominent. Greater educational attainment improves one's sense of voting duty and approval of the way the electoral system operates; but it decreases one's faith that elections are effective. Almond and Verba's data showed that one of the items used here to measure voting duty, namely satisfaction when going to the polls, evoked a response which was correlated with education in four of the five countries studied. Thus, the first of our findings supports earlier research.[48] Age is also correlated significantly with the first two factor scores, if negatively. Thus, the youngest adults feel their obligation to participate most strongly and more fully approve of electoral processes. Together the age and education effects in our data suggest the possibility of preadult political socialization influence—something that should become a focus of future inquiry. The only other correlates of note are party preference and income. They correlate significantly in one case each with the electoral support components. In general, our capacity to account for the electoral attitudes by using these ten predictors is limited. We account for 13% or less of the variance in the factor scores by use of these predictor variables in each case.

Another correlational question that we might raise concerns possible effects of these electoral sentiments upon behavior. One behavior of interest here is individual turnout rate over a series of elections. Do our electoral support factors relate significantly to frequency of turnout, when other variables are held constant? Table 9 presents data pertinent to this question.

The table begins, in the top portion, with two more general orientations, political efficacy and political trust, which have been scored on the basis of a separate factor analysis of nine additional survey items.[49] Political efficacy is rather similar in construction here to the index of the

TABLE 9. CORRELATES OF TURNOUT: SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS AND OTHER VARIABLES

Correlates	Turnout[a]	
	r	Partial r
Political Efficacy	.16	.02
Political Trust	−.05	−.09[b]
Voting Duty	.36	.35[c]
Approval of Electoral Process	.04	.05
Efficacy of Elections	.00	.02
Support for Party System	.10	.08
Political Party Preference Index	−.04	−.01
Frequency of Religious Attendance	−.16	−.16[c]
Age	.14	.30[c]
Race	−.05	.02
Sex	−.06	−.03
Ideology Index	−.01	−.04
Occupational Prestige Index	.19	.09[b]
Education	.11	−.01
Income	.20	.16[c]
Percent of Life Spent in Present Place of Residence	.15	.14[c]
Multiple R =	.53	

[a] Turnout is scored on participation in three elections: 1964 November election, 1966 September primary, and 1966 November election. Scores range from 0–3.

[b] Significant at the .025 level, using one-tailed t distribution.

[c] Significant at the .001 level using one-tailed t distribution.

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[48] *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

[49] The major items are:

Rotated Factor Weight	Political Efficacy
−.73	"Government officials don't care much about what people like me think."
−.71	"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
−.69	"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
−.63	"The people who really run the country do not even become known to the voters."

same name employed by the Survey Research Center studies of voting behavior. The latter constituted one part of the political involvement dimension reported in *The American Voter.*[50] The other long-term portion of political involvement is "sense of citizen duty"—which, in the present context, is "voting duty." One of the first questions we might raise is which of these two aspects of political involvement better accounts, in the Wisconsin data, for the variance in extent of voting participation.

Looking at Table 9, we find that voting duty is of considerably greater importance for turnout than is political efficacy. Indeed, when the effects of other variables, such as education, are controlled, the turnout—political efficacy correlation approaches zero. Voting duty on the other hand is the strongest of all of this list of correlates ($r = .36$; partial $r = .35$), and is approached in magnitude only by age ($r = .14$; partial $r = .30$).[51]

What does not correlate here is perhaps as interesting as what does. That voting duty, mobility, and age should be positively associated with turnout is hardly surprising given past research. Lack of correlation with political efficacy on the other hand is unexpected on these grounds. *The American Voter,* for example, presented data from the 1956 election that showed a very marked relationship between turnout and political efficacy.[52] We might also have thought that the election support factors other than voting duty would show higher correlation than they do. However else these latter sentiments may serve to differentiate behavior, attendance at the ballot box is not much affected by them.

IV. CONCLUSION

Both those who are concerned about the fate of the regime of democracy in America and those who pitch their theoretical interests at the level of system persistence and transformation are apt to be intrigued by the state of popular opinion regarding that most characteristic institution of popular participation, the election. Certainly the spate of electoral studies of the last generation in political science would suggest such an interest. What the latter studies have not dealt with directly, however, is the condition of elections in popular thinking at the level of the institution. It is the purpose of the present inquiry to initiate that enterprise.

The 1966 Wisconsin data, even when supplemented by the excellent and suggestive research of others, as above, are limited and preliminary to the tasks of measurement and theory construction in this area. If we grant that this initial excursion is only able to be suggestive, we nevertheless obtain thereby some sense of the broad contours of public support for elections. Particularly when we compare earlier American national data, cross-system data, and evidence pertaining to the sister institution of political parties, are we able to sharpen considerably the dim outlines of these preliminary inferences.

The general conclusion is that the institution of elections enjoys a broad base of popular support, most strongly at the level of personal commitment to the norm of voting obligation. Aggregate sense of citizen duty to vote is improving, moreover, rather than decaying, if the slight trends we find are indicative. The future of institutional support on this level looks bright. This is also true when we take account of the correlation of voting duty with education and (negatively) with age. Rising levels of educational attainment and increasing proportions of young people in the adult population should reinforce this trend in coming years. While support is distinctly lower on perception of how elections operate in America, it is nonetheless probably high in comparison with public backing for the parties.

There is a problem which could develop, however, from the gap between the level of feeling of an obligation to participate in elections and the relative perception of the value of the elec-

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Political Trust

.75	"The government in Washington can usually be trusted to do what's right."
.75	"Almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing."
.65	"Most political candidates seem to really mean what they say."
−.42	"Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked."

[50] *Op. cit.,* pp. 101–110.

[51] Other variables showing significant correlation with turnout are frequency of religious attendance —which shows that those who go to church more often vote less, and vice versa—and lack of mobility (percent of life spent in present place of residence). The latter is no doubt explained by the legal obstacles present for those who move their residence, and by the tendency of those who remain longest in a community to translate their greater stake in its affairs into higher participation. It is perhaps also interesting and surprising to see in this instance that those who are more mistrustful of politicians and government turn out to vote at a higher rate—perhaps to protect their interests in what for them is a more dangerous and uncertain political world.

[52] *Op. cit.,* p. 105.

toral process. The problem is that a possible erosion of public confidence in the institution could come about if people increasingly disbelieve that campaigns are worthwhile expenditures of social resources or that elections have an impact on leadership and policy. Under the latter circumstances, a collective sense of obligation to vote could lead increasingly to an overemphasis upon the ritual behavior aspects of voting.[53] The smallish negative trend on the efficacy of elections dimension together with the countertrend on voting duty suggests that we could see an increase in the gap between expectation and perception, or between perceived electoral input and output. The present small degree of fragility of the electoral institution could become magnified if this gap is increasingly perceived. Future work should turn more directly to this question.

I propose, therefore, that scholarship continue to devise and take such measurements as these. Nation-wide, periodic surveys are particularly desirable if we are to understand more comprehensively and reliably the nature of the processes of development or decline of public sentiment toward this major institution of democracy. While the foundations of diffuse support for the institution of elections appear to be relatively firm for the present and able to withstand considerable stress, the centrality of elections in the democratic scheme of things and in the life of many major political systems make raising the hypotheses tentatively tendered here a matter for continuing empirical concern.

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[53] For discussion of the symbolic and ritual aspects of voting, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

INCUMBENCY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN SENATE ELECTIONS: DEFINING PARAMETERS OF SUBPRESIDENTIAL VOTING*

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I. THEORETICAL SETTING

Compared with the recent substantial strides in presidential election analysis, research on congressional elections has only begun. The majority of studies have been cast within the presidential-election context, with the relationship between the presidential and congressional vote the phenomenon to be explained.[1] The present attention to presidential contests is understandable because of the inherent interest in such races in a presidential-centered political system and because reliable survey data have been limited to nationwide samples, severely restricting analysis on a state or district basis. And yet without some comparable advances at the congressional level, we cannot assess bases of electoral support nor the numerous assumptions of behavior in Congress as linked to this support, nor attempt a theory of voting behavior that does not consider voting at the subpresidential level. Put simply, the state of research is such that we have only begun to identify and measure the key variables affecting congressional voting outcomes. It is this basic task to which recent research in the field has been directed.

Consider as the core phenomenon for explanation the sharp fluctuations over time in the partisan division of the vote for Senator and Representative. Since studies of voting behavior indicate the stability of party loyalties over time, evidence of sharp shifts in voting outcomes suggest factors other than party cues influencing the vote decision. Among the lines of inquiry opened, studies by Cummings, Press, and Hinckley, following the work of Key, have utilized aggregate election statistics to measure the substantial impact of the presidential vote on House election outcomes.[2] Donald Stokes has employed a variance components model to measure the relative impact of national, state, and district influences on the vote for Representative in the 1950's. Using aggregate election data and measuring the variation in congressional vote from the national mean congressional vote, Stokes finds that "national," "state," and "district" influences can explain 32%, 19%, and 49%, respectively, of the variation from the mean. He concludes that the large size of the district component "strongly suggests the importance of the congressional candidates, their party apparatus, and issues having a focus in the individual constituency."[3] A study by Harvey Kabaker mea-

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[1] See V. O. Key's analysis of Senate and House elections in relation to the presidential vote, *Parties, Politics, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964); Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York: The Free Press, 1966); Barbara Hinckley, "Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's 'Expected' Loss of Seats," this REVIEW (September, 1967), 694–700; Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails," this REVIEW (December, 1958), 1041–1050, and "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (November, 1963), 320-335; Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1955–56), 353–368; and Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW (June, 1957), 293–312.

One study of House elections on their own terms is to be found in Charles Jones, *Every Second Year* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 45–71. And see Jones, *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 76–90. See also Robert A. Schoenberger, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-making in the 1964 Congressional Elections," this REVIEW (June, 1969), 515–520.

[2] See citations, note 1.

[3] Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, ed. John M. Claunch (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1965).

sures the impact of turnout on voting for Representative and finds it minimal (i.e., capable of explaining less than 10% of the deviation from "normal" voting, defined as the mean percent of the two-party vote in the district for a twenty-year span).[4] Each study, it might be noted, treats elections to the House; Senate elections have received no attention. Each is in some way concerned with isolating and measuring major non-idiosyncratic factors affecting congressional voting. And each, necessarily, relies on aggregate election data.[5]

Within this context of inquiry, two related problems of conceptualization and measurement can be identified by comparison against presidential-election studies—problems which can partially explain the lack of advances in the field. For one point, presidential-election analysis has been able to employ a relatively clear-cut tri-partite scheme of "party, candidates and issues" to separate long-term (party loyalty) and short-term (candidates and issues) components.[6] By contrast at the subpresidential level the conceptualization of variables is considerably more complex since parameters of voting may be linked to the office contested. At the *presidential* level, a turn away from party cues—as evidenced by considerable deviation in voting outcomes from a normal party vote—points toward the short-term factors of a particular election and election year. Whereas at the *congressional* level, a turn away from party cues need not necessarily mean a turning toward such particularistic factors, but rather the existence of congressional incumbency or presidential voting parameters affecting the congressional vote independently of the particular congressional candidates, campaigns, or issues salient on a state or district basis. And clearly it is of considerable interest to students of legislative behavior to assess how much the individual congressman owes the strength of his election to his actions in Congress, the impact of his campaign, or the issues of the time and place, on the one hand, and how much to the simple fact of his incumbency, on the other.

For a second point, it would seem important to derive a reliable measure of a "normal" or baseline" (minimum) party vote against which to measure and explain deviations in the vote for Senator and Representative. Such a "normal vote" concept—pointing to that stable percentage of voters in a population identifying as Democrat or Republican—has been found useful for presidential-election analysis, but has not been operationalized at the congressional level due to the absence of survey data on a state or district basis. The measures employed by Stokes and Kabaker are efforts in this direction. But in offering a baseline to measure fluctuations derived from averaging the fluctuations themselves, these measures do not permit isolation of the party loyalty factor. It would seem particularly important for congressional-election analysis to separate party loyalty from other stable electoral cues which, by the use of aggregate data alone, could not be distinguished. Thus stable voting for a Democratic Representative over a decade may include both Democratic partisan and House incumbency components. Similarly the strong positive relationship between presidential and congressional voting outcomes which has been noted may combine both partisan and presidential voting components.

II. ANALYTICAL METHOD

One partial solution to this second problem may come from the use of survey-derived estimates of party identifiers on a state or district basis. Recently Ronald Weber and Frank Munger have calculated from nationwide samples the percentage of statewide "participating electorates" for 1956 through 1964 identifying with one or the other of the two parties.[7] The "participating electorates," in contrast to "eligible electorates," represent the proportions most likely to vote. From these estimates a base line or minimum "party vote" by states can be derived against which deviations in the actual vote outcomes can be measured. While this base party vote by states permits analysis of Senate elections only, similar estimates could be conducted on a district basis; and for purposes of congressional research, the same questions may be asked of Senate and of House elections. Due to the experimental nature of the Weber-Munger estimates, results need to be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, the usefulness of a measure of statewide party identification would seem to justify the experiment; and further, when checked against the few state surveys which include a usable party identification question, the Weber-Munger estimates seem well in line with survey results.[8]

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[4] Harvey M. Kabaker, "Estimating the Normal Vote in Congressional Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (February, 1969) 58–83.

[5] For initial studies of voter attitudes in congressional elections, based on nationwide survey studies, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influences in Congress," this REVIEW (March, 1963); "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1962); and *Representation in the American Congress,* forthcoming.

[6] For utilization of this scheme and the concept of a "normal vote," see Angus Campbell *et al., Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

[7] Ronald E. Weber and Frank J. Munger, "Party Identification and the Classification of State Party Systems," paper represented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1968. The technique for making these calculations—generally analagous to the procedures employed in the MIT Simulmatics project—calls for synthesizing state electorates by subdividing them into voter-types whose party identification scores are then determined through an additive formula from national survey data. A detailed description of the procedures can be found in Ronald E. Weber, *Public Opinion in the States: A Simulation Approach* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1969).

Utilizing the Weber-Munger estimates to isolate the party loyalty factor on a statewide basis, it should be possible to identify and measure major variables affecting Senate election outcomes. It would seem important first to determine how much of the fluctuation in Senate voting—here measured by deviations in actual vote outcome from the base party vote—can be explained by such nonidiosyncratic factors as incumbency and the presidential vote. Then and only upon that basis could one define and interpret the range of short-term variability—i.e., the importance of "candidates and issues" in particular senatorial elections. (1) How much of the fluctuation in vote for Senator is explainable by the "pull" of the presidential vote—constitutionally staggered so as to affect alternating Senate elections? Voter turnout regularly and sharply declines from presidential year to off-year elections and that smaller portion of off-year voters—of measurably stronger party loyalty—may be expected to follow party lines more faithfully than the larger electorate reacting to the stimuli of a presidential campaign.[9] Indeed, the greater volatility of the congressional vote in presidential years compared to off-years has been widely noted. (2) How much of the fluctuation in vote for Senator can be explained by the impact of Senate incumbency? One stable characteristic of American voting behavior is the tendency to reelect not only House but also Senate incumbents—a fact which merits a wider acknowledgment than it currently enjoys. Given this incumbency advantage, to be documented subsequently, one would expect fluctuations in senatorial vote depending on the presence or absence of an incumbent ticket. Thus states where an erstwhile second or minority party gained the majority support over some time span could appear to shift dramatically in senatorial vote from strong support for one party to the other simply by the retirement of the former majority party's incumbent.

With the Weber-Munger estimates of base party vote by states for 1956 through 1964, one can calculate for each Senate election in the time period the deviation in actual vote outcome from the base party vote. The subsequent analysis is based on all regularly scheduled Senate contests for 1956 through 1966 in the 34 states sufficiently competitive on the statewide level to have elected at least one Senator or one Governor from both parties during the time period. The data base parallels the Weber-Munger estimates and permits comparison of three presidential-year and three off-year elections. Data from simultaneous contests for President and Governor on a statewide basis are supplied for comparative purposes.

III. FINDINGS

Table 1 presents a summary distribution of deviations from the base party vote for the ten-year period. Since this base vote represents a minimum core of statewide party identifiers, the normal pattern in voting outcomes, as would be expected, shows a plus-Democratic deviation. The mean is +5.6; the standard deviation, 9.3. Considering Senate outcomes separately first, the overall pattern is one of dispersion, with con-

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[8] Percentages of Democratic Party identifiers are as follows:

		Weber-Munger Estimates	
Survey Results		*"Eligible" Electorates*	*"Participating" Electorates*
California (Roper '58)	54.8	49.8	50.3
Minnesota (Roper '56-'64)	44.4	41.1	41.3
Ohio (Harris '58)	42.0	42.5	43.8
Iowa (Roper '56–'64)	40.1	38.7	43.1

Party identification results for 1968 from the 13 states of the University of North Carolina's Comparative State Elections Project should soon be available.

[9] Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics* (November, 1964), 745–757; and Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 19.

TABLE 1. ELECTION OUTCOMES MEASURED BY DEVIATION FROM DEMOCRATIC BASE PARTY VOTE[a]

(Percentage Points)

Elections	Extremely Strong Democratic (≥+15.0)	Strong Democratic (+14.9 to +10.0)	Moderate (+9.9 to +5.0)	Moderate (+4.9 to 0)	Strong Republican (−.1 to −4.9)	Extremely Strong Republican (≥−5.0)
Senate (n=140)	16	16	19	19	16	14
President (n=70)	20	11	10	23	19	17
Governor (n=97)	10	15	25	29	13	7

[a] The mean of the Senate distribution is +5.6, close to the midpoint of the two "moderate" categories above. Outcomes of +14.9 or more or −4.4 or less (i.e., larger negative numbers) are beyond 1 standard deviation of the mean and are reflected closely by the "extremely strong Democratic" and "extremely strong Republican" categories above.

tests spread fairly evenly across the range of categories, with this pattern holding for election-by-election and state-by-state analysis. Twenty-seven of the 34 states exhibit a range of deviations in the ten-year span of more than 10 percentage points; 17 of the 34, more than 15 percentage points; 9, more than 20 percentage points. What these figures mean, of course, is that states have shifted in senatorial voting from Democratic to Republican or back—often from strong Democratic voting to strong Republican and back in a relatively short span of time. To take a particularly clear illustration, New Jersey shifted in Senate contests from close to the base party vote in 1958 (+2.7) to 5.5 percentage points below in 1960, to 13.2 percentage points above in 1964, to 11.7 points below in 1966, for a total range of deviations of 24.9 percentage points. Comparing elections for the three offices, state electorates appear to diverge more frequently from moderate voting patterns in the vote for Senator than for Governor. Senate patterns are considerably more similar to the presidential than the gubernatorial pattern. The comparison can be seen more clearly by collapsing the categories from 6 to 3 into strong Democratic, moderate, and strong Republican deviations and noting the percentage of contests in each category:

Elections	Strong Democratic (≥+15.0 to +10.0)	Moderate (+9.9 to 0)	Strong Republican (−.1 to ≥−5.0)
Senate (n=140)	32%	38%	30%
President (n=70)	31%	33%	36%
Governor (n=97)	25%	51%	25%

Incumbency

One stable characteristic of American voting behavior is the tendency to reelect not only House but also Senate incumbents. Figures supplied by Lewis Froman, Jr., suggest similar 85% success rates for both houses.[10] Senate incumbents' average performance at the polls, measured by percentage of two-party vote, is stronger in both parties compared to victorious nonincumbents. And comparing elections for Senator and Governor in simultaneous contests in these 34 states for the past two decades, Senate incumbents win a considerably higher percentage of their contested races (80% compared to 64%),[11] and as Table 2 shows, Senate incum-

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[10] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 170. For data on House incumbents, see Jones, *Every Second Year*, pp. 63–68.

Such a similarity may surprise some who hold to the traditional view that the Senate—representing whole states rather than small homogeneous districts—is a much more electorally competitive body. One explanation may be that the incidents of electoral mortality commonly cited for the Senate to show its comparative "competitiveness" are drawn from a very few large urban states marked by highly competitive, active parties. The incumbent success rate for New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio is substantially lower than the overall rate. Of the 24 Senate contests in those states, incumbents won 12 of 19 or 63%—still a definite edge, but a less strong performance than the overall pattern. But these are only 6 of 50 states. The general situation for Senate incumbents is one of electoral safeness.

[11] The percentages are based on the 167 simultaneous contests between 1948 and 1966 in the 34 states sufficiently competitive to have elected at least one Senator or Governor from both parties. The turnout differential between Senate and gubernatorial contests, by state for each section, was found to be virtually nil, supporting the assumption that the election results are produced by substantially the same electorate.

The Senate incumbency advantage is not merely a "second-term" advantage, as it might be thought since after two full terms or 12 years of Senate bents (but not Senate nonincumbents) tend to lead their gubernatorial running mates, whether incumbent or not.

TABLE 2. EFFECT OF INCUMBENCY ON VOTE LEADER: SENATE AND GUBERNATORIAL RACES COMPARED[a]

Incumbency	Total Simultaneous Contests	Number of Contests Senator Leads	Number of Contests Governor Leads
Incumbent Senator Incumbent Governor	27	17	10
Incumbent Senator Nonincumbent Governor	38	30	8
Nonincumbent Senator Incumbent Governor	13	3	10
Nonincumbent Senator Nonincumbent Governor	29	15	14
Total	107	65	42

[a] Based on the 107 simultaneous contests, 1948–1966, where the same party won both Senate and gubernatorial contests. One contest (Wisconsin, 1960) was excluded, with no percentage difference between the candidates.

With this electoral advantage enjoyed by Senate incumbents of both parties, can incumbency help explain the sharp fluctuations in Senate voting? Dividing the Senate deviations reported above into incumbent and nonincumbent elections, one finds a statistically significant relationship between incumbency and strong versus moderate deviations from the base party vote, with this relationship holding for both presidential-year and off-year elections.[12] The shape of the two distributions is reversed with Senate nonincumbent contests distributed similarly to the gubernatorial results presented earlier and Senate incumbent contests considerably more dispersed and similar to the presidential voting distribution. (The comparative data for governors indicates no similar effect for incumbency in explaining deviations in gubernatorial voting).

	Strong Democratic	Moderate	Strong Republican
Senate Elections			
Incumbents (n =95)	37%	31%	33%
Nonincumbents (n =45)	22%	53%	25%
Gubernatorial Elections			
Incumbents (n =32)	28%	47%	25%
Nonincumbents (n =65)	23%	52%	25%

Such a clear difference between the two kinds of Senate contests supports the hypothesis that Senate incumbency can help explain the sharp fluctuation found in Senate voting. To illustrate from the New Jersey case cited above, in an election with no incumbent victory, the state held close to the Democratic base party vote; twice when Republican incumbents won, it shifted sharply below (−5.5 and −11.7); and with a Democratic incumbent victory, shifted sharply above (+13.2).

Presidential Vote Deviations

It is also possible that the widely noted "pulling power" of the presidential vote exerts an additional impact on Senate outcomes in presidential election years, producing strong performances for Senate candidates in states where the affiliated presidential candidate also ran strongly, and less strong Senate performances where the affiliated presidential candidate ran only moderately well or poorly. If such a relationship exists, it would be marginal at most, since sharp deviations in Senate voting were found as frequently in off-years as in presidential-election years.

Relating the presidential voting deviation from the base party vote in all presidential-year elections by states to the deviation for affiliated Senate candidates yields a strong positive relationship (r = .70) which has been summarized in Table 3. The stronger the presidential candidate ran in a state, the stronger the affiliated Senate candidate ran, as measured against the state's base party vote. The implications of this point in relation to earlier research should be noted. Past studies by Key, Cummings, and others have documented the close relationship between presidential and congressional voting, but it was never possible to control for the underlying partisan division in a state or district to observe the *separate* impact of presidential voting on congressional races. This investigation corroborates the earlier studies by pointing to a

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service, the advanced age of incumbents compared to more youthful opponents might depress their success rate. But the data show no decline in success rate for third- or fourth-term tries. Based on all Senate contests in the period in the 34 states, incumbents trying for a second term won 77%; for a third term, 78%; and for a fourth term (37 tried), 81%.

[12] As reported in the text, $\chi^2 = 7.9$; significant at .01, 1df. For presidential years, $\chi^2 = 7.31$, corrected for continuity, significant at .05, 1df; for off-years, $\chi^2 = 4.10$, significant at .05, 1df.

For this study, an incumbent is defined as any Senator *in office* at the time of the election. Thus the category would include some small number of Senators previously appointed and not previously elected.

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE VOTING MEASURED BY DEVIATIONS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC BASE PARTY VOTE

Presidential Vote Deviation[a] (in percentage points)	Number of Contests	Senate Vote: Mean Deviation from BPV
Extremely Strong Democratic (≥+15.0)	14	+16.0
Strong Democratic (+14.9 to +10.0)	8	+12.4
Moderate (+9.9 to +5.0)	7	+ 5.1
Moderate (+4.9 to 0)	16	+ 6.0
Strong Republican (−.1 to −4.9)	13	+ 3.2
Extremely Strong Republican (≥ −5.0)	12	− 2.6

[a] The mean deviation for the presidential vote is +4.7; standard deviation, 19.0. As reported earlier, the distributions for presidential and Senate voting are quite similar.

strong relationship between presidential voting over and above the effect produced by stable party loyalties.

The explanatory power of these two variables on Senate fluctuations can be summarized more generally. Correlation analysis—a mode of statistical analysis suited to the exploratory nature of the inquiry—indicates for presidential-year elections a strong relationship ($r = .60$) between Senate Democratic incumbency, no incumbency, and Republican incumbency and deviations in the Senate vote. Combining both variables, the multiple correlation coefficient $R = .81$ indicates that 66% of the variation in the Senate vote over and above the base party vote can be statistically explained by these two variables.[13] For all elections—presidential-year and off-year—incumbency is strongly related to deviations in Senate voting ($r = .67$) and presidential-vote deviations register an independent though less strong relationship ($r = .40$). A multiple R of .80 indicates that of all the Senate voting fluctuation exhibited in the ten-year time span, 64% of this fluctuation can be statistically explained by these two nonidiosyncratic variables.[14] Of course some considerable variation remains unexplained and this may well be an area for investigation of regional, demographic, or campaign-based influences.[15]

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The findings indicate that one cannot take the simple datum of fluctuations in vote as a measure of electoral response to idiosyncratic or campaign-based factors—the "candidates and issues" of particular campaigns and election years. Senate incumbency appears to be a stable factor affecting outcomes regardless of the year or the particular candidate involved; and a similar effect exists for the impact of presidential voting in Senate elections, although this vote may itself vary with presidential-election short-term forces. And so only by first isolating the fluctuations which cannot be explained by incumbency and the impact of the presidential vote could one begin to investigate the ways and the conditions under which candidates and issues affect congressional contests. Judging by the present findings, it is possible that some large proportion of Stokes' "district" component registers the impact of House incumbency rather than the idiosyncratic effects of candidates and issues.

The Senate incumbency advantage has wider implications for legislative behavior research. The explanation—in voter attitude or information—for this electoral advantage is not yet known. It may simply be that an incumbent is more widely known than his opponent—due to the publicity available as a member of the Senate, the franking privilege, etc.—and that with generally low levels of voter interest and information about Congress, voters will tend to vote for the more familiar (less unfamiliar) name. Or it may be, as Joseph Schlesinger suggests, that Senators accumulate electoral support with increasing years of service, in contrast to Governors who accumulate grievances,[16] an interesting hypothesis of difference between legislators and executives. The claim to "experience," the promise of the advantages of seniority, the remembrance of past favors received, may contribute to the accumulation of voter support. It should be noted that these alternative explanations presuppose different levels of voter interest and information. The Schlesinger explanation points toward voter awareness of Senator X and his senatorial activity whereas the first explanation presupposes no understanding of the Senate or of the advantages of seniority but simply points toward either the recognition of a less unfamiliar name or of the fact that X is a "Senator." Since this incumbent advantage holds on a nationwide basis, more intensive research on the linkage between voter interest and incumbency would seem possible through existing survey facilities and well worth pursuing. To the extent a Senate or House incumbent is reelected mainly by virtue of his incumbency and not by his behavior in Congress or his constituency relationships or the attributes of a particular congressional campaign, then, these latter factors—stressed in journalistic analysis of congressional elections—are considerably reduced in importance.

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[13] Incumbency was quantified by assigning a "3" to Democratic incumbent victories, a "2" to nonincumbent victories, and a "1" to Republican incumbent victories. The partials for incumbency and Senate deviations controlling for presidential-vote deviations are .42 and for presidential-vote deviations and Senate deviations controlling for incumbency, .58.

[14] In order to conduct correlation analyses for all elections, "presidential-vote deviations" for the off-years was quantified as the mean presidential vote deviation for presidential years (+4.7) rather than 0, which would have indicated a pro-Republican deviation. Thus a +4.7 deviation for off-year elections should indicate neither a pro-Republican nor pro-Democratic pull of the presidential vote operating on the Senate election results. The partial for presidential vote and Senate vote deviations controlling for incumbency is .35.

[15] All 34 states were somewhat competitive by definition during the time period, but a check was carried out by ordering the states from high to low Democratic base party vote (thus in order of increasing two-party competition) following the Weber-Munger scheme, with no relationship observable between this ordering and the amount of deviation.

Further, the contrast between Senate and gubernatorial results raises a key theoretical point —that voter behavior varies with the office contested. Incumbency is a key variable for understanding Senate and House elections, but preliminary analysis suggests less explanatory power as applied to contests for Governor. Incumbent governors enjoy a considerably lower success rate than incumbent senators. And incumbency, which helps explain deviations in Senate voting, does not hold similarly for gubernatorial contests. The presidential vote similarly may have a varying impact by office. Recent survey studies suggest a stronger relationship between presidential-congressional contests compared to national (presidential)-state contests. These two points in turn suggest that party loyalty itself may vary in salience as a cue-giver for electoral choice depending on the office contested. Continuing studies of subpresidential elections should provide evidence for assessing the impact of office on election results. And with the development of a measure of base party vote by states which can facilitate aggregate data analysis such studies would now seem possible.

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[16] Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 68, 69.

COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING*

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Innovation can be defined as ". . . the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, products, or services."[1] We mean here an activity, process, service, or idea that is new to an American city. We do not restrict it to mean only the first appearance ever of something new (i.e., an invention) or only the first use by one among a set of social actors.[2] We are concerned neither with the diffusion of innovation nor with internal stages in the adoption process, but rather with the characteristics of cities that have successfully implemented innovations in federally financed public housing. We focus on three aspects of community innovation: (1) the *presence or absence* of a federally financed public housing program in the city, (2) the *speed* of innovation of such a program, and (3) the level of *output* or performance of this innovation activity.

Most of the studies of innovation have used as units of analysis either individuals or organizations, and little attention has been given to innovation in community systems, although community systems are continually introducing new ideas, activities, processes, and services. For example, the form of government may be changed from a mayor-council to a city-manager type. In fact, two studies of such innovations were carried out prior to World War II, but these were primarily concerned with describing the rate of diffusion of this social invention among American cities, not with characteristics of innovating cities.[3] The addition of a new planning department to the city administration or a decision to fluoridate its water system are community innovations as we have defined the term.[4] But innovations are not limited to actions of city government, although these may be the most frequently observed types of innovations. A Chamber of Commerce may innovate by creating an economic development agency, or a community may enter the "War on Poverty," neither of which necessarily involves the formal machinery of municipal government, at least not at the outset.

We are interested not only in the incidence of innovations, but also in the speed of the innovation. For example, among communities that have instituted planning departments, there may be significant variation in the speed with which the innovation took place. The community attributes associated with the incidence of an innovation may be quite different from those that account for the speed with which it is adopted.

Still a third aspect of community innovation is the level of output or performance of the innovative activity. Some community innovations involve repetitious and cumulative activity. Af-

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[1] Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 10 (June, 1965), p. 2. Also see Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969); Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," this REVIEW, 63 (*March*, 1969), 111–126; and Jack Walker, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States," this REVIEW, 63 (September, 1969), 880–899.

[2] For reviews of much of the literature on innovation, see Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovation* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and Elihu Katz, Martin L. Levin, and Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research in the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (April, 1963), 231–252.

[3] F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York: Century, 1928); and Edgar C. McVoy, "Patterns of Diffusion in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (April, 1940), 219–227.

[4] Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, *The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

ter successfully entering the public housing program, a community may implement a succession of discrete housing programs. After establishing a Community Chest agency, the amount of money contributed by citizens may vary from year to year. Not all community innovations involve this kind of performance or outputs. For example, changes in laws regulating zoning, traffic control, or liquor licenses may be innovations, but they need be neither cumulative nor repetitious. Thus the characteristics of level of output or performance of innovations in community systems are not common to all innovations.

Political scientists have shown concern for certain aspects of what we call community innovation, often using the term "policy outputs." Salisbury explicitly raises the question of the conditions under which policy innovation, as distinct from merely incremental additions, occurs[5] He suggests, as we do, that the several dimensions of adoption or nonadoption of an innovation, its speed, and the volume or quantity of outputs may be usefully distinguished and analyzed. Similarly, Lowi distinguishes three types of public policies—distributive, regulatory, and redistributive—which differ in the level of disaggregation of benefits.[6] At one extreme are distributive policies in which groups come into no direct conflict with each other; there is "something for everyone," and there are multiple points of access to decision making. At the other extreme are redistributive policies which are essentially zero-sum policies. While he does not concern himself with innovation *per se*, what we have called innovation in public housing could be considered to be a distributive type of public policy.

Froman's distinction between areal and segmental policies may also be related to the incidence, speed, and output of innovation in a community.[7] Those issues which directly affect only a few people, affect different people at different times, and are continuously or repeatedly raised (segmental policies) may be much easier to innovate than the opposite types of issues.

Several scholars have tentatively accepted the proposition that "governmental policy making is incremental in nature; sharply innovative decisions are rarely made,"[8] basing this judgment on expenditure studies which find that the previous year's expenditures are the best predictor of this year's expenditures.[9] While this may be granted, the fact that there are sharp variations from city to city (or state to state, in Sharkansky's study) means that aggregate expenditures might better be regarded as a mosaic of past innovations which have become embedded in continuing commitments to varying levels of outputs or performance. If we are interested in explaining the great differences in the substance of innovative policy making, we must take into account the historical processes which have led some political systems to innovate in the past and not others. Many innovations are not simply discrete decisions with no impact on the future, but policies with cumulative consequences.

Our study does not deal with all of these theoretical and methodological issues. We are primarily concerned with the underlying structural properties and community processes that explain why some communities moved quickly to enter the public housing program and have built a great number of housing units, while others were slow to innovate this program and still others have never participated at all in this federal program.

In this paper we link a study of public housing innovation to theories of a variety of studies on policy outputs—urban renewal, fluoridation, voting on bond issues, desegregation, and the like.[10] This paper is one of a series by the authors on different federal programs.[11]

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[5] Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 151–175.

[6] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July, 1964), 677–715.

[7] See Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1968), 94–108, for still another classification of public policies.

[8] Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of the Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (May, 1968), 510–538. See also Salisbury, *op. cit.*

[9] Ira Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

[10] For general discussions of policy outputs and urban politics, see Jacob and Lipsky, *op. cit.;* Robert R. Alford, *Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Michael Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power: Readings* (New York: Random House, 1970).

[11] See Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (August, 1970); and Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and the

Some Theories of Community Innovation

Nowhere have the various explanations of community innovation been brought together. In part this lack of theoretical integration is due to diverse concepts, since what we have called innovation has been called community decision making, community decision outcomes, and policy outputs. The five theories explaining innovation are:

(1) *Political Culture:* Cities with majorities holding "public-regarding values" are hypothesized to be more innovative with respect to policies benefiting the community as a whole than cities dominated by groups with "private-regarding values."[12]

(2) *Concentration or Diffusion of Community Power:* There are three aspects to this argument: concentration of systemic power,[13] diffusion of power through mass citizen participation,[14] and centralization of elite power.[15] In each case the hypothesis is the same, namely, the greater the concentration of power, the greater the degree of innovation. Conversely, the greater the diffusion of power, the lower the degree of innovation.

(3) *Centralization of Formal Political Structure:* Cities with centralized administrative arrangements and a strong mayor, that is, cities with city manager or partisan mayor-council governmental structures are hypothesized to be more innovative.[16]

(4) *Community Differentiation and Continuity:* Older and larger cities have been hypothesized to be more bureaucratic and consequently less receptive to policy innovations, suggesting that younger and smaller cities should exhibit higher policy innovation.[17]

(5) *Community Integration:* Cities in which community integration breaks down or is extremely low have a lower probability of innovation or other collective actions. Consequently innovation should be highest in integrated communities.[18]

We have presented these five explanations separately because it is possible to conceive of them as five independent factors in the innovativeness, speed of innovation, and intensity of outputs in a community political system. One or more of these factors may be either spurious or intervening variables for the operation of another, more fundamental factor. We shall return to the logic of the interrelationships of these explanations later.

The indicators of the theoretical variables of interest to the various investigators have been quite diverse, overlapping, and sometimes used for quite different concepts. City-manager government, for example, has been used both as a direct measure of governmental centralization and as an indicator of "public-regarding" values. The educational level of the community has been used both as a measure of a propensity for high political participation and as a measure of need. This diversity in the use of the same empirical indicators is partly a result of the great "distance" which the data from available sources such as the U. S. Census and the *Municipal Year Book* are from the theoretical variables of greatest concern to most scholars.

War on Poverty: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," in Mattei Dogan (ed.), *Studies in Political Ecology* (Paris, 1970), for parallel data on different federal programs, and more extended theoretical and methodological interpretations. The model cities program will be the subject of a future paper.

[12] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887; and James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, Communication to the Editor, this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 998–999.

[13] Amos M. Hawley, "Community Power Structure and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology,* 68 (January, 1963), 422–431.

[14] Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," *American Sociological Review,* 32 (December, 1967), 970–984.

[15] Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure and Decision-Making," in Terry N. Clark (ed.), *Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 91–126; and "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *American Sociological Review,* 33 (August, 1968), 576–593.

[16] Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, *op. cit.;* see also J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 267–292.

[17] Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly,* 4 (December, 1968), 141–165.

[18] James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1957). Also see Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: A Case of a Fluoridation Referendum," *American Journal of Sociology,* 68 (March, 1963), 513–526.

Most of the data we shall use are no better, but we have the advantage of bringing together most of the different types of indicators used in the previous literature, rather than considering only two or three of them. But we have several measures in addition which, while they possess defects of their own, have the merit of being considerably closer to the theoretical variable to which they refer.

We turn now to a description of the various measures of innovation in public housing which we shall use in this paper, a brief discussion of sources of other data on community characteristics, and the methodology employed here.

I. DATA AND METHODS

\The findings of this study are based on the universe of 646 incorporated urban places of size 25,000 or more in 1960 that were also in existence in 1930. Thirty cities which did not appear in the census volumes in 1930 have been excluded.

Participation in the federally financed housing programs, beginning with the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, is our indicator of community innovation. An understanding of this program requires some background in the history of public housing legislation in the United States.

History of Public Housing in the United States[19]

Public housing in the United States was a child of the Great Depression, with the exception of a small-scale housing program during World War I. The fact that ". . . millions of people had left the middle class for the subsistence level or worse . . . created a tremendous pressure for government housing. . . . "[20] But this pressure did not produce a program which fused slum clearance with adequate public housing, something which still does not exist. The Public Works Administration (PWA), created by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, began to buy land, clear houses, and build public housing. Under this legislative mandate of the NIRA, the PWA constructed 21,000 units in 50 low-rent housing projects in 37 cities, and the Resettlement Administration constructed another 15,000 units in a number of resettlement projects and "Greenbelt" towns. But the housing and other activities of the NIRA were stopped by a federal court decision in 1935 which held that eminent domain could not be used to clear slum property and to then ". . . construct buildings in a state for the purpose of selling or leasing them to private citizens for occupancy as homes." This decision was never appealed, possibly because ". . . the outlook for the New Deal programs before the Supreme Court looked dismal in 1935. . . ."[21]

The next significant commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred on September 1, 1937, when the United States Housing Act (USHA), under Public Law 412, was approved. It was the purpose of this legislation

> . . . to provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activity. . . .[22]

Local housing authorities were responsible for the construction, ownership, and operation of these federally assisted low-rent housing programs. However, state enabling legislation authorizing and empowering these local public agencies had to be enacted in states not already having such legislation.[23] In this federal and local government partnership, the federal government made loans (not to exceed 90 per cent of the development costs) and provided annual subsidies for such projects. Local municipalities were required to pay the equivalent of 20 per cent of the federal contribution (although their contribution was often in the form of a tax exemption). In 1940, Public Law 671 applied the provisions of the USHA to defense housing. By 1948, a total of 189,000 low-rent housing units had been built in the United States, 168,000 of these having been built under USHA of 1937.

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[19] Much of the information in this section has been abstracted from "The Public Housing Program," Section 7, Part I, *Local Housing Authority Management Handbook*, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1963.

[20] Lawrence M. Friedman, *Government and Slum Housing* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), p. 100. This book reviews the entire history of these programs. See also *Journal of Housing* for many details on the administration of the programs.

[21] Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

[22] "United States Housing Act of 1937," *Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development* (as revised through January 15, 1968), Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 177.

[23] It is, and has been, possible for the tribal housing authorities on Indian reservations located in states not having state enabling legislation to develop low-rent housing projects.

Perhaps the most significant and far-reaching commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred with the Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 171) which was signed into law by President Truman on July 15, 1949. The preamble of this legislation follows.

> The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.[24]

Numerous amendments to this legislation have been made in the ensuing years, although the structure of the program remains basically unaltered. The federal government's major role has been in the creation of a revolving loan fund to aid local housing authorities in the construction and development of low-rent housing projects and the provision of grants which are limited to the amounts and periods necessary (annual contributions) in order to assure the integrity of the low-rent nature of these housing programs.

In addition to having a local housing authority (which of course assumes that the state in which the city is located has passed appropriate enabling legislation), the local housing authority must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the federal government that there is a need for such low-rent housing not currently being met by private enterprise, must obtain the approval from the local governing body of its application for a preliminary loan from the federal government,[25] and must sign a formal contract with the local governing body which grants a tax-exempt status to the low-rent housing project.

There are a number of distinguishable steps that a local community goes through in the "conventional bid method" of participation in the low-rent housing program as established by the United States Housing Act of 1937. Some of the major steps in this method are as follows: (1) the application for a program reservation (which of course can be made only by a local housing authority), (2) the approval by the federal government of the application for a program reservation, (3) the execution of a preliminary loan contract for surveys and planning (which requires the approval of the local governing body but which is an optional step), (4) the execution of the annual contributions contract between the local housing authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (which can be signed only after the local housing authority and the local governing body have signed a cooperation agreement granting tax-exempt status to the project and, as of 1956, only if the community has a workable program outlining plans for the eradication of slums), (5) site acquisition, (6) the advertising, opening, and awarding of construction contracts, (7) the start of construction, (8) the final completion of construction, and (9) the full availability and occupancy of the housing project. Some other programs under USHA 1937 such as the "flexible formula" for acquisitions and the leasing programs do not require the negotiation of each of these stages, however. Other programs, such as the "turnkey" program, were administratively implemented after 1965, based on already existing powers.

There have been a number of important amendments and additions to the provisions of the Housing Act of 1949 and the basic authorization in USHA 1937. For example, the 1954 amendments made it mandatory that the local housing authority make payments to the local governing body in lieu of taxes, usually at the rate of ten per cent of shelter rents. The amendments of 1956 were such that the annual contributions contract could not be executed without the local governing body having a workable program for the prevention and elimination of slums. The 1959 amendments also permitted low-income single persons aged 65 and older to become tenants of low-rent housing programs, changed the general age requirements to conform to the Social Security Act, and granted greater control to the local housing authority for establishing income limits and rents. The 1961 amendments were concerned to a great extent with provisions for low-rent housing for the elderly. The 1964 amendments eliminated the requirement (established in the Housing Act of 1937) that the local contribution should be at least 20 per cent of the amount of the federal contribution. Among other things, the 1965 amendments established a new program, the leasing program, which permits the local housing authority to lease low-rent housing units from private owners. The turnkey program, also developed in 1965 (but based on the prior legislation), permits local housing authorities to purchase low-rent housing units from a private developer or builder after construction or rehabilitation is completed. On December 24, 1969, Public Law 91–152, Section 217, did away with the "workable program" requirement previously described.

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[24] "National Policy and Purpose: Excerpt from the Housing Act of 1949," *Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development, op. cit.*, p. 1.

[25] It is not required that all housing authorities participating in the programs as authorized and amended under the Housing Act of 1949 obtain a preliminary loan for surveys and planning. Some housing authorities have sufficient resources to do such surveys and planning on their own. In addition, the leasing program that was established by the 1965 amendments requires neither a preliminary loan, cooperation agreement, tax exemption, nor workable program. These, however, do not apply to leasing or privately owned accommodations. For three of the 646 communities in this study, the first program the community developed was a leasing program. Two (Amsterdam, New York, and Lansing, Michigan) had previously executed a preliminary loan with the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the third, Vallejo, California, had not, however. The procedure used for taking this into consideration is described below.

A number of states have their own public housing programs. It is possible that some findings might be accounted for by the presence of large state housing programs in cities which have thus not had the incentive to seek federal funds. However, most of the states with state public housing programs are also those states containing cities with a higher level of federal funding for housing: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and others. It may be that the same factors which are conducive to a city undertaking housing programs also further state programs, but, in any case, it cannot be argued that state housing compensates for or obviates federally supported housing.

It is important to note that federal legislation did *not* require the establishment of new governments or new agencies to implement the housing programs, although in many cases a special housing authority was created. "While this has frequently been the end result of the federal legislation, the reasons for it . . . are not reflective of federal 'coercion' or even of strictly federal influences."[26] Thus, the "local organizational response" is not simply a function of federal requirements, but rather something influenced in major respects by local conditions. Also, the state enabling legislation does not define the conditions under which communities shall or shall not act. We shall assume, therefore, that within fairly well-defined limits set by the state and federal statutes and administrative rulings, local communities are free to apply or not apply for federal housing funds. We also assume that the various modifications of the original legislation did not significantly alter the differential incentive from city to city to obtain these funds.

Indicators of Community Innovation and Other Variables

The incidence of innovation we measure by whether or not a community has participated in any public housing program since 1933, i.e., the NIRA of 1933 or the USHA of 1937 and amendments to it, including the Housing Act of 1949. Of the 646 cities included in this study (30 cities that did not exist in 1930 were excluded), 393 (or 61 per cent) had innovated a federal public housing project. Only 33 cities had first entered a public housing program under NIRA while an additional 151 cities first began a federal public housing project under the USHA of 1937, but prior to the Housing Act of 1949. Finally, 209 additional cities began a public housing project for the first time between 1949 and June 30, 1966, the cutoff date of this study. There are, therefore, 253 cities in our study which had not initiated a public housing project as of June 30, 1966.

The speed of innovation is measured by the number of years after 1933 before a community began construction on its first housing project. The degree of skewness of the distribution toward the lower end was not sufficient to warrant a transformation of this scale.

Since a local community could not participate in a federal public housing program unless the state in which it is located had first enacted appropriate enabling legislation, there is some question of whether or not this measure reflects local initiative alone. Ohio was the only state that had appropriate enabling legislation for public housing in 1933. In 1934, seven additional states enacted such legislation, and the following year ten more followed. By the end of 1937, 30 states had such laws on their books, and by 1940, the total was 39. But the remaining 11 states were slow to enact such legislation. As of 1949, only five additional states had enacted this enabling legislation, bringing the total to 44. All states with exception of Utah and Wyoming had such legislation as of June 30, 1966, but as the reader has observed, there was a great disparity in dates at which communities could legally have entered the federal programs in public housing.

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[26] Daniel J. Elazar, "'Fragmentation' and Local Organizational Response to Federal-City Programs," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (June, 1967), 32.

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING

	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Program Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years It Took After State Enabling Legislation was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Constructed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
Presence of innovation in any public housing program since 1933	X	−.73***	−.60***	.99***
Number of years after 1933 before construction began on the first housing project		X	.88***	−.77***
Number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present			X	−.64***
Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)				X

*** $P<.001$

Note: The number of cases is 646 except for the proportion of registrants voting, which is 411. The presence of participation in any public housing program and two of the political structure variables were treated as "dummy" (binary) variables for purposes of correlations and regression analyses. The natural logarithms of four highly skewed variables were used for correlation analysis, in order to produce an approximately normal distribution.

In an attempt to account for this, a second speed of innovation measure was constructed: the number of years it took a community to begin construction in its first public housing project *after state enabling legislation was enacted.* This distribution was also skewed toward the lower end of the scale, but again a transformation was not called for.

The *level of output* of this type of community innovation is the number of low-rent public housing units constructed since 1933 per 100,000 population. This variable was transformed into its natural logarithm, because of its degree of skewness.

The relationships among these various indicators of community innovation are shown in Table 1, and, as shown there, they are quite high.

The various measures of community structure were taken from the *Municipal Year Books* of 1963 and 1964, the 1950 Census of Housing, the 1960 Census of Housing, and the 1967 *County and City Data Book.* The information for coding the various innovation measures described below was taken from Report S–11A, *Consolidated Development Directory,* Statistical Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1967, and from information provided by the Office of Counsel, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.

We employ correlation coefficients to express relationships among variables and statistical tests of significance to establish the strength of association. Since the cities that are included in this study constitute the population of all the incorporated urban places of size 25,000 or more that were in existence in 1930, one may question the appropriateness of using statistical tests of significance. We use statistical tests of significance for two reasons. First, even given that we have exhausted all units in the universe, statistical tests are still appropriate since there is the possibility that the observations here were produced by errors of measurement. Second, in the absence of any other systematic criterion to establish the strength of a relationship, statistical tests of significance can be used.[27]

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[27] See David Gold, "Statistical Tests and Substantive Significance," *American Sociologist,* 4

TABLE 2. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF INNOVATION IN LOW-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING AND VARIOUS MEASURES OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

Theoretical Categories and Empirical Indicators	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Program Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years it Took After State Enabling Legislation Was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Constructed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
Political Culture				
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage[a]	−.05	.12**	.17***	−.08*
Per cent of elementary school children in private schools[a]	−.04	.06	.12**	−.05
Median family income[a]	−.43***	.43***	.44***	−.47***
Per cent voting democratic, 1964[b]	.21***	−.20***	−.13**	.22***
Concentration and Diffusion of Community Power				
MPO ratio[a]	−.28***	.22***	.16***	−.30***
Per cent of adult population with four years of high school education[a]	−.47***	.43***	.31***	−.51***
Per cent of registrants voting[d]	.17***	−.12*	−.06	.17***
Political Structure				
Presence of a city-manager form of government[c]	−.18***	.14***	.11**	−.18***
Presence of nonpartisan elections[c]	−.18***	.10*	.03	−.18***
Per cent of city council elected at large[c]	−.03	−.03	−.05	−.01
Number of members of the city council[c]	.11**	−.09*	−.01	.09*
Community Differentiation and Continuity				
Age of the city (census year city reached 10,000 population)[a]	−.38***	.43***	.39***	−.40***
Size of the city (natural logarithm)	.30***	−.46***	−.44***	.30***

* $P<.05$

** $P<.01$

*** $P<.001$

[a] U. S. Census of Population, 1960.

[b] *County and City Data Book*, 1967. The Democratic vote is the county presidential vote in 1964. The two cities for which data were not available (Washington, D. C., and New York) were assigned to the mean category.

[c] *The Municipal Year Book*, 1963 (International City Managers' Association, 1963). Four or five cities with missing data on one or more of the measures of political structure were assigned to the mean category. The categories for the number of members of the city council were collapsed as follows: 3–4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10–19, 20–29, 30–50. Means for this table were based on the full distribution.

[d] Data are from a survey taken by Eugene C. Lee, Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at Berkeley.

TABLE 2.—(*Continued*)

Theoretical Categories and Empirical Indicators	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Program Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years it Took After State Enabling Legislation Was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Constructed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
Community Integration				
Per cent unemployed[a]	.34***	−.31***	−.25***	.36***
Per cent migrant[a]	−.23***	.20***	.08*	−.24***
Poverty				
Per cent of housing dilapidated, 1950[a]	.31***	−.36***	−.34***	.36***
Per cent of families with less than $3,000 income per year, 1959[a]	.40***	−.46***	−.44***	.45***
Per cent adults with less than five years education (natural logarithm)	.52***	−.52***	−.40***	.55***
Per cent 14–17 year olds in school[a]	−.40***	.41***	.36***	−.44***
Per cent of population that is non-white (natural logarithm)	.43***	−.49***	−.44***	.48***

We include in our analysis cities which have innovated and those which have not, because we are concerned with the conditions under which innovations take place, not primarily with the conditions affecting the intensity and scope of outputs after innovation has occurred. If those cities without any federally financed housing are excluded, the relationships found are attenuated, but remain in the same direction in almost all cases. The magnitudes of the correlations for the speed of innovation remain most similar to the original ones.

II. FINDINGS

The data testing the various theories of community decision making or policy outputs as they are related to community innovation in public housing are found in Table 2. Although there is some overlap in the indicators of the different theoretical variables, a given indicator has been classified under only one theoretical concept, usually the first time it is discussed.

First, *political culture:* Voters holding "public-regarding values" are hypothesized by Banfield and Wilson to be more supportive of policies benefiting the community as a whole than voters with "private-regarding values." Banfield and Wilson used voting behavior in local bond and other expenditure referenda in several American cities as indicators of policy choices, and they used ethnicity, Protestantism, and income level as measures of groups likely to hold public- or private-regarding values. They predicted that public-regarding voters would be more likely to favor metropolitan reorganization, "reform" governmental structures, regional planning, and fluoridation.[28] It should be noted that their work focused on comparisons of voting behavior differences in wards within several American cities. In a supposed testing of their hypothesis, Wolfinger and Field compared policy outcomes for issues such as urban renewal in larger American cities, and they strongly criticized, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the work of

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(February, 1969), 42–46; and Robert F. Winch and Donald T. Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance," *American Sociologist,* 4 (May, 1969), 140–143. For a recent dissenting view, see Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, "Significance Tests Reconsidered," *American Sociologist,* 4 (May, 1969), 131–139.

[28] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.,* pp. 33–46; and Wilson and Banfield, *op. cit.*

Banfield and Wilson, although Wilson has maintained that the thesis developed and tested by Wolfinger and Field was not theirs.[29] In spite of the question of authorship of the Wolfinger and Field statement about political ethos and policy outcomes in cities, it remains an important and provocative hypothesis which merits testing with other kinds of public policies and with additional, and perhaps better, measures of the independent variable. Our assumption is that the more voters with characteristics presumably predisposing them to hold public-regarding values, the more likely a city should be to make public-regarding decisions.

Therefore, cities having a low proportion of foreign stock, a small proportion of Catholics (as measured by the proportion of elementary school children in private schools), and a high proportion of the population that is middle class (as measured by median family income) should be more influenced by public-regarding values, and, hence, should have higher levels of performance on policies which do not directly benefit the persons voting. Such cities should presumably have more federal public housing.

Democratic presidential voting in the county in 1964 can be utilized as an additional indicator of private-regarding values. Cities that are heavily Democratic are likely to have greater ethnicity (r = .34), have many Catholics (r = .23), and be heavily working class in terms of proportion blue collar (r = .22), but there is no relationship with median family income (r = −.03). Although one might debate the use of Democratic voting in this way, if this line of reasoning is accepted, then we should find that Democratic communities are less likely to have public housing.

In Table 2 are shown the 16 relationships between the four indicators of political culture and the four indicators of community innovativeness. The political culture hypothesis is weakly confirmed for the two indicators of ethnicity and religion since cities with few persons of foreign stock and few children in private schools were more likely to innovate public housing. However, these relationships either become insignificant or reverse when they are computed for cities within the North and South separately.[30] The original relationships are thus due to the great differences between North and South in ethnicity and religious composition. In the case of the two remaining indicators of political culture, median income and Democratic vote, the findings are clearly in the opposite direction from the public-regardingness hypothesis. These relationships remain the same in both North and South, with only one exception. In the South, there is no relationship between the Democratic vote in the county and the second measure of speed. The political culture hypothesis is thus not supported.

Second, *concentration or diffusion of community power:* We refer here to three related explanations of community structure and consequences for the distribution of power: (1) the ecological or systemic theory which sees power as a property of dominant institutions, (2) a citizen participation theory which argues that structural features which increase mass participation will as a consequence diffuse power, and (3) an elite participation theory which argues that the smaller the number of elite participants and the more homogeneous their interests, the more concentrated the power structure. We can test all but the last theory with quantitative data parallel to those already presented. While they differ in the feature of community organization which they single out as the critical measure or cause of concentration of power, they share the general assumption that the fewer the actors, whether citizen or elite, or the fewer the number of managerial functions, the more concentrated the power. The further inference that diffused power arrangements lead to less innovation is not always explicitly stated, but we believe that it is a justified extension of the theories to be discussed.

In his study of urban renewal, Hawley argued an *ecological* or *systemic* theory that communities with a greater concentration of power will have a high probability of success in any collective action affecting the welfare of the whole.[31] He postulated two types of power: (1) functional power which is required to execute functions and (2) derivative power which spills over into external relationships and regulates interactions between parts (units) of the system. In relatively routine issues, he suggested that power is exercised through established and well-worn channels. But for nonroutine decisions affecting the entire system (such as public housing), the way in which derivative power is distributed is critical. If derivative power is concentrated, he argues that the community should be able to act as a unit in almost any emergency; if power is widely dispersed, successful coordination leading to collective action is less assured. Hawley used participation in urban renewal programs as his measure of a collective community success, and he used the MPO ratio (the proportion of the employed civilian labor force that are managers, proprietors, or officials) as his measure of the degree of concentration of community power. He reasons that the higher the MPO ratio, the greater the dispersion of community power, and the less the successful implementation of urban renewal.

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[29] Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 306–326. Also see James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, Communication to the Editor, *op. cit.*

[30] Southern cities are those in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The data are not presented because of limitation on space.

[31] Hawley, *op. cit.*

Table 2 would seem to confirm Hawley's hypothesis for the policy area of public housing. Cities with high MPO ratios are less likely to innovate in all respects than cities with low MPO ratios. This is also true for each of the four innovation measures when correlation coefficients are computed for northern and southern cities separately. The relationships in the South are somewhat attenuated, but remain statistically significant.

Other data drawn from case studies question this interpretation of the MPO ratio, however. Aiken classified 31 case studies of community power (which are among the 646 cities studied here) on a four-point scale of concentration of power ranging from "pyramidal" to "dispersed power" arrangements using qualitative judgments of the number of groups involved in major issues in the community as the measure of degree of dispersion of power.[32] The results show, first, that communities with diffused power (many power groups) have somewhat higher levels of innovation and outputs, and that cities having high MPO ratios have higher concentrations of power (i.e., fewer power groups) than cities with low MPO ratios.

According to Hawley's own data, cities having low MPO ratios are more likely to have the following characteristics: mayor-council form of government, a manufacturing labor force and large manufacturing plants, low educational achievements, and low median income.[33] A persuasive argument can be made that attributes such as these are more likely to be characteristics of cities having diffused power arrangements, thus raising more questions about Hawley's interpretation of this measure.

Thus, our empirical findings are that cities with high MPO ratios have less public housing, as an extrapolation of Hawley's reasoning would suggest, but few active power centers if the results from the 31 case studies are correct. But it should be remembered that concentration of power for Hawley referred to the distribution of systemic power while the meaning here refers to elite participation.[34] It is still logically possible that systemic power could be highly dispersed, yet there could be few actors or power centers active in such cities. Still, this inconsistency does raise important questions about the meaning of the concept of concentration of power and about the ways in which such apparently contradictory findings might be reconciled.

The second theory associated with the hypothesis that concentration of community power leads to greater innovation refers mainly to *citizen participation.* It has been argued by Crain and Rosenthal that the higher the level of education in a community, the higher the political participation, which in turn leads to higher conflict, producing stalemate and low innovation.[35] Thus, the hypothesis links a high level of educational attainment with a low degree of community innovation and output, and posits an intervening process of heightened political participation and consequent community conflict and blockage. The hypothesized relationship between the per cent of adults with a high school education and the four measures of innovation gives strong support to this hypothesis (see Table 2). These correlations are approximately the same when they are separately computed within the North and the South.

While the empirical relationship between these variables is as they predicted, some questions can be raised about the meaning of this educational variable and the intervening process. Does a high level of educational attainment in a community reflect the presence of a politically informed and active middle class? Or does it reflect merely the absence of a poor and needy population, or at least a sufficiently small one that has few political resources? The correlation coefficient between the proportion of adults with four years of high school or more and the upper extremes on the education and income distribution—per cent of adults who have completed college and per cent of families with incomes of $10,000 or more per year—are .70 and .69 respectively. The correlation coefficients between the proportion of adults with four years of high school or more and the lower extremes on the education and income distributions—per cent of adults who have completed less than five years of education and per cent of families with incomes of less than $3,000 per year—are −.75 and −.44 respectively. The interpretation of educational level depends to a great extent on which end of the stratification scale one wants to emphasize, whether the level of poverty and poorly educated citizens or the presence of an articulate and active middle class.

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[32] Aiken, *op. cit.*

[33] Hawley, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

[34] This same point can be made with respect to urban renewal decisions, as we have in "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," *op. cit.*

[35] Crain and Rosenthal, *op. cit.* Their argument is more complex than this, however. For decisions about urban renewal and school desegregation, they found a negative relationship between level of education and success. However, they found a curvilinear relationship between educational level and success in an issue such as fluoridation. Since the public housing decision is most comparable to urban renewal, we have discussed their theory only as it applies to this kind of decision. We have not included their discussion of a curvilinear relationship between educational level and policy outcomes in which cities with the very highest educational

In the analysis of the 31 case studies of community power it was found that cities with high educational levels had more concentrated power arrangements (i.e., fewer power groups) than those with low educational levels, although the relationship was not a strong one.[36] Similarly, Clark found a positive relationship between the median educational level and the degree of centralization of power (i.e., fewer elites participated in decisions about urban renewal, the election of the mayor, air pollution, and the anti-poverty program in high-education cities).[37] Cities with high educational levels evidently have less elite participation, although it is still possible that such cities have greater citizen participation, as Crain and Rosenthal argue. They, like we, lack direct data on the key intervening variable of participation, and, unfortunately, such data do not exist for a large sample of cities. If voting turnout can be regarded as a crude indicator, a recent study has shown that better-educated cities have *lower* voting turnout than less well educated cities.[38] We find, as shown in Table 2, that among the 411 cities in our study for which data on voting turnout are available, *higher* voting turnout is associated with greater innovation in public housing. While the relationships are small, it should be noted that they remain approximately the same when correlation coefficients are computed within northern and southern cities, despite considerable differences between the regions on voting turnout.

The same questions that can be posed about the meaning of this education variable can also be posed about the meaning of the MPO ratio because of the extremely high relationship between per cent of adults with four years of high school and the MPO ratio (r = .65). Both of these are also strongly related to the per cent white collar (r = .88 and .77, respectively), although it should be noted that MPO is one component of the white-collar variable. These can be regarded as measures of the degree of middle-class domination of a city, and in each case we find that middle-class cities have more centralized power arrangements (i.e., fewer active power groups and actors) and less public housing, but how do we account for this? If low centralization implies high *citizen* participation (as measured by voting turnout) or dispersed systemic power (as measured by the MPO ratio), then we find that there is less public housing in decentralized cities. If low centralization implies *elite* participation, then we find that there is less public housing in centralized cities. There appears to be an inconsistency here for which there is no readily available explanation. Our comments are not intended to imply that the well-reasoned theories of Hawley and Crain and Rosenthal are incorrect. We simply do not have the evidence to demonstrate that, and it is logically possible that all explanations are correct. Still, it is important to note the different usages of the concept concentration or centralization of power and to distinguish carefully among them. There are a sufficient number of questions about both the Hawley and Crain and Rosenthal hypotheses to argue that they constitute incomplete and less promising theoretical explanations, even though our zero-order correlation coefficients are consistent with their hypotheses. We have moved toward a different type of explanation which is discussed later in this paper.

These remarks have not discussed in sufficient detail the third aspect of the concentration of power thesis: *elite participation*. The hypothesis here is that the fewer the number of influential persons in a community (and by definition the more concentrated power is in the political system), the easier it is to innovate. Although the community power literature has not dealt directly and systematically with innovation or policy outputs, the implied hypothesis by defenders of *both* the pluralist and the reputational schools is that the more centralized the political system, the greater its capacity to act. While

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levels have more success than cities with intermediate educational levels.

[36] Aiken, *op. cit.*

[37] Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *op. cit.*

[38] Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," this REVIEW, 62 (September, 1968), 796–813.

Hunter[39] stressed the role of a few heads of large corporations and banks as the source of coordinating leadership, and Dahl[40] stressed the role of a few political and public leaders as the moving force within an "executive-centered order"—without systematic data and without presenting this general hypothesis except indirectly—both assume that a centralized community system will be more able to make decisions and to make them faster.

Dahl, for example, concludes from his study of urban renewal in New Haven that "during Lee's tenure as mayor, control over urban redevelopment became much more highly centralized in the hands of the mayor and his redevelopment team than it had been in the previous administration." This "new redevelopment coalition . . . enabled him and his collaborators in redevelopment to assume influence over local policies on redevelopment and renewal."[41] And Hunter concludes that "policy decision tends to center in the actions of a relatively few men in the community."[42] Hunter's study was neither comparative nor historical, but the clear implication of his work is that no major innovation in Atlanta could be carried out without the direct involvement of the relatively few men who constituted the power structure.

We must not make too much of the relevance of the community power literature for our present argument. Both Hunter and Dahl stress the limitations on possible actions created by existing commitments to institutional arrangements, divisions of powers, and allocation of resources. But they, as well as we, essentially restricted their discussion of community decisions to those which are well within the range of the politically feasible at any given time. Federal programs such as public housing challenge few established economic or political interests, if any, and thus do not constitute a radical innovation.

Both Hunter's and Dahl's studies focused upon single cities. Few systematic comparative studies have been done of the concentration of community power which examined the number of actors in different issues and the consequences for community innovation. Clark's study of 51 cities found that the greater the decentralization of community power as measured by the number of persons involved in decision making in four issues (urban renewal, air pollution, poverty programs, and the selection of the mayor), the greater the number of urban renewal dollars per capita secured from the federal government. Clark concluded that more decentralized communities had higher policy outputs and advanced the hypothesis that "fragile" decisions were more susceptible to blockage.[43] The point that is relevant here is that decentralization (i.e., few elites participating) was associated with higher outputs. And as we have already seen, Aiken's coding of 31 case studies of community power into four levels of centralization (i.e., number of groups participating) came to the same conclusion.[44]

Third, *centralization of formal political structure*: This argument has two aspects, one based on centralization of formal power, the second related to the political culture argument. In the first case, the thesis in the literature is that the more centralized the formal political structure, the more innovative in policy making it should be. The indicators of centralization are ambiguous, however, since the usual conception of "reform" government is that its structural devices—the city-manager form, nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, small city councils—were intended to centralize power in the hands of a small executive and a professional manager at the same time that potential power in the hands of citizen groups was fragmented and dispersed by removing the instruments of the political party and the ward organization. On the other hand, some have argued that strong political parties were the most effective device for centralizing power. But in either case, there was agreement that administrative or political centralization should lead to greater innovation.[45]

The second aspect of political structure is related to the political culture argument, because it has been argued that reform political institutions are part of the array of policies favored by groups with public-regarding values, and presumably the instruments of such values should produce consequences similar to that of sheer demographic composition.

In most respects, the predictions of innovation which would be made by either the administrative centralization or political cultural interpre-

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[39] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

[40] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Power and Democracy in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

[41] Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

[42] Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[43] Clark, *op. cit.*

[44] Aiken, *op. cit.*

[45] The most recent statement of this hypothesis occurs in a study of fluoridation by Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, and one on poverty programs by Greenstone and Peterson, *op. cit.* The somewhat more complex argument of Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal will be discussed in detail below.

TABLE 3. INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY INNOVATION AND OUTPUT BY INDICATORS OF FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

	(N = 78) Commission	(N = 127) Partisan Mayor Council	(N = 41) Partisan Council-Manager	(N = 126) Nonpartisan Mayor-Council	(N = 274) Nonpartisan Council-Manager	(N = 646) All Cities
Presence of innovation in any public housing program since 1933	76%	73%	71%	61%	49%	60%
Speed of innovation: Number of years after 1933 before the city began construction on its first public housing project	19.2	21.1	24.2	23.6	24.9	23.2
Speed of innovation: Number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present	12.4	17.9	21.2	19.7	19.8	18.6
Level of output: Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population	1,080	751	684	645	520	668
Level of output: Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)	5.36	4.94	4.68	4.07	3.30	4.11

tation of differences of formal political structure would be the same. The prediction is ambiguous only in the case of the form of election. If nonpartisan elections are considered to reflect decentralization and high citizen participation, then, according to this line of reasoning, they should be associated with low innovation. But if they are regarded as instruments of groups with public-regarding values and as political mechanisms which reduce citizen participation, then nonpartisan elections should be associated with high innovation.

Table 2 displays the correlations between four aspects of the formal political structure of American cities and four measures of innovation in public housing. The centralization argument is supported by none of these indicators, unless one wishes to accept the argument that partisan elections lead to administrative centralization, less citizen participation, and therefore higher levels of innovation. The data support only the latter proposition. Cities with city-manager governments, nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, and small city councils are either *less* likely to innovate in this public policy area than cities with mayor-council governments, partisan elections, ward elections, and large city councils, or there is no relationship. Again, the same pattern is found in both northern and southern cities. Some significant relationships drop to insignificance, especially in the South, and the one reversal (per cent elected at large and the second speed measure in the South) is not statistically significant. As a corollary, the political culture argument also fails, since the reform institutions are not more innovative than the nonreform institutions.

In Table 3 we examine the degree of innovation among each of five types of city government, in order to test the more complex hypothesis of Crain, Katz and Rosenthal that cities with both low political participation and high executive centralization (which would be maximized by the city-manager form of government and partisan elections) should have higher rates of innovation, although their rationale for such hypotheses is too complex to present here.[46] They found that administrative adoption of fluoridation was greatest in cities with city-manager government, followed by those with partisan mayor-council, nonpartisan mayor-council, and lowest in those with commission form of government. We find that innovation in public housing is greatest in cities with the commission form of government; such cities had the *lowest* rate of innovation (administrative adoption) in fluoridation, however. Like the fluoridation findings, innovation in public housing (as well as in urban renewal and the war on poverty) is greater in partisan mayor-council cities than in the nonpartisan mayor-council type. But unlike the findings for fluoridation, we find that nonpartisan council-manager cities have the least innovation in public housing; administrative adoption cf fluoridation was found to be greatest in council-manager cities.

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[46] Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–205.

As Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal suggest, some community systems can make certain kinds of innovations with dispatch while other cities can make other types of decisions only with great difficulty. Evidently, the contrasting findings about innovation in public housing and fluoridation are one example of their conclusion. Although there are some findings in these data about public housing to support in part the predictions of Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, the inconsistencies in findings as well as the low zero-order relationships of political structure with innovation, at least in comparison to some other relationships with innovation, lead us to conclude that such a theory is perhaps not the most appropriate for an explanation of innovation in public housing.

Fourth, *community differentiation and continuity*: Larger and older cities have both greater structural differentiation and greater continuity. In the literature on community decision making, it has been argued that larger and older cities are both more innovative and less innovative in two different studies. Each of these studies has focused on innovations in different issues and provided differing and contradictory theoretical explanations. Thomas Dye, studying desegregation in 55 northern and southern cities, found that larger and older cities tended to have more segregation than smaller and younger ones.[47] He argued that larger cities were likely to be more bureaucratic and that ". . . large bureaucracies have many built-in mechanisms to resist policy innovations." Older cities were immobilized because ". . . over time persons and organizations adjust themselves to circumstances as they find them." And he did find greater segregation in older and larger cities, at least in the North, as the hypothesis would suggest.

On the other hand, a recent article dealing with public health organizations in 93 cities located in four midwestern states and Ontario by Lawrence Mohr found that public health organizations in larger cities were more innovative. He explained this by arguing that a community decision organization such as a public health organization was larger in big cities, had more resources available, and, in such circumstances, innovative leadership was more likely to be effective.[48]

The interpretations of the meaning of the age and size of cities are thus contradictory. On the one hand, it has been argued that older and larger cities are more rigid, more set in their ways, more complex and differentiated and, therefore, more incapable of action. On the other, such cities should be more adaptable, more experienced, and more flexible.

The data in Table 2 show that older and larger cities are in fact considerably more likely than younger and smaller cities to have innovated in public housing. When correlation coefficients are computed separately for northern and southern cities, the relationships differ only slightly from those reported in Table 2. Whether or not age and size are merely a reflection of a high level of structural degradation of the housing and building stock which cannot readily be replaced by the private market for low-rent housing is an important question for the interpretation of these relationships and will be taken up later.

Fifth, *community integration*: The argument here is that more highly integrated communities, i.e., those with highly developed networks of communication and contact among social groups, should suffer less from paralyzing conflict in the case of a new issue requiring decision, because on the one hand, channels of communication to work out compromises exist, and, on the other hand, isolated factions standing fast on their own position would not be present.[49]

The indicators of community integration used by Pinard are quite diverse, and include several already mentioned here under other headings. Positive fluoridation decisions were hypothesized to be associated with low ethnicity, many middle-class persons, low voting turnout, small population size, low unemployment, and low in-migration. As already seen, three of these—low ethnicity, middle-class composition, and small size—are associated with *less* innovation in public housing, not more as would be predicted by the integration theory.[50] In the case of unemployment and in-migration, the thesis is that high unemployment levels will produce disintegration of community life by reducing attachments to community institutions and increasing conflict. High levels of in-migration will reduce integration by disrupting long-standing networks of communication and interchange among groups and organizations in a community. Contrary to expectation, low unemployment is associated with less innovation in public housing, not more. The only indicator among these six that works in the predicted direction is the degree of in-migration. Cities with high levels of in-migration (which are hypothesized to be less well-integrated) do have less success in public housing. When correlation coefficients are computed for northern and southern cities separately, the relationships for the two additional variables discussed here are hardly changed.

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[47] Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (December, 1968), 141–165.

[48] Mohr, *op. cit.*

[49] Pinard, *op. cit.* James Coleman, *op. cit.*, has provided the theoretical argument which he illustrated by case studies, and Pinard has applied the theory in his study of fluoridation decisions.

[50] While we cannot summarize Pinard's complex argument here, it may be noted that his data do not support his hypothesis about the effects of middle-class composition. Middle-class cities are less likely to decide to fluoridate their water than

To summarize, few of the hypothesized relationships drawn from the literature discussed here are borne out completely, and we have raised some questions about the theoretical interpretation of those that were as predicted. The main findings thus far are that older and larger cities, those with lower levels of education and income, fewer managers and officials, higher voting turnout and Democratic voting, a lower degree of in-migration, and higher unemployment levels have participated more in public housing, entered it faster, and have higher performance levels. The question which these results immediately raises is whether or not public housing is simply a response to poor housing stock and higher levels of need and dependency.

The factor of community need might be regarded either as an independent variable or as a control variable, depending on the specific problem in which one was interested. If the need of the community for welfare programs—as measured by unemployment, poverty, low education, etc.—accounted for all or most of the statistical variation between communities in the degree and level of a particular type of innovation, this would be an extremely important finding, because it would show that need, whether manifest in political demands by the needy or in autonomous responses to need by political leaders regardless of demands, was the major source of innovation and policy outputs, regardless of the values of key groups, the concentration of power, or the integration of the community.

Table 2 thus includes some additional measures of the poverty and housing conditions among these 646 cities. Cities with more dilapidated housing in 1950, many poor families, many poorly educated adults, more high school dropouts, and many nonwhites were indeed more likely to have entered the public housing program, entered it faster, and have higher performance levels as reflected by the number of housing units per 100,000 population. These relationships, as with most of those previously discussed, are approximately the same when computed separately for northern and southern cities.

Given these strong and consistent relationships between city size and these need measures and innovation in public housing, we may pose the question whether or not many of the previously discussed relationships, regardless of the concepts they were alleged to represent, are not simply functions of a high degree of community need for public housing. In an attempt to answer this question, we first computed a series of partial correlations for most of the variables in Table 2, controlling for level of dilapidated housing and city size. As shown in Table 4, the relationships between the variables that were strongly related to innovation measures in Table 2 still have relatively strong relationships with the innovation measures even when the effect of city size and the amount of dilapidated housing are removed statistically. Step-wise regression analyses which introduced the need variables first also supported this finding.

Clearly factors other than simply reflections of a needy population are efficient predictors of community innovation, and clearly the two measures of centralization of power that were consistent with predictions—per cent of the adult population with four years of high school or more and MPO ratio—do not hold up when other variables are controlled.

But to point out the consistencies in these empirical relationships does not solve the problem of understanding why and how some communities enter the public housing program and others do not. The mind is not set at rest by discovering that poorer, more needy cities have greater participation in this federal program or that older, larger, more heterogeneous cities are also more innovative. In the first place the relationships are not unusually strong. In the second place, these "ecological" correlates do not tell us anything about the intervening processes which enabled some cities to mobilize local resources sufficiently to provide relatively high levels of

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working-class cities, contrary to the integration hypothesis. Pinard then argues that a large middle-class city is more likely to have a divided elite, thus decentralized power arrangements, more conflict, and, therefore, less innovation. Although his postulates about the meaning of his indicators are inconsistent with ours, his data are consistent, at least with respect to the effect of middle-class composition.

TABLE 4. PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND SPEED OF INNOVATION (AFTER ENABLING LEGISLATION) AND LEVEL OF OUTPUT, CONTROLLING FOR SIZE OF COMMUNITY AND PER CENT OF HOUSING DILAPIDATED IN 1950

	Speed of Innovation in Housing (After Enabling Legislation	Log N Number of Housing Units per 100,000 Population
Political Culture		
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage	.01	.08*
Per cent of elementary school children in private schools	.04	.10*
Median family income	.29***	−.28***
Per cent in the county voting Democratic, 1964	−.05	.17***
Concentration and Diffusion of Community Power		
MPO Ratio	.10*	−.27***
Per cent of adult population with four years of high school	.18***	−.41***
Political Structure		
Presence of a city-manager form of government	.08*	−.16***
Presence of nonpartisan elections	.01	−.09*
Per cent of city council elected at large	−.02	.02
Number of members of the city council	.07	−.01
Community Continuity		
Age of city (year city reached 10,000 population [Log N])	.20***	−.31***
Community Integration		
Per cent unemployed	−.13***	.24***
Per cent migrant	.04	−.25***
Poverty		
Per cent of families with less than $3,000 income per year	−.29***	.34***
Per cent of adults with less than five years education (Log N)	−.19***	.36***
Per cent of 14–17 year olds in school	.17***	−.31***
Per cent of population that is nonwhite (Log N)	−.18***	.31***

* P <.05.
** P <.01.
*** P <.001.

public housing for its needy citizens while others did not. What do these and other available data tell us about the political and organizational factors and processes that enabled some cities to mobilize effectively for this particular structural and policy innovation, and others not? Both a reinterpretation of the data already presented and a more complex analysis of them may cast some light on this question.

Structural Differentiation and Community Innovation

Cities that appear to be most heterogeneous, differentiated, and decentralized—as indicated by ethnicity, a large working class, nonwhite composition, size, and the qualitative data on centralization (i.e., degree of elite participation) in the works of Clark and Aiken—are most likely to have innovated in public housing. An alternative theory of community innovation—at least for innovation in programs such as urban renewal, low-rent housing, the war on poverty, and model cities—must begin with the proposition that successful innovation in such programs is more frequently attained in fragmented, differentiated and heterogeneous community systems. The demographic data just described offer only indirect support for this proposition. More important are the data from Aiken and Clark already cited which show that the more groups and actors participating in current decisions, the higher is the level of innovation and outputs.

Several other bodies of data can be used to support this proposition, however. The sheer size of a city is only a crude indicator of the degree of structural differentiation and organizational complexity of a community. A more direct way of measuring organizational complexity would be a count of the number of organizations of various types which play some role in community life, i.e., the richness of organizational life.[51] We have data on the extensity of three types of organizations—manufacturing firms, banks, and trade unions—although for only a sub-sample of cities in each case. Unfortunately, we lack data on other more crucial types of organizations such as political parties, voluntary associations, or the local government.

Not only is the sheer number of organizations important, but also the number having sufficient resources to affect critically the course of community innovation. For this reason we have chosen the number of manufacturing establishments with 100 or more employees and the number of independent banks with assets of at least ten million dollars as our measures of organizational complexity and differentiation. Unfortunately, the unionization data cannot be treated in exactly the same way. But because larger firms are more likely to be unionized and because the data include all establishments in which a majority of the plant workers are unionized, we believe that this measure too is an appropriate indicator of the organizational complexity of a community.

The data relating structural differentiation and community innovation are presented in Table 5. Because the level and character of union-

[51] Cf. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142–193.

TABLE 5. DIFFERENTIATION OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICAN CITIES

	Manufacturing	Banking	Unionization	
	Number of Establishments of Size 100 or More	Total Number of Independent Banks	Per Cent of Plant Workers Unionized, Among All Industries	
			North	South
Innovation				
Presence of innovation in public housing since 1933	.18**	.14*	.08	.41*
Speed of Innovation				
Number of years after 1933 before construction began on the public housing project	−.40***	−.27***	−.19	−.05
Number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present	−.34***	−.30***	.15	−.18
Outputs				
Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)	.22***	.17*	.08	.43***
N =	(217)	(217)	(76)	(35)

Source: Manufacturing and banking data are available for the 217 nonsuburban cities in the size range 25,000 to 250,000 population which had 20 per cent or more of their labor force in manufacturing in 1960. The unionization of manufacturing establishments is available for 84 metropolitan areas, which provide an estimate of the trade union level of 112 cities within them. See Michael Aiken, "Economic Concentration and Community Innovation," unpublished manuscript, 1969, for details on the construction of the measures. The banking data were taken from *Polk's Bank Directory* (Nashville: R. L. Polk and Co., March, 1966). The data on unions are drawn from Bulletin No. 1465–86, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., October, 1966, titled *Wages and Related Benefits: Part I, 84 Metropolitan Areas*, 1965–66. The measure is the approximate per cent of all plant workers employed in establishments in which a union contract covered a majority of workers during the period July, 1964, to June, 1966. We have assigned the degree of unionization in the SMSA to the urban place, as the best estimate we have of the unionization of the city itself.

* $P<.05$
** $P<.01$
*** $P<.001$

ization can be presumed to be different in the North and the South, the data for that variable are presented by region. These results are consistent with our expectations. The cities with more manufacturing establishments of size 100 or more, with more independent banks with assets of ten million dollars or more, and with more unionized plants are most likely to have innovated in all respects.

These measures of structural differentiation can be regarded as ways of more precisely spelling out what it means to be a large city, as far as capacity to innovate is concerned. Large cities have a greater diversity of social organizations, and apparently one consequence is greater innovation.

This deceptively simple and obvious statement can be generalized, but before doing so, we should point out that this whole line of interpretation of the data in Table 5 is inconsistent with most of the previously discussed theories. Among the 112 cities for which unionization data are available, highly unionized cities are more likely to have fewer working-class persons ($r = -.50$ with the MPO ratio), to have fewer well-educated citizens ($r = -.24$ with per cent high school graduates), to have higher political participation ($r = .37$ with the per cent of registrants voting), and to be in more Democratic counties ($r = .27$ with the per cent Democratic vote in 1960). According to the ethos theory, such cities should be more private-regarding, and therefore have less public housing. According to Hawley's argument, they should be more decentralized and therefore should have less public housing. According to the integration argument, they should have more conflict, and therefore less public housing. None of these is the case.

The manufacturing and banking data also contradict the centralization argument, since we would expect that a power structure of executives and bankers should be more homogeneous in a context of fewer and larger firms. Instead, the greater the number of such organizations, the greater the innovation and the outputs.

What these disparate findings suggest is that the independent variables explaining community innovation must be disaggregated. The concepts normally used to explain community behavior may reify the diversity of community structures which sponsor and carry through actions. Global concepts such as centralization, integration, or ethos may hinder the comparative analysis of urban political and governmental processes. Concepts recognizing the fundamental diversity and differentiation of cities should be incorporated into the basic analytic framework.

Unfortunately, the data we have reported here may efficiently predict community innovation in public housing (regression analyses of 17 of the variables shown in Table 2 explain 30 to 40 per cent of the variance in the four innovation measures), but they cannot directly test our ideas about the processes which lead to community innovation. Before turning to a brief alternative theoretical sketch, we believe that some comments on the relation of theory to methodology in this area will be useful.

III. SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Quantitative ecological analysis raises certain methodological considerations related to the *indicators* used, the *unit of analysis,* the difficulties of analyzing complex *causal processes* which are essentially historical in character and national in scope, and, lastly, the use of the data as a *sampling frame*. We shall use our previous substantive findings as examples illustrating these problems, also discussed elsewhere.[52]

The difficulty of obtaining satisfactory empirical *indicators* of theoretical variables such as centralization, differentiation, complexity and the like is primarily due to two problems: lack of easily and cheaply available data and lack of resources to obtain better data. The Census Bureau and agencies such as the International City Management Association which collect the only easily quantifiable data do not obtain those data which may be most useful for purposes of causal explanation, and better data are extremely time-consuming and costly to collect. It is for this reason that students of urban decision making have emphasized case studies, which provide richer and more complex information about the detailed processes and events involved. But if one begins with the assumption that comparative quantitative studies provide an invaluable framework of basic findings and parameters, one must attempt to make the most careful and logical inferences from the crude ecological data that are available.

Our previous discussion of the problems of interpreting the meaning of the MPO ratio, the level of education, and the form of government has illustrated concretely the problem of selection and interpretation of indicators. The general implication which we draw is that single indicators of complex theoretical variables are not sufficient, *if* the indicator is several inferential steps from the phenomenon of real concern. Multiple indicators provide simultaneously a check on the consistency of the patterns of relationships presumed to be found with other variables and some assurance that several dimensions of meaning of the theoretical variable are being tapped. This principle holds for both independent and dependent variables. In this article, for example, we have analyzed four different indicators of the dependent variable. Sensitivity to the problem of the gap between indicators and theoretical variables will also avoid easy resort to the statement: "This variable is operationalized as follows. . . ."

The problem of the *unit of analysis* arises essentially because of ambiguity about the location of causal agency for the processes represented by the data available. Whether or not the observed phenomena of innovative outputs can be best explained by the actions of community organizations and officials, by the operations of cultural values, by ecological and economic forces at the level of the urbanized area, or by political configurations and traditions at the state or regional level, is not obvious from the data themselves. To some extent this problem can be regarded as one solved by seeing the operation of causal forces in a way which parallels the "nesting" of units of analysis within each other: decisions, men, organizations, urban areas, states, regions, nations. Organizations shape and select the men who make the decisions; urban areas grow in ways which shape and select the organizations within them; states and regions develop in ways which shape the urban areas within them. But this way of seeing the units of analysis merely redefines the problem in a possibly clarifying way; it does not solve the problem of selecting the appropriate unit of analysis or of interpreting the resulting data.

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[52] Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969).

Generally, the reasoning about our data leads us to an eclectic approach to this problem, one which does not rule out *a priori* the operation of causal forces at any level of social or political organization. We suggest in our theoretical section following that many of the properties usually assigned to the community as a whole can be reduced to properties of organizations and interorganizational relationships, which might seem to opt for a smaller, more "micro" unit of analysis. But we do not offer this as a methodological principle. Rather, it seems to us that the analyst should not prematurely assume, just because his *data* refer to cities, for example, that the theoretical concepts appropriate for an adequate explanation must also be defined in terms of the city as the causal agency. The basic causal forces may be at a larger, more macro level (the state, region, or nation as a whole), or at a more micro level (organizations, individuals), or perhaps at all three levels.

This point brings us to a last and related problem: the location of complex *causal processes* which are essentially historical in character. Most of the variables which we have found to be related to innovation are closely related to the region in which a city is located. Cities in the Northeast tend to be larger, older, have more out-migration and more persons of foreign stock. If three dummy variables representing region are used in a regression equation, they alone explain approximately eight per cent of the variance in the innovation measures. The empirical relationships are clear; the way to handle them methodologically in order to make a theoretical point is not at all clear.

Cities differ along many dimensions which are related to the stage of industrialization during which they grew, the period in which certain ethnic or racial groups were migrating to specific regions, and the period of time in which certain innovations of structure and function were being diffused and adopted. Such complex historical processes cannot be isolated into separate "factors" by any conceivable multivariate statistical procedure. If this is true for American cities, the same methodological problem will appear even more sharply once systematic comparisons of cities are attempted on a cross-national basis. Again, we can only raise some of the problems and issues, not solve them.

The statistical "effect" of regions (or international differences, which are logically similar) can be handled in two ways, if one wishes to approach the problem quantitatively. The regional units can be broken into two categories and treated as "dummy" (binary) variables for the purpose of correlations and regression analysis. The other way is that of contextual analysis which we have followed in this paper: repeating the correlational analysis separately within different regions. This procedure has the advantage—if it works, as it did in the data we report—of greatly strengthening the tests of hypotheses if the same patterns are found in different regions, or if deviations can be readily explained. If the procedure does not work—if, that is, relationships become wild and random (at least in terms of any theoretical framework available at the moment)—one cannot be sure whether or not one has artifically destroyed real relationships by the "control" for region via the contextual analysis procedure. This point deserves a bit of emphasis with an example.

We know that the proportion of persons who are of foreign stock differs greatly from region to region in the United States, being highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South and Far West. By separating the nation's cities into four regions, and examining correlations within each, we are tacitly assuming that the meaning of the "ethnicity" variable is the same from region to region. Yet if the mean proportion of persons of foreign stock is sharply different from region to region, we are not really dealing with the same variable at all since a high of 15 per cent in the South may be equated with a high of 60 per cent in the Northeast. Failure to find similar relationships of this variable with others may be an artifact of the procedure employed. On the other hand, if we use the "dummy" variable procedure in a regression analysis, we are ignoring the problems of the temporal causal ordering of the variables by throwing into one matrix variables causally prior to others in the same matrix. Not only that, but region is by definition a complex summary or proxy variable which "stands for" a multiplicity of processes of migration, age, ethnic composition, and the like. If these variables are also in the regression equation, it is very difficult to interpret the outcome. The severe problems of multicollinearity which occurred whenever we attempted to use region as a dummy variable underlines this difficulty.[53]

Lastly, the data and findings reported here could be used as a *sampling frame* for a comparative community study in which the intervening process of community decision making is the key focus of the research. In such a research enterprise, the data and findings in the present study could be used to select a sample that is not only characteristic of given region or size categories, but also a sample of cities having high and low structural potential for outputs as well as high and low actual performance. The study of the deviant cases could be particularly fruitful.

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[53] See Robert R. Alford, "A Critical Evaluation of the Principles of City Classification," in Brian Berry (ed.), *Classification of Cities: New Methods and Alternative Uses*, forthcoming, for an elaboration of these methodological points with special reference to the factor analyses of city characteristics.

Another procedure that could be used in sampling would be based on the calculation of residuals in regression analysis. Within a given size or region category, for example, at least three types of cities could be identified: a) "over-performers," b) "under-performers," and c) "normal performers," at least as predicted by a set of key independent variables in a regression analysis. These are only two possible ways of establishing a sampling frame. The data and findings could be used in designing comparative research projects on American communities, and might also be fruitfully applied to research on communities in other societies.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Our tentative alternative approach is that community innovation of the kind examined here must involve a two-level analysis. First, an explication of the kinds of community attributes which create the conditions for the development of certain types, numbers, and qualities of organizations that are critical for innovations for the type under discussion here, and, second, the kinds of attributes of organizations and their environments—or organization sets to use the term of William Evan[54]—that facilitate the speed of implementation and subsequent performance of the innovation. To some extent these levels are the same thing examined from two points of view, but we believe that the concepts may be usefully distinguished.[55]

With respect to the first, our findings point to three kinds of concepts as the most important: the quality and stability of interorganizational ties, the accumulation of experience and information in a community system (continuity), and structural differentiation. Interorganizational networks are conceived as properties of community systems that are developed historically through the experience of organizational units and their leaders with each other. If the population of a community is relatively stable, these interorganizational networks are not likely to be disrupted by the continuous influx of new citizens and organizations, and thus there is the greater potential for increasing their capacity for coordination over time.

The degree of historical continuity in a community structure—especially as it affects interorganizational networks—may also influence innovation. Presumably older cities have had a longer time for existing organizations to have worked out patterns of interactions, alliances, factions, or coalitions. In such communities the state of knowledge in the community system about the orientations, needs, and probable reactions to varying proposals for community action is likely to be quite high, thus increasing the probability of developing a sufficiently high level of coordination in order to implement successfully a community innovation.

The degree of structural differentiation and complexity of a community may also influence innovation for two reasons. First, larger cities are likely to have more organizations devoted to specific kinds of decision areas—i.e., more likely to have a redevelopment agency, a housing agency, a community action agency, a city development agency for model cities, welfare councils, and other community decision organizations. Such organizations are likely to have larger, more specialized, and more professionalized staffs to provide the technical, administrative, and political knowledge required to innovate successfully not only within their organizations, but also in those areas which require activating interorganizational relationships and establishing critical coalitions. Secondly, it is precisely in the larger, more structurally differentiated communities that coalitions that can implement an innovation will be easiest to establish. If we assume that all organizational units in a community do not have to be mobilized in a decision such as public housing, but rather that only a limited number of organizational units can suffice to bring about a successful innovation, then it follows that in large, highly differentiated communities a lower proportion of organizations will participate in such decisions, and that there will be wider latitude in selecting organizations for these critical coalitions. The more highly differentiated or specialized a community system, the higher the proportion of decisions that are likely to be made by subsystems and the less likely the entire system will be activated.

We thus suggest that these three properties of communities—structural differentiation, the accumulation of experience and information, and the stability and extensiveness of interorganizational networks—may contribute to the capacity of a community to generate the kinds of social resources necessary for innovation. While we have no direct measures of these properties and while these suggestions are only inferential, such imagery about the process of community innovation does appear to be consistent with our findings about the characteristics of communities that have been most successful in innovating in public housing.[56]

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[54] William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganization Relations," in James D. Thompson (ed.), *Approaches to Organizational Design* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966).

[55] The research by Mohr, *op. cit.*, is suggestive of the appropriateness of this two-level approach.

In our larger study of community innovation and decision making, similar relationships have been found for participation in other federal programs such as urban renewal, the war on poverty, and model cities. What is common to each of these programs is first, resources come from outside the community, second, each of these programs has a sponsor—a community decision organization,[57] and, third, the decision to innovate is made in most cases by representative agencies—the city council, the community decision organization, and other representational units. Many of the decisions examined in the previous studies—fluoridation, desegregation, and school bond and other referenda—involved few external resources, did not usually have the sponsorship and legitimization by a community decision organization, and were characterized by a high degree of citizen participation. Such factors are likely to be critical in determining whether one theory or another best explains different policy outcomes. It may be that the centralization or integration theories, if appropriately modified, can best explain policy outcomes for issues with a high potential for citizen participation, but for issues which are more likely to be insulated from popular participation—such as public housing or urban renewal—the model alluded to here, which conceives of a community subsystem as the key unit of analysis, which considers organizations as the key actors, and which views their interrelationships and degree of coordination as critical, may be a more appropriate model.[58]

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[56] See Aiken and Alford, *American Sociological Review, op. cit.,* for a more extended theoretical statement.

[57] See Roland L. Warren, "Interaction of Community Decision Organizations: Some Basic Concepts and Needed Research," *Social Services Review,* 41 (September, 1967), 261–270; and "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 12 (December, 1967), 396–419, for a discussion of the meaning of the concept.

[58] See Paul E. Mott, "Configurations of Power," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power: An Anthology* (New York: Random House, 1970), for one example of this approach.

A THEORY OF PROFESSIONALIZATION IN POLITICS*

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Professionalization, in customary usage, refers to the assimilation of the standards and values prevalent in a given profession. Every profession, including politics, tends to have some set or sets of values that are widely held and which define what it means to be a "professional" within that field. These values are important because they affect the likelihood that the individual will achieve success in his profession. If the values are widely held, those that deviate from them are likely to be sanctioned by their colleagues, and people who fail to maintain the minimal standards of their profession are not likely to obtain professional advancement. Those who do behave according to the dominant values of their profession, however, are likely to be accorded the status of "professional" in the eyes of their colleagues, and that designation will contribute to the success of their careers.

In the profession of politics, as in other professions, there is seldom one set of standards and values that prevails in all places at all times. These normative elements are likely to vary from political system to political system, to vary within a political system, and to vary within the profession of politics over time. In a highly centralized local political organization, for example, the achievement and maintenance of a position is likely to depend upon such values as deference and loyalty to the leaders of the political hierarchy.

In a more decentralized political system, however, a different set of professional standards is likely to be predominant. In the "pluralistic" political system, the politician is a principal broker in the process through which collective decisions are made. The man who is able to develop successful coalitions and who can work out acceptable compromises is critical to the decisional process where interest conflict abounds. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom have described the prevalence of such individuals in the political process of the United States:

> . . . social pluralism facilitates the rise of political leaders whose main skill is negotiating settlements among conflicting social organizations. Thus the whole cast of the political elites is modified by pluralism; the fanatic, the Messianic type, the leader whose aim is to consolidate the supremacy of some small group tend to trip themselves up on the barrier of groups and group loyalties. The Federalists, concerned with maintaining the domination of eastern financial and commercial interests, were unable to compete with the Jefferson alliance; they died out as a party. All important politicians have been excellent negotiators of group alliances, from Jefferson and Jackson to Roosevelt and Truman.[1]

Dahl and Lindblom point to what may be the most critical of the political skills required for success in American politics, a skill at bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Explicit bargaining pervades the entirety of the political process, from the development of electoral alliances to the formation of legislative coalitions, and at the center of these processes stands the politician. To be successful, the politician must first forge a winning coalition from the kaleidoscopic variety of interests present in most constituencies. But it does not end there. The ability to bargain also determines to some extent the success of the representative in his legislature, whether at the Federal, state, or local levels of government. The ideologue who is unwilling to bargain or the "citizen-politician" who is above such behavior are not likely to be sought out for alliances.[2]

Although there are undoubtedly many other skills required of the successful politician, the ability and willingness to bargain would appear to be a necessary requirement for success in politics in the pluralistic political system. But the ability to bargain presumes as well that the politician has a positive view toward the processes of bargaining and negotiation. One feature of American politics has been a widespread distrust

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* The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GS 496 and GS 1898.

[1] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. 304.

[2] For a more detailed analysis of the attitudes and orientations of "citizen-politicians," see Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). This study and the Prewitt study utilize data from the same source; the City Council Research Project, directed by Heinz Eulau.

of the politician, a distrust that probably stems in part from the particular requirements of the political role; for example the requirement that the politician bargain with the diverse groups and individuals around him.[3] For some reason, "bargaining" seems to be viewed as slightly "unethical" to many people, particularly those segments of the population that have accepted the grand myth of the Progressive Era that in every conflict situation there exists a "right" decision.[4]

I. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTERING THE POLITICAL ARENA

If there does exist a widely held antagonism toward "politicians" and toward "bargaining," one wonders how it is that some people develop skills and values congruent with the requirements of politics. Do they enter into politics because they are skilled at bargaining and compromise or do they develop these skills after they enter the political arena? And what accounts for the variations in norms and values among those active in politics? Clearly not all politicians are equally skilled at bargaining; not all politicians are even favorably disposed toward bargaining. Why is it that some individuals seem to learn the norms, values, and attitudes of the pluralistic political process more easily than others?

One answer to these questions may come from an understanding of the motivations of the men who enter the political arena. Some men appear to seek offices in order to enhance their nonpolitical careers, others may enter politics because of a sense of civic obligation, while still others may not have sought their office at all—they may have been thrust into it by their friends. These and many other motivations are common in politics, but they are not the kinds of motivation that one would associate with those who seek political careers.[5]

This study is concerned with one type of motivation that may be related to the socialization of potential politicians; the desire for political advancement. Although many people enter politics in order to enhance their nonpolitical careers, other individuals seek success through politics where success is measured in terms of political advancement. According to Joseph A. Schlesinger:

> The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office.[6]

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[3] Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, 333–334. William C. Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician," *Western Political Quarterly*, 12 (June, 1959), 683-698. Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

[4] The ideology of the "municipal reform movement" is an important component in local politics. The thrust of the arguments was for "good government," the "public interest," and a kind of Burkean politician who could stand above the conflict and who would reach the "right solution" to a problem rather than pandering to "selfish interests." These reforms were to come about through the adoption of such institutional changes as at-large elections, city manager plans, and nonpartisanship. The importance here is that the ideology of the municipal reform movement specifically rejected the "pluralist" view of the decisional process; and this point of view has been extremely popular in California where this study was conducted. This is reflected in the fact that all of the cities in this study operate under nonpartisanship, nearly all have at-large elections, and most have either city managers or city administrators. For a review of the history of the municipal reform movement, see Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, LV (October, 1964), 157–169. On the Progressive Movement in California, see George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 86–104.

[5] One classic study of political motivation is Max Weber's "Politics as a Vocation." He distinguishes between the men who are involved in politics on a marginal basis, as an avocation, and the men who either "live for" or "live off" politics, those whose politics are a vocation or a "calling." *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 77–128. In addition to Weber's work, this study relies reavily on three recent studies of political motivation: James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965); Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); and James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[6] Schlesinger, *ibid.*, 6. Wilson distinguishes between "amateurs" and "professionals" with the same factor of ambition; the office goals of the individual. He argues that: "The professional, for whom politics primarily has extrinsic rewards, is preoccupied with maintaining his position in party

This motivation, the desire for political advancement, should be related to an individual's commitment to politics in general, to his willingness to assume the risks and to pay the costs of furthering his career, and perhaps, as we shall explore in this study, to the extent to which he internalizes norms and values congruent with his political aspirations. The decision to seek political advancement rests on the political ambitions of the individual; and although it may be valuable to know what forces or experiences in the past of the individual produce political ambition, we suggest that the presence or absence of ambition itself is the critical intervening factor between an individual's political past and his political future and between his initial political values and those of the professional politician.

Two Levels of Political Commitment

Although the arguments presented here are not restricted to any single set of political officeholders, the data are based on a study of the city councilmen of the San Francisco Bay Area.[7] As part of that study, 435 city councilmen were interviewed from eighty-seven cities. The interview was quite lengthy and included both open and closed questions. The tables in this paper employ questions from this interview along with some additional data on the cities themselves. *It is important to remember that these respondents all were officeholders at the time of the interview.*

The decisions that "potential politicians" make reflect their level of commitment to politics relative to other alternatives. Politics is, more than many other pursuits, a risky venture, particularly for the officeholder. Although the severity of the risk is different for different politicians, the fact of political defeat is a fact that many aspiring politicians are forced to live with continuously. Even if one has been relatively successful for a time, many budding careers have been ended with a single defeat.

For those individuals who hold office, it is useful to distinguish between two different levels of political commitment; commitment to the position the individual currently holds (in this case, the office of councilman) and the commitment to seek other political or governmental positions. The former will be referred to as *positional commitment* and it reflects the value the officeholder places on the achievement and retention of the position he currently holds. The latter will be referred to as *progressive commitment* and it reflects the generalized aspiration of the officeholder for other political or governmental offices.[8]

These two types of political commitment need not be highly correlated; that is to say, those who are progressively committed to politics need not necessarily be high on positional commitment. With regard to the case at hand, a councilman may have run for the council, not because he was particularly concerned with local politics, but because he wished to use the council as a springboard for other political offices. Likewise, a councilman who places a high value on his job as a councilman may see that as the limit of his involvement in politics.

One method of measuring the commitment of councilmen to their office and to the achievement of other offices is simply to ask them about their commitment, i.e., about the value they place on these offices. A second measure of an individual's commitment to a given alternative (or career) is the extent to which the individual is willing to invest in that alternative relative to other alternatives. Every position in a prospective career has a set of investment costs attached to it. These costs might include the fulfillment of a skill requirement through prolonged education, the cost of expensive equipment, or other types of investments. The common denominator of all investments is that they entail some element of risk; and this risk is the cost that will be sustained if the individual fails to achieve benefits commensurate with his investment.

Although it is impossible to aggregate all the investment costs for the individual, we do have two factors which would seem to be related in a rough fashion to the relative investments that these councilmen have made in politics. These are the size of the city and the extent of the competition for office in the city. City size is important for two reasons: the larger the city, the larger will be the electorate to which the councilman must appeal, and the more costly in general will be his campaign. Also, the larger the city, the more time and effort will the duties of the position of councilman require. For both reasons, an individual's investment in politics would appear to be associated with the size of the political unit in which the individual serves.

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and elective offices. Winning is essential, although sometimes electoral victory must be subordinated to maintaining the organization." *Ibid.*, 17.

[7] The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under contract GS 496 and GS 1898.

[8] Schlesinger makes a similar distinction between *static* and *progressive* goals in his ambition theory of recruitment. *Op. cit.*, 10.

In addition, those who run for office in cities in which the elections are closely contested are likely to have to campaign more vigorously for their office and thereby pay higher costs. Thus, the councilmen from the larger and more competitive cities are likely to have made a greater investment in politics than those who come from the smaller and less competitive cities,[9] and this variation in their investment in politics should be related to their commitment to politics in general.

Therefore, we are employing three estimates of the councilman's commitment to politics: (1) two surrogate measures for the initial investment of seeking the councilmanic position, the size of the city and the average closeness of the vote in city elections; (2) the councilman's expressed desire for the office of councilman; and (3) the councilman's expressed intention of seeking other political and governmental offices. The first reflects the *risk* the councilman sustained in seeking the councilmanic position, the second reflects his *positional commitment,* that is to say, the value he places on his current position, while the third reflects his *progressive commitment* to politics.

II. POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICIANS

What is it that sets the "politician" apart from other participants in the political process? If we were to conduct a study of professional politicians, we would probably locate a large number of attitudes and values that are somewhat distinctive of politicians as a group.[10] In this study we are concerned with two general attributes that probably differentiate politicians as a group from other individuals in the society.

The first involves the councilman's definition of his role on the council and the manner in which he believes others define that role. An officeholder need not see himself as a "politician," especially at the local level. He may define himself and his work on the council in strictly nonpolitical terms, and he may perceive that politics is irrelevant to his activities on the council. At the same time, he may perceive that the citizens in his community do not define his role as that of a politician. He may believe that they simply see him as another citizen, or perhaps as a public servant, but not as a politician. In fact, many local officeholders are probably loath to consider themselves as "politicians" because of the negative connotations of that term for so many people.

One element, therefore, in the politician's socialization process is the extent to which the individual defines his activities as "political," or sees himself as a "politician." But an individual's role is not entirely self-defined; a role is also defined by the expectations of others.[11] Of equal importance, then, is the extent to which the officeholder believes that the citizenry of his community defines his role as "political." These two sets of expectations form one dimension of the politician's socialization process.

A second element in that process has to do with what many students of American politics believe to be the dominant skill in politics in this country, a skill at bargaining. While we do not know the actual extent to which these councilmen engage in bargaining, we do have information on their perception of the extent to which bargaining occurs on the council and on their attitude toward bargaining in general. If a councilman is going to acquire some skill at bargaining, it seems safe to presume that he must begin to see bargaining in a positive light. If a councilman engages in bargaining behavior on the council, it also seems safe to presume that he will perceive that bargaining occurs on the council.

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[9] Both the size of the city and the closeness of the vote in elections are related to the cost of running for office, the amount of time and effort the councilman puts into his campaign, and some of the psychic costs of electoral contesting. Both relationships are positive and strong; and these results can be seen in Gordon S. Black, *The Arena of Political Competition* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming).

[10] Although there are a large number of studies that explore the attitudes and values of politicians of various kinds and a large number of studies that explore the attitudes and values of the general public, only a few studies actually compare the attitudes of politicians with the attitudes of the general public, and these restrict themselves to attitudes on public policy. See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56; Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 66–72.

[11] Robert K. Merton suggests that the occupant of a given *status,* in this case the councilmanic position, has a role-set that is the ". . . complement of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status." For the councilman, the public is a "significant other" with which he interacts, and what we are examining here is the councilman's perception of how the public defines his role in the position he occupies of councilman. *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 368–370.

These two elements probably precede the acquisition of skill in political bargaining. In a sense, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for becoming a skilled bargainer. While those who are favorably disposed toward bargaining may, of course, never acquire the skill to bargain, they are much more likely to acquire that skill than those who are antagonistic toward bargaining.

Returning to our earlier argument, then, we should expect to find that the three components of political commitment are related to the likelihood that an individual will internalize the political attitudes and role definitions outlined above. We can summarize these hypotheses in the following set:

Hypothesis Set I: The larger the city and the more intense the electoral competition in the city, (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

Hypothesis Set II: The higher the *positional commitment* of the councilman; (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

Hypothesis Set III: The more intense the *progressive commitment* of the councilman to seek other political or governmental offices; (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

These three sets of hypotheses link the *risk* that councilmen sustained to obtain the council seat, the commitment they have for their position on the council, and their ambition for other offices to the various perceptions, attitudes, and values discussed above. Although we will examine these variables two at a time, the important issue is the pattern that exists across all of the variables. Each of these empirical propositions examines a slightly different aspect of the broader theoretical hypothesis that an individual's commitment to a given career, in this case politics, is related to the extent to which the individual internalizes the norms and values associated with his profession.

The Role of the Councilman as a Politician

On the whole, the city councilmen in this study do not see themselves as "politicians." Over half of the councilmen (54%) define the councilmanic position in strictly "nonpolitical" terms, i.e., that the position requires no political skills whatever. When asked how the citizens viewed their position, only 10% of the councilmen indicated that the citizens in their communities tended to view them as "politicians." Of the remainder, 62% believe that the citizens think of the councilman as a "public servant" while 28% of the councilmen believe that the citizens of their community simply think of them as another "citizen."

These views, which tend to subscribe to the position that local politics is apolitical in character, disguise a considerable amount of variation in the pattern of attitudes. As a part of our first hypothesis set, we suggested that the councilmen in the "large" cities with "closely contested" elections would be the most likely to define their own role in political terms, while the councilmen from the "small" and essentially non-competitive cities would be the least likely to think of themselves in political terms. In addition, the effect of the two variables should be *cumulative*, that is to say, both variables should have a positive effect on the likelihood that a councilman will see himself as a "politician."

In order to test this proposition we divided the cities into two categories, those above 30,000 in population and those below.[12] The measure of competitiveness for the city was the closeness of the vote among the various candidates for office. This measure was obtained by calculating the *Mean Deviation* of the vote among all the candidates who received more than 15% of the vote, and then the scores (Mean Deviations) for five elections in each city were averaged to obtain a measure of the closeness of the vote for the city over a ten-year period.[13] The councilmen were then divided according to whether the city in which they were elected was "high" or "low" on the measure of the closeness of the vote.[14] In Table 1 these two variables are correlated with the councilman's view or role definition of his job as a councilman.

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[12] The selection of 30,000 as a cutting point was an arbitrary decision on my part. I do not suggest that this particular cutting point has any special virtue that sets it above other cutting points in the same general range of cities. My only real concern was to choose a point that seemed large enough to separate out the cities in which the costs of running for office were significant, but small enough that I had sufficient councilmen in the large cities for the analysis.

TABLE 1. THE COUNCILMAN'S ROLE DEFINITION OF HIS POSITION BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

Position's Requirements[15]	Large Population			Small Population		
	Average Closeness of Vote			Average Closeness of Vote		
	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Politician or political skill	70	—		46	32	
Nonpolitical	30	—		54	68	
Respondents	(73)	(12)*	(85)	(136)	(114)	(250)

* Too few cases to analyze.

TABLE 2. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY THE CITIZENS IN HIS COMMUNITY BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

Perceived Citizens' View of Position	Large Population			Small Population		
	Average Closeness of Vote			Average Closeness of Vote		
	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Politician	32	—		11	6	
Public Servant	56	—		66	59	
Citizen	11*	—		23	34*	
Respondents	(62)	(11)**	(73)	(122)	(108)	(230)

* Rounding error.
** Too few cases to analyze.

Among the "high risk" cities, i.e., those that are "large" and closely contested, 70% of the councilmen define their job on the council as that of a "politician," or at least they indicate that the position requires political skills. Among the "low risk" cities, however, only 32% of the councilmen describe themselves as "politicians" or indicate that their job requires political skills. Thus, there is a 38% increase in the number of councilmen who define their position in political terms as one increases the risk attached to running for the council. Although the small number of cases in one column makes it impossible to determine whether the two variables have a fully cumulative effect across the whole table, an increase in the closeness of the vote among the small cities does show a corresponding 14% increase in the percentage of councilmen who define their position in political terms. The relationships here seem fairly clear: the greater the investment risk in running for the council, the more likely is the councilman to define his position in political terms.

This same pattern is observed when the dependent variable is the councilman's perception of how the citizens in his community view his role as the councilman. (See Table 2.)[16]

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[13] These cities are all, in effect, multiple member districts. There were, on the average, more than two candidates for every office, and there were always more than two councilmanic positions at stake. The *Mean Deviation* (or Absolute Deviation as it is sometimes called) is computed by determining the sum of the absolute deviations from the mean number of votes per candidate and then dividing that sum by the number of deviations. The *Mean Deviation* is a measure of dispersion around the mean, but it differs from the standard deviation in that it weighs every deviation the same, rather than weighing extreme scores more heavily. In almost all cases, the measure of the closeness of the vote, the *Mean Deviation,* was determined from five elections in each community, and the average was taken and is used here.

[14] The cutting point was a score of 13% for the average of the *Mean Deviations*. The range of the variable was from 8% to about 18%, but there were four cities that never had contested elections. This cutting point was chosen because it stood at the middle of the range.

[15] The question for this variable was: "Which of the following would you say comes closest to your conception of the requirements of the job of City Councilman? The councilman then chooses between four statements; the first indicated that the job was a "tough political job" that required the councilman to be a "real politician," the second suggested that the job required "some political skills," the third indicated that the job required the "ability to get along with people," but was not political, and the fourth statement suggested that a City Councilman was a "public servant." In dividing the Councilmen, the Councilmen who chose the first two statements were grouped together and the Councilmen who selected the second two statements were grouped together.

[16] This question was: "In your opinion which of the following best describes the way the people in your community view the job of being a City Councilman?" The responses were "a real politician," a "public servant," or "as just another citizen and by no means a politician."

Among the "high risk" cities, 32% of the councilmen think that their constituents view them as "politicians" while only 11% of the councilmen believe that their constituents view them as "just another citizen." In the "low risk" cities, the pattern is just the opposite; only 6% fall in the "politician" category while 34% of the councilmen believe that the citizens in their community view them simply as a "citizen." And, as in the previous table, an increase in the closeness of the vote, i.e., risk, is associated both with an increase in the tendency of councilmen to answer "politician" and with a decrease in the tendency to respond with "citizen." The net increase across the columns is 26% as opposed to a 38% increase in the previous table.

One might argue that the positive relationships between size and competition, and the two variables of role perception are a function of some other factor besides investment risk. The differential willingness to incur the risk of running for office reflects only one dimension of commitment, and we need not rely on these two variables by themselves.

The other two dimensions of commitment are, in this case, the councilman's positional commitment and his progressive commitment to politics. As a measure of the councilman's commitment to his position on the council, they were asked how much they wanted the office of City councilman during their last campaign for the council.[17] Their answers reflect the value the councilmen placed on their office at the time of their last election. In addition, the councilmen were asked whether or not they intend to seek other political or governmental offices, i.e., the councilman's progressive commitment to politics. Councilmen were divided on this question into those who *may* seek other offices and into those who *will not* seek such offices.

TABLE 3. THE COUNCILMAN'S ROLE DEFINITION OF HIS POSITION BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

	(Desire for Council Seat)					
	Considerable			Some and Little		
Position's Requirements	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N
Politician or political skill	75	52	—	47	38	—
Nonpolitical	25	48	—	53	62	—
Respondents	(60)	(58)	(118)	(75)	(142)	(217)

The pattern of relationships in Table 3 is similar to that found in the previous two tables. Among those councilmen who are both positionally and progressively committed to politics, 75% indicate that they think of themselves as "politicians" or see their position as requiring "political skills." Among the least committed group of councilmen, those who had only "some or little" desire for their position and who do not intend to seek other political or governmental offices, only 38% consider themselves to be politicians or see their position as requiring political skills. Some 62% believe that the councilmanic position is entirely nonpolitical in character. The pattern across the table is also similar to the previous two tables: both of the variables of political commitment are related to the councilman's definition of this role, and the effect of the two variables is cumulative. In Table 4 the same pattern of effects occurs again.

Among those councilmen who are the most committed to politics, those who placed a high value on obtaining their present council seat and who may seek other political and governmental offices, 35% think that the citizens in their community define their role as that of a "politician" while only 6% believe that the citizens look upon the councilman simply as another "citizen." The pattern is reversed among the least committed councilmen with 6% choosing the "politician" category and 28% selecting the "citizen" response. Again, as before, the percentage of councilmen who believe that the citizens in their communities think of the councilman as a "politician" increases as the councilman's commitment to politics increases, from 6% to 17%, to 20% and then 35%. There is a corresponding decrease in the percentage who respond with "citizen."

The pattern of relationships in Table 4 is common to all of the previous tables and the relationships are about the same in each case. In each case, the percentage of the councilmen who either see themselves in distinctly political terms or who believe the citizens in their communities see the councilman in these terms increases with the level of commitment of the councilman. The more extensive the councilman's political commitment, the more likely is he to begin to define

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[17] *Positional commitment* was measured with a scale item that asked the Councilman to estimate his "desire and efforts to be elected to the Council during (his) last campaign." *Progressive commitment* was determined by asking the Councilman whether there were "any other political or governmental positions—local, state, or federal—which you would like to seek?" Councilmen who indicated any interest in such positions were grouped together.

TABLE 4. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY CITIZENS BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

	(Desire for Council Seat)					
Perceived Citizens' View of Position	Considerable			Some and Little		
	Desires Other Offices			Desires Other Offices		
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Politician	35	20	—	17	6	—
Public Servant	60	56	—	59	66	—
Citizen	6*	24	—	24	28	—
Respondents	(52)	(55)	(107)	(63)	(129)	(192)

* Rounding error.

his role as that of the "politician." These findings tend to confirm all of the hypotheses stated earlier.

Discussion

On the whole, the councilmen in the San Francisco Bay Area *do not* think of themselves as "politicians," nor do they believe that the citizens in their communities think of the councilman as a "politician." When offered a choice, they prefer to think of themselves as "public servants" or as just another "citizen," and a majority of the councilmen specifically reject the notion that the job of the councilman might either be political or call for political skills.

In general, Americans appear to hold curiously ambivalent views about the "politician" in this society. On the one hand, certain political roles such as the President, Senator, or Mayor are rated very favorably when compared with other occupational roles.[18] On the other hand, the profession of politics is not so highly esteemed; in fact, a large segment of the public apparently thinks that politics is necessarily corrupt and dishonest.[19] One reason for this view has been suggested by Dahl and Lindblom:

> . . . the role (of the politician) calls for actions such as compromise, renunciation, face-saving of oneself, which are morally ambiguous or even downright immoral to people with morally rigorous standards.[20]

If the role of the "politician" is viewed as negatively as the evidence suggests, this may account for the majority of the councilmen in this study who prefer to define their job and its activities as nonpolitical. The city council is relatively low on the hierarchy of political positions in most instances, and these cities are not only small, but they are nonpartisan as well. Nonpartisanship was intended as a means of insulating the local polity from influences from the partisan political environment, and although that insulation appears to be less than complete in most cases, the existence of nonpartisanship probably does segregate the nonpartisan community somewhat from the surrounding partisan polity.[21] All three factors, the small size of most of the communities, nonpartisanship, and the nominal status of the councilmanic position probably contribute to the recruitment of councilmen who have attitudes and values that are less "political" than those found in partisan politics.[22]

At the same time, however, a sizable number of the councilmen tend to deviate from the rest of their colleagues and from the general public in that they are willing to think of themselves as "politicians." While the arguments above might explain why most of the councilmen think of their role as "nonpolitical," we must seek alternative explanations why a minority nevertheless deviate from the general pattern. Our initial hypotheses suggested that the factors of differential risk and political commitment may be related to the likelihood that councilmen will adopt norms and values congruent with the larger political environment, and the tables tended to confirm these hypotheses. In each case, the adoption of the "political" role was positively and cumulatively related to the risk the councilman was willing to sustain to obtain his seat, and to his positional and progressive commitment to politics.

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[18] See "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, 9 (September 1, 1949), 3–19; Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige Status of Occupations," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (1943), 185–192.

[19] Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935–46* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 584; Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 683–698; National Opinion Research Center, *The Public Looks at Politics and Politicians*, Report No. 20, March, 1944.

[20] Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

[21] See, for example, Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," *Western Political Quarterly*, XII (June, 1959), 452–457; A. Clarke Hagensick, "Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on a Nonpartisan Election System," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVII (March, 1964), 112–119; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics under the Nonpartisan Ballot," this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1056–1066.

[22] Although we have no data with which to compare these councilmen to councilmen elected under a partisan system of elections, these councilmen are quite antagonistic toward partisan politics at the local level. Over 90% believe that the community would be worse off with partisan elections, and nearly 90% believe that "better people" are elected under nonpartisan elections.

In each table, however, a sizable proportion of the councilmen do not conform to the general pattern within the table. In the lowest risk cities and among the least committed councilmen, some of the respondents still think of their job as "political." Conversely, some of the more committed councilmen think of themselves in "apolitical terms." One plausible explanation for this is that we are not tapping the full range either of the risk undertaken by officeholders or of the commitment that politicians have to their positions and to political careers. For this reason, the variables of risk and commitment as *measured here* should not be expected to account for all of the variance in the role definitions of the councilmen. This factor will be discussed later.

III. THE COUNCILMAN AND THE BARGAINING PROCESS

Bargaining as a means of reaching decisions pervades the American political system. It is the *modus operandi* within virtually every major political institution in the society such that the very term "politics" is analogous with bargaining for many people. Although this prevalence of bargaining is seen by many students of politics as one of the most important positive characteristics of this society, it is doubtful that the general public views bargaining in such a favorable light. Bargaining appears to connote to many people "behind the back deals" in "smoke-filled rooms" or the pursuit of "private gain" at the expense of the "public good."

At the same time, however, the city councilman is called upon to reach decisions among conflicting demands; and although such policy conflicts are limited in scope to the confines of his community, they may be just as important to the participants as the broader issues of public policy that arise at the state and federal levels of government. And like other governmental decision-makers, and perhaps unlike decision-makers in business and industry, the city councilman can seldom act independently and authoritatively in reaching his decision. He is forced, instead, to bargain and negotiate among the conflicting interests in his community.

In order to determine the councilman's perception of and attitude toward the bargaining process, the councilmen were asked: "City councilmen sometimes talk about decisions in terms of bargaining—do you think this goes on in your Council?" This question was employed to determine whether or not the councilman perceived that bargaining occurred on the council; while his attitude toward bargaining was determined by coding his responses to a series of probes about the bargaining process. Table 5 shows the relationship between these two items; the councilman's perception of whether bargaining occurs on the council by his attitude toward bargaining as a technique of decision-making.

TABLE 5. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF WHETHER BARGAINING OCCURS ON THE COUNCIL BY HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BARGAINING PROCESS

Amount of Bargaining	Attitude Toward Bargaining		
	Positive %	Negative %	N
Some	90	22	
None	10	78	
Respondents	(145)	(179)	(324)

The councilman's attitude toward bargaining is clearly related to whether he perceives that bargaining occurs on the council, and the extent of the relationship is striking. Although alternative hypotheses are possible, it appears to be the case that a councilman's attitude strongly affects the manner in which he defines the behavior that occurs on the council. If he believes that bargaining has positive consequences for council decision-making, he tends to define at least some of the interaction that occurs as "bargaining behavior." If he does not hold this view, the councilman, who may be observing similar behavior to those who hold a positive view of bargaining, defines the behavior that occurs as something other than bargaining.

What is more important for this analysis, however, is whether the councilman's view of the bargaining process, both his attitude toward bargaining and his perception of the extent of bargaining, is a function of the variables of risk and political commitment. In Table 6, the councilman's evaluation of bargaining and his perception of the extent of bargaining on the council are correlated with the two variables of electoral risk, the size of his city and the closeness of the vote in city elections.

In both parts of the table the pattern is almost precisely the same. In those cities with substantial electoral risk, the large and competi-

TABLE 6. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF BARGAINING BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

	Large Population			Small Population		
Amount of Bargaining	Average Closeness of Vote			Average Closeness of Vote		
	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Some	60	—		47	37	
None	40	—		53	63	
Respondents	(90)	(16)*	(106)	(161)	(132)	(292)
Evaluation of Bargaining	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Positive	59	—		48	35	
Negative	41	—		52	65	
Respondents	(71)	(15)*	(86)	(114)	(98)	(212)

* Too few cases to analyze.

TABLE 7. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF THAT BARGAINING BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

	(Desire for Council Seat)					
Amount of Bargaining	Considerable			Some and Little		
	Desires Other Offices			Desires Other Offices		
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Some	68	52		55	37	
None	32	48		45	63	
Respondents	(60)	(58)	(118)	(76)	(143)	(219)
Evaluation of Bargaining	*High %*	*Low %*	*N*	*High %*	*Low %*	*N*
Positive	57	46		54	37	
Negative	43	54		46	63	
Respondents	(51)	(46)	(97)	(59)	(103)	(162)

tive cities, about three-fifths of the councilmen have both a positive attitude toward bargaining and believe that bargaining occurs on their councils. At the other end of the continum, the cities with the lowest electoral risk, only about one-third of the councilmen believe that bargaining occurs on the council and evaluate bargaining in positive terms. A second common element in both parts of the table is the increase in the perception and positive evaluation of bargaining that is associated with an increase in the electoral competitiveness of the city, in which the councilman holds his office. Electoral competition has the effect of increasing the cost, and thereby the risk, of seeking the councilmanic position; and those councilmen who were elected in the small cities that were competitive seem to have a more favorable view of the bargaining process than those councilmen elected in the less competitive small communities.

The pattern of relationships found in Table 6 is congruent with the results of earlier tables. The variables of electoral risk, i.e., city size and the closeness of the vote in city elections, were related *both* to the role expectations of councilmen and to their attitudes toward the bargaining process in their communities. In each instance the councilmen who are elected in high risk cities are more likely to hold "politicized" attitudes about their role in the local political process. But electoral risk only reflects one aspect of the politician's commitment to politics; and in Table 7 the measures of positional and progressive commitment are correlated with the two measures of the bargaining process.

In the first part of the table, the councilman's perception of whether bargaining occurs on the Council is related to both measures of political commitment. The more committed a councilman is to his office, i.e., his positional commitment, and the more committed the councilman is to seek for other political or governmental offices, i.e., his progressive commitment, the more likely is he to believe that bargaining occurs in the councilmanic decisional process in his community.

The relationships in the second part of the table, however, deviate somewhat from the general pattern that has been observed throughout this analysis. The variable of progressive commitment follows the predicted pattern: the more committed councilmen are more likely, on the whole, to have a more positive orientation toward bargaining; but the variable of positional commitment is only slightly related to the councilman's attitude toward bargaining. Although the relationship between the councilman's desire for his position and his attitude toward bargaining follows the predicted positive direction, the strength of the association is very small and is not significant at the .05 level.[23] The argument in this paper, however, is based on the results of a number of hypotheses and a number of tables, and a separate interpretation for this case does not seem warranted, especially because the direction of the effect that does occur is positive, even though it is small. At the same time, it does suggest that positional commitment for the councilmen may not be as strong a measure of the councilman's generalized commitment to politics as is the councilman's desire to seek other political and governmental offices.

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[23] Tests of significance and measures of association have not been presented with the data for two reasons. All of the tables with the exception of this one show associations that are significant at the .05 level with the Chi-square test of significance. For that reason, the presentations of significance levels is redundant. Also, the argument rests on a

With the exception of the case just discussed, the results of these and the earlier tables seem to confirm the general hypothesis that the socialization of the officeholder is linked to his generalized commitment to politics and to a political career of sorts. But before turning to a discussion of these findings, there is an alternative hypothesis that requires examination.

IV. SOCIAL PLURALISM, RISK, AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT

In the analysis above, the variable of community size has been employed as a measure of electoral risk. For most of the councilmen and for most officeholders in general, the avenue of advancement is via the electoral arena, and that arena has a set of costs attached to it that all potential officeholders must at some time pay. These are fixed costs and they must, in varying degrees, be paid by every candidate whether or not the candidate wins. They constitute a *risk* for the candidate in the sense that the candidate will lose all or at least part of these costs if the candidate loses. Although the risk of seeking office will vary considerably from candidate to candidate, depending upon a large number of individual factors, we have argued that these costs will, in general, be an increasing function of the size of the city and the degree of competition in city elections.

At the same time, however, the variable of city size reflects a second dimension of community life, the extent of the social pluralism in the community. From Madison to the present, students of political life have recognized that the size of a political unit is highly related to the diversity of groups, factions, and interests that will be present in the unit. In this study the cities range from several that are less than 2500 in population to the largest, San Jose, which is over 400,000 in population. We have employed 30,000 as the dividing point for dichotomizing the variable of city size, and although the size of a city is not a perfect indicator of social pluralism, it seems obvious that the cities over 30,000 are, on the whole, considerably more socially pluralistic than those under that size.[24]

The importance of social pluralism in this instance derives from its relationship to bargaining. Where a community is highly pluralistic such that no one group, faction, or interest can dominate a community, bargaining becomes a necessity. Thus the size of a city may be related to the councilman's perception of and attitude toward bargaining through the intervening effect of social pluralism and not because of the factor of risk. In an empirical sense, both the variable of social pluralism and the variable of risk are multi-dimensional constructs, and it is not at present possible to establish a single indicator for each variable; and for that reason, it is not possible to test which of the two variables, social pluralism or risk, is responsible for the shift in the councilman's attitudes toward the bargaining process.[25]

Although we cannot establish which of these two factors associated with city size is producing the effect on the councilman's orientation toward bargaining, it is possible to show that a primary dimension of political commitment, the councilman's desire to seek other political or governmental offices, is related to the councilman's attitudes and orientations even when the effects of size are controlled. In this manner the

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set of relationships, rather than a single relationship, and the test of significance for all of the tables is significant at less than .0001 level. Measures of relationship such as the tau-beta or tau-c would be misleading because we only have a limited range of the independent variables of commitment. Obviously, political commitment extends down to people who have little or no interest in politics and upward to people who make politics their exclusive career. Restriction of the range of the independent variable, as in this case, would naturally lower the measures of relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables in the study.

[24] See, for empirical evidence, Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). They show correlative evidence that size is strongly related to the social, demographic and ecological diversity within a community.

[25] The cost factors in electoral politics cannot be cumulated because it would involve making interpersonal comparisons of utility. The variables of social pluralism cannot be aggregated because we know of no theoretical method of integrating the characteristics of social pluralism. For these reasons, the factor of size, which is roughly related to both risk and social pluralism, is employed as a surrogate measure that approximates the variables.

TABLE 8. THE COUNCILMAN'S DEFINITION OF HIS OWN POSITION'S REQUIREMENTS AND THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY THE PEOPLE IN HIS COMMUNITY BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE FOR OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE CONTROLLING BY THE SIZE OF HIS COMMUNITY

	Large Population			Small Population		
Position's Requirements	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N
Politician or political skill	73	63		46	33	
Nonpolitical	27	37		54	67	
Respondents	(52)	(41)	(93)	(80)	(164)	(244)

Perceived Citizen's View of Position	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N
Politician	43	37		21	4	
Public servant	50	50		56	65	
Citizen	7	13		23	31	
Respondents	(42)	(38)	(80)	(73)	(149)	(222)

TABLE 9. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF BARGAINING BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE FOR OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY THE SIZE OF HIS CITY

	Large Population			Small Population		
Amount of Bargaining	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N
Some	66	47		54	37	
None	34	53		46	63	
Respondents	(61)	(51)	(112)	(94)	(190)	(284)

Evaluation of Bargaining	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N	Desires Other Offices Prob. %	No %	N
Positive	60	50		53	34	
Negative	40	50		47	66	
Respondents	(50)	(44)	(94)	(76)	(135)	(211)

influence of political commitment on the politician's socialization process can be established irrespective of the effect of social pluralism.

Both of the independent variables, city size and the councilman's ambition for other political or governmental offices, are positively related to the councilman's role orientations, but the important consideration here is that the councilman's progressive commitment to politics is related to his role orientations even when the variable to community size is controlled. Thus, even if we cannot distinguish between the effect of city size as a measure of social pluralism from the effect of city size as a measure of electoral risk, it is possible to show that one of the other measures of the councilman's commitment to politics is related to his orientations toward his role as officeholder. We can obtain additional evidence for this finding by examining these two independent variables with regard to the councilman's orientations toward bargaining.

In Table 9, as in the previous table, both of the independent variables are related to the councilman's orientations toward the bargaining process. Thus when size is controlled, the councilman's ambition is still related to his perception of and attitude toward the bargaining process. In fact, of the 29% net shift across the whole table with regard to the extent of perceived bargaining, about 19% is associated with the councilman's ambitions while 11% is associated with the size of the community. Of the 26% net shift in the councilman's evaluation of bargaining, about 15% is associated with the councilman's ambition while 11% is associated with the size of his city. This means that, on the whole, the councilman's ambition is more strongly related to his perception of and attitude toward bargaining than is the variable of city size.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The issue of political ambition, or political commitment, has been with us for some time, but we still know very little in any precise fashion about the relationship between the politician's ambitions and the values and attitudes he adopts towards the political process. Max Weber, for example, examined the emergence of the "professional politician" in a number of countries, and he then proceeded to relate this new type of political participant to a number of aspects of the political system.[26] More recently, James D. Barber, in his study of the Connecticut legislature, explored the relationship between the state legislator's involvement in the legislature and his attitudes and orientations toward the political process.[27] And James Q. Wilson has suggested that the "amateurs" in the political club movements of California, Chicago, and New York have quite different styles, attitudes, and values than the "professional politician" and that these differences are, in part, a function of the different motivations of "amateurs" as opposed to "professional" politicians.[28]

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[26] Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 87.

[27] Barber divides his respondents into four groups on the basis of two variables; the legislator's willingness to return three or more times to the legislature and his activity as a legislator. Both of these variables are similar in character to those of this study in that both variables reflect the willingness to invest in politics, and the findings of his study are similar to the findings in this study. For ex-

But perhaps more than anyone else, Joseph A. Schlesinger has elevated the variable of political ambition to a central place in the study of the political process, particularly the recruitment process. In his seminal study of the opportunity structure in the United States, Schlesinger suggests:

> To slight the role of ambition in politics, then, or to treat it as a human failing to be suppressed, is to miss the central function of ambition in political systems. A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so driven; the desire for election and, more important, for re-election becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials. No more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for the political futures.[29]

The findings of this study, although limited in scope to city councilmen, suggest the politician's ambition, or more broadly, his political commitment, are not only related to the recruitment of politicians, but to the socialization of councilmen as well. What we found in nearly every case was that the more committed councilmen, those who were willing to take the greatest risk and who expressed the most desire to proceed to other political or governmental offices, were also the most likely to express attitudes and values appropriate for success in a decentralized and pluralistic political system.

One possible implication of these findings is that both the recruitment process and the socialization process for politicians may be evaluated in light of the utility calculus of the politician.[30] When one examines the ambitions and political commitment of prospective politicians, we are in fact examining the rational calculus that the political actor makes with respect to a given set of alternatives. To say that a man is politically ambitious is to say that he places a high value on the alternatives within a sequence of political roles. In this case, we asked the councilmen to evaluate both their current position and the next position they may seek. In addition, we constructed a rough estimate of the amount of *risk* that they had to sustain in order to obtain the councilmanic position that they held at the time of the study. All of these elements are components of the utility calculus.

What is less obvious, however, is that attitudes and values may be also a part of the rational actor's utility calculus. Suppose, for example, that some attitudes will increase the probability of success in a given career sequence while other attitudes might have the converse effect; they might make it much more difficult to achieve success in a given career. The rational actor, if his desire is to move up the career sequence, is likely to adopt those attitudes which increase his probability of success in that career, unless of course, the set of attitudes in question is very repugnant to him such that adopting them would involve a very high cost. But if he refuses to adopt the attitudes, he may well have to pay the cost of being less successful than he might otherwise wish. In either instance the net result would seem to be the same, and an examination of higher levels in any career line should show increasingly greater homogeneity of attitudes and values, either because individuals adopted the attitudes in order to be a success or because the individuals who refused to conform were screened out at lower levels in the career line.

The findings of this study seem to conform to such an interpretation. On the whole, the more ambitious councilmen, those willing to sustain a substantial electoral *risk* and who also wish to go on to other offices, tend to have role orientations and attitudes towards bargaining that are congruent with the demands of the larger political environment. They are the potentially "professional" politicians.

In one sense, these results are more significant than the data seems to suggest. The reason for

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ample, among the most committed of his subjects, those willing to return to the legislature and who have a high activity level (Law-makers), 55% identify themselves as "politicians" and 82% have engaged in major negotiations. Among the least committed group, those not willing to return three times and low on legislative activity (reluctants), only 33% identify themselves as "politicians" and only 47% have engaged in major negotiations. *Op. cit.*, pp. 25–26, and 166–167.

[28] Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–31.

[29] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[30] Running for office is a form of political participation. For an analysis of voting behavior using utility analysis, see William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42.

this is that the empirical indicators of risk and political commitment only measure a limited range of these variables. This study is of city councilmen, and, as such, the distribution of respondents only cover a small range of either risk or commitment. Neither the uncommitted individual nor the highly committed, professional politician is found among our subjects. Because the distribution of respondents only covers a small range of the independent variables, we should only be able to predict a portion of the attitudinal distribution of political activists. If the subjects of the study had shown a greater range of political commitment, we should have found an even stronger set of relationships than we found in the tables.

The findings here, however, are limited and they will not permit an examination of some of the broader issues in the recruitment and socialization of politicians. Our data strongly suggest that the ambitions of politicians are related to at least some of the attitudes and orientations that politicians have toward the political process. Apparently, the city councilmen in the study are involved in the process of professionalization, and the more ambitious of the councilmen are learning a set of orientations and attitudes that will aid them in their pursuit of future political goals. Although it is not possible with this data to show whether they are recruited because they had these attitudes originally or whether they were socialized into these attitudes after they came on the council, we did confirm our hypotheses that the presence of "politicized" attitudes is a function of the measures of electoral risk and political commitment. The consistency of the findings suggest that the relationship between the ambitions of politicians and the process of professionalization is both positive and strong.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF DEFEATED CANDIDATES IN AN AMERICAN STATE ELECTION*

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Electoral victories and defeats occur repeatedly. This is especially true in democratic political systems where key governmental roles are filled through periodic elections. The attitude of defeated candidates toward the regime norms directly affects the system stability, because disaffected by defeat, these candidates may withdraw their support for the regime and may also translate such disaffection into radical political action. Despite the potential threat the defeated electoral candidates can pose to democratic stability, their political attitudes have rarely been investigated systematically in political science literature.[1] Do defeated candidates exhibit an attitude toward the democratic rules and norms governing electoral competition significantly different from that of winning candidates? Do defeated candidates become politically less active after the election than they were before? Under what conditions do they become disaffected with the democratic rules and norms? This paper attempts, first, to compare the political attitudes of both winning and losing candidates, and second, to explore the variables which might account for differences in such attitudes.

The data used in this paper are derived from a larger study of political recruitment in Oregon.[2] Structured interviews were conducted with both winning and losing candidates who ran for the Oregon House of Representatives in the 1966 election. The samples were interviewed at three different times: before and after the primary, and after the general election. This research strategy permits us to analyze the effect of the outcome of the election on the attitudes of the candidates. Data were collected on the candidates' degree of support for the democratic rules of competition, their expected changes in political activity as a result of participation in the election, their career ambitions, and the perceived reward-cost, i.e., the material and psychological gains or losses which accrue to the candidates as a direct result of their participation in the election.

I. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES

Dependent Variables

The candidates' support for the democratic rules and their expected changes in political activity are the two dependent variables used in this study. Support is defined in terms of the extent to which a candidate considers the formal and informal rules and procedures governing electoral competition as adequate. The operational measure of support is based on a candidate's feelings about the legal and practical requirements for getting elected, the degree of perceived fairness in the election outcome, and his feelings about the overall fairness in the political opportunity structure.[3] Responses to these three

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[1] A few exceptions must be noted: John W. Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," this REVIEW, LXI (March, 1967), 137–145; Jeff Fishel, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), 1213–1232; and Lester G. Seligman, *Political Recruitment* (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming).

[2] This study includes three samples: (a) a quota sample of 68 candidates interviewed before the primary election, (b) a mixed-stratified sample of 109 post-primary election candidates, and (c) 77 completed interviews from a total population of 110 general election candidates. The present analysis is based on 46 winners and 31 losers in the general election and 92 winners and 17 losers in the primary election. For further details on the samples and sampling procedures, see Lester G. Seligman, Michael R. King and Chong Lim Kim, *Political Recruitment: Winning and Losing in American Politics* (forthcoming).

[3] The support items are (a) "In general, do you feel that the legal requirements in getting elected in the election give each candidate the same chance of winning or do some have an advantage?" (b) "In general, do you feel that the practical requirements in getting elected give each candidate the same chance of winning or do some candidates have an advantage?" (c) "In running for office in this district, do you believe that a person can succeed primarily on the basis of ability and initiative or are other things important for success in politics?" and "Is this the way it should be?"

interview items are cumulatively scaled and a single support scale is obtained (CR = .92). Our measure of expected changes in political activity is derived from a candidate's responses to three questions: does he intend to follow issues more than before the election? Does he intend to discuss politics more frequently than befor the election? And, given the election outcome, does he still intend to continue a political career? Whenever a candidate gives a positive answer, a score is assigned and these scores are summed to form a simple index of expected changes in political activity.

Independent Variables

(A) Perceived Reward-Cost

The conceptualization and measurement of rewards and costs attendant upon electoral victory and defeat present a complex problem. The term "reward-cost" will be defined in terms of both material and psychological gains or losses that result directly from election participation.[4] The reward is great when a victory in political competition insures high prestige, wealth, influence, and opportunity for career advancement. Conversely, the cost is severe if a political defeat results in the loss of all these. Any attempt to measure the reward-cost of winning and losing confronts at least three kinds of measurement problem. First, the candidates may have different hierarchies of values, and may therefore estimate the reward-cost attendant upon electoral victory and defeat differently. Second, winning a public office does not necessarily mean a career advancement, for it is relative to one's previous social status.[5] Candidates enter political competition from varying status positions, and it would seem possible that the outcome of an election produces varying degrees of satisfaction or deprivation for different individuals. Finally, measuring the reward-cost is further complicated by two types of incentive associated with public offices.[6] One of these is the "extrinsic" reward-cost, which may be defined in terms of the gains or losses in income, occupation, prestige, influence, and career opportunity. The other type is the "intrinsic" reward-cost that a candidate derives from participation itself, such as a sense of fulfillment of civic duties or community service.

Our operational measurement of reward-cost is based on a battery of questions designed to determine the effect of electoral victory and defeat on a candidate's social esteem, income, occupation, career opportunity and political influence. Obviously, some reward-costs are more important than others but for the purpose of this analysis each reward-cost item is assigned the same weight.[7] Nine such items are used and the responses to these questions are coded into positive, neutral, and negative categories.[8] For example, our respondents responded to: "As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your circle of close friends?" Responses are coded: (a) gained more friends, (b) no change, or (c) lost some friends. A summated scale of the reward-cost is constructed: each respondent who gives positive and/or negative response is assigned a score based on the arithmetic sum of his coded responses.

(B) Career Ambition and Expectation about the Election Outcome

Both Eulau and Schlesinger have argued that analysis of a politician's ambition illuminates his behavior because ambition "probably molds a good deal of political behavior."[9] Career ambition is defined by the level of office a candidate wishes to achieve in his career. It is accordingly measured by classifying level of office desired into four categories: national, state, local, and "no ambition." The measure of expectation about the election outcome is derived from a candidate's own assessment of his chance of winning at the beginning of the electoral campaign. For instance, a candidate might at the outset have described his chance of winning as "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor." It might be expected that defeat would imply a serious career setback for an ambitious candidate—one who hopes to go a long way in politics—and that this might lead to attitudes significantly different from those of candidates with less ambition. By the same token, the differential assessment of chance of winning might also affect the attitudes of the candidates.

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[4] Hereafter, the term 'reward-cost' will be used in the singular, for our concern is with the *amount* of perceived reward or cost. But, for some other purpose, we can presumably speak of rewards or costs since there may be different kinds of these.

[5] James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 36.

[6] See James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 4; Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6 (September, 1961), 134–137; and John C. Wahlke *et al. The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 113–119.

[7] I am presently engaged in a more detailed analysis of the various types of reward-cost attendant upon electoral victories and defeats in order to determine their relative importance to candidates.

[8] The following items are used to measure the reward-cost: (1) As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your job, (2) As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your circle of close friends, (3) Do you anticipate a change in your income as a consequence of the election, (4) Do you feel that your esteem among your colleagues in your occupation has gone up or down, (5) Do you feel that your esteem among members of your religion has gone up, (6) Do you feel that your esteem among your neighbors has gone up, (7) Do you feel that your esteem in your family has gone up, (8) Do you expect that your loss in the election will help or hinder your chances if you decide to run again for the House, and (9) Do you feel that your political influence has increased as a consequence of the election.

(C) Types of District and Election

Districts are classified into safe, competitive, or unsafe, given a candidate's party affiliation. The degree of party competitiveness (measured by the ratio of the registered Republican and Democratic voters and the percentage of time each party has been successful in electing its candidates) and each candidate's party label served as the basis of this classification. The types of election simply refer to the primary and general elections. Our assumption is that types of election and district might account for the variations in the attitudes of the defeated candidates because a candidate running in the safe district, and therefore relatively sure of his victory, may find it more difficult to face up to an unexpected defeat than others running in competitive or unsafe districts. In the same vein, a defeat in the primary election may be considered of less consequence than a defeat in the general election, and if this should be the case, we would then expect significant differences in the attitudes of the primary and general election losers.

(D) Occupation, Income and Education

These stratification variables are included primarily because of two theoretical considerations. The first stems from the general findings of research on the effects of stratification on political opinions, voting behavior, political participation, and support. Secondly, as Seligman has succinctly stated: "the ousted politician cannot fall below the level his skills and training ensures."[10] Therefore, a candidate's occupation, income, and education may cushion the cost of defeat.

TABLE 1. POLITICAL SUPPORT OF WINNER AND LOSER

(In Percentage)

Support	Primary Election		General Election			X^2	P
	Winner $N=84$* (A)	Loser $N=17$ (B)	Winner $N=46$ (C)	Loser $N=31$ (D)			
High	64.2%	58.8%	65.1%	25.9%			
					A&B	0.72	NS
Medium	33.5	41.2	28.4	64.4	C&D	11.75	.01
					A&C	1.57	NS
Low	2.3	0.0	6.5	9.7	B&D	6.01	.05
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%			

* 8 cases are excluded because of the lack of information on their support.

In addition to the eight variables cited above, the incumbent status of candidates at the time of the election may influence subsequent attitudes, for the adverse effects of defeat may be greater for incumbents than for others. We cannot take this potentially important variable into account, however, for lack of data. Out of 60 possible winners for election to the Oregon House in 1966, 47 were incumbent winners and the remaining thirteen were nonincumbents. There were a total of four defeated incumbents and all refused to be interviewed.

II. FINDINGS

Support and Activity of Winners and Losers

Table 1 shows the level of support that the candidates accord the democratic rules of competition after having participated in the primary and general elections. Winners in both primary and general elections exhibited a greater degree of support than did the losers. The difference is not as pronounced for the primary election as for the general election, which suggests that the outcomes of the primary election probably do not change the supportive attitude of the candidates as much as the outcomes of the general election. This point is reinforced when we confine our comparison to the losers. Note that 59

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[9] Heinz Eulau, *et al.*, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.) *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 254; and also see Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966).

[10] Lester G. Seligman, "Political Leadership: Status Loss and Downward Mobility," (unpublished paper delivered at Annual American Political Science Association meeting, New York, 1966), p. 24.

TABLE 2. CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION WINNER AND LOSER

(In Percentage)

Support Change	Winner $N = 44$	Loser $N = 28$
Increase	22.6%	11.2%
No Change	63.8	44.4
Decrease	13.6	44.4
No Response	(2)	(3)
Total	100 %	100 %

N includes only those interviewed twice.
$X^2 = 9.03$, $p < .01$.

percent of the primary election losers reported high support, as compared to only 26 percent of the general election losers ($X^2 = 6.01$, $p < .05$).

Of course, such a difference in support for the democratic rules of the game between the winners and losers may not result from the election itself. It is possible that a greater percentage of the winners might have been supportive from the outset. Since we repeated the support items at various times of the election, we can determine whether this was the case by comparing a candidate's support over time. Table 2 shows that almost one half of the losers, in contrast to only 14 percent of the winners, reported a decrease in support. And this difference is statistically significant ($X^2 = 9.03$, $p < .01$). Thus, it seems safe to conclude that the losers are more likely to be less supportive of the democratic rules than the winners, and that the former are more likely than the latter to reduce their support as a result of participation in elections.

Equally significant is the finding that only a small number of the candidates manifested low support for the democratic rules of the game, regardless of the outcome of the election. Roughly 10 percent of the losers in the general election and none of the losers in the primary election registered low support. It thus appears that winning or losing does effect some changes in support, but does not produce enough disaffection to induce low support for the democratic rules among the losers.

With respect to the expected changes in political activity, Table 3 shows that the winners indicated a significantly higher intention to remain politically active than did the losers. Almost 83 percent of the winners, as compared to only 39 percent of the losers, said that they would spend more time following issues after the general election than before it ($x^2 = 14.3$, $p < .001$). Similarly, over one half of the winners expected that they would discuss politics more frequently after the general election than before it, while only one-third of the losers reported the same intention. The difference between winners and losers in their intention to continue a political career after the general election is not statistically significant, even though the winners tended to give positive responses slightly more than the losers.[11]

Factors Influencing the Supportive Attitude and Intention for Future Political Activity of the Defeated Candidates

The analysis in this section is confined to some selected variables which affect political attitudes of the defeated candidates. Table 4 summarizes relationships between the dependent and independent variables discussed earlier.[12] The level of political ambition of the defeated candidates is very strongly associated with their intention for political activity. This evidence suggests that the losers with high political ambition are more likely than the less ambitious losers to exhibit a high intention for political activity (Gamma = .75). The candidates' expectation about the election outcome correlates negatively with support and intention to continue political activity. Those candidates who initially gave an optimistic assessment of their chances of winning seem to manifest a less supportive attitude toward the rules of the game and are less likely to continue political activity than are the other losers who went into the election with less optimism.

Whether a loser ran in a safe or unsafe district appears to make a difference in terms of how politically active he would be after the

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[11] There are two possible reasons why some candidates wish to continue a political career in spite of electoral defeat. One reason is their belief that they would have a better chance of winning in the next election because they have gained some name familiarity in their districts as a result of the unsuccessful campaign. Another reason is that many of our candidates are what Barber might call "advertisers." Their main motive for running for an office is not because they want to win it but to promote private interests such as legal practice through electoral participation. See Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–115

[12] Both cross-tabulations and between item rank-order intercorrelations are also examined. Although *tau* values are generally smaller than Gammas presented in Table 4, basically the same pattern is observed.

TABLE 3. EXPECTED CHANGES IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE GENERAL ELECTION WINNER AND LOSER

(In Percentage)

Activity	Response	Winner $N=46$	Loser $N=31$	X^2	P
1. Do you intend to spend more time thinking about politics and following issues in mass media than before the election?	More Time	82.6%	38.7%		
	No Change	15.2	48.4		
	Less Time	0.0	3.2	14.24	.001
	No Response	2.2	9.7		
		100%	100%		
2. Do you intend to devote more time to discussing politics with your friends and associates than before the election?	More Time	56.5%	25.8%		
	No Change	36.9	51.6		
	Less Time	4.4	12.9	7.13	.05
	No Response	2.2	9.7		
		100%	100%		
3. In the light of your experience in the election, do you wish to continue your political career?	Yes	58.7%	48.4%		
	Undecided	32.6	25.8		
	No	6.5	19.4	3.23	NS
	No Response	2.2	6.4		
		100%	100%		

election. The losers from relatively safe districts showed less enthusiasm for future political participation than did other losers from competitive or unsafe districts. The type of election in which a candidate was competing is also strongly associated with support for the rules of the game and political activity. The primary election losers are more likely than the general election losers to be supportive of the democratic rules and to engage in politics actively.

Contrary to my expectation, a candidate's education is virtually unrelated to either support for the democratic rules or intention for future political activity. Occupation and income variables are weakly associated with support and activity. Compared to the ambition, expectation, and types of election, our stratification variables appear to have far less effect on the attitudes of the defeated candidates.[13] I will, therefore, exclude them in the following analysis.

The Perceived Reward-Cost and the Attitudes of the Defeated Candidates

The data in Table 4 reveal that the amount of perceived reward-cost is very strongly associated with both support for the rules of the game and intention for future political activity (Gamma = .56 and .61). The analysis also shows that ambition, expectation, type of district and type of election affect the attitudes of

TABLE 4. SOME CORRELATES OF SUPPORT AND ACTIVITY

(Gamma)

Variables	Support	Activity
Level of Ambition: national, state, local	.05	.75
Expectation of Election Outcome: excellent, good, poor	−.45	−.36
Type of District: safe, competitive, unsafe	−.08	−.25
Type of Election: primary, general	.41	.39
Occupation: prestige ranking	.22	.16
Income	.26	.06
Education	−.02	−.12
Reward-Cost Score	.56	.61

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[13] One possible reason why our stratification variables turned out to be weak predictors of the attitudes is the candidates' highly homogeneous social background characteristics. For example, 79% of our respondents have college or advanced degrees, 71% of them have prestigious occupations such as lawyers, doctors, and proprietors of large or medium sized business, and 66% of these candidates make an annual income of $15,000 or more.

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REWARD-COST AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE DEFEATED CANDIDATES WITH AMBITION, EXPECTATION, TYPE OF DISTRICT AND ELECTION CONTROLLED

(Gamma)

Support Control Group I ($N=20$)	.63
Support Control Group II ($N=28$)	.53
Activity Control Group I ($N=21$)	.65
Activity Control Group II ($N=27$)	.60

the defeated candidates. Therefore, it seems appropriate to control their effects before we proceed to interpret the observed relations between the perceived reward-cost and the attitudes of defeated candidates.

Due to the small sample size ($N = 48$), we cannot opt for the conventional partialling technique. Instead, an *index formation technique* is employed to control simultaneously for political ambition, expectation about the election outcome, type of district, and type of election. The method is "based on the relation of each control classification to the dependent variable. On the basis of these relationships, weights are assigned to each category in control classification and each individual in each category receives the designated weight. These weights are summed for each individual to yield an index based on all of the controls. Finally, the index is used as a control classification in the usual sense."[14]

Treating the amount of perceived reward-cost as the independent variable and level of support for the rules of the game as the dependent variable, an index score for each candidate is computed based on four controls (ambition, expectation, type of district and type of election). Then, these index scores are dichotomized to form support control group I and II respectively. Finally, the relationship between the perceived reward-cost and support is examined within each control group. Again, a similar procedure is used to yield control groups for political activity.

Table 5 shows the relationships between the perceived reward-cost and the attitudes of the defeated candidates within each of these control groups. The data clearly indicate that the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates as a result of their participation in elections strongly correlates with both support for the rules of the game and intention for future political participation, even after controlling for the effects of their ambitions, expectations, type of district, and type of election.

It is evident from the above analysis that the amount of reward-cost perceived by a defeated candidate is a powerful predictor of his supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and his intention for future political activity. The higher the perceived reward, the more likely is a defeated candidate to become supportive of the rules and active in politics after the election. Conversely, the higher the perceived cost of defeat, the more likely he is to become disaffected with the accepted rules of the game and further political participation.

The Reward-Cost Attendant Upon Electoral Victory and Defeat

What difference does it make to win or lose an election in terms of the reward-cost? Table 6 presents the data on the reward-cost as perceived by the winning and losing candidates. It is quite apparent that the losing candidates in both primary and general elections perceived a significantly lower reward than the winning candidates. This leads us to believe that the winners and losers are rewarded differently by their respective participation in the election. It is, however, important to underscore the fact that most of our respondents, regardless of the election outcome, are found on the positive side of the reward-cost scale. Among the losers, roughly 82 percent of the primary and 81 percent of the general election candidates reported some rewards. This evidence clearly suggests that the electoral competition analyzed in the present paper is not a winner-take-all type of contest. In spite of electoral defeat, a predominant majority of the losing candidates gained in their social esteem, occupation, career opportunity or political influence.

The finding that the difference between winning and losing is rather moderate in terms of reward-cost (no one reporting "great cost") points to what is probably a significant feature of competition in the American political system. Given the relatively small differences perceived by the winning and losing candidates, the system can be described as a "low risk system."[15] A low risk system exists where the reward of political victories is modest and the cost of defeats minimal. By contrast, a high risk system is char-

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[14] Sanford I. Labovitz, "Methods for Control With Small Sample Size," *American Sociological Review,* 30 (April, 1965), 243.

[15] For an elaboration of the concept of low risk system, see Seligman, *Political Recruitment* and also my "Some Effects of Political Status Loss: A Comparative Approach," The Laboratory for Political Research, Report No. 17 (The University of Iowa, 1968).

TABLE 6. PERCEIVED REWARD-COST AS A RESULT OF WINNING AND LOSING

(In Percentage)

Amount of Reward-Cost	Primary Election		General Election				
	Winner $N=92$ (A)	Loser $N=17$ (B)	Winner $N=46$ (C)	Loser $N=31$ (D)		X^2	P
Great Reward	10.9%	17.6%	30.5%	6.4%			
Some Reward	33.7	17.6	36.9	38.7			
					A&B	18.16	.001
Little or No Reward	55.4	47.2	32.6	35.6	C&D	14.09	.01
					A&C	10.19	.01
Some Cost	0.0	17.6	0.0	19.3	B&D	3.27	NS
Great Cost	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%			

acterized by political competitions which result in immense gains for winners in status, wealth and influence, and in extremely severe deprivations for losers.

Speculatively, many new states of Asia and Africa appear to be high risk systems. The potential rewards for victory are immense, for political positions traditionally confer high social prestige and give control over access to wealth. The ladder for upward social mobility is therefore often concentrated in political offices.[16] The cost of political defeat in many of these states is devastating, for political competition tends to be very much warlike and often results in a total victory or defeat. Various factors account for such warlike competition. Among them are the deep cleavages between elites concerning the system goals and the methods of their implementation, a set of mutually reinforcing antagonisms that run along ethnic, tribal, religious, or regional lines, and widespread anti-governmental reflex which Shils has aptly described as an "oppositional syndrome."[17] Moreover, the dominance of a single authoritarian party in many new states makes the emergence of political opposition constitutionally and practically impossible and thereby increases the potential cost of being a member of a counter-elite.[18]

The high cost of political defeat in some of the new states may also be attributed to the fact that many of the political leaders have only limited occupational skills. What little evidence there is indicates that these leaders are "professionals" in the sense that they have no occupation other than politics.[19] Therefore, as Apter has put it, "for them to go out of office is, in effect, to be unemployed."[20] And sometimes going out of office means going into exile as well. Because of the great reward associated with political victory and the severe deprivations inflicted by defeat, political competition in these new political systems tends to be less constrained by the accepted rules of the game than in low risk systems such as the United States.

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[16] See Lester Seligman, "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Political Leadership," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 304–306, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 1 (May, 1965), p. 17.

[17] Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in Jason L. Finckle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 353–355.

[18] David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 179–222; Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 267–301; and Ruth Schachter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa," this REVIEW (June, 1961), pp. 294–307.

[19] The author's exploratory study of the defeated candidates in Korea revealed that 37% of the sample interviewed were unemployed at the time, which was two years after their electoral defeats. This appears to suggest that the defeated candidates had neither other occupational skills to return nor the wish to pursue non-political occupations. See my "Some Effects of Political Status Loss."

[20] David E. Apter, "Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations," in his *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 73.

III. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the attitude of the defeated candidates toward the democratic norms of competition and their inclination to future political activity. Another research objective was to explore the variables which might account for the differences in such attitudes. Major findings and their theoretical implications are discussed as follows.

1. The evidence presented indicates that the defeated candidates in both the primary and general election exhibit a lower support for the democratic rules of competition than do the winning candidates after the election. With respect to their inclination to political activity, the losers showed significantly less enthusiasm than did the winners. It seems, then, quite clear that the winners and losers differ significantly in their supportive attitude and inclination to political activity.

2. However, it is highly important to note that despite the differences between the winners and losers, very few respondents reported low support for the democratic rules of competition after the election. In fact, differentials in support were not between high and low support but between *high* and *medium support categories.* This evidence strongly suggests that the losers do reduce somewhat their level of support as a result of defeat and yet remain basically supportive of the democratic rules governing electoral competition.

3. The result of primary elections appears to have less impact than general elections on the attitudes of candidates. Defeat in the primary election discouraged less candidates than defeat in the general election to continue political activity. Similarly, the candidates defeated in the primary election did not reduce their supportive attitude as much as those candidates defeated in the general election. Where a competitive party system is operative, thereby making general elections meaningful contests, the outcome of general elections is therefore likely to have a greater effect on the attitudes of candidates than that of primary elections.

4. Focusing on the variation in the attitudes of the defeated candidates, we found that their career ambition, expectation about the election outcome, types of district and election in which they ran have some effects on their post-election attitudes. Those defeated candidates who had initially a high ambition showed a higher inclination to continue political activity after the election than did others who had a low or no ambition. The candidates' expectation about the election outcome is also strongly associated with their supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and inclination to political activity. Those who made an optimistic assessment of their chances of winning before the election, reacted to defeat by decreasing their level of support and their inclination to political activity, while others who assessed their chances of winning less favorably did not react in this manner. Our data also indicate that the type of district in which a candidate is defeated is related to his post-election attitudes. For example, the candidates who were defeated in safe districts manifested considerably lower inclination to political activity than did others defeated in competitive and unsafe districts.

5. The most important finding is perhaps the direct association that we discovered between the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates and the manner in which they adjust to the election outcome. The losing candidates who perceived a high reward indicated a visibly higher support for the democratic rules of competition and a higher inclination to political activity than did others who perceived a low reward. This relationship is sustained even when the effects of other variables such as career ambition, expectation about the election outcome, types of district and election are accounted for. Thus it seems quite reasonable to assert that the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates is one of the key determinants of their supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and inclination to political activity after the election.

6. The analysis of the amount of reward-cost as perceived by both the winning and losing candidates makes it evident that (1) the winners gain higher rewards than the losers in terms of occupation, social prestige, influence, and career opportunity as we would expect, but (2) a preponderant number of the losers also gain considerable rewards. This clearly suggests that the political competition analyzed in the present paper is a low risk system because the winners did not take all the rewards and the losers did not lose too much.

The findings summarized above have important theoretical implications. Because the withdrawal of support by defeated candidates can be one possible source of political instability, their adherence to the accepted rules of the game is a critical variable for the system maintenance. If a large proportion of the defeated candidates become disaffected as a direct result of their participation in electoral competition and decide to challenge the legitimacy of the accepted rules, stability will obviously be weakened to that extent. As our evidence indicates, the losers accorded less support as a result of electoral defeat than they did before the election and also exhibited lower support than the winners, and yet, they remained basically satisfied with the rules of the game. Although our data were gathered in one state election, there is reason to believe that the defeated candidates rarely become totally disillusioned with the democratic rules in American political system. Thus, political competition in the United States, unlike that in the high risk systems of Asia and Africa, does not appear to produce many disenchanted losers who can threaten system stability.

Knowledge about why defeated candidates in one political system remain largely supportive of the rules of the game while defeated candidates in another become disaffected can add to existing theories of democratic stability.[21] Easton has suggested: "Since today's loser in an electoral campaign or policy has an opportunity to become tomorrow's victor [in a stable democracy], differences do not have to be fought out to the knife, unlike those systems where the winner takes all."[22] The essence of this argument is that the maintenance of the democratic norms of temperance and moderation in political competition depends in a large measure upon a modest difference between the reward of political victory and the cost of defeat, that is, a low risk system. Where the reward of winning is immensely great and the cost of losing exorbitantly high, political competition tends to be warlike and, therefore, is disruptive of stability.

The direct relationship that we discovered between the amount of perceived reward-cost and the manner in which the defeated candidates adjust to the election outcome is entirely consistent with Easton's contention. The higher the cost of defeat, the greater the likelihood that a losing candidate withdraws his support for the democratic rules of the game and shows a low inclination to political activity. Because a moderate difference between the reward of winning and the cost of losing induces favorable attitude toward the rules of the game among defeated candidates and thereby eliminates one potential source of instability, a low risk system is one important condition of democratic stability.

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[21] A perusal of some existing theories of democratic stability proposed by Eckstein, Lipset, and Almond-Verba, indicates that they have not included the reward-cost dimension of political competition and its relation to stability in their theoretical formulations. See Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) and also, *A Theory of Stable Democracy,* Research Monograph No. 10, Center of International Studies (Princeton University, 1961); S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 45–96; and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 337–374.

[22] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 201.

AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS: A STUDY OF DELEGATES TO THE 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION*

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I. THE "AMATEUR DEMOCRATIC" AND THE NEW LEFT

Several years ago James Q. Wilson studied the members of the three amateur Democratic clubs in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.[1] He intended his study, by his own admission, to be interesting rather than theoretical, but we have found its theoretical portions to be intriguing. The amateur politicians studies by Wilson primarily concentrated their energies in local politics, although their ambitions extended far beyond local campaigns and issues. Indeed, they expressed a clear desire to alter fundamentally the character of the American party system and, accordingly, all governing institutions.

Wilson's task of identifying and characterizing the political motives and tactics of amateur Democrats was facilitated by the existence of political clubs.[2] He had only to identify the clubs he wished to study and survey their members. Future researchers were left the responsibility of identifying similar political motives and tactics in less well-defined groups. We attempted to do this for a sample of delegates to the Democratic National Convention in 1968, and, following Wilson's criteria, we were successful in identifying a substantial proportion of amateur Democrats.

The amateur Democrat described by Wilson was not set apart from the more conventional party activitsts by his liberalism, his age, education or class. He was not a dilettante or an inept practitioner of politics, nor did he regard politics as an avocation or hobby. Rather the amateur found politics intrinsically interesting because it expressed a conception of the public interest. The political world was perceived in terms of policies and principles which were consistent with the amateur's theory of deomocracy. Internal party democracy and the acceptance and encouragement of the largest possible base for participation were given unequivocal acceptance by amateurs. In this sense, intra-party democracy was a salient factor in the motivation of amateur Democrats. Policy goals for the party were conceived to be largely programmatic and were intended to offer clear alternatives to the opposing party. The amateur placed his highest political priorities on intra-party democracy and the party's commitment to specific substantive goals. In sum then, the amateur Democrat described by Wilson was one who perceived politics as the determination of public policy in which issues are settled on their own merits and not simply on the basis of partisan advantage. Thus, the amateur was most reluctant to recognize the necessity of compromising issues for party advantage.[3]

In contrast to the amateur, whose chief rewards for political participation tend to be somewhat abstract and intangible, the conventional or professional party activist wanted to win elections and thus provide the inducement which followers require for participation. The professional was not concerned with taking positions on controversial and abstract public policies. His preoccupation with winning allowed him to compromise substantive programs more easily than the amateur, although he may have been as liberal ideologically as the amateur. Intra-party democracy was by no means denied by the professional, but it was valued extrinsically for the purpose of creating party unity (i.e., to forge as broad a coalition as possible), rather than for its own intrinsic worth.

Several psychological characteristics of amateurs which appear to determine their general orientations toward politics deserve special attention, as well as some systemic consequences which follow from these orientations. First, there are parallels between the amateur's conception of politics and that of the New Left. The amorphous and ideologically elusive New Left movement, which has captured the attention of the nation also placed great value on participatory democracy. "Participatory democracy is offered as the solution for bridging the gap be-

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* This Project was funded by the Political Research Institute at Florida State University.

[1] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[2] *Ibid.*, ch. 1. We have relied heavily on Wilson's study in designing our own and hereby acknowledge our intellectual debt to him. Henceforth only specific references from *The Amateur Democrat* are noted.

[3] The characteristics of the amateur and professional are described by Wilson in Chs. 1, 10 and 11, *Ibid.*

tween the perceived desire by individuals to shape their own destiny and the power to do so."[4] In this regard, the Port Huron Statement, which outlines the principles of the Students for a Democratic Society, is enlightening. This statement posited democracy *per se* as a value, and not as a mechanism. Its analysis of contemporary society was blunt:

> America rests in national stalemate . . . its democratic system apathetic and manipulated rather than 'of, by and for the people' . . . We seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation governed by two central aims: that the individual share in these societal decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.[5]

In the decade which has followed since Wilson's study of the amateur Democrats we have seen an upsurge of political activism on the part of the New Left. News coverage has provided a great deal of visibility for political dissent and it is not going too far to suggest that contemporary amateur politicians draw practical and theoretical sustenance from some New Left activities. Similarly, New Left people were attracted initially to the programs and candidates backed by amateur Democrats.[6]

Secondly, the conception of democracy held by amateurs clearly implies that citizens are equipped to operate issue-oriented parties by democratic means in the interest of a common good. The amateur's theory of government stipulates that the electoral choice between candidates in the general election is an insufficient guarantee of democracy, hence the amateur's demand for intra-party democracy. This "town meeting" orientation held by amateurs is rooted in their presumption of an interested and enlightened citizenry which is willing and eager to participate actively in policy formation. Voting behavior research by social scientists raises questions about the validity of these assumptions and has provided support for the conception of democracy in which most of the citizens' interests are better served by a non-programmatic party system in which the electorate is required simply to make a single dichotomous choice between parties rather than to participate in the development of a policy itself.[7]

A third consequence which follows from the amateur's position involves the role of political parties. Wilson has previously pointed out in his study of amateurs that should they triumph over the party professionals, which he viewed as doubtful, parties would serve a divisive function rather than acting as a force for political integration.[8] This inference stems from the amateur's demand for programmatic parties and their relative unwillingness to compromise their positions. Some observers see this demand and its consequences as a virtue—others do not. Even if intra-party democracy is assumed, the age-old problem still exists of how to handle a situation where the majority of a party has decided upon a programmatic course which a minority cannot conscientiously accept. The amateur's philosophy assumes that a party consensus would emerge after the rational consideration and debate of party programs and candidates. The feasibility of this, however, is highly questionable.[9]

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[4] For examples of this theme, see: Martin Oppenheimer, "Alienation or Participation," paper read at the 1965 Meetings of the Pennsylvania Sociological Society, and reprinted by the Students for a Democratic Society; Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); Andrew Kopkind, "Of, By and For the Poor: The New Generation of Student Organizers," *The New Republic,* June 19, 1965.

[5] Commonly know as the "Port Huron Statement," this document exists as a statement of principles of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962.

[6] New Left members have been characterized as being totally alienated by rejecting the contemporary two-party system, thus making comparisons between them and avid partisan amateurs fallacious. See Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.,* chs. 4 and 5. No doubt there exist many New Left people who completely eschew conventional partisan activity. But these individuals appear to represent what Keniston has labelled the "uncommitted" as contrasted with the "committed" or "radicals." The latter, while nursing an abiding suspicion of political parties and their leaders, are still willing to engage in party activities when they believe there exists an opportunity for achieving some goals. During the Chicago convention delegates and supporters of Senator Eugene McCarthy often joined New Left protestors outside the convention hotels. One chant in particular, "You killed the party, you killed the party . . ." which was directed at Humphrey delegates, reflects some affinity between amateur Democrats and New Left supporters. See Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals: Note on Committed Youth* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968) and also *The Uncommitted* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965).

[7] Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent,* David Apter (ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1964); Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), ch. 9; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, LVIII (June, 1964) 361–382; Murray B. Levin, *The Alienated Voter* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

[8] Wilson, *op. cit.,* p. 359. It should be noted, however, that a good deal of diversity exists even within locally based party organization both in terms of motivational and value perspectives. See Samuel J. Eldersveld's insightful study, *Political Parties:* A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

II. THE STUDY DESIGN

Following Wilson's study of amateur Democratic clubs, we have described certain perceptions and psychological traits which distinguish amateurs from professional party activists; we have outlined briefly what appear to be the roots of the amateur's political orientation and the probable political consequences of that orientation. The questions this study was designed to answer are: (1) To what extent can Democrats to the 1968 Democratic National Convention be distinguished with respect to amateurism criteria? (2) What background characteristics distinguish between amateur and professional delegates? (3) What kind of political socialization and recruitment experiences have professionals and amateurs undergone? (4) Does amateurism aid us in predicting the decision-making strategies and candidate-preferences of delegates?

It should be emphasized, that our definition of amateurs and professionals does not include ideological classifications, leadership positions (e.g., being a public office holder), or length of service to the party. Amateurs and professionals are distinguished psychologically by their style and orientation toward politics. It is a separate empirical question whether amateurs hold elected public offices, have a long history as party activists, or are ideologically distinguishable. The distinguishing differences have been outlined in our previous description. It was with some caution that we operationalized amateurism as a variable to include three categories: amateurs, semiprofessionals (or semi-amateurs), and professionals. The specific summated items used to delineate Democratic delegates are listed below. The underlying theme which each item was designed to capture appears in parentheses:[10]

(1) My party leaders often make too many arbitrary decisions without consulting with sufficient numbers of party workers. (intra-party democracy)

(2) As a convention delegate basically my only job is to choose a candidate who will win in November. (preoccupation with winning)

(3) The principles of a candidate are just as important as winning or losing an election. (willingness to compromise)

(4) Party organization and unity is more important than permitting free and total discussion which may divide the party. (intra-party democracy)

(5) I would object to a presidential candidate who compromises on his basic values if that is necessary to win. (willingness to compromise)

(6) Controversial positions should be avoided in a party platform in order to insure party unity. (programmatic parties)

(7) A good party worker must support any candidate nominated by the convention even if he basically disagrees with him. (willingness to compromise)

(8) Party platforms should be deliberately vague in order to appeal to the broadest spectrum of voters. (programmatic parties)

(9) Part-time volunteers play a more important role in the party's campaign than any other segment of a party. (citizen's role)

(10) Would you characterize yourself as someone who: (a) works for the party year after year, win or lose and whether or not you like the candidate or issues; or (b) works for the party only when there is a particularly worthwhile candidate or issue. (self-characterization)

Respondents were asked to strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree to each item. The actual classification involved a cross tabular comparison between the delegate's general stylistic preferences (willingness to compromise, relative importance of the electoral victory, and intra-party democracy) and the general self-characterization provided by the response to question number 10. (See Figure 1.)

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[9] More programmatic, internally democratic and responsible parties were recommended by the American Political Science Association Committee on Political Parties in 1950. This report has been subject to some of the identical criticism raised here concerning the amateurs conception of parties. See, V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, fifth edition, 1964), chs. 9, 12, pp. 662–665; and Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System: A Commentary," this REVIEW, XLV (June, 1951), 448–500.

[10] When these items were factor analyzed, four factors emerged. An examination of the four factors indicated that preoccupation with winning, willingness to compromise, intraparty democracy and programmatic parties appeared to be the dimensions underlying the concept "amateurism." Although we have statistically treated amateurism as a unidimensional variable, it can be broken down conceptually into correlated components.

The Sample

A team of five interviewers gathered data on 187 Democratic delegates and alternates over the four-day convention period at Chicago in August. Our strategy at the outset was to conduct interviews with a pre-selected random sample but the unusual circumstances of the Chicago Convention necessitated a change in this strategy. A quota sample consisting of a proportionate number of delegates and alternates from each state was interviewed successfully by the painful method of seeking out the respondents in hotel lobbies, personal suites, cocktail parties and state party receptions. This method worked well and we met the quota for each state, although on some occasions interviews were terminated before being completed.

In order to allay our doubts about the representativeness of our sample, we obtained an almost complete catalogue of aggregate statistics collected by the CBS News Bureau.[11] The CBS data dealt with education, sex, occupation and the number of previous conventions attended. Chi square tests revealed that our sample of 187 delegates were not significantly different ($p > .10$) on any one of the four comparisons. These calculations permit us to have some confidence in the representativesness of our sample, at least along several demographic dimensions, and we accordingly report tests of significance as well as measures of association in analyzing our data.

III. FINDINGS

Social and Economic Correlates of Amateurism

Of the 187 Democratic delegates who were interviewed 180 respondents were classified along the amateurism dimension. Subtotals of 42 amateurs, 52 semiprofessionals and 82 professionals were identified who also answered our questions dealing with age, education and annual income. Contingency tables were generated with amateurism and each of these background variables. The correlations between age groupings and amateurism was .32 (gamma) with the amateurs being younger (not shown in tabular form). Twenty-six percent of the amateurs were under 30 years of age compared to nine percent of the professionals; five percent of the amateurs were over 50 compared to 30 percent of the professionals.

FIGURE 1

	Self Characterized as (see Q. 10): Amateurs	Professional
Responses to more than 6 items in the amateur direction	Amateurs	Semiprofessionals
Responses to from 4–6 items in the amateur direction	Amateurs	Professionals
Responses to 3 or less items in the amateur direction	Semiprofessionals	Professionals

No relationship was found between amateurism and level of education. There was a slightly larger number of amateurs who held post graduate degrees, but the overall correlation observed was low (gamma = .09). Eighteen percent of the professionals not gone beyond a high school education as to eleven percent of the amateurs (not shown in tabular form).

When income level was cross tabulated with amateurism, we found 52 percent of the amateurs earn more than $20,000 per year compared to 33 percent of the semiprofessionals and 38 percent of the professionals. The overall correlation indicated that amateurs tended to have higher annual incomes but that the relationship was very weak and insignificant (not shown in tabular form).

Of the three background factors considered, age appears to be the best predictor of amateur status. Although none of the variables revealed striking differences between amateurs and professionals, the differences that were observed are generally consistent with those described by Wilson in amateur Democratic clubs.[12] By precise standards these background variables are very crude proxy variables for socialization experiences. We turn now to the examination of several more precise indicators of political socialization and recruitment to party activities and eventually to the 1968 convention.

Political Socialization and Recruitment of Amateurs and Professionals

In this section, we are concerned with the questions of why, when and how the delegates initially became interested in politics. The delegates were asked if they were raised in a family setting in which politics was an active concern. Table 1 shows that semiprofessionals and professionals have nearly an even probability of being

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[11] We wish to thank the CBS News Bureau for providing us with the *CBS News 1969 Democratic National Convention Handbook*, copyright: Columbia Broadcasting System.

[12] Wilson, *op. cit.*, 13.

TABLE 1. AMATEURISM AND FAMILY'S POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Political Activity	Amateurs ($N=42$)	Semiprofessional ($N=52$)	Professional ($N=82$)
Active	35%	53%	47%
Inactive	65	47	53
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma $= -.12$, $P > .05$.

TABLE 2. AMATEURISM AND AGENT OF INITIAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION*

	Amateurs ($N=42$)	Semiprofessional ($N=52$)	Professional ($N=82$)
Family	22%	37%	42%
School Experiences (High School and College)	12	10	16
Adult Peer Group	39	22	22
Events (War, Depression, Assassinations, etc.)	27	31	20
	100%	100%	100%

$X^2 = 9.13$, $P < .20$, ** V (Craemers V) $= .16$

* The question asked was, "who would you say was most important in getting you interested in politics?" This was a closed question.

** While Craemers V is not a commonly used measure of association in social science literature, it is a chi square based statistic which is equivalent to phi in a 2×2 case, and is preferable to Tschuprow's T because its upper limit can be unity when the number of rows and columns are unequal. See Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960) 229–230.

reared in either a politically active or inactive family. Only 35 percent of the amateurs, however, are drawn from politically active families. The remainder (65 percent) represent the first of their line to participate actively (beyond voting) in partisan politics.

Our data also revealed that professionals and semiprofessionals tended to be younger when they first became active in partisan politics.[13] Thirty-eight percent of the professionals became active in politics before their twentieth year, as compared to 28 percent of the amateurs. Similarly, 23 percent of amateurs were over thirty when they first became active. Only 15 percent of the semiprofessionals and 14 percent of the professionals delayed this long before becoming active in the party. Those persons who eventually become party professionals tend to develop political interests early in their lives, and then spend years in apprenticeship working within the organization. Further evidence of this is shown in Table 2. Forty-two percent of the professionals reported that their family was the most important influence leading to their involvement in politics. Only 22 percent of the amateurs reported similar experiences. Again, the semi-professionals fall between these two groups. The high school and college experience does not reveal any noteworthy difference between the groups. Adult peer group influence tends to be a more important factor in the socialization of amateurs into party politics. Thirty-nine percent report that their friends and associates were the most important factor contributing to their political involvement as compared to only 22 percent of both the semiprofessionals and professionals who cited this factor. Professionals were also less likely than semiprofessionals and amateurs to be affected by public events (e.g., wars, depressions, and assassinations) which contributed to their entrance into politics. Again, this suggests the importance of early familial experience in the political socialization of the political professional.

In Table 3 we consider partisan longevity, or the years spent active in the party. There are few surprises in this table. The largest category in each group includes those delegates who have been active in the party more than ten years. But, longevity is closely associated with amateur-professional status. Professionals and semiprofessionals have been active in the party for the longest periods of time. This relationship is striking in the 1–2 year category where 24 percent of the amateurs, 4 percent of the semiprofessionals and none of the professionals are represented.

We have shown here that there is a temporal difference in the political socialization of amateurs and professionals. But, what are the political implications of these different experiences? Since the professional's induction into politics occurred early, we may speculate that party identification as transmitted by the family was a most salient concern. We are suggesting that the professional learned that the party was not only a means to certain substantive ends, but that it assumed some intrinsic value—i.e., party loyalty and confidence in the party made it less imperative that the professional be concerned with substantive issues. In short, the professional has confidence in the party. A victorious party meant that issues could be resolved in the best way possible. Such an orientation led to a more

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[13] Not shown in tabular form.

TABLE 3. AMATEURISM AND YEARS ACTIVE IN THE PARTY

Years Active	Amateurs ($N = 42$)	Semiprofessional ($N = 52$)	Professional ($N = 82$)
1–2 Years	24%	4%	0%
3–5 Years	9	12	5
6–10 Years	31	23	20
Over 10 Years	36	61	75
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = .50, $P < .01$.

TABLE 4. AMATEURISM AND SELECTION PROCESSES FOR THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

Method of Selection	Amateurs ($N = 42$)	Semiprofessional ($N = 52$)	Professional ($N = 82$)
Appointed	50%	64%	67%
Elected	50	36	33
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = −.20, $P < .05$.

pragmatic approach to the substantive concerns of the party.

The later introduction of the amateur suggests a major modification in this process. The authors of *The American Voter* have suggested that ideology develops later in life and is a function of the intellectual maturity of the individual. In their words,

> . . . in the bulk of cases, the individual is committed to a party at a time when he is least likely to have the wherewithal to bring ideological considerations . . . into play.[14]

Further evidence of this phenomenon is found in a study of the development of political ideas among adolescents, which concluded that "there is a gradual increase with age in the use of philosophical principles for making political judgements."[15] The amateur's idealism may possibly be explained by the fact that ideological concerns rather than the more direct family socialization experiences led to his entry into partisan politics. If so, we would expect the amateur to view the party in instrumental terms, i.e., as a means to certain ends, rather than an end in itself.[16]

These results provide some basis for the following inferences about the adult socialization of Democratic amateurs: The highly articulate yet abstract rationalization of the amateur's participation in party politics which Wilson described[17] may be a function of the amateur's being politically socialized after reaching intellectual maturity. The professional, who was exposed to politics at an earlier age, may have been attracted by less complex concerns. We may speculate that the professional's concern for the party rather than more abstract ideological issues may be a result of his earlier political socialization.

Thus far, we have considered only the informal and frequently less proximate temporal aspects of the political socialization process. In Table 4, we consider the more formal and immediate process of political recruitment, i.e., the method by which delegates were selected for the 1968 Democratic Convention. Although the differences are not striking, both professionals and semiprofessionals are more likely to have been appointed as delegates rather than elected. This tendency is consistent with our earlier discussion of professionalism in which we indicated that organizational loyalty was an inherent part of our definition of professionalism. Since this is the case, it is not unusual in those states which do not require elections for the appointments of delegates to go to those who have served the longest, remained most loyal, and contributed most to the party organization. The more recent entry into partisan activity precludes the recruitment of many amateurs by party appointment.

TABLE 5. AMATEURISM AND NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONS ATTENDED

Number of Conventions	Amateurs ($N = 46$)	Semiprofessional ($N = 52$)	Professional ($N = 86$)
1 (1968 only)	72%	65%	52%
2	26	15	20
3 or more	2	20	28
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = .32, $P < .01$.

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[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

[15] Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, IV (1966), 295–306.

[16] When we speak of the party being an "end," we mean that party loyalty ranks near the top of a person's hierarchy of political values.

[17] *Loc. cit.*

TABLE 6. AMATEUR-PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES

Items (liberal response in parenthesis)	Percentages Expressing Liberal Response				
	N	Amateurs	Semi-professionals	Professionals	Gammas
1. Communism today has changed greatly and we must recognize most wars and revolutions are not Communist inspired. (Agree)	184	44%	42%	31%	.19*
2. Viet Nam is historically and geographically an Asian country and should be allowed to develop autonomously within the Asian sphere of power. (Agree)	181	71	73	54	.30*
3. The U.S. should give help to foreign countries even if they are not as much against Communism as we are. (Agree)	185	80	83	75	.13
4. The best way to deal with people who break the law is to punish them so they fear the consequences of breaking it again. (Disagree)	185	44	54	48	.01
5. People who advocate radical changes to our way of life are over-protected by our laws. (Disagree)	185	59	75	59	.06
6. Law enforcement agencies should be allowed limited eavesdropping by wiretapping and other devices. (Disagree)	187	59	45	47	.12
7. Public employees should not have the right to strike for higher wages. (Disagree)	185	59	71	72	.15
8. School children should be bussed to achieve racial balance in elementary and secondary schools (Agree)	179	36	35	31	.09
9. One has a moral responsibility to disobey laws he believes are unjust. (Agree)	186	29	23	7	.52*

Gammas with asterisks indicate a level of significance less than .05. Gammas were computed by considering the responses elicited by each item (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) and amateurism-professionalism as two ordinal variables in a contingency table. See Linton Freeman, *Elementary Applied Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965) 79–89, 162–175.

Another aspect of longevity—convention attendance—is reported in Table 5. Here again, the data support our earlier findings and, on the surface, include no surprises. For most delegates this is their first national party convention. There are two possible explanations for the data shown in Table 5. First, it is possible that amateurs are mobilized for a particular convention and their absence at subsequent conventions is volitional. Given the nature of the amateur's participation based on more immediate circumstances (e.g., issues, candidates, events), rather than organizational loyalty, it is conceivable that convention attendance is a one-time affair. For example, some delegates, who were committed to McCarthy rather than to the Democratic Party, may choose not to participate in presidential politics in 1972 because the selection process is no longer salient. It is also possible that because of their tenuous commitment to the party, some delegates may be excluded involuntarily by the regular party organization. An alternative speculation is that a conversion process occurs in which amateurs are re-socialized as a result of their involvement in national party politics. That is, they lose some of their idealism and become political "realists" who learn to compromise, and accept the professional's view that the overriding goal of the party is to win elections. This hypothesis is also given some support by our finding that older delegates tended to be professionals. Although it is not possible for us to accept or reject either explanation, we can safely hypothesize that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. An accurate explanation probably includes elements of both.

Ideological Correlates of Amateurism

In this section, we attempt to answer the

TABLE 7. AMATEURISM AND SUMMATED LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM*

	Amateurs ($N=46$)	Semiprofessional ($N=53$)	Professional ($N=88$)
Conservatives	15%	17%	16%
Moderates	22	17	34
Liberals	63	66	50
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = −.03, P>.05.

* Respondents answers to each of the items presented in Table 9 were summed together in Likert fashion and then classified as Liberals, Moderates and Conservatives. "No responses" were given the neutral score of 3 on 1–5 scales, hence accounting for the inclusion of all 187 respondents.

question of whether a delegate's amateur or professional orientation is associated with his views on a number of foreign and domestic issues. An examination of Table 6 reveals that there are only three issues which significantly distinguish amateurs, semiprofessionals, and professionals. Amateurs and semiprofessionals are more likely than professionals to agree that "Communism has changed greatly," and that "wars and revolutions are not Communist-inspired." Similarly professionals are more likely than either of the two other groups to take a more aggressive stand on Vietnam.[18] Item 9 most clearly discriminates between amateurs and professionals. Amateurs and semiprofessionals are much more likely to accept the principle of civil disobedience than professionals (gamma = .52). In this case, however. a larger majority of all groups disagree with this basic tenet of civil disobedience. What finally emerges from our examination of Table 6 is not the differences between these groups, but rather the similarities. On six of the nine items there were no significant amateur-professional differences.

Another view of this relationship is shown in Table 7. Here amateurism is associated with the summated liberalism-conservatism scores.[19] The relationship is weak and suggests that amateurs, semiprofessionals and professionals are not distinguishable along ideological lines. This should not be surprising when we recall that the differences between amateurs and professionals appear to be procedural and stylistic. They have relatively similar attitudes toward substantive issues that might be summarized along a liberalism-conservatism continuum. This finding, however, does not necessarily indicate the salience or the intensity of the expressed opinion and, as we shall show later, when amateurs are put into a compromise situation, which requires flexibility, they react quite differently from professionals holding the same substantive attitudes.

TABLE 8. AMATEURISM AND DELEGATES' PARTISAN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS*

Roles	Amateurs ($N=40$)	Semiprofessional ($N=50$)	Professional ($N=83$)
Local	25%	26%	39%
State or region	40	38	37
Nation	35	36	24
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = −.21, P<.10.

* The closed question used to elicit which geographical segment of the party the delegates felt most responsible to was "To what segment of the party do you feel most responsible as a delegate? (a) my local party organization, (b) my state party organization, (c) my regional party, or (d) my national party."

Amateurism and Decision-Making

The effects of amateurism are considered here by examining the responses to three questions concerned generally with party loyalty and candidate preference. First, we asked about the geographical segment of the party to which they felt most responsible as a delegate. The responses to this question are reported in Table 8. The differences are not dramatic (gamma = −.21). But, there is an observable tendency for amateurs and semiprofessionals to define what might be called their areal roles[20] in terms of representing or being responsible to state, regional or national constituencies rather than local constituencies.

This tendency is consistent with earlier notions of the professional in politics. Both Merton and Wilson have suggested that the professional politician "is pre-occupied with the local community to the exclusion of his affairs outside his

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[18] It should be noted here, however, that a majority of all groups agreed with the Vietnam statement, which is a direct quote from a speech by Senator Eugene McCarthy.

[19] See note, Table 10.

[20] John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1962), Ch. 13.

TABLE 9. AMATEURISM AND DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES IF DELEGATES' FIRST CHOICE FAILS

Strategy	Amateurs ($N=43$)	Semiprofessional ($N=48$)	Professional ($N=82$)
Vote for another candidate with whom I agree	95%	83%	63%
Vote for the apparent winner to promote party unity	5	17	37
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma =.63, P <.01.

TABLE 10. AMATEURISM AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

Candidate Preference	Amateurs ($N=42$)	Semiprofessional ($N=49$)	Professional ($N=79$)
Humphrey	33%	51%	71%
McCarthy	41	24	7
Other*	26	25	22
	100%	100%	100%

$X^2=24.5$, $P<.001$.
V (Craemers V) $=.26$.
* Kennedy, McGovern and favorite sons.

community."[21] They describe the amateur as a "cosmopolitian" who has minimal ties to the locality and a much stronger attachment to a larger constituency.[22]

Another question asked was, "If it appears your first choice cannot win the nomination, what would you do?" In Table 9, we have divided the responses into two groups—those whose support is contingent upon their agreement, in principle, with a candidate and those who would simply vote for the apparent winner in order to promote party unity. It appears that while a majority of all groups intend to adhere to some principle of ideological compatibility professionals are much more likely to compromise that principle for the sake of party unity (gamma = .63). These findings provide support for the notion that the professional is more inclined to compromise certain attitudes in order to achieve party unity, and likewise underline the amateur's relative unwillingness to compromise for the sake of partisan consensus.

Finally, we turn to a consideration of the relationship between amateurism and candidate preference, the latter being the most important factor in assembling the Democratic delegates. An unmistakable relationship exists between amateurism and support for Vice President Humphrey and Senator McCarthy (Table 10). Seventy-one percent of the professionals in our sample threw their support to Humphrey as contrasted with only eight percent who favored McCarthy. The amateurs, on the other hand, divided their support more evenly between the candidates with McCarthy being favored by 41 percent.

In order to assess the relative capacity of the amateurism variable to predict candidate preference we chose another commonly used variable in analyzing political decision-making for comparison. Liberalism-conservatism (See Table 7) has been used on numerous occasions by political scientists, and although there exists little agreement on operational grounds,[23] the variable has been found to have some predictive utility for political decision-making. The usefulness of ideological variables appears to be greater in studying so-called "elites" or highly politicized groups than for citizen groups. McClosky was able to differentiate Republican from Democratic convention delegates on policy positions, as well as show substantial differences between the policy positions of party leaders from both parties and the rank and file of the respective parties.[24] McClosky's findings, nevertheless, revealed significant intra-party differences between party leaders. Thus the question of ideological consenus, and its presumed impact on convention decision-making has yet to be empirically demonstrated.

Data in Table 11 show that ideology and can-

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[21] Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Revised Ed.; Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), pp. 387–420; and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–11.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] See David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 5 (November, 1961), 317–331; and Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter (ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261.

[24] See Herbert McClosky, *et al.*, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review* 54 (June, 1960) 406–427; and "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 58 (June, 1964) 361–379. In addition to McClosky's studies which dealt with positional issues, a host of other studies too numerous to list here have found ideology to be correlated with political decision-making.

TABLE 11. IDEOLOGY AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

Candidate Preference	Conservative ($N=26$)	Moderate ($N=44$)	Liberal ($N=100$)
Humphrey	58%	81%	44%
McCarthy	0	3	34
Other*	32	16	22
	100%	100%	100%

$X^2=33.6$, $P>.01$.
V (Craemers V) $=.32$.
* Kennedy, McGovern and favorite sons.

didate preferences are strongly related. The more liberal respondents supported McCarthy while the more conservative favored Humphrey and other candidates. Given this finding we again turned to our primary interest in amateurism, which has previously been shown to be virtually unrelated to liberalism-conservatism (see Table 7). Therefore, we hypothesized that amateurism represented a variable that could predict candidate preferences independent of ideology. Table 12 shows the correlation coefficients between amateurism and candidate preference controlling for ideology, and ideology and candidate preference controlling for amateurism. This procedure is essentially a partialing process assuming nominal level measurement of the variables. The capacity of both amateurism and ideology to predict candidate preference independent of each other is demonstrated by the substantial V values that remain when controls are imposed. When amateurism and ideology are combined, the multiple association with candidate preference increases (V = .63).

TABLE 12. PARTIAL AND MULTIPLE ASSOCIATIONS INVOLVING THE EFFECT OF AMATEURISM AND IDEOLOGY ON CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

	V (Craemers V)*	X^2**
Ideology and candidate preference		
Original (Table II)	.32	33.6
Controlling for amateurism		
Professionals	.26	11.3
Semiprofessionals	.33	9.5
Amateurs	.44	14.8
Amateurism and candidate preference		
Original (Table 10)	.26	24.5
Controlling for ideology		
Conservatives	.41	9.9
Moderates	.31	8.5
Liberals	.33	22.8
Multiple association		
(Amateurism and Ideology)	.63	68.6

* See note, Table 2.
** All X^2 values are significant beyond the .05 level.

To recapitulate, the liberal amateur delegate was the most typical supporter of McCarthy, while Humphrey's most consistent supporters were conservative professional delegates. Amateurs are not necessarily liberal. They were ranked as conservatives almost as often as professionals. We have shown in Table 12 that ideology and amateurism are significantly and independently related to candidate preference.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

James Q. Wilson, whom we have relied upon for our conception of the amateur Democratic delegate, has suggested that "It is not age, education, or class that sets [the amateur] apart and makes him worth studying . . . Rather, it is his outlook on politics, and the style of politics he practices."[25] Our results are in general agreement with Wilson's earlier description. We have inferred from our findings that the amateur's outlook on politics is determined, in part, by his later (adult) socialization experiences. We have suggested the ways in which the earlier (childhood) socialization experiences of the professionals may have contributed to their concern with party unity, their willingness to compromise and their primary desire for electoral victory. Further, we have suggested that the political socialization process cannot be evaluated in terms of crude background characteristics such as age, education and income. Finally, we have identified two dimensions of candidate appeal. First, we have shown that the perceived policy position of the candidate, defined along a liberal-conservative continuum, were an important determinant of his appeal to convention delegates. The second dimension, and the dimension we have been most concerned with, which we have labeled amateurism, has been shown to have a significant impact on candidate preference—independent of ideological or policy concerns.

Commenting on the relationship between ideology and amateurism, Wilson has stated:

> . . . it is not their liberalism that is their chief distinguishing characteristic. They [amateurs] can

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[25] Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

> be found in the Republican party as well, and there they are likely to be extremely conservative. What is necessary is a definition that distinguishes the new [amateur] from other politicians but which is applicable equally to liberal and conservatives.[26]

Perhaps the most important result of this study is that we have successfully operationalized a definition of amateurism which is drawn largely from Wilson's earlier work. Beyond this, we have demonstrated that this measure meets the criterion Wilson suggested, i.e., it is not related to ideology and, to that extent, represents an important independent dimension of political decision making and candidate appeal.

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[26] *Ibid,* p. 2. It is interesting to speculate about the extent of amateurism present among Republicans especially when we recall the Goldwater nomination in 1964. See for example, Aaron Wildasky, "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians and the Future of the Two-Party System," *Review of Politics,* 27 (July, 1965), 386–413.

IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM: PHILOSOPHY OR PASSION?

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In "Politics, Ideology, And Belief Systems"[1] Professor Sartori has undertaken the Sisyphean task of drawing up conceptual schemes to distinguish the political mentalities of the pragmatist and the ideologist. His "Hypothesis" poses the curious proposition that "ideology and pragmatisms qua 'political cultures' are related, respectively, to the 'cultural matrixes' rationalism and empiricism." (p. 402) When political scientists put forth hypotheses, students of history are usually not far behind with their arid facts and pale negations. Sartori's hypothesis is an intriguing theoretical formulation of a central issue in twentieth century politics; whether it is historically valid is the concern of this article. For the question that remains uppermost as I read his article is simply who are the ideologists and who are the pragmatists? Historically considered, if we were to apply Sartori's defining characteristics to a specific context it may very well be that the totalitarian "ideologies" of communism and fascism would have to be judged "pragmatic," while the mentality of American political behavior may even have to be considered "ideological." Since I am sure Professor Sartori did not have this ironic interpretation in mind, perhaps some elaboration is in order.

When Marx turned Hegel on his head he not only gave a materialistic base to German idealism but imputed an activistic impulse to political theory. Dialectical materialism is the "actualization of philosophy," the extension of contemplative thought into real life. And whether regarded as a "knowing-process" or as Sartori's "belief system," Marxism represented a rejection of both the deductive rationalism of Descartes and the sensationalist rationalism of Locke.[2] In this respect I doubt if Marxism—which Sartori cites as "the outstanding current example" of an ism conceived in a "cultural area qualified by the notion of *rationalism*" (p. 402)—can be subsumed under his following syndrome of "rationalist ideologies":

> The *rationalistic* processing-coding tends to approach problems as follows: i) deductive argumentation prevails over evidence and testing; ii) doctrine prevails over practice; iii) principle prevails over precedent; iv) ends prevail over means; and v) perceptions tend to be 'covered up,' doctrine-loaded, typically indirect. Hegel's famous sentence 'the rational is real' goes to the very heart of the rationalistic mind, for the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, there must be something wrong with the practice, not with the theory. (p. 402)

This is a tidy list of mental traits but I fail to see where it applies to the communist as an ideological personality. More specifically, a Marxist who accepted Engel's bastardization of dialectical materialism and evolutionary positivism would have to deny many of these very dualisms.[3] And a Marxist who followed Lenin's advice would have to accept a code of conduct that would be decidedly empirical, concerned primarily with realizing doctrine not through deduction but through action, with unifying theory and practice and joining means and ends. Sartori tells us that "Oakeshott equally makes a good point when he writes that 'Rationalism is the assertion that . . . practical knowledge is not knowledge at all.' " (p. 402) Significantly, Lenin made a similar assertion when he attacked the "rationalist" Machists, whom he mistakenly believed to have been foreshadowed by Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and then went on to emphasize the overriding importance of practice as the sole criterion of knowledge.[4] Since the kernel of Marxist epistemology is "*praxis*," it would seem that for a communist practical knowledge is the only real knowledge. Cognitively, then, Marxism as a system of thought would have to be judged "empirical" rather than "rationalist." Translated into politics, it is this empirical or "scientific" nature of Marxism which probably accounts for communism's highly pragmatic and opportunistic mode of action; and, it seems appropriate to add, it was this "experimental" ethos which explains the "Americanization of Marxism" by the Old Left of the thirties, especially by those intellectuals who were nurtured on the pragmatism of John Dewey.[5]

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[1] This REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969), 398–411.

[2] Gustave A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Study of Philosophy in the Soviet Union,* trans. Peter Heath (New York: Praeger University Series, 1963), pp. 3–41, 256–267, 488–517.

[3] George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger University Series, 1961), pp. 234–258. For a specific rejection of rationalism and empiricism as "invalid" epistemological categories, see Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," in Arthur P. Mendel (ed.), *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York, 1961), pp. 499–513.

[4] V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,* XIV, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 19–39, 138–143, *passim.*

In the example of fascism it is also difficult to understand how ideology and pragmatism can be treated as "polar opposites." Can fascism, particularly "classical" Italian fascism, be interpreted as indicative of a "rationalistic" state of mind and thus a doctrinal ideology? To answer this question we merely have to go to the horse's mouth itself, to the famous essay "The Doctrine of Fascism" signed by Mussolini but probably ghosted by Gentile. Here we are informed that fascism is not a doctrine of words but "an act of life" whose "pragmatic veins" are "its will to power" and "its will to be."[6] Similarly, Gentile elsewhere maintained that fascism was opposed to doctrinal reasoning because "intellectualism" meant "the divorce of thought from action, of knowledge from life, of brain from heart, of theory from practice."[7] By breaking down the anti-naturalistic dualisms between thought and action, fascism became something of a mirror-image of Marxism. But fascism actually went further than Marxism in demanding that action prevail over theory, in making practice a transcendent end in itself, an ecstatic "premise" in the case of Italian fascism, a sublime "fulfillment" in the case of German National Socialism.[8] Clearly fascism represented at once an amalgam and distortion of various philosophical traditions; nevertheless it strains historical credibility to regard the fascist mind as a rationalistic mentality in which theoretical knowledge is paramount. On the contrary, Italian fascism conceived itself as an endless movement unencumbered by any teleological fixations, an adventurous experiment in which the only approach to political knowledge must be pragmatic. After all, Mussolini claimed William James as one of his leading "mentors."[9]

Carrying this admittedly brief survey up to date, one may also wonder how the "New Left" can be categorized under the rubric of "rationalism." For the New Left reason is the enemy, doctrine is a delusion and theory a snare. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the political mood of the rebellious young is based on emotion and spontaneity, a "soul politics" where style substitutes for content and engagement for inquiry. Professor Sartori states that "an important feature of the ideological mentality that neatly flows from its rationalistic matrix is that the central elements of an ideological belief system are necessarily 'ends,' not 'means.'" (p. 403) This generalization is doubly ironic. For aside from the existential subjectivism of today's youth—which defies Sartori's philosophical points of reference—it seems fair to say that the New Left's demand for sheer power rather than specific program reveals a concern for means rather than ends, and that its tactic of confrontation politics suggests an interest in the innovating forms of protest rather than in the deductive content of thought. Can this recent and, in historical perspective, totally unanticipated phenomenon of radical dissent be explained as an expression of the axiomatized rationalism which Sartori believes is the mark of the ideological psyche? Indeed the irony is compounded as we stop to consider that when the anti-ideological liberal opposes the desperate antics of the New Left his characteristic response is: "I agree with your goals but not your methods." If the liberal and radical do agree on common ends (a skeptical assumption at best) and differ only on means, what remains of the distinction between the "pragmatist and "ideologist"?

Apparently Professor Sartori's answer to this question is provided in the second section of his essay where he draws the distinction between ideology as a mentality and ideology as a passion. In many ways this is the most convincing part of his article; yet I am still in doubt as to how ideological mentalities and ideological emotions relate to one another. Discussing the "emotive status" of the ideologist and the pragmatist, Sartori argues that the former's "belief system" is based on "fixed elements" deeply held by a "closed cognitive structure," while the latter's is based on "flexible elements" loosely held by an "open cognitive structure." (p. 405) But here we are dealing with personal inclinations and social awareness, with inner passion and external perception; in short, with nothing less than morality and mind, axiology and epistemology. Sartori admits that "beliefs are inextricably value-laden—they precede the analytical distinction between value and fact"; and because of the unresolvable predicament in value theory he states that "I propose to search for structural elements of differentiation bearing on *how* one believes." (p. 401) By focusing on the "how" Sartori is content to describe the process of belief, not its purpose; and by concentrating on "how" he avoids the more telling question of "why" people believe what they believe. The upshot is that since Sartori is not interested in the intellectual or psychological genesis of belief he is unable to show a precise causal relationship between his philosophical categories and his political patterns of behavior. As such, the argument is neither logically compelling nor empirically convincing. Why, for example, should a "rationalist," who supposedly derives political knowledge from universal truths and values which are grasped only by reflection, be any more prone to ideological extremism than an "empiricist" who, assuming values "given" in the natural world, realizes political knowledge not in reflection but in action? In short, if Sartori's categories are to have any validity the questions we must ask are essentially these: Is there some inner-connection between ideology and rationalism on the one hand and pragmatism and empiricism on the other? Can social beliefs be inferred from philosophical dispositions? Does metaphysics govern politics?

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[5] Sidney Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (New York, 1933); see also Max Eastman's criticisms of Hook in *Marxism: is it Science* (New York, 1940), 299–348.

[6] Reprinted in Carl Cohen (ed.), *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations,* (New York, 1962), pp. 349–364.

[7] Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophical Basis of Fascism," *Foreign Affairs,* 6 (January, 1928), 290–304.

[8] Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism,* trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York, 1966), pp. 243–271, 365–425.

[9] William K. Stewart, "The Mentors of Mussolini," this REVIEW, 22 (November, 1928), 843–869. Although the pragmatic content of Italian Fascism appealed to American liberals, Stewart's claim that Mussolini was familiar with James's philosophy is doubtful. See this author's "Flirtation With Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini's Italy," *American Historical Review,* LXXI (January 1966), 487–506.

Such issues, of course, are only implicitly germane to Sartori's contemporary study, and it would be petty to criticize him for not addressing his learned essay to these unanswered questions in intellectual history. But one purpose of the present essay is to suggest that historically the affinity between philosophical mentalities and political beliefs is not as simple as Sartori's models imply. If we followed Sartori's conceptual illustrations we would be hard pressed to explain why similar philosophical systems of reasoning have led to diametrically opposite political conclusions. To cite a familiar example, if philosophy shapes politics how can we explain why John C. Calhoun was able to draw upon an empirically-reasoned, Marxist analysis of history and society and arrive at a comprehensive, ideological defense of slavery?[10]

Perhaps the riddle could be explained if we acknowledged that political commitments are more often based on personal ideals and value judgments that are not logically tied to philosophical schools of thought. But in Sartori's analysis, confined to "*how* one believes" rather than "why," there is no dialectical interplay between thought and values. As a result we remain in the dark as to the motives of political beliefs. About all we can legitimately infer is that the possession of a similar philosophical mentality is no guarantee that the mode of political behavior will likewise be similar. This was the conclusion reached by the doubting-Marxist Henry De Man, who nearly a half century ago declared: "Socialism is a *passion*, not a *cognition*."[11] It is precisely this personal dimension, this mystery of character and ethical intuition, this sense of the human mind responding to a concrete situation, that is lacking in Sartori's analysis. Without this inner-dimension and external context I fail to see how we can fully understand anything about the behavior of an ideologist or a pragmatist from the anonymity of abstract models. Moreover, in light of the recognition on the part of both American pragmatists and European Marxists that value judgments cannot be deduced from empirical evidence,[12] it is difficult to accept Sartori's hypothesis that the empirical mentality distinguishes the pragmatist from the ideologist. Rather than resort to the matrixes rationalism and empiricism, it seems more valid to suggest that it is not the philosophical method of thought but the overwhelming power of moral vision, psychic turbulence, identity anxiety, or social malaise that determines cognitive tendencies and world outlook. Sartori acknowledges the function of "ideological heating," but since he offers no causal explanation of this emotional factor it is impossible to understand why ideology waxes and wanes. Why do embedded values subtly erode away? Why should a crisis of conscience suddenly erupt? Why the "alienation" of the intelligentsia? If we could answer these questions we might begin to understand why the ideologist is "loosed upon the world/ full of passionate intensity" and why the pragmatic "centre cannot hold." These are crucial questions for political scientists and historians, as well as psychologists and poets.

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[10] Richard Hofstadter, "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Class," in *The American Political Tradition* (Vintage edition, New York, 1954), pp. 68–92.

[11] Henry De Man, *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans. Eden & Çedar Paul (New York, 1927), p. 497

[12] Sidney Hook, "Marxism and Values," *Marxist Quarterly*, 1 (January-March, 1937), 38–45; Lesaek Kolakowski, *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today* (New York, 1969), pp. 58–66. To a behavioralist, of course, the fact-value dichotomy is a non-problem since ideology serves to "rationalize" value-selection whereby "the cognitive conviction of truth and 'moral' conviction of rightness are merged." (Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* [Glencoe, Ill., 1951], 351.) But Sartori rightly rejects this functional description of ideology as "far too broad" and "almost nil" in its discrimination of the "value dimension" of behavior. (p. 400)

Of course "why" problems may be regarded as the agony of the historian, not the political scientist. Yet it seems that Sartori promises more than he delivers. Although he states that "for the present enquiry ideological doctrines are givens" (p. 399), he also admits that ideology "does belong to the concepts that are supposed to have broad and far-reaching causative significance. Hence, if the eminence attributed to the notion of ideology is justified, it must be justified because the term *explains,* not merely because it abridges and/or provides a regressive stopper. Therefore, as the discussion proceeds the focus will be progressively shifted to the *explanatory value* of the various meanings of ideology, for my ultimate purpose is to probe and single out the conceptualizations that are cognitive instruments, that do have explanatory-causative potency." (p. 400) As one follows Sartori's figures and quadrants (up to and including number six on the "End of Ideology Hypothesis") it is hard to tell where the "regressive stopper" is unplugged and when the "explanatory-causative potency" begins to flow. For example, Sartori's graphic illustrations apparently are designed to establish the conditions under which the "end of ideology" will be realized. To fulfill these conditions Sartori argues that it is not so much the emotive but the cognitive status that must change from (I) "fixed elements [which] are rigid, dogmatic, impermeable to argument and evidence," to (III) "firm elements [which] are firmly held, but are open to evidence and/or argument." (pp. 404–406) According to this pattern, would Mussolini's transition from doctrinal socialism to dynamic Fascism be interpreted as presaging the end of ideology? Similarly, would not Stalin and Togliatti, who were always willing to adapt theory to new evidence, have to be regarded as "pragmatic," while Wilson and Roosevelt, who possessed "fixed" ideas about Europe's political future, have to be characterized as "ideological"? And how would we include in this "explanatory-causative" schema Lenin and Lincoln? Can Sartori's distinction between ideology and pragmatism explain their paradoxical behavior? Lincoln, who opposed Polk's precipitating war by sending troops into a disputed territory and then himself dispatching troops to disputed Fort Sumter; Lenin, who used war to seize power in the name of world revolution and then withdrew Russia from the war thus adhering to the very "revolutionary defensism" he previously denounced; Lincoln, who was passionately devoted to individual freedom and yet forced to suppress civil liberties for reasons of military expediency; Lenin, who with equal passion called for "no enemies on the Left" and then crushed the Kronstadt anarchists for the sake of revolutionary success. Both leaders, it would seem, could operate with "fixed" historical "ends" in mind and yet respond to the flux of experience and change with the course of events while at the same time trying to guide events. To be sure, the comparison is superficial: Lincoln desired to conserve a country by restoring the union; Lenin wanted to transform the world by realizing the revolution. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to use Sartori's models to judge who was the rationalist and who was the empiricist for the simple reason that both men brought human will to bear upon history not merely by comprehending it but by trying to change it. And in a sense both were successful. They correctly read the movement of history and thereby emerged victorious over their opponents. Is then the pragmatic thinker by definition the historical victor, the one whose very position proves that his ideas had accurately gauged the pace and direction of history? Whatever the answer to this question, Sartori's categories are of little help. Indeed, when one tries to compare the actions of an 'ideologist" like Lenin to a "pragmatist" like Lincoln the meaning of political pragmatism begins to seem like nothing more and nothing less than the content and agony of men in power.

Sartori's distinction between rationalism and empiricism also explains very little about the vaunted pragmatism of American liberalism. Empiricism as a scientific philosophy may have inspired a pragmatic mentality, but the intellectual groundwork of American politics was nourished in a "cultural matrix" that would have to be described as rationalistic. One need only peruse *The Federalist* to appreciate the extent to which the axioms of Newton and the "maxims of geometry" influenced the Framers.[13] Moreover, throughout much of our history the American mind was paralyzed by such concepts as natural law, rationalistic theories that were later transmuted into scientific laws like Social Darwinism. It is true that a school of pragmatic philosophers ultimately revolted against this abstract "formalism" in American thought, but the naturalistic metaphysics eventually developed by America's most influential philosopher, John Dewey, had the effect of obscuring the very dualisms which Sartori believes to be the defining earmarks of rationalism and empiricism, and hence of ideology and pragmatism.[14]

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[13] The best expression of these deductive axioms is in Hamilton, *The Federalist,* No. 31; for a per-

To be more precise, let us return to Sartori's categories. His hypothesis maintains that "the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if practice goes astray, there must be something wrong with the practice, not with the theory"; whereas the "empirical attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, something is likely to be wrong with the theory, not with the practice." (p. 402) This is a well-wrought distinction; but once again, how are we to apply the model to pragmatism where, as Dewey emphasized, there is no fundamental dualism between ordinary practice and prescriptive theory?[15] And how are we to apply it to American history where, as Daniel Boorstin has argued, it was assumed that all theoretical speculation was needless since the descriptive (the "is") and the normative (the "ought") fused into an unspoken national faith in the "givenness" of values?[16] Indeed, can we apply Sartori's model to America's past political behavior? Can it be argued, for example, that when political practice went "astray" during a crisis as profound as the Civil War Americans questioned the "theory" of the republic?[17] Have Americans ever seriously challenged the theoretical foundations of their government? On the contrary, when practice seems to deviate from theory Americans have shown a tenacious capacity for either reaffirming earlier theoretical ideals or for creating myths and symbols to reconcile the contradictions between the mundane exigencies of practice and the hallowed images of theory.[18]

Giovanni Papini once observed that pragmatism is a philosophy of doing without a philosophy. In politics it could be said that pragmatism is a theory of doing without a theory. And without a sense of theory how can the political pragmatist discern whether it is practice or theory that has gone "astray"? Indeed, inasmuch as the pragmatist assumes that ideas are immanent in the texture of experience, that precedent gives rise to principle, that ends are embodied in means, and that theory is implicit in practice, one can only conclude that pragmatic behavior embraces both of Sartori's rationalistic and empirical paradigms. Applied historically and examined philosophically, Sartori's models are operationally meaningless.

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ceptive analysis of Madison's theoetical premises, see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Phoenix edition, Chicago, 1963), pp. 4–33; for the philosophical implications, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise," in *Reflections on Human Nature* (Johns Hopkins paperback edition, Baltimore, 1968), pp. 37–65.

[14] Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Beacon paperback edition, Boston, 1957); see especially White's Critique of Dewey's ethical theory, pp. 203–219.

[15] *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (Capricorn edition, New York, 1960), pp. 192–194, 281, *passim.*

[16] *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953). See also my "Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin," which will appear in the *American Historical Review,* February 1971.

[17] No major American political thinker reexamined the theoretical assumptions of the federal republic as a result of the Civil War crisis, at least not in the terms Sartori has laid down. While southern legalists like Alexander Stephens appealed to the Constitution to vindicate the cause of secession, northern statesmen like Lincoln appealed to Providence only to discover that the causes of the war remained inscrutable—"The Almighty has his own purposes." (See Edmund Wilson, *Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War* [Galaxy edition, New York, 1966] pp. 99–130, 380–437.) At the same time many intellectuals blithely welcomed the war as a purification of the body politic—Whitman even drew upon Hegel to rhapsodise about a "general soul" that would reveal itself dialectically through the struggle of opposites. (See George M. Frederickson, *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union* [New York, 1965].)

[18] The value conflicts, moral antinomies, cultural tensions, and political contradictions between belief and behavior in the history of the American mind have been explored in the works of John Higham, R. W. B. Lewis, Leo Marx, Marvin Meyers, Charles Sanford, Henry Nash Smith, and William R. Taylor. For a review of a portion of this scholarship, see David Brion Davis, "Some Recent Directions in American Cultural History," *American Historical Review,* 73 (February, 1968), pp. 696–707.

Historically, past experience may very well show that Sartori's formulations result in a paradox. Can a people enjoy a pragmatic political culture and at the same time question the theoretical basis of its political system? Would not much constant scrutiny force the public into interminable debates over the proper "ends" of government, into the divisive issue of *telos* instead of the innocuous matter of technique? If American history is any guide, the record seems to suggest that only when a society takes its "ends" or "theory" for granted can pragmatism flourish. In this respect pragmatism means the cessation of theoretical reflection and the mystification of process as an end in itself. Studying this mindless, anormative behavior, Louis Hartz concluded that America's "irrational Lockianism" became "one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world."[19] Indeed to have a reciprocal dialogue between theory and practice might require an intense degree of social or cultural conflict, the presence of those very elements who would challenge the political foundations of society by articulating fresh values and outspoken ends, thereby undermining the pragmatic consensus. Hence the paradox of Sartori's empirical syndrome. Hence, too, the dilemma of political pragmatism: a consensualized society cannot analyze itself in view of theoretical norms without ceasing to be pragmatic; without, that is, ceasing to believe that values are "given" in the nature of experience.

Philosophically, Sartori's argument is also questionable. For it is possible that pragmatism and Marxism alike overlap the distinction between rationalism and empiricism since both Dewey and Marx never quite shook off Hegel's influence. Dewey recalled that "Hegel's thought . . . supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy. . . . Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation."[20] Marx also drew upon Hegel to absorb the classical conflicts of philosophy, the dichotomies between thought and action, being and doing, theory and practice.[21] Because both the pragmatist and the Marxist (and the pragmatically-oriented fascist like Gentile) share Hegel's anti-dualist assumptions, Sartori's distinctions between rationalism and empiricism are of little value in explaining either ideological or pragmatic behavior. Sartori writes that "the ideologist cannot have it both ways, he cannot claim at the same time an intellectual and a practical primacy." (p. 402) Why not? To the extent that a pragmatist and a Marxist believe that knowledge is realized in action and theory fulfilled in practice, there is no reason why they both cannot claim the best of all epistemological worlds.

The ideologist and the pragmatist can claim not only a common epistemological premise but a common ontological premise as well. Years ago Mannheim was the first, I believe, to notice that the controversy over ideology brought about "a decisive turn in the formulation of the problem of reality." When the ideologist was accused of entertaining only utopian visions he was forced to demonstrate his ideas were useful and consequential in the real world. For once it was granted that ideas could be "regarded as futile when it came to practice," it followed that "the only reliable access to reality is to be sought in practical activity." Ironically, the concept of ideology negated itself as the ideologist came to accept a pragmatic definition of reality. The locus of political reality thus shifted from contemplation to realization, and the ideologist himself soon forsook the life of theory and became caught up in the debate over practice. Thereafter the validity of political ideas was no longer solely a matter of ends but also of means. And since even the ideologist would have to prove his wisdom in the realm of experience. "The inevitable and appropriate outlook" for "modern man" became that of "pragmatism."[22]

Not long after Mannheim made this shrewd observation the pragmatist Dewey and the Marxist Trotsky debated one another. Significantly, Dewey agreed with Trotsky that "increasing the power of man over nature" and abolishing the "power of man over man" was the proper "*end-in-view*," but he disagreed over the "*means that are judged to be most likely to produce that end*."[23] Accepting Trotsky's thesis on the "interdependence of ends and means," Dewey also endorsed the Marxist position on the historical relativity of morality by admitting that "the only alternative position to the idea that the end justifies the means is some form of absolutistic ethics." But what Dewey objected to was the assumption that the specific strategy of "class struggle" could be deduced from the universal goal of human liberation. Now insofar as Dewey charged Marxism with the "Hegelian" notion that empirical means could be derived from moral ends, Sartori may take some satisfaction in his rationalist paradigm. In this connection, however, three comments seem appropriate. First, the charge had little foundation in Trotsky's "empirical" reading of Marxism, a reading which offered "no such automatic answers" to the problems of ends and means since only the "living experience of the movement under the clarification of theory provides correct answers to these problems."[24] Second, the major thrust of Dewey's critique was to accuse Marxists, and rightly so, of relying on "historical laws" as a guide to social action. The "assumption of a *fixed law* of social development is not relevant" to the issue of means and ends, wrote Dewey.[25] In this respect the American philosopher was not attacking Marxism for its rationalistic mentality but for its pseudo-scientific empiricism and positivism. Finally, Trotskyists themselves were just as disposed to reason pragmatically when they accused American pragmatists of becoming "hypnotized by abstractions" in their puristic "search for truth." Using Dewey's own vocabulary, the Trotskyists declared: "Simply to claim 'we seek truth' is not enough. Even in the highly developed physical sciences, the concept of truth, the adoption or rejection of the whole method of inquiry, must be in the end related to the purposes which the inquiry is designed to serve. . . . Historical and political inquiries do not occur in a social vacuum; they are immediately and crucially related to the political ends and aims of individuals, parties and classes, and function actively as weapons in the political struggle."[26]

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[19] *The Liberal Tradition in America* (Harvest edition, New York, 1955), pp. 11, 58.

[20] "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *The Golden Age of American Philosophy*, ed., Charles Frankel (New York, 1960), pp 389–390.

[21] Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (Ann Arbor edition, 1962), pp. 15–76; Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Beacon edition, Boston, 1960), pp. pp. vii–xiv, 3–29.

[22] *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (Harvest edition, New York, n.d.), pp. 72–73.

[23] This debate, which first appeared in the *New International* in 1938, has been reprinted in the pamphlet *Their Morals and Ours: Marxist Versus Liberal Views on Morality*, ed. George Novack (Merit Publishers, New York, 1966), 57.

This illuminating encounter between American liberals and Marxists, between pragmatists and ideologists, suggests that Sartori's paradigms must be qualified by Mannheim's prescience. For when we observe both sides maintaining that their opponents are "mystical" and "abstract," and both sides professing to be "empirical" and "historical"; and when we see that the debate was essentially over means, over scientific method rather than moral ends; and when we note that each group used the language of instrumentalism and claimed their rivals were blinded by the concepts of rationalism, then the only conclusion to draw is that Mannheim shrewdly predicted that "pragmatism" would be the "inevitable and appropriate outlook" in modern political dialogue.

Assumptions can move models as well as mountains. Professor Sartori's hypothetical assumptions were constructed in the inviting spirit of "awaiting contrary proof." (p. 399) Whether he regards historical evidence and philosophical argument as sufficient proof remains to be seen. Nevertheless, after defining ideology as a rationalistic mentality it was curiously ironic that Sartori himself proceeded to study ideology rationalistically; that is, to set up conceptual models from which patterns of behavior are to be deduced with graphic-like precision. Given the intractable nature of the subject it would seem that when an over-arching word like "ideology" fails us, and when the concept itself resists systematic analysis, perhaps our only recourse is to study the history of the idea in all its manifestations and try to discover whether the various concepts of ideology have had any binding effect on political conduct.[27] Turning to history, of course, inevitably means focusing upon the rich tapestry of the particular and unique; the existential situation where, as historians and political scientists have learned from novelists, political behavior may be penetrated in its full individuality and ambiguity.[28]

But even granting Sartori's methodological premises, the crux of my reply is to suggest that the matrixes rationalism and empiricism are, when applied to the historical "ideologies" communism and fascism, more apparent than real; and that the absolute polarity ("polar opposites") between ideology and pragmatism is, when considered in view of Sartori's criteria and in light of the historical record and philosphical implications, more modelled than true. Too often, I'm afraid, we American pragmatists tend to regard an ideologist as anyone on the wrong side of the barricades. Sartori's otherwise insightful study does little to clarify the situation. The very word itself is so shot through with terminological confusions and semantical traps that it has almost ceased to have meaning in political discourse.[29] What to do? Perhaps we should either develop a new vocabulary and a new set of conceptual tools to distinguish the pragmatist from the ideologist; or, in the ecumenical spirit of "awaiting contrary proof," admit that we are all pragmatists and we are all ideologists.

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 41; see also Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940,* Volume III (Vintage edition, New York, 1965), pp. 438–444.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[26] James Burnham and Max Schactman, "Intellectuals in Retreat," *New International,* 5 (January, 1939), 6.

[27] For a masterly synthesis of the various historical expressions of ideology, apart from its behavioral implications, see George Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays* (Vintage edition, New York 1967), pp. 3–46.

[28] See, for example, Allen Bullock's comments on Proust and Dostoievski in "The Historian's Purpose: Historian and Metahistory," in *The Philosophy of History In Our Time,* ed. Hans Meyerhoff (New York, 1959), pp. 292–299; and the recent anthology, *The Political Imagination in Literature,* eds. Philip Green and Michael Walzer (New York, 1969).

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[29] In addition to the excellent references Sartori cites regarding this problem, see also the debate among Daniel Bell, Carl J. Friedrich, and George Lichtheim in the *Slavic Review: American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Studies,* XXIV (December, 1965), 591-621.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

I hesitated before writing to comment on the review of my book by Professor Macridis and Mr. Schell (this Review, March 1970, pp. 234–235) on the grounds that reviewers are entitled to their opinions and should not have to anticipate dealing with howls of rage from the authors impaled. I decided to allow myself the luxury of reply because my complaint has less to do with the opinions of the reviewers than with the description they provide of what I say.

According to the review, I think that industrialization and affluence "induce inevitably" a decline of ideology, that political cleavages have "dissipated," that people vote on the basis of "increased knowledge." It is stated that I accept generalization about industrial societies *"in toto,"* and that I "believe that the end of Ideology had come." Thereafter, I am accused of a "somewhat uncritical application of the 'decline of ideology' theory."

A capsule summary of what is already a survey of a wide range of materials is a hazardous business. To review what is already a review of some very controversial theses must be all the more trying. Nevertheless, this is a caricature that I cannot leave unchallenged.

My book was conceived as an attempt to assess the claims of the end-of-ideology/depoliticization/growing-consensus literature in a case study of a recalcitrant subject: France. I tried to look at countertrends, to distinguish a variety of groups, to avoid statements about inevitability and the foolish notion that all visible trends were likely to point in the same direction. I emphasized the particularities of the French case and said they might indefinitely impede the kind of political arrangements that had arisen elsewhere in the West.

The book in question, *Political Change in Contemporary France,* is, indeed, more sanguine about prospects for political stability than is currently fashionable, though it makes many qualifications unmentioned by the authors of the review. In particular, it does not come down in support of many of the most familiar "decline of ideology" arguments, arguing that abstraction will become *more* apparent in the political thought of contemporary Western nations, that the Communist Party shows no sign of disappearing in France, that while there are signs of change, the style of politics in France is not yet very different from what it was, though some issues have declined in salience, that depoliticization has not occurred.

Unfortunately, the reviewers' interpretation of the character of the book leads to their treating it as though it were a polemic, which it was not meant to be. This affects the tone of the review. For example, we are informed that "Waterman discovers in his Epilogue a student subculture," whereas the subject is dealt with, even emphasized, in earlier chapters as well.

The book undoubtedly raises some difficult intellectual issues and has provoked disagreement elsewhere on substantial questions of political sociology (*See* Frank E. Myers, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Industrial Systems," *Comparative Politics,* 2 (1970), 389–412.). I would hope that future debate will also center on the important questions of social structure, political protest and socio-political change in the West and not on the dead horse of whether or not there has been an "end of ideology."

Harvey Waterman

Douglass College, Rutgers University

To the Editor:

Professor Waterman has written a good book and the review Mr. Schell and I wrote indicates that we thought so. He is unduly sensitive to the caveats and qualifications that a reviewer has the right—justly or unjustly—to bring forth. I do not think the matter calls for a long reply—the whole subject related to the "decline of ideology" continues to lend itself to many misunderstandings both for authors and reviewers!

Roy C. Macridis

Brandeis University

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

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As of January 1, 1971, the Book Review Editor of the American Political Science Review will be Professor Philip Siegelman of San Francisco State University. All correspondence pertaining to book review matters (except that pertaining to the December 1970 issue) should be sent to Professor Siegelman at the following address:

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa. BY W. HOWARD WRIGGINS. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 275. $10.00)

Howard Wriggins has written "An Advice to Princes in the New States". He deliberately avoids effort at "grand theory" and "inclusive schemes", and self-consciously employs a morally neutral vocabulary like his Florentine model. In his own words, his book ". . . is . . . an attempt to look out of the president's or prime minister's window, to see his problems as he sees them. It centers attention on the ruler's search for allies and his effort to rally support for himself so that he can stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability to get certain things done. It assumes that every leader has some choice in the way he tackles his job, for no two leaders would deal with their problem of aggregating and using political power in exactly the same way. It is, in sum, a study of alternative strategies leaders have used in their efforts to gain or to sustain control, and to use that control to effect their will or whim on the polities they 'rule'."

This is a valuable book. It will find its way into courses, both graduate and undergraduate, dealing with developmental problems. It may also find its way to the desks of statesmen and politicians, both in the new nations, and the older ones, who need a lucidly written book of this kind. While it avoids "theorizing", anyone familiar with the theoretical literature dealing with development themes will find in *The Ruler's Imperative* traces of frameworks and concepts which have been formulated in the last ten or fifteen years.

The study begins with an enumeration of the kinds of problems which confront the leaders of the new nations, the kinds of goals which these new elites tend to seek, the significant social groupings and competing elites which constitute some of the materials with which the leadership of the new nations must deal. Wriggins then turns to what he calls eight strategies for aggregating power. These include: one, projecting the personality; two, building an organization; three, promoting an ideology; four, rewarding the faithful and the susceptible; five, intimidating the opponent and wavering ally; six, developing the economy; seven, expanding or contracting political participation; and eight, using foreign policy. In the final chapter he deals with the problem of the interdependence of these strategies, conflicts among them, strategic mixes, how these strategic mixes can contribute to short and long-run goals, and a few illustrations of the development strategies of a number of leaders in the new nations.

A number of problems arise in attempting to use this book to illuminate problems of development policy in Asia and Africa. While Wriggins constantly refers to the variety of kinds of nations in Asia and Africa, he never breaks them down into groupings which would significantly effect the kinds of policy options which leaders in the new nations have. Here he diverges from the Machiavellian model which offers special advice to the rulers of hereditary, conquered, civil, ecclesiastical and mixed principalities, among others. The seventy-odd countries which are to be found in the various parts of Asia and Africa differ radically one from the other according to their size, level of economic development, the complexity of their traditional cultures, ethnic and linguistic composition, previous colonial and political experience, proximity to cold war conflicts, and other aspects of *fortuna* and *necessita.* Needless to say, these gross differences in the characteristics of the many nations about which Wriggins is generalizing effect the kinds of goals that the leaders of these nations can reasonably seek, and the strategies and strategic mixes which are appropriate for these goals. From this point of view Wriggins has seriously over-generalized his advice to princes. Sorting these countries out by relevant variables and combinations of variables would enable us to locate the particular country or kind of country which concerns us in an appropriate class or type. This would have made it possible for us to speak with more focus to the question of developmental goals and strategies.

The treatment of the notion of strategy and strategic mixes also creates some analytic problesm. The eight strategies which Wriggins treats are laid out side by side as though the leaders of the new nation had relatively free choice in selecting among them. Actually every leader of a new nation will have a problem of rewarding the faithful, and intimidating the opponents, developing the economy, doing something about political participation, and developing some kind of foreign policy. While I share with Wriggins his concern with excessive theoretical formalization, just a bit more theorizing, classifying, connecting and differentiating would have helped the leader of the new nation apply these valuable materials and discussions to his own peculiar fate.

In an effort to avoid the deterministic overtones of some of the theory in the developmental field, he has exaggerated the freedom of political leaders in the new nations. The demonstration effects of the modern world and the diffusion of products and ideas across borders, the cultural level, economic resources, social structure and political organization in particular countries all have the effect of defining and limiting options. A realistic advice to princes would have to come closer to the real crunches and constraints of everyday life. How much real freedom does a leader have in the choice of form of political organization, extent of political participation, the development of ideology, the use of rewards and penalties, if he chooses a policy of economic development? How much real freedom does he have in the broad area of economic and social modernization? What are the consequences for leadership choices of the rapidly widening gaps between the modern and the non-modern world? Failure to confront these larger issues contributes to a certain blandness of tone particularly in parts III and IV of the book.

It avoids the abstraction of much of the theoretical work in the field. It is full of interesting and valuable illustrations and illuminating anecdotes. The price it pays for this is getting lost in detail, and dealing with problems and processes out of context. But we owe a debt to Wriggins for bringing the important theme of developmental leadership into focus.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

Stanford University

Politics and the Social Sciences. EDITED BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 328. $7.50; paper, $2.75.)

This is not the first nor is it likely to be the last symposium on the relations between the study of politics and the other social sciences. But editor Lipset has brought together ten fine essays by distinguished practitioners of cross-disciplinary political analysis. Thus the volume provides a guide to many of the contemporary dilemmas in the field.

Because the authors are conspicuous contributors to both the substantive and polemical literature on the subject there are few surprises. Fred Greenstein and Arnold Rogow find psychology not only useful but essential to the understanding of politics. Scott Greer sees the study of politics as an application of sociological theories, particularly within the context of organization theory. Far more sceptical of the sociological explanations is Giovanni Sartori who argues for a "political sociology" in which political variables would be given more independent weight than they are in " the sociology of politics." William Mitchell examines his own semi-defection from Parsonian sociology to "political economy" while Mancur Olson demonstrates how truly antithetical economic theory is to Parsonian sociology.

With the exception of Sartori, the authors mentioned see the study of politics on the receiving end of the disciplinary theoretical exchange. There is evident among the political scientists, however, an enhanced self-confidence that studies in the political arena might also improve psychiatry and economics. It is a measure of the theoretical pecking order of the disciplines that the historian Richard Jensen and the anthropologist Ronald Cohen are most concerned with the aid which they can receive from the more systematic political science. The symposium concludes with Hayward Alker's tour of advanced techniques in the use of statistics in causal analysis.

In a symposium of such diversity the points at issue revolve around approaches and theories. No one, of course, finds any theory or method unique to the study of politics. What does differentiate the authors is their thinking on how the social sciences can or cannot be joined. The question is sometimes raised explicitly, but more often it is implicit in the discussion. The dominant viewpoint among the authors and one shared by most behaviorally oriented political scientists is that a natural harmony prevails among the disciplines. As Greer indicates, ". . . there are really only two basic analytical schemes in the study of human behavior—the psychological and the sociological. . . ; their explanatory theories . . . are cognate." While no single theory reigns, no great difficulty exists in bringing them together. Certainly politcal scientists have moved blithely from notions of political culture to group theories, role theories, personality theories, communications theories, structural-functional theories, and then to systems theories, all with little intellectual strain. Even when a concept such as the group retreats from its original pretensions as the explanation of all political behavior, it nevertheless remains an important tool in subsequent political analysis. In effect there is a general social science, pluralistic in its explanations, and the study of politics is the application of these explanations in a specific context.

This is the central thrust of Fred Greenstein's well thought-out defense of the use of psychological variables in political analysis. Greenstein recognizes the limitations, but he argues that as long as we can explain the actions of a Wilson or a Kennedy in psychological terms we must include the psychological interpretation in our analysis. Psychology does not have to explain everything, just something in order to justify its worth to political science. And of course Greenstein is right—in a pluralistic social science all variables deserve equally to be heard and tested.

A strikingly different view is that of the economist Mancur Olson who argues that the social sciences rest on two different and frequently opposing preconceptions and methods. At one pole lies the rational calculus, closely associated with economic theory, but applicable in any situation in which men "have determinate wants or objectives but at the same time do not have so much of the means to achieve these ends that all their desires are satiated." At the opposite pole is the preconception, ". . . that people do what they are brought up to do," characteristic of the dominant modes of thinking in sociology and psychology (and one might add political science). The latter preconception finds its explanations of political behavior by studying how wants are derived. The former focuses on the means by which wants are satisfied.

I am, of course, oversimplifying what Olson already admits is an oversimplification; nevertheless I think his argument is correct. The differences between rational calculus and social psychology are differences not of subject matters but of method and theory. One can find representatives of both approaches in every social discipline. Those who ask how man's wants arise tend to use diffuse, plural, functional explanations. Those who focus upon the means of satisfying wants tend to work from logical-deductive theories. In political science in recent years there has been a growing literature of game theory, party theory, choice theory, and exchange theory, all of which seek to reduce and hold constant the "want" side of the equation, to explore the logic involved in satisfying a few narrowly defined or assumed politcal wants.

The importance of Olson's distinction lies in the assertion that rational calculus and the social psychological approach do not blend easily. They tend to produce conflicting not additive explanations. For example Olson dissects the problem of political integration. The functionalist sees political unity as a product of common needs, a consensus of values. The proponent of rational calculus, Olson argues, explains integration as the product of differences, of a situation in which men with different needs and wants find satisfaction in coming together for purposes of exchange.

The extent to which rational calculus and the social-psychological approach are at odds is not widely understood. The pluralistic assumptions of general social science lead us to expect that the conclusions reached by rational calculus are merely additional variables. Yet this expectation causes social scientists to talk past each other and perhaps past themselves. For example, when V. O. Key raised the possibility that the electorate might be responsible he treated it as a question of evidence, and the subsequent controversy has tended to center upon the evidence. In reality what Key demonstrated was that even where the evidence is the same the rationalist perspective (to which Key was addicted in all his work) leads to explanations opposed to those based on social psychology.

The reactions of Sartori, in the symposium, to sociological explanations of voting are similar to Key's. Although it is not explicitly stated, I think Sartori's scepticism flows from the rationalist bias inherent in politics itself. As much a game of rational calculation as economics, politics calls out for theories of rational behavior. The complaints that contemporary political science isn't about "politics" would be echoed in Economics if that field were to devote itself primarily to the differential spending habits of classes and groups, the economic socialization of consumers and producers, and personality differences among corporate executives. Such questions may be interesting to economists, but only within the framework of rational theory.

It is, of course, possible that the truths of social psychology can be wedded to those of rational calculus to produce a truly unified political or social science. But if theoretical unity is ever to come, we must first recognize how different the two approaches are. By making us sensitive to the differences this symposium makes a real contribution.

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The Role of the Congressman. By Roger H. Davidson. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 220 $7.00 cloth; $2.25 paper.)

Roger Davidson's, *The Role of the Congressman,* is one of those few books on the national legislature that can be recommended to both students with a general beginning interest in Congress and scholars with an extensive background in the field. Starting with the same sample survey of 116 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, completed in 1963–1964, that served as the basis for the earlier volume by Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966) Davidson uses the role concept to develop a relatively comprehensive picture of the Congressman and his environment. The author extends the classification of legislative roles applied by John Wahlke and his associates in their four state survey, *The Legislative System* (N.Y.: Wiley, 1962), to the House of Representatives with frequent comparisons between legislative bodies at these two levels. He integrates in a tightly written and highly readable analysis a wide range of previous studies of the Congress.

Those readers familiar with the Congress will find an accurate, recognizable description of the House, as well as a rich variety of new insights drawn from the survey data. For the newcomer, Davidson's treatment cuts through many of the stereotypes of Congress posing basic value conflicts in the interpretation of Congress. The survey results on Congressional attitudes summarized in an appendix are in themselves a revealing self-portrait of the House.

The overriding conclusion of the study, that "the legislator is a divided soul" as a member of both a prestigious national institution with task- and work-group-oriented norms and as a spokesman for external constituency interests, is not new. Davidson goes beyond this general Insider-Outsider dichotomy of members however to demonstrate "coherent and consistent patterns of role-taking" within the House, He finds for example that "the Tribune is an instructed Delegate, a Local, and a party Loyalist; he is slightly more receptive to interest groups than the average Congressman." In contrast the Ritualist is the classic "House man." His pattern of role cognitions are Trustee, National, neutral toward party and slightly less receptive to interest groups than his average colleague. The author suggests a comprehensive map of role cognitions in his concluding chapter.

The most interesting parts of the analysis are Davidson's explorations of some of the patterns he finds. He suggests, for example, why partisan role orientations decrease with seniority, why Republicans are more district-oriented than Democrats, why purposive and partisan role orientations vary by geographical region. He cautions the reader that the strong local strain among members should not be equated with "parochialism." To the Congressional reformer who prefers competitive seats to safe districts, Davidson notes that "whatever the benefits of electoral competition, it does not tend to produce Congressmen who are Trustees or who are free to take a national view of things. And whatever the vices of safe districts, they *do* tend to produce just such members."

Within the conceptual framework he has adopted and the data available to him, the author's analysis is carefully and methodically developed. He offers only "a limited perspective drawn from a narrow range of findings." He is aware that he is pushing his data to the limit and sometimes beyond and that his limited sample-size precludes sophisticated multivariate analysis. On the other hand, he tends to accept uncritically the role classifications of *The Legislative System* and to sidestep the question of how role cognitions bear on enacted roles and outputs of the legislative system. Do role cognitions vary for example with issue scope? The author's own estimate of the utility of further applications of role theory would have been instructive.

Davidson raises some interesting questions about trends bearing on Congress that he might have explored at greater length. In a highly suggestive analysis of legislative careers over ten selected Congresses he finds that contrary to expectation, in recent years, the general trend has been toward younger first-term Congressmen and that prior formal officeholding seems to have decreased perceptibly within both parties. One possible explanation is that "the career ladder to Congress has become more distinct from career ladders to other public offices," a point well worth developing.

One of the most important issues raised by Davidson is the relative salience of internal and external role expectations over time. Contemporary Congressmen are more firmly "House men" than their nineteenth century predecessors in his estimate. The implied strengthening of Insider or Trustee and National orientations has been balanced by a secular decline in the competitiveness of districts which has probably served to moderate external role-expectations. Davidson concludes that "internal and external roles are probably in greater equilibrium today than in the past." He acknowledges one potential conflict however. Insofar as we know anything about *public* expectations for the performance of legislators "citizens apparently expect their Representatives to follow instructions rather than exercise independent judgment." This conflict is not normally serious as long as it is limited to a fairly narrow range of issues. If "attentive publics" grow in number and size the duality of the legislative life could become increasingly uncomfortable. Beyond these general observations Davidson does not attempt to project future trends in representation or changes in the size and nature of the Congressional constituency.

The Role of the Congressman is more than a restatement of conventional and non-conventional wisdom about Congress. It is a valuable point of departure for both layman and scholar as we fashion a contemporary statement of political representation for the American democracy.

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Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis. BY CHARLES F. HERMANN. (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1969. Pp. 234, $8.50.)

Hermann presents several models of crisis decision making and tests them against data from an internation simulation series and U.S. foreign policy cases. The first model proposes that a crisis is a situation characterized by high levels of threat, time pressure and surprise. While the author defines threat as blocking of goals, his operations in the simulation and participant perceptions seem to suggest that the communication of possible use of force is a more critical semantic aspect of threat.

Hermann argues that this combination of three traits produces unique behavior as opposed to any combination of less than three traits. His analysis proceeds to study behavior in crisis situations as compared with behavior in high threat plus time pressure (with surprise controlled) or other combinations of his traits. In so doing one tends to lose sight of possible interconnections of these factors. One also tends, of necessity, to think of only linear relationships.

For instance, Hermann proposes that crisis induces action. This hypothesis is based on cases and research such as that of North's group; but puts aside work such as McClelland's which strongly suggest that inaction follows crisis. By using the dichotomy—crisis vs. non crisis—Hermann must discount either North's or McClelland's results. However, the simulation results are unclear on action in crisis. He then distinguishes among types of action and hypothisizes that crisis induces hostile and exploratory action but surpresses cooperative action. The simulation data support this hypothesis.

However, it appears that "non-crisis" situations such as those with both high threat and time pressure produce even stronger tendencies to avoid cooperation and to try exploration but have no connection with hostile action. Hermann sees this as supporting the idea that crisis has "unique" effects.

Another approach is to follow Hermann's provocative suggestion that variables in the definition may interact. Using a model of decision process developed by Driver and Streufert ("Integrative complexity: Individuals and groups as information processing systems," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* June, 1969) one can propose that a) Surprise can be viewed as amplifying threat since no plans for coping with the threat exist and b) short time compresses information, as Hermann notes. In our model information density and threat are jointly termed *environmental load* and interact to induce common effects on the general complexity of decision making systems. This view then would see Hermann's crisis situation as a high environmental load situation. Combinations of threat and time pressure or threat and surprise might be moderate load conditions, while only one trait could describe low load conditions.

This view proposes a curvilinear relation between the complexity of decision making and load. An examination of the types of action reveals that in low load situations, the predominant response to input was *simple* cooperative acquiescence. In moderate load (e.g., high threat plus time pressure) simple acquiesence is avoided, the more complex exploratory response is increased—but simple hostility is avoided. Finally in high load (crisis) the simpler hostility action increases and exploration is less strong.

In the next portion of the book, Hermann suggests that action in crisis will be moderated by intervening variables within the decision unit such as perceptions of hostile intent by the threatening agent. While the conceptualization in these chapters is quite insightful and the case material is well employed, I found some difficulty with the statistical analysis. The statistics compared the incidence of an intervening variable for only cases of action in crisis vs. non-crisis. For instance, the data say that action takers in crisis see the other party as more hostile than action takers in non-crisis. It is not clear that this result means that in crisis (as opposed to non-crisis) *if* the other party is seen as hostile, action is more likely. The data could mean that in both action and inaction cases, crisis induced more perception of hostility than non-crisis, i.e. no necessary connection of hostile perception with action probability. This uncertainty plus the use of the unclear action-in-general variable will preclude any extended review of this section.

In the final chapters, Hermann proposes an ingenious elaboration of his model: crisis increases pressures to act while decreasing evaluations of successful action. A decision taken under such incongruous conditions induces low confidence and a compensating search for support which generates a flurry of communication. The simulation data generally confirms this model. However, here again the use of unrelated traits and dichotomous categories yields some odd results, which might be more meaningful if examined from an environmental load point of view.

For instance, Hermann argues that crisis produces a decrease in search for definitional information and for alternatives, number of alternatives discussed and amount of participation in the group process. Each of these phenomena can be seen as aspects of integrative complexity in decision process. Complexity will be highest in moderate load and decline in crisis or low load. The simulation data clearly support the curvilinear hypothesis with respect to all variables except amount of participation. Actual participation increased to a maximum under crisis, but subjective perceived involvement declined; suggesting that group integration, i.e. people *influencing* policy as opposed to merely talking, declined in crisis. Thus, all of these factors reflecting integrative complexity do decline in crisis—including effective integrating of people and information, yet the high values of these variables in high threat plus short time situations is not so baffling.

Similar clarifications of puzzling results relating to post decision confidence and search for support in "non-crisis" (moderate load) settings could be presented. However, the above examples illustrate sufficiently the difference between a linear, categoric approach to crisis and a curvilinear, dimensional approach.

Hermann has conducted an exemplary simulation-experiment which yields both provocative findings and a stimulating post hoc model. Exceptional care and insight characterized the design of this study. This simulation had all the usual exciting, motivating characteristics of simulations, all the relevance to actual foreign policy settings, yet was not deficient in control. In fact, each type of threat, surprise and time pressure was introduced in controlled sequences. The data are free of much of the usual complaint that simulation runs are not comparable. Hence, the support derived therein for both Hermann's model and my rudely superimposed model is unusually well founded. This study should be used as a primer for simulation-experiment design.

A final note concerns validity. How far can one generalize from a set of Navy Petty Officers in the Internation simulation? As one answer Hermann well illustrates how Cuba and other cases reflect his hypotheses; and he does point the reader to useful sources (e.g. Guetzkow) on this problem.

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Theory of Voting. BY ROBIN FARQUHARSON. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. Pp. 83. $5.00.)

This short work, which received the 1961 Monograph Prize of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the field of the social sciences, has gone unpublished for more than ten years. The delay is most unfortunate, for *Theory of Voting* is an elegant and thoroughly charming little book. It is, in addition, a major contribution, which may well rank among the most important contributions to analytical political theory to date.

The scope of Farquharson's work is relatively narrow; it comes closest to Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections* in this respect. Within this scope, however, it achieves a number of important results and insights. In precision of thought and analytical depth, the work with which it most invites comparison is Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values,* yet Farquharson manages to perform his analysis without the somewhat forbidding technical apparatus employed by Arrow; the reasoning, though rigorous, is expressed with clarity and elegance, and is illustrated by numerous examples. (Though a number of unfortunate misprints do mar the exposition.) Understanding *Theory of Voting* will require genuine intellectual effort on the part of the reader; but it will not necessarily require extensive background in technical mathematics.

The central part of the analysis—comprising some 51 pages, many wholely or partly covered with diagrams or footnotes—is an analysis of committee voting. The framework is game-theoretic, the members of the committee being viewed as players in an non-cooperative, n-person game. There are m possible outcomes (such as alternative amendments to a bill, or candidates for a particular office), and n voters, each with his own preference ordering or ranking of the outcomes. Aside from the rather innocuous assumption that there are no ties in any of the preference orderings, there are no special restrictions (such as single-peakedness) on individual preferences. The committee must select one of the outcomes for adoption, and must do so by means of some procedure in which outcomes are progressively eliminated from consideration by a succession of votes, until finally only one is left. Most of the analysis is concerned with *binary* procedures—that is, procedures such that at each stage of voting the committee is confronted with only two possibilities (subsets of outcomes) to vote on. The usual committee procedure for successively voting on alternative amendments to a single bill is a binary procedure in Farquharson's sense. A three-candidate election in a single-member district, on the other hand, would normally not constitute a binary voting procedure, since under usual electoral arrangements (e.g., simple plurality rule, or absolute majority with runoff), members of the electorate can vote more than two on the first ballot.

Each voter is interested in casting his votes so as to achieve the most favorable final result possible. Only rarely will "sincere" voting be best for this purpose; often a committee member will find it advantageous to vote against an outcome he really prefers, but which has no chance of being adopted, in order to improve the chances of some second-best outcome. Thus in deciding how to vote each member must weigh various possible voting strategies. Typically, there are many such strategies available to the individual voter; with only four outcomes, for example, there will always be at least eight distinct strategies for each member, and depending on the particular binary voting procedure employed, there may be as many as one hundred and twenty-eight. Since the final result depends on the joint strategy choices of all n committee members, the number of contingencies to be considered is substantial, and the strategic calculations facing the individual voter as he attempts to determine his "best" strategy are hardly trivial. Indeed, in game situations of this sort, it can easily happen that there is no "best" strategy—as in a two-person zero-sum game which has no saddlepoint.

As Farquharson shows, there are indeed "best" strategies for committees employing binary voting procedures, which are "best" in the sense that when all members of the Committee employ their "best" strategies, no single member can secure a better final outcome by switching to some different strategy. (In game-theoretic terms, this amounts to showing that the Nash equilibrium points of such games are pure strategies.) In general, however, there are many such sets of best strategies; and to reduce this "somewhat embarrassing" (28) plethora of equilibrium points, the concept of "sophisticated" voting is introduced. Very roughly speaking, a "sophisticated" voter is one who uses his knowledge of the preferences, strategic opportunities, and sophistication of his opponents to predict their behavior (more precisely, to predict the strategies they will *not* employ), and who uses this information in making his own strategy choice. If all members of the committee are sophisticated in Farquharson's sense, and all aware of each other's sophistication, then this type of "hyper-rational" reasoning leads to a unique result; by successively eliminating the dominated strategies of each voter the original game is progressively reduced until each voter is left with only a single strategy—his "sophisticated" strategy. In this sense, every binary voting procedure is shown to be determinate.

In a second general result, Farquharson provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a voter to have a strategy which is "best" in the much stronger sense of remaining "best" even when some or all of the other committee members play "irrationally", by using non-equilibrium strategies. As one might expect, however, such strategies—termed "straightforward" strategies by Farquharson—typically exist for only a few (or no) committee members.

In addition to these general results, a number of interesting insights are also provided by means of an example which is laid out in detail in Appendix I. In a committee whose members vote "sincerely", for example, " the later a proposal is voted on, the better its chance;" and, a voter who also possesses a casting vote (i.e. can break ties) "gets his way more often than a voter with only a deliberative vote." (p. 62) Yet, interestingly, in a committee whose members vote strategically, both of these conclusions are reversed. "Therefore, to get your way, seek extra power in a sincere committee, but shun extra power in a sophisticated committee." (p. 63)

Appendix II outlines a framework for the study of ordinal, n-person games without transferable utility. This work, while interesting, is somewhat dated, since a good deal has been done on such games since those pages were written. Appendix III present a game as a "model" for Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social*. By analyzing the game, Farquharson secures "a rationale by which to explain Rousseau's hostility to the existence of political parties, and a means of interpreting his assertions which permits many of his apparent inconsistencies to be reconciled." (p. 80)

Such are the contributions of *Theory of Voting*. The limitations should also be pointed out: all results are for binary voting procedures, and do not apply to trinary or other procedures. Coalitions are not allowed; the analysis is noncooperative. (In a subsequent collaborative paper, however, Farquharson managed to relax these restrictions to some extent. See M. Dummet and R. Farquharson, "Stability in Voting," *Econometrica*, 29, 1961.) One and only one of the alternatives confronting the committee must be selected; hence, unlike the situation of a legislature voting on a series of independent bills, where none, one, or all might eventually be adopted, such phenomena as logrolling or vote trading cannot really arise. To say all this, however, is to say only that a great deal of theoretical work remains to be done in voting (as in most other areas of political science).

It is still too early to say how important these contributions will prove to be. The author, however, is unequivocal as to his aims:

> "the theory . . . is intended to be of use. Though its conclusions are reached by logical deductions, its assumptions are not logical truths. As an interpreted theory, it makes synthetic assertions about particular voting procedures and particular modes of behavior. Since these assertions are not analytic, they may be wrong. At least, they are testable. And if they are not confirmed, it will be certain that (logical slips aside) the explanation lies in some aspects of these assumptions. Then the way will be clear for these to be re-examined, and a more fruitful model constructed." (p. 4)

A personal guess is that Farquharson's results, properly understood and digested, will eventually prove to be quite useful, both in the study of how actual committees and committee members behave, and perhaps more importantly, as a starting point for the construction of more elaborate analytic models of political mechanisms. However that may be, *Theory of Voting* is still a little gem to read; and no serious theoretically-inclined political scientist can afford not to have mastered its contents.

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Human Nature and History: A Study of the Development of Liberal Political Thought. BY ROBERT DENOON CUMMING. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 2 Vols., Pp. 809. $20.00.)

This is a massive, rich, and at times curious work. Cumming introduces his reader at the outset to John Stuart Mill as *the* characteristic liberal and defines liberalism as a philosophy of "adjustment" in an age of "transition." In Mill's case the adjustment is three-fold: "scientific" in the sense of attempting to construct an ethology of human character based on a model of the physical sciences; "historicist" in the sense of recognizing the importance of time, place, and circumstance in political development; and "moralistic" in the sense of concern for man's inner self and individual diversity. Cumming professes not to write a history of ideas, but to deal with political philosophies as "structures of knowledge." This involves placing any political thinker in "topological" context with reference to "other studies"—not only the sciences and history, but economics, poetry, and rhetoric as well. His still broader frame of reference, however, consists of what he considers the two great traditions of Western political philosophy: the socio-historical tradition in which political problems are fitted into the context of history and the moral-psychological tradition in which they are dealt with in a context of human nature.

In turn, understanding Mill requires going "some distance back" to the genesis of these traditions and arguably involves the very history of ideas which Cumming has disavowed. For ultimately he traces the two traditions not simply to Polybius and Cicero, but to their differing interpretations of Plato's *Republic* and *Statesman*. In fact that part of the study could stand as a small but fascinating book in its own right. From there Cumming moves forward through Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Bentham to Mill and what he regards as the desecration of political philosophy.

He presents Mill's first or scientific adjustment as having shattered the rough frame of reference of human nature within which most earlier British thinkers had managed to contain political philosophy. For Mill's resort to the method of the physical sciences fails in the end to yield any substantive ethology; the result instead is a radical split between logic and psychology which leaves us with empty method. But can Mill's historicist adjustment save us? Mill on occasion does suggest that with each succeeding generation man becomes "better adapted for study" by scientific method. This possibility that history will somehow reunite logic and psychology is quickly subverted, however, by Mill's moralistic adjustment. If Mill accepts after a fashion the Saint Simonian-Comtean view of history, he refuses to accept the levelling enslavement of man's inner self by such massive facts of history as American democracy. His antidote is of course his concern with the seemingly endless diversity of individuality and the fragmentary quality of any one individual's perspective. But that compounds the failure of his first adjustment by defying the possibility of any frame of reference within which the individual can take himself as being representative of universal human nature.

If other critics have made these same points in one way or another (without returning to Polybius and Cicero), Cumming is perhaps more original and certainly devastating in his closing treatment of Mill's *Autobiography*. There he finds liberalism in microcosm: not only Mill's acute awareness of transition around him, but his conviction that the human mind must still have "a certain order of possible progress" and that a given individual can both represent his age and get a bit ahead of it by "always pressing forward." But all this proves to be, in Cumming's judgment, nothing but a narcissistic escape from Mill's failure as a philosopher. For his compulsion to demonstrate that he was always making "mental progress" leads Mill to distort in the *Autobiography* what we know from other sources about his mental history. More than that, his adjustments with his predecessors, other studies, new ideas, and history become so increasingly "slack" that Cumming uses that word or a variation repeatedly in his last several pages.

But the ultimate charge against Mill is that in failing as a philosopher he becomes little more than an historian of ideas—and of course of his own ideas. That makes him not just an heir of the dead tradition of political philosophy, but the "guiltiest of heirs—the heir who would disfigure the corpse." "There is no structure of knowledge left when the historian of ideas finds any thinker relevant insofar as his thinking was transitional—that is, insofar as it was composed simply of adjustments . . ." And that is an indictment which clearly stands in the case of a thinker whose ultimate concern is his own ideas. How about the case of Cumming himself? He covers himself somewhat by again disclaiming to be an historian and also by concluding that his very "selection of Mill to represent liberalism" was dubious. Apparently in the end Mill is not "relevant."

As for British political philosophy and liberalism, one wonders what T. H. Green or the early Laski would say about ending matters at this point. Both tried interestingly to weave new fabric from some of the loose ends left by Mill, and in a study of liberal thought it seems curious to exclude both the idealist and pluralist variations. One is also likely to be troubled throughout by Cumming's refusal to define liberalism in terms of substantive doctrine rather than as a process of adjustment per se—and especially so when Mill in the end turns out somehow not to be truly representative of liberalism. Self-government, for example, is a process, but surely liberalism's perennial commitment to that concept in one form or another has substantive significance which deserves attention. Again, if Millite liberalism fails as a "structure of knowledge," is that not a charge which can be levelled broadly at most modern political thought, without seeming to single out one ideology or culprit? And if the substantive doctrine usually identified with liberalism is not to be taken seriously, then perhaps an interpretation of liberalism in terms of social class ought to be confronted more straightforwardly. Although Cumming mentions fleetingly the possibility of Locke's "class bias," it is disappointing that he does not deal with C. B. MacPherson's telling dissection of both Hobbes and Locke. For that dissection not only helps sort out some problems which trouble Cumming in those two thinkers; it is also relevant to Mill himself.

Nor does Cumming deal with the provocative revisionist interpretation by Maurice Cowling and W. M. Simon, who suggest that behind Mill's commitment to libertarian diversity there was always the long run expectation of some new, true, futuristic orthodoxy of moral belief and practice which would be virtually religious in quality. They document that argument in part, incidentally, with other works by Mill which Cumming very much neglects—e.g., the essays on Comte, utilitarianism, and religion.

That omission is all the more surprising when one recognizes that Cumming is sensitive all along to the basic problem in liberalism to which this interpretation of Mill responds. He spots it early in dealing with Locke when he notes the dilemma of liberalism in maintaining political tenets without postulating a total, holistic view of the world. It is not simply that liberalism has often held forth a promise of individual and group freedom which is arguably intolerable in any real society without the assumption of some frame of reference within which freedom is to be exercised. More bluntly, the problem is that the promise of freedom is almost invariably explicit, while the assumed frame of reference or orthodoxy is usually tacit, hidden, or admitted only in the footnotes of liberal theory. That of course is the gist of the charge of "hypocrisy"—whether witting or unwitting—which liberalism has faced so often of late. And in the end, perhaps that charge, rather than that he desecrated political philosophy, is the fairer one to bring against Mill himself. As for being an historian of ideas, it is difficult for me to see that Cumming deserves that description any less than Mill. But I should hasten to add that I happen to consider the history of ideas an honorable, creative calling. And Cumming's own extraordinarily thoughtful study, laced as it is with more than a little brilliance, surely confirms that judgment.

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The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's. By Numan V. Bartley. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969, Pp. 390. $10.00.)

The author attempts to document the reaction of the white South to the push for integration during the 1950's, and to present this information within a conceptual framework which facilitates analysis and interpretation. On the first count, documenting white resistance, he succeeds in presenting an exhaustive narrative of the rise and demise of massive resistance as the primary strategem of the white South. On the second, developing a conceptual framework, he is not as successful. His conceptual scheme flows from the somewhat convoluted 'race relations' perspective of southern politics rather than from a more realistic one incorporating the incontrovertible truth that the study of race and politics in the South is the study of an oppressed people arrayed against an oppressor bent upon maintaining that oppression. Because of this inappropriate conceptual scheme the author's analysis leaves something to be desired.

The narrative begins with an analysis of race and southern politics during the decade immediately prior to the *Brown* decision and moves through the years of unbridled massive resistance to integration and up to the period when "never" and interposition gave way to token integration. En route the author discusses the reactions of forces such as the White Citizens' Councils, third parties, community power structures, churches and labor unions to the integrationist movement. Some of the most important civil rights battles—Little Rock, New Orleans, Mansfield, Texas, and Clinton, Tennessee—are revisited. The roles of prominent southern politicians such as Faubus, Earl Long, Harry Byrd, and Leroy Collins are the subject of careful analysis. To be sure, this is familiar territory and much of it has been covered elsewhere. Still the author has made a worthwhile contribution in bringing these events together under one cover for by doing so he forces the reader to deal with their cumulative impact on southern politics. The wealth of well documented facts provides useful insights into a number of subareas of southern politics. For example, while much has been written about the pathological impact of segregation and discrimination on the personality of Blacks very little is known about their impact upon white personality. This in depth study of white resistance provides sharp insights into the pathological condition of white personality as regards race and politics. We see, for example, school boards firing presidents emeritus because of heretical views; state legislatures passing with gusto superfluous interposition and nullification measures; and aspirants for public office being required to respond to questionnaires to prove their unflagging racism in order to gain community support.

The narrative also provides us with a sobering historical perspective from which to view contemporary developments in southern politics. The discussion of the rise and decline of the Dixiecrat party is useful for understanding the contemporary Wallace movement. Similarly, the discussion of the use of violence and economic pressures in tandem by white racists to maintain segregation throws in clear relief the contemporary law and order movement. Indeed we are given at least an intimation of what law and whose order are involved.

Unfortunately the full implications of the data are not developed, as indicated earlier, because of an inappropriate frame of reference. The author employs what amounts to a group approach and seeks to explain the rise and demise of massive resistance by focussing on conflict among three white groups, neobourbons, neopopulists, and business conservatives. In a brief statement which cannot give justice to the author's thesis, his argument is that the politics of race during the fifties was a struggle between neobourbons who wanted to maintain undisturbed the oppressive racist order of the South, on the one hand, and the other two groups who were somewhat more progressive, on the other. The neobourbons are defined as the politicians and political activists, primarily from the black belt, who led the massive resistance campaigns. Neopopulists are persons characterized by feelings of frontier independence with an inclination to defend liberty and democracy, bait interests, support the underdog, and favor bread and butter issues over race. Business conservatives are from the urban middle class and though segregationists show signs of being influenced "by the modern redefinition of human equality and by their urban environment."

While this triadic scheme may be useful in sorting out patterns of goal directed activity among southern whites it tends to over emphasize conflict among them on the question of white supremacy and Black subjugation. Their relationship on this score is more a consensual one than one of conflict. They differ on race only insofar as their position on it affects their pursuit of other goals. The author indicates some awareness of this when he argues in his concluding chapter that the give and take of the political process occurred "within a white supremacy context." Nevertheless, he is content to use his conflict model. This leads to contradictions in his analysis, and it mitigates against raising forthrightly questions concerning collusion among these three groups to maintain white domination. Neopopulists and business conservatives turn up playing roles assigned to neobourbons. For example one neopopulist Governor is quoted lecturing on the best strategy to maintain "maximum segregation," while another is quoted threatening to register "every damn nigger in Macon county" to punish an adversary.

Governor Coleman, Mississippi's business conservative, is recorded as defending the confinement of a Black professor who applied to Ole Miss to the insane assylum because "if he were not a lunatic" he would realize that there would be no integration in Mississippi.

The author's contribution would have been greater had he given more consideration to his assertion that the give and take of the political process occurred in a white supremacy context. Had he done so he would have perforce begun with the question "What strategies were used by various white groups to maintain white oppression?"

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Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization. BY FRED I. GREENSTEIN. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 200. $5.95.)

As the sub-title to his new book indicates, Fred Greenstein wishes to sort out the methodological and theoretical problems associated with research into psychology and politics. His enterprise is worthy. After all, the personality and politics literature has been the discipline's stepchild for a very long time. Greenstein rightly notes that this literature's shapelessness, its dubious methodological assumptions, and its paucity of supported conclusions have combined to discourage political scientists from drawing upon it for enlightenment. He also believes, correctly I think, that without some understanding of the impact of personality on politics, theory building in political science will suffer. Therefore, he attempts to rescue the study of personality and politics from unmerited oblivion by providing it the form and theoretical foundation it presently lacks.

We could desire no more accomplished, knowledgable, or judicious Vergil than Greenstein to conduct us through this mottled landscape. He has been charting the geography of the area for many years; indeed, much in this present book has appeared elsewhere, though in altered form.

The author pursues a three-fold strategy. He reviews the pertinent literature, ordering it into clear and manageable categories. He confronts the criticisms of those who have derograted the personality and politics enterprise; in the process he offers his own theoretical rationale for research. Finally, he proposes guidelines for useful future inquiry in the area. Greenstein specifically disavows (p. 152) any desire to prescribe research practices, but the pains he takes to reconstruct the logic of personality and politics inquiry, when added to the specific suggestions he proffers, belies his disavowal. Is Greenstein's effort successful? I believe the first aspect of his strategy clearly succeeds, but I see only limited success for the other two.

Greenstein proposes to group the personality and politics literature into two sets of categories. The first set is defined by the size of the population to which personality attributes are imputed. Thus, studies are made of individuals, personality types, and large aggregates, including whole societies. Greenstein argues persuasively that there are distinct theoretical and methodological problems associated with study in each of these domains. He next divides the literature by the tasks it undertakes. The tasks are also of three sorts: descriptive or "phenomenological," "dynamic," and "genetic." Again Greenstein has hit upon useful categories. Describing accurately the situation in which personality is presumed to have an impact upon politics is manifestly different from describing the way the personality structure in question actually operates. Therefore, the dynamics of personality functioning should be distinguished from the phenomenology of personality impact. Similarly, uncovering the origins of personality is quite different from describing personality dynamics themselves. Greenstein's analysis of the authoritatian personality in terms of these three analytic tasks provides one of the highlights of the book. His clear exposition will undoubtedly reduce the number of future students who will confuse dynamism with genesis, a mistake rife in both current scholarly literature and popular parlance.

Once having arranged the literature into these categories, Greenstein pursues the second phase of his strategy: establishing the viability of personality and politics research. In this effort, he is less successful. Part of the problem lies in his occasional inability to address the difficulties associated with assessing the impact of personality on politics. For example, he believes that once one demonstrates the possibility of individual impact on political events and also proves variability in individual response to situational constraints, he has made a case for the impact of the individual personality on the political process. But his argument does not take account of a logically prior problem. The only way one can demonstrate the impact of a particular leader, say, on a political event is by proving that another leader would have had a different impact. This proof is impossible to offer, for history provides us no opportunity for the necessary experimental manipulation of events. This dilemna (usually designated the contrary-to-fact conditional) is unresolved by Greenstein's analysis.

One of Greenstein's methods for establishing the viability of personality analysis in political science is to turn the objections leveled against such analysis into a series of empirical propositions, which, if investigated, could yield a range of situations within which personality has political impact. This method, while ingenious and defensible, is marred by the triviality of the hypotheses Greenstein offers to guide the necessary research. Thus, to the objection that individual actors rarely influence political events, Greenstein replies that impact will be greater "*. . . to the degree that the environment permits of restructuring*." (p. 42, italics his). Who would have thought otherwise?

Moreover, Greenstein's method focuses mainly on malleable characteristics of the political environment. Consequently, his hypotheses are addressed primarily to political scientists whose major interest lies not in personality at all, but in the more traditional stuff of politics. Greenstein's propositions thus hold the study of personality in abeyance, by implication accepting the contention he means to question: that personality studies *are* a residual category in political analysis.

Greenstein makes a second attempt to establish the validity of personality research in the study of politics. He aims to remove from the field its reliance upon Freudian assumptions about personality structure and dynamics. Greenstein points out that these assumptions have frightened off many potential investigators. But again he encounters some knotty theoretical problems. For example, he argues that one of the difficulties with the literature on the authoritarian personality is its foundation in Freudian ego-defense. In some cases, he argues, authoritarianism is a rational, cognitive response to a restrctive environment. This is an important point to make; yet it does not necessarily do what Greenstein wishes it to do. It does not establish the utility of personality research in the cognitive or ego psychology mold. Unless it can be shown that a non-Freudian theory produces personality structures which are resistant to the environment we have not established the utility of non-Freudian assumptions. Greenstein apparently assumes general knowledge of such proof, for he ignores the problem. Yet, at least at first glance, a non-Freudian psychology leaves the individual comparatively vulnerable to environmental stimuli. If so, why study personality? This crucial omission will leave some readers with the unforturnate option of either continuing to rely upon Freudian theory or of forgetting about personality in politics. Moreover, as Greenstein himself hints (p. 146), demonstration of the utility of non-Freudian assumptions may be difficult, because even distinguishing ego-defensive from other behavior is problematic.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the guidelines Greenstein offers the future researcher must remain in some animated suspension. However, most of the suggestions he offers should prove useful whatever the resolution of these theoretical dilemmas. This section on Greenstein's work profits by its close attention to the few true successes in the personality and politics literature. But again Greenstein occasionally fails to examine the theoretical implications of positions he takes. For example, each of his strategies for personality research involving large aggregates, while perhaps useful in themselves, assumes some position on the tie between individual personalities and the functioning of such aggregates. These positions are not addressed or explicated in the text, thus leaving the utility of the guidelines uncertain.

These criticisms should not detract from the many strengths of the book. Any analyst of this subject would encounter the problems which plague Greenstein. Few would clarify them so well or confront them so candidly. This book will be welcomed for its capacity to introduce advanced students to the problems and literature of this field. Certainly Greenstein's bibliographic facility rewards us all. It is perhaps fruitless to ask for more, given the state of our knowledge. I suspect, however, that advances in the analysis of personality and politics will come less from trying to follow any particular program, and more from the creative efforts of future investigators unwilling to abide by the strictures of friends *or* foes.

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The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. BY MICHAEL H. ARMACOST. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, Pp. 304, $10.00.)

This is an admirable case study of the controversy over research, development, production and deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) during the 1950's era of the "New Look" in military policy. The Thor-Jupiter controversy's importance in the history of postwar American defense policy would be assured by its substantive aspects alone; it was a central focus in conflicts over how best to exploit technological and strategic opportunities for long-range, nuclear-armed weaponry in meeting a dangerous and growing Soviet challenge to American superiority. Conflicting propriety and budgetary claims of the Army and

Air Force gave the controversy added importance. The decision to allow both services to develop IRBMs, the further decision to produce and deploy both the Army (Jupiter) and Air Force (Thor) systems, and the putative obsolescence of both systems before they even became operative, all served to reinforce common suspicions that the controversy was a major example of wasteful inter-service rivalries. So the Thor-Jupiter controversy became a major stimulus to the Defense Department reorganization in 1958, and to the more extensive revolution in weapons selection and other defense policy processes in the McNamara era. Finally, having failed to anticipate the consequences of the IRBMs dependence on overseas bases, American planners were unnecessarily surprised to discover that our NATO allies' security interests are not always compatible with our own. The ensuing conflicts over Thor and Jupiter deployments helped to uncover a malaise in NATO strategy which still plagues the alliance.

Professor Armacost recounts these and other aspects of this controversy, and also offers to explain them. He builds his analysis around a pressure-group model of policy-making, treating the military services as institutional interest groups. Exploring the implications of this model about as far as possible in a one-case study, he raises and partly answers important questions about how closed is the relatively closed process of converting innovations in weapons technology into hardware to serve policy ends. He offers illustrations and a partial synthesis of findings by Hammond, Hilsman, Huntington, Schilling, Snyder and other contributors to the series sponored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; this study, like the others, emphasizes the highly political character of national security policy-making. The pressure group model is, he concludes, a better explanation of how military-technological innovations are incorporated into policy than is C. P. Snow's picture of a secretive and uncommunicative dialogue between politicians and experts.

Beyond explanation, Armacost also attempts some judgments on the process. How reasonable, he asks, are decisions likely to be in a decision system that weights lateral bargaining among component elements at least as heavily as the central coordinative pressure of the ostensible decision-makers? Much of the justification for the decisions in this case, he argues, must be found in the pressures that activated the decision process, rather than in the character of that process itself. Thus the decision to pursue two lines of research and development instead of one, to create production facilities concurrently with development, and to deploy the missile systems despite their obsolescence, all derived largely from pressures to produce an interim long-range capability as quickly as possible. To a point, rivalry between the Army and the Air Force was a positive factor, opening up the decision process to consideration of alternative solutions; and both inter-service and inter-industry rivalries helped spur new and potentially valuable innovations in missile technology.

But his judgements on decision outcomes are not all positive. The yield in technological innovations was a "haphazard" by-product of rivalry between development programs in the two services, for there was no clear understanding at the center of how this yield might be maximized. Limited production of both missile systems was not decided on the basis of any careful cost analysis; apparently it was just easier to authorize this than to write off one or the other development program, with its parallel production capacity, against the cost of producing a single capability. Perhaps most difficult to justify is the decision to produce an IRBM capability at all. It will not do to justify production of an obsolescent weapon system on the *post hoc* grounds that parts of the product proved valuable in the space program; that was a fortuity, not a planned result. The justification must lie in the interim character of the IRBM capability; but all that was really considered in this regard were the pressure of time and the possibility of achieving an intermediate range capability well ahead of the production of inter-continental missiles. "There is little evidence to suggest that comparable attention was paid to equally important design criteria such as the political suitability of highly vulnerable, slow-reacting, intermediate-range missiles in Europe" (p. 263).

For these and other shortcomings in the decisions, Armacost faults weakness at the center—in the Secretary's office, in the budgetary processes, and in the conciliar and Presidential realms of national security policy-making. Strengthening coordination at the center would be no panacea; but neither, he concludes, does mutual adjustment among partisan rivals yield perfectly coordinated programs. Armacost also records some important changes in the weapons selection process during the 1960's, changes increasing coordinative power at the center of the defense community and enhancing the rigor and quality of analytical inputs. He raises important questions about these changes, but of course cannot answer them within the bounds of a single-case study and a single-model view of the policy process. Needed now are comparative studies, over time and among cases, and a more rigorous attempt to define and classify the stakes perceived by participants in the decision process as they analyze, persuade, and bargain their way to policy decisions. The most important contribution of this study to that larger effort is its demonstration of the quantity and quality of data available in the public record, a consequence of the openness in the decision process that the study reaffirms.

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The Behavioral and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs. A Report by the BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES SURVEY COMMITTEE, under auspices of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY and the SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp., 320. $7.95.)

For several reasons, this report is likely to be regarded as a landmark document. It presents the first systematic, empirically-based, collective self-portrait of ten recognized social science disciplines, framed in a policy context of how professional social scientists, as distinguished from promoters and amateur sympathizers, appraise the resource-potential of the behavioral-social sciences for dealing with the problems of society. The picture of their growth and present state of development is painted as far as possible in quantitative terms: (1) membership, degree production, university research organization (governmental, industrial, and nonprofit-corporate research are passed over lightly), facilities and costs; (2) an estimate of the requirements in dollars for maintaining this existing national asset over the next ten years, exclusive of new, large-scale programs; (3) a series of policy recommendations, directed mainly but not exclusively to the federal government, designed to foster such progress.

The overall study-report constitutes a symbolic act of integrated planning for the behavioral and social sciences. The full implications of the decision by an official committee of the National Academy of Sciences to sponsor its publication jointly with the executive committee of the Social Science Research Council may take years to realize. One obvious implication is that the social sciences have finally joined the natural sciences in pursuing methods the latter have used successfully since the 1944 Bush report to persuade Congress and the public to visualize science as a vital national resource, whose maintenance and expansion is a public purpose to be achieved through investment in annual budgets and appropriations. Another is that the natural sciences have finally recognized that the methods and attitudes of *science* (sic) have been extended to the sciences of man. Still another is awareness and acceptance by all the sciences, natural, biological and human, of the need to apply the full range of scientific knowledge and analysis to the problems besetting contemporary and emergent societies.

Lastly the NAS-SSRC report is important because it is the product of a voluntary, pluralist-federalistic exercise in representative self-government by qualified representatives of the behavioral-social sciences themselves. The manner in which the NAS-SSRC project was set up and carried through is instructive. A Survey Committee, consisting of six to ten-member panels for each of the ten designated disciplines (more than 80 social scientists) was appointed jointly by the Academy's Science and Public Policy Committee and the Council's Problems and Policy Committee. It does not appear precisely how the nominations and final appointments were arrived at, but one may infer the pattern of extensive informal consultation, clearance and cooptation, that characterizes so much of the relationships between confederate peak-scientific organizations and autonomous, constituent scientific societies, was followed. From each of the six major social science panels (anthropology, economics, history as social science, political science, psychology and sociology) a panel chairman and co-chairman was appointed by the SSRC Problems and Policy Committee; from the other four panels (geography, linguistics, psychiatry and statistics) a single chairman was chosen. These sixteen plus two other co-opted members, and a Central Staff composed of a Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Survey Committee, both named by the SSRC, and an Executive Officer from the NAS staff, made up the 21-member Central Planning Committee which designed the study, reviewed and approved the final report drafted by the Central Staff. Begun under the administration of Pendleton Herring at SSRC, the final document clearly bears the imprint of his successor, Henry Riecken, who was co-chairman of the Planning Committee, Ernest Hilgard, the chairman, and Stephen Viederman, the Executive Officer. Harvey Brooks, chairman of the Academy's Science and Public Policy Committee, also seems to have been a key figure in the entire project.

An outstanding feature of the study was a questionnaire survey of behavioral and social science research units (departments, centers, institutes, libraries, laboratories, professional schools, computer centers and central financial coordinators) at 135 universities, whose responses provided much of the data used not only in the overall report under review, but in the *ten separate reports on each of the disciplines* prepared contemporaneously by the panels composing the Survey Committee. The political science study, drafted by panel chairman Heinz Eulau, has already been published by Prentice-Hall, and deserves major attention by the discipline, along with the two Somit-Tanenhaus studies for comparison.

Space limitations prevent evaluation of the authoritative findings and related recommendations of the NAS-SSRC report. No less than seven chapters (1-5, 16-17) are devoted to a remarkably readable, descriptive explanation of the social sciences for the citizen, public official or legislator seeking a realistic understanding of what they do, how they do it, and what they can be expected to contribute toward the formulation of public policy. The Planning Committee's six major recommendations and supporting documentation may be summarized as follows:

1–2 (Chapter 6). The Committee associates itself with efforts under way to develop *a system of social indicators* revelatory of basic trends in the structure and processes of society, and endorses the principle of Congressional legislation to encourage this objective. Pending and preparatory to official, public assumption of this responsibility, behavioral and social scientists outside the government are urged to start work on the problems connected with the publication of an *Annual Social Report to the Nation,* identifying and measuring fundamental changes in the quality of life for all people.

3-4 (Chapters 7–8). To support the analytical and interpretive tools envisaged in the first two recommendations, the Committee proposes the establishment of *a special technical commission* to investigate and recommend procedures for *a national system of statistical data reporting designed for social scientific purposes,* and *a continuing high-level governmental body* including nongovernmental members to investigate and prescribe policies *for protecting the anonymity of respondent-contributors to the national data pool.*

5 (Chapters 9–13). The Committee presents a critical analysis of existing research organization, primarily within universities, and emerges with a recommendation that *universities should consider the creation of new, broadly-based, programs of interdisciplinary training and research, outside the established disciplines, symbolized by the organizational concept of a Graduate School of Applied Social Research.* This organizational unit should combine commitment through research both to basic understanding of human relations and to solution of persistent social problems.

6 (Chapters 14–15). The Committee concludes from its analysis of research funding from all sources that *an annual increase of from 12–18 per cent in federal support of basic and applied research is necessary to sustain normal growth of the behavioral and social science through the 1970's.*

To a reviewer located on the outer periphery of the academic, foundation and governmental circles whose thinking is reflected in this document, the recommendations scarcely seem controversial. Perhaps this is because they are deep-lying and fundamental, far below the popular-ideological level of present-day political controversy. This very quality may lead observers less oriented toward the academic-scientific-administrative elite to question their "policy relevance." Persons accustomed to thinking about poverty, urban decay, crime and environmental pollution on the intellectual level of TV-reporting are not likely to get "involved" in improving our census, welfare, police, housing, health and education statistics. The role of scientific information in shaping the objects of public controversy, as for example in how inflation should be controlled, or how to channel low-income and educated people into constructive participation in local community-improvement programs, is scarcely touched on in this report. The reasonable rejoinder by the Committee that "this was not our problem" highlights the fact that the report was prepared primarily by university social scientists and research administrators interested in fostering the progress of basic social science, on the premise that such progress is a prerequisite for improving out understanding of how to tackle basic social issues. The "new politics" of the 1960's challenges exactly this presupposition, without necessarily refuting it. In support of the committee, however, is the feeling that public funds would be better spent on social research than weapons development, and, far from being radical, the Committee's proposal of an annual increase in federal social science funding of 12–18 per cent for the 1970's is conservative compared with the 20 per cent average that was in fact experienced from 1959–1968.

Within the university community, the most interesting and controversial proposal is for a new Graduate School of Applied Social Research. It is not clear whether the Committee had in mind the model of a School of Social Engineering, to train experts in "social bridge-building," specialists in labor and race relations, in industrial, political, financial and community organization, urban planning, the administration and control of violence in local, national and international affairs, etc. Its thinking is focussed on what it calls "applied" research into such problems. But the conceptual connection between applied social research and social engineering-development, and the institutional relations between the basic social science disciplines and a School of Research in Public Policy Applications, surely deserve resuscitation and widespread re-examination in the academic community, already watching experiments under way at Yale, Buffalo, Irvine, and Pennsylvania State University, not to mention Syracuse, Cambridge, Princeton and Berkeley.

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Political Science: The Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey. EDITED BY HEINZ EULAU AND JAMES G. MARCH. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 148. $5.95.)

The Making of a Political Scientist: An Empirical Analysis of Ph.D. Programs. BY NORMAN LUTTBEG AND MELVIN KAHN. (Carbondale: Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University, 1969, Pp. 72.)

Both of these books are largely based upon questionnaire-response data; both occasionally touch on the same topics, since the Eulau-March volume considers certain aspects of graduate training and the Luttbeg-Kahn study, its title notwithstanding, is concerned with more than just Ph.D. programs. There, however, the similarities cease. *The Making of a Political Scientist . . .*, the work of two young political scientists, is really little more than a pamphlet published by a University "bureau." *Political Science*, edited by two of the profession's senior members (speaking for a panel of eminent colleagues), is one of a series of studies covering the social sciences being done under the prestigeous auspices of the National Academy of Science and the Social Science Research Council. More importantly, the two volumes are addressed to different audiences and are intended to serve quite different purposes. For this reason, I will consider them separately, rather than in relationship to each other.

In early 1966, Professors Luttbeg and Kahn sent a questionnaire to the chairmen of some seventy political science departments then offering the doctorate degree. Beyond their desire to secure information about Ph.D. programs, graduate student recruitment policies, placement practices, etc., the authors sought to answer two questions: First, how do these departments fall on a "behavioral-traditional" scale? Second, as the chapter heading puts it, "Departmental Status: Does It Make a Qualitative Difference?" The answers to these questions will be of interest, I suspect, largely to fellow political scientists.

The authors found (on the basis of fifty-six replies) that 46% of the departments are (or were) "behavioral" in orientation,, 37% are "traditional," 11% can be classified as "eclectic," and only 14% are strongly committed one way or another. Some of those who have followed the interminable discussions of this issue may share my skepticism that these terms have any useful, let alone consistent, meaning. These classifications, moreover, were based entirely on the chairmen's evaluation—and I am reluctant to accept any one man's opinion as a reliable guide in this matter.

Are there measurable differences in the quality of graduate training offered, respectively, at "status" and "non-status" institutions (Cartter's ratings are the basis for this distinction)? The hypothesis on which the authors proceeded was that there would not be significant differences with regard to "empirical orientation, admission and retention policies, curriculum content, language and research tools, testing procedures, and placement efforts" (p. 25). This hypothesis was confirmed. The authors report a " . . . remarkable absence of any relationship between status and *graduate training characteristics noted in this study*" (p. 41, italics mine). These findings are undoubtedly correct—*if* these are the proper "characteristics" by which to measure the "quality" of graduate training. Messrs. Luttbeg and Kahn, I should add, admit that other criteria could be equally—or more—relevant.

To summarize: I am not altogether sure that the first of their two questions was really meaningful and, in any event, am unhappy about the evidence on which their conclusions were based. The second question was defined in such a fashion that, in my opinion, it skirts rather than directly confronts the matter of quality. Still, if they have not been able to accomplish their major objectives—and as competent professionals they are fully aware of these difficulties—Professors Luttbeg and Kahn have brought together some very useful information. Given recent changes in graduate programs, their findings may no longer tell us where we are now, but they do provide valuable base-line data for subsequent studies.

The Eulau-March volume, we are immediately informed, was ". . . written not for our colleagues who practice political science as a profession, but for those on whose good will and understanding the future of the discipline greatly depends—governmental and educational policy makers, members of the Congress and the state legislatures, foundation officials, university administrators, and other interested citizens" (p. 1). The purpose of the book is to persuade this audience that the "discipline's research and research training needs" should be supported in more generous fashion than has been the case to date.

The volume, then, is essentially a proposal, and its organization and contents are necessarily shaped by its basic objective. In a truly admirable opening section, the authors drive home the point that "the further development of a science of politics will have important consequences for the training of tomorrow's leaders, for understanding society's needs and wants, for the development of sound policy analysis and public policy itself" (p. 2). This theme is repeated in Chapter 1, entitled "What Political Science is About" and, perhaps to resolve any remaining doubts, Chapter 2 deals with "Relevance for Public Policy." The remaining five chapters describe, respectively, "Changing Frontiers of Theory and Research," "Personnel: Status and Trends," "Financing Research and Research Training," "Education for Research in Political Science," and "The Prospects of Research in Political Science." These last-named chapters follow a common format: First, the current situation is described, with substantial reliance on data derived from a 1968 questionnaire survey. This done, the authors advance recommendations aimed at improving and strengthening the discipline. In almost every instance, the recommendation specifies the amount of money needed for its implementation.

There is a wealth of information about the profession here. Some of it amplifies and updates earlier studies (i.e., field distribution); some of it is quite original (i.e., per faculty dollar support of research, by status of department). The spatial limits of this review compel a selective treatment and I will accordingly comment only on the projections of Ph.D. output (p. 70). I think these are mistaken in two respects. First, they do not include either international relations or public administration doctorates. Second, they are much too conservative. Thus, they estimated that political science output alone (sans the aforementioned two sub-fields) for 1967–68 would be 391 doctorates. The reality was 452—and the total for all three areas a whopping 561. These technical matters aside, I regret that the panelists did not consider the longterm consequences to the discipline of a doctoral output now running close to 700 annually and one likely to hit the 1,000 mark by 1975–76.

Eulau and March advance some fifteen separate proposals (unfortunately, the volume does not provide a summary of these). Since many of them cannot be briefly restated, selectivity is again in order. I find it difficult to muster much enthusiasm for the suggestion that we establish a "national training program in psychiatry for young political scientists" (p. 51). This may have been a fresh and exciting idea at the Science of Politics meeting forty-five years ago but there are many other fields (economics, mathematics, ecology, biology, even sociology) where training programs would be far more useful for *tomorrow's* political scientists.

Having established my critical independence, let me promptly say that there are a number of imaginative and potentially fruitful suggestions: for "national study centers," (p. 131), for expanded NSF funding for political science research (p. 140), for increasing the number of "strong" departments (p. 74), for new training programs at the post-baccalaureate and doctoral levels (pp. 119–121) and, though I have my reservations, for "explicitly preprofessional undergraduate programs for behavioral and social science" (p. 114).

Are Messrs. Eulau and March correct in claiming that they have advanced some "bold proposals"? I think so. Not only are several of their suggestions imaginative but it would cost almost seventeen million dollars *annually* to fund their recommendations—and for political science this is very bold thinking indeed. They have been equally bold, many will agree, in their view of the contribution which political science can make to policy formation, now or in the immediate future.

On balance, the members of the panel have done all that could be asked of them. They have provided us with a great deal of information about the profession—more, I suspect, than most political scientists want to know. But this is of secondary importance. The panelists were charged with the task of developing proposals which would lead to expanded public support for political science and they have responded with some (hopefully) attractive ideas. Whatever comes out of their efforts operationally (in terms of actual funding), the profession owes them a vote of thanks.

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BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY

Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought. By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. Pp. 307. $8.50.)

This is Professor Ekirch's eighth book. It is interestingly written and neatly organized—a pleasantly readable study. The book does not pretend to be a general intellectual history of the thirties for, as the author makes clear, the focus is on that complex whirl of ideas, alternating in hope and frustration, that were at the intellectual center of the New Deal. The author's skill in framing various and changing images of FDR from the recommendations and responses of intellectuals to the New Deal deserves note. The book draws upon fresh materials in the National Archives, the Roosevelt Papers at Hyde Park, and important private collections. The reader will find stimulating commentary and well-chosen quotations from and on the social and political thought of leading New Dealers and anti-New Dealers such as Wallace and Tugwell, Arnold and Thomas, MacLeish and Edmund Wilson.

However, the main interpretative themes of this historian's analysis of the role of the New Deal in American life and thought are not new. This reviewer finds most of these themes or perspectives on the New Deal present in the Professor Ekirch's previous works. *Ideologies and Utopias* elaborates these perspectives, develops them in some depth, and gives them a forceful synthetic statement. Ekirch's general thesis is that the "nationalism or statism of the New Deal," the "wave of the future" carrying us "further away from the individualistic heritage" of our past, "inaugurated the real revolution in modern American life and thought." (p. viii, 262, 265) The author is clearly inclined to view the New Deal as a "revolutionary era in American thinking." The bold outlines of this image of the New Deal and its impact begin to fade, however, when we perceive them from the interpretative milieu of Ekirch's 1955 book *The Decline of American Liberalism.* In other words, when we pick up the historian's telescope in the 1955 study it is as if we can see the "wave of the future" building up from afar, whereas in the current study the same instrument seems at times to have caught a sea monster looming into view. The conceptual pattern used in *Ideologies and Utopias* is continuous with that developed in the earlier work. The concept of liberalism is at the heart of the matter.

The reader is advised to consider the 1955 study (available in paperback since last year), for the New Deal is here one of the latest chapters in a long story: the decline of American liberalism. If we accept Ekirch's 1955 construction of the concept "liberalism" (which he admitted was "rather precise and rigid") and his corollary idea of "the progressive tradition" running from the Square Deal to the Fair Deal, then the role of what his new book calls the "nationalism of the New Deal" in constituting a "new departure in American thought," even a "new public philosophy" may appear enormous indeed. In relation to the particular terms of Ekirch's norm, "historic" or "classical" liberalism, the stress in *Ideologies and Utopias* on the New Deal's "nationalistic concepts of planning and collective social action" as "[s]ingularly modern" (p. 264) appears logical. The reader may wonder if it is the soundest historical logic.

However, the prospective reader of the book deserves from the reviewer a more substantial account of Professor Ekirch's chosen perspective on the New Deal. Perhaps some readers will be inclined to challenge the Ekirch definition of liberalism as leading to a concept of "conservatism" unfit for coping with the complex realities of a "modern pluralistic democracy." In the foreword to his 1955 book, Ekirch suggested that probably "it would be fairer if modern liberals would agree to being called progressives, socialists, nationalists, etc. . . ." The reviewer suggests that there is substantial merit in viewing Ekirch's "modern liberals" as nationalists and as part of the progressive legacy. But the reviewer proposes that most of these same liberals would legitimately claim that they are "pluralists" and not "socialists" and that, correlatively, the New Deal which is so central to their self-image as well as to their image of American society was not "nationalistic" in some of the ways Ekirch contends in *Ideologies and Utopias.* (The reviewer commends his development of this thesis in chapter 7 concerning the dispute among the intellectuals on the role of education in a general period of war).

Specifically, Professor Ekirch's interpretation of the New Deal's "statism," while it points up some very serious problems (as in the field of education), may have some notable shortcomings. The reader is advised to consider Ekirch's notion of the singular *modernity* of the New Deal's "nationalistic concepts of planning and collective social action" (present also in the 1955 book) in light of

Andrew Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism* (1965), Chapter XIII, and the last chapter of Grant McCornell's *Private Power and American Democracy* (1966). McConnell's study shows how a strong American *tradition* of decentralization has fostered the development of an array of elite-based power structures which by various means have acquired a significant degree of control over major areas of public policy. McConnell writes of the "tradition of the virtuous small constituency" and, like Lowi more recently, he criticizes the illusion "that the surrender of public authority to private hands results in democracy." (p. 367–368) Shonfield's comparative analysis shows both the New Deal's alleged commitment to natural planning and the role of public power considerably more uncertain than does Ekirch. Shonfield says of Roosevelt that he responded "to a national instinct to break up government into many small parts, an instinct which seems at times to be guided by some eccentric model of a system of administration in which a lot of independent bodies engage in furious competition with one another—the nearest thing in fact to a market place." (p. 318)

The point is certainly *not* that *Ideologies and Utopias* tends to be a right-wing diatribe against a "socialistic New Deal." Rather the book's author deliberately steers the reader away from the conclusion and emphasizes that the new political economy that emerged was "an amalgam of private enterprise and government controls, an American version of state capitalism and social democracy." (p. 104). It is almost as if he were suggesting to a large portion of his audience: "I won't interpret this 'socialist' if you won't call the interpretation 'reactionary'." According to Louis Hartz, it is the game that good, tolerant American Lockeans play. At times Ekirch offers support to the pluralist view of the political impact of the New Deal, but it almost seems that for every concession to what Lowi calls the new public philosophy of interest-group liberalism a cost is marked, e.g. by a reference to the "paternalism of the modern bureaucratic state." (p. 263) Roosevelt preserved capitalism but capitalism has become an "adjunct of a welfare-warfare state" (p. 104, 262) Ekirch quotes Vernon Louis Parrington in 1929: "We must have a political state powerful enough to deal with corporate wealth, but how are we going to keep that state with its augmenting power from being captured by the force we want it to control?" Ekirch goes on to write that what Parrington and others did not anticipate was that "the depression would go far to destroy the political influence of big business and to restore to the people the political power they appeared to have lost in the twenties." (19–20)

The reviewer's point is not that the New Deal, in terms of actual achievements, made a smaller impact on American society than the progressive movement. Quite the contrary! Neither is the point to castigate Ekirch's deference to pluralism with a Millsian "power elite" argument. Rather, as the use of the Shonfield and McConnell studies would have made clear, the problem in Ekirch's interpretation is his inclination to confuse the American bureaucratic politics of small constituencies with "national planning." For example, he holds (unlike Shonfield) that "there was a continuing element of national economic planning which gave to the later New Deal, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, ' a social-democratic tinge never before present in American reform movements'." (p. 107) Actually, both Hofstadter in the *Age of Reform* (1955) (pp. 305–306) and Michael Rogin in his critique of pluralism, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* (1967) (p. 204) indicate that this "social democratic tinge" was related to the mass working-class base on which the New Deal depended and to which it reacted. Hofstadter's "new departure" thesis on the New Deal did not stress planning, but Ekirch obscures this somewhat and perhaps because concepts of "planning" and "nationalism" are central to his own thesis of a "new departure in American thought" which he argues was manifested in the New Deal itself (105–108).

The support for the pluralist view of the New Deal's impact combined with the thesis on the New Deal as a "revolutionary era" in Ekirch's book need not be seen as contradictory if we consider Rogin's analysis (following Hartz) of the dialectical interplay of pragmatism and moralism in Lockean liberalism. (194–195) Perhaps Hartz's concept of the liberal, fragment society is more useful than Ekirch's concept of liberalism developed and employed in terms of the tradition itself. To quote Hartz in *The Founding of New Societies* (1964) (p. 117): "What is centrally involved is the entire obscurantist attitude of the New Deal tradition itself which, in its pragmatism, has not dared to disturb the national absolute." The doctrinal connections between the New Deal and the progressive movement are well-known. "Progressivism introduced administrative liberalism into American politics" (Rogin, p. 205) and the New Deal institutionalized it, the process feeding on war-related tensions as Ekirch brings out well. Contemporary pluralist theorists of the new industrial state, are in many ways, part of that progressive tradition which has done so much to bureaucratize the reform impulse. In Ekirch's friendly study they have the pragmatic achievements of the modern technological ego balanced by the moral claims of the traditional liberal super-ego: a new departure perhaps but the pattern of ideological ambiguity seems familiar.—HERBERT REID, *The University of Kentucky.*

The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power. By Ralph Miliband. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969. Pp. 292. $6.95.)

Ralph Miliband is a Marxist—no slavish toady of cant—but, as befits Harold Laski's intellectual successor at the London School of Economics, an unfettered practicioner of socio-economic analysis who can be as disconcertingly unsentimental about the socialist pretentions of the British Labor Party (see his *Parliamentary Socialism,* 1961) as he is caustic about the democratic pretentions of pluralist ideology. Neither the labor movement, the pluralists, nor the Western system of power come off very well in this important new study, characterized by Miliband as "a general sociology of advanced capitalism." In place of the 'postcapitalist' pluralist model (dismissed as ". . . a profound obfuscation of reality"), Professor Miliband offers an updated marxism which although intended to overcome traditional deficiencies accepts that

> The economic and political life of capitalist societies is *primarily* determined by the relationship between . . . the class which . . . owns and controls and the working class . . . The political process in these societies is mainly about the confrontation of these forces. (p. 16)

Free from the sterilizing ambitions of 'value-free inquiry', Miliband pursues this relentless sociology beyond the irrelevancies of empirical functionalism (which in its Simonian treatment of values as instrumentalities must swallow uncritically the non-instrumental ends dictated by the status quo) to a radical posture in which the empirically dysfunctional can be treated as the socially necessary.

Professor Miliband proceeds concretely, undertaking a comprehensive survey of power relationships in France, Italy, Japan and other selected 'advanced caitalist' nations as well as in England and America. Within systems Miliband distinguishes the state from its several organs—permitting comparative analysis of such putatively 'neutral' institutions as the judiciary, the civil service and the military, and allowing scrutiny of the legitimizing roles played by schools, churches and mass media; purportedly classless ideals like nationalism and the public interest are convincingly depicted as guises for class interest and elite rulership.

Miliband does not, however, conjure up a monopolistic ruling elite in direct control of the state, but portrays rather a dominant economic class into whose hands is concentrated a radically disproportionate share of wealth, giving it an irresistable advantage in the theoretically egalitarian competition which legitimizes democracy in the pluralist pressure system. It is this capacity for indirect rule that allows capitalism to flourish in the absence of overt repression.

Compelling as this vision is, the perspective from which it issues is not without conceptual and methodological difficulties. Conceptually, Miliband must rely on the inflexible economic categories of historical materialism. But when uprooted from the European environment and applied to the peculiar exploitative variations of American capitalism, notions like 'class struggle' or 'class consciousness' lose much of their explanatory power—seem almost quaint and antiquarian, as if the standards of "Aida" were being employed to judge the aesthetics of "Hair."

European unions may still fall victim to government-business conspiracies, and a 'socialist' government in England *is* foisting wage restraints on a reluctant T.U.C., but in America unions are more often found black-mailing timorous city governments or intimidating defensive oligopolies. European poverty has been class-conscious, but American poverty is race-conscious. The spectre which haunts America is not worker's revolution but racism, urban blight and ecological mayhem. Indeed, when Miliband promises that "sooner or later . . . the working class and its allies will acquire the faculty (for ruling a nation . . .)" (pp. 276–277), one feels contrained to ask whether this is likely to happen in America under a red hammer and sickle, or a gray Confederate flag.

Economic determinism also appears to be an unrewarding perspective from which to view the psychological costs not only of capitalism's human failures but its material success. Pervasive consumerism, for example, has enabled capitalist society to neutralize values which threaten it by embracing and merchandizing them; like his liberal counterpart, however, the coercion-conscious Marxist is unlikely to perceive that a *Vogue* feature celebrating anarchism or a *Time Essay* pondering Black nationalism can do far more to emasculate "treasonous" ideas than censorship or repression. Nor is he apt to feel obliged to account for such symptoms of bourgeois malaise as alienation, anomie or ennui indicated in soaring rates for middle class crime, alcoholism, divorce and suicide—despite the fact that in many capitalist societies the middle class constitutes over half the population. The young Marx of the Paris manuscripts might have been able to respond to this class of issues, but Miliband reflects the concerns of the mature and cynical Marx of *Kapital.*

Here Professor Miliband will object that such problems as these are symptoms of decadence rooted in the capitalist mode of production and its attendant economic relationships, and are to be fully apprehended only in the context of economics and history. In a compelling passage enumerating some of these symptoms, he writes:

> Opponents of capitalism believe it to be a system whose very nature nowadays makes impossible the optimum utilisation of resources for rational human ends; whose inherent character is one of compulsion, domination and parasitical appropriation; whose spirit and purpose fatally corrode all human relations; and whose maintenance is today the major obstacle to human progress. (p. 73)

But this raises the second more methodological set of difficulties facing Miliband: how to establish cause from historical evidence? How to demonstrate the validity of the Marxist interpretation as against some other? As Miliband concedes, "bourgeois politicians and governments view the system [described in Marxist terms above] in precisely opposite terms—as most closely congruent with human nature, as uniquely capable of combining efficiency, welfare and freedom . . . (etc.)" If marxism is to be something more than a self-evident and closed philosophical system within which everything becomes explicable and nothing predictable, it must in rejecting bourgeois explanations adhere to some notion of evidence and proof. Yet though cumulatively persuasive, Miliband's reasoning does not display a careful regard for rules of evidence. Terms like "often," "primarily," "mainly," or "generally" are allowed to serve purposes which belong properly to sociological or economic data. And where changes in social structure or simple material progress have beclouded traditional class models, Miliband seems to rely on the irrefutable proposition that the non-exploitative exception is but proof for the exploitative rule. If major consessions are made to unions they are to be understood as the 'ransom' or 'price' paid by capitalism to insure its preservation. Though civil liberties may be real and may even "help to mitigate the form and content of class domination," one can nevertheless be certain that "this mitigating function does not abolish class rule and even serves, at a price, to gurarantee it." (p. 266) But surely at some point mitigation becomes transformation, attentuation becomes abolition; at some point capitalism's "concessions" annihilate capitalism and the exception becomes the rule.

This is not to say that such a point has been reached, only that there must be such a point. Otherwise, like the psuedo-Freudian who 'proves' all behaviour is sexual by treating apparently non-sexual behaviour in terms of sexual inhibition or repression, the psuedo-Marxist can explain away every kind and degree of equality, freedom and abundance by treating them as so many "concessions" made in the name of preserving hierarchy, servitude and poverty. Even the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can be understood as a concessionary tactic of a temporarily dispossessed bourgeoisie to insure its eventual return to power. Professor Miliband is certainly no psuedo-Marxist, but he does veer dangerously close to this logic when he avers that "to achieve the dissolution (of class divisions) or even their serious erosion would take rather more than working-class access to refrigerators, television sets, cars or even 'tahitian' bungalows on the Riveria;" (p. 28). Class conscious or not, property-owning workers ensconsced in tahitian hideaways on the Riveria have a great deal more to lose than chains.

Yet for all of its problems, the Marxist perspective comes far closer to capturing the relevant realities of the Western system of power than the sublimely complacent fixations of the pluralists. Its very vulnerability to rejoinder is one of its chief strengths, for its judgements inspire thoughtful controversy, its conjectures invite relevant criticism, and its profound humanity guarantees that politics will not be subordinated to methodology and that stability will never be mistaken for justice.

This reviewer's particular American prejudices make Professor Miliband's analysis suggestive rather than definitive; but the enterprise in which he is engaged can truly be called *political science.* This makes *The State in Capitalist Society* a rare book.—BENJAMIN R. BARBER, *Rutgers University.*

Revolution and Church: The Early History of Christian Democracy 1789–1901. BY HANS MAIER. Translated by Emily M. Schossberger. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969. Pp. 326. $10.00.)

The first edition of this book, written by the occupant of the chair for Political Science at the University of Munich, was published in Germany in 1959; it covered the origins and development of the Christian democratic idea in France during the period 1789 to 1850. The second edition, enlarged by a chapter that takes the story to the end of the 19th century and the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII, has now been made available for the English reader. The translation is competent and the documentation ample, yet this is a curiously uneven book. Some chapters are well organized and readable while others are rather confusing. The book as a whole will be of interest more to the historian of ideas than to the student of the Christian Democratic parties that flourished in Western Europe in the years after World War II.

The reader may want to skip the first chapter in which Professor Maier toils valiantly at elucidating the meaning of terms such as "Conservative Catholicism," "Democratic-social Catholicism," "Liberal Catholicism," "Political Catholicism," "Social Catholicism," "Democratic Catholicism," "Catholic traditionalism," and "Catholic politics." Since this chapter lacks a chronological or topical structure the author's trains of thought much of the time are rather difficult to follow. The next three chapters, on the other hand, are interesting. They deal with the encounter between French Catholicism and the French Revolution and the aftermath of this collision—the attempt on the part of some French Catholics to achieve a reconciliation of church and revolution. The latter task, Professor Maier argues, was indeed the overriding aim of Christian Democracy in France.

A substantial segment of the French clergy at first was sympathetic to the French Revolution. It has been estimated that about one half of the secular (parochial) and about one third of the entire clergy swore the oath of loyalty to the Civil Consitution of the Clergy of July 1790. A member of this so-called "Constitutional Church," Mgr. M. Lamourette, the Bishop of Lyons, was the first to use the term "Christian Democracy." Addressing a parliamentary committee, the progressive bishop contrasted the moral principles of the early church, founded by "the wise man of Nazareth, the true friend of the people," with the later corruption that made Jesus into an aristocrat and "opened the eternal abyss under the steps of whoever would think of breaking the chains of servitude." But the spokesmen of a "holy alliance of Christianity and Freedom," as Professor Maier shows in an informative chapter, soon lost ground and the amalgamation of church and democracy ended in failure.

In the next two lengthy chapters the author treats of the political thought of the traditionalists, de Maistre, de Bonald and the early Lamenais, as well as the reemergence of more liberal currents during the years 1830–50. While this discussion does not break any new ground it is, nevertheless, carefully executed and highlights a good many interesting details. The last chapter, on the other hand, dealing with the years 1891–1901, fails to live up to the same standards of thorough scholarship and readability. The Paris Commune and, more importantly, the laic laws of the Third Republic are barely mentioned with the result that the discussion of the *Ralliement*, the attempt on the part of Pope Leo XIII to reconcile French Catholicism and the republic, badly lacks historical context.

As Professor Maier himself notes at the end of his book, it was not French Christian Democracy but the political Catholicism of Belgium, Holland and Germany that pointed the way to the later Christian Democratic parties of Europe. This being the case, the subtitle of this book is just a bit misleading. The work represents less a contribution to the history of European Christian Democracy than the generally thoughtful treatment of an important chapter in the history of French Catholicism.—GUENTER LEWY, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*.

The Critique of War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations. EDITED BY ROBERT GINSBERG. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1969. Pp. 360. Clothbound, $12.50; paperbound, $3.95.)

Ginsburg has selected 18 of 192 essays submitted by philosophers of many countries. One comes away from it all with two vivid impressions. First, war is senseless, horrendous folly. Second, Philosophy can surely do better than this.

The first impression jumps out at the reader constantly—reminding him of Calvin Coolidge's fabled report of the morning sermon. "He talked about sin. He was agin' it." Indeed, there is so much *agin'ness* here that one longs for the constructive analysis promised in the editor's introductory essay: "Since war is human activity, philosophy must propose plans of action to counteract war. To denounce war does not suffice. Philosophy must lead to the practice that will defeat war." (p. xiii).

Alas, the denunciations of war's immorality, and the proofs of its irrationality, go on and on, but the plans of action do not arrive. Even the analyses which might serve as the basis for policy are frustratingly vague. The familiar "causes of war" are all trotted out here or there: irrationality, frustration, necrophilia, anarchy, ideology, fear, social injustice, colonial rivalry, moral decadence—but none is pursued to the sticking point of coherent theory. The corresponding cures are also to be found—world government, a new humanity, nonviolence, a resort to reason, a federation of friendly states, an explosion of man's will to live, the expansion of civil liberties, the abolition of the department of Defense—but with corresponding vagueness on how to get from here to there.

Is it professional parochialism to expect the philosopher to come to grips with the scholars of one's own (and other) disciplines? Not, I think, if the philospher claims to chart the way to peace. In fact, contributor Steinkraus writes that philosophers should "review the ethical and value presuppositions of the so-called conventional wisdom of military deterrence," and "assist in promoting constructive ideas for meeting conflicts creatively and without violence." Yet one looks in vain, amid the haystack of sweeping diagnoses and prescriptions, for a needle pertaining to the vast literature on arms control and international order. Other than Herman Kahn, who of course receives several barbs, Quincy Wright and Karl Deutsch are the only political scientists cited in the volume—and they are smuggled in by the panel's one political scientist, Carl Friedrich. Nowhere does one encounter either the names or the leading associated ideas of Aron, Bloomfield, Bull, Claude, Falk, Morganthau, Kissinger, Osgood (whether Robert or Charles), Schelling, Singer, Stone, Tucker, Ralph K. White. Have these men contributed *no* "constructive ideas" for "a practice that will defeat war?" Has the philosopher nothing to say about their "ethical and value presuppositions"?

One suspects that this massive inattention to next steps, or even to middle axioms, can be traced to the rationalistic presuppositions of the editor. Mr. Ginsburg is apparently able to believe that "armed with reason man ought to be able to master himself," and that "if we can instruct men to do what they ought, then we will prevent war" (pp. xvi, xx). If the need of the hour is for a reiteration of the irrationality of war, we need look no further. If the need is for more thought the intermediate and immediate range of problems, in a world where reason is often the servant of passion, the search must go on. Perhaps, indeed, it will be furthered by the second volume of essays, which is promised but not described.

Four essays struck this reviewer as especially valuable. There is much to savor in the late Robert Merton's brilliant commentary on the denaturing of our political (and commercial) language. Some of the contributors would benefit from Risieri Frondizi's emphasis on the ideological component of contemporary conflict. John Somerville's exploration of communist doctrines of war and revolution is a salutary corrective to American stereotypes.

Finally, the immaginative conscience, dulled by a quarter century of latent terror, is properly stirred by Robert Hartman's devastating analysis of the firepower statesmen now possess, and its implications. In fact, Hartman's profoundly sobering essay forces one to wonder whether it is not wiser, upon the appearance of any dovish book on war, simply to doff one's hat and wish it well.—GORDON L. SHULL, *The College of Wooster.*

The Politics of Affluence: Ideology in the U.S. Since World War II. BY JAMES P. YOUNG. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 241. $2.25.)

This book is an essay on the intellectual basis of a number of current public-policy positions. By examining the setting of ideological conflict in America and its political tradition, Young hopes to determine what in that tradition is of use in meeting new realities. American political tradition emphasizes consensus with a narrow spectrum of conflict. Both the conservative and the liberal tradition in America have common roots in a highly individualistic conception of the nature of society but they have differed largely over the means by which the individual is to be served. The dilemma in American political thought is the "transitional period" it is passing through. According to Young, "the United States is faced with a set of issues unlike any it has ever faced before." Perhaps most important concerns are reflected by changes in international life characterized by the rapid decolonization since the end of World War II, the rise of powers to challenge America's supremacy and the threat of nuclear destruction.

The premise from which liberalism proceeds is individualism. Faith in reason but rejection of the state as a natural institution has led today's liberals into a state of philosophical disarray according to Young. Also, most modern philosophy has been characterized by a belief in the relativity of values to culture. Niebuhr provides a systematic re-examination of liberal beliefs. Young contends Niebuhr is an important figure in American thought for two reasons; first, as an important symbol of an intellectual mood widespread in the United States and entire Western world; and second, because he is a significant source of that mood. The humanists have criticized both Niebuhr's conception of original sin and his view of the nature of liberalism. Young draws two conclusions; first, the alternative to a disbelief in the doctrine of original sin need not be a surrender to babbling optimism about the future; second, Niebuhr's theology is separable from his politics.

To understand American liberalism, it is necessary first to understand the New Deal which represents a synthesis of older reform ideas and some that are entirely new. The New Deal was pragmatic in nature, relied on "an ideology of the status quo" and lacked consistency. How liberals assess the basic character of the American economic system is a key question that Young answers largely through the work of John Kenneth Galbraith. Young concludes; "The task of American liberalism must be to find ways to integrate a high degree of respect for the dignity of the individual with the complexities of a highly industrialized economy . . . A renewed attempt to define the content of public interest is called for."

Young's review of major conservative writers clearly illustrates the problems inherent in creating a viable American conservatism. Young concludes that Burkean conservatives have no permanent political home in the United Sates i.e., the aristocrats of American politics have been and seem to be getting fewer. The dominant characteristic of conservative policy has been its close relationship to the business world, stemming from the twin doctrines of laissez-faire and social darwinism. Young maintains that the major themes of American conservatism are here: the rejection of egalitarianism (especially in its economic form) and a determined resistence to the further growth or centralization of the national government. The most important point at issue is the compatibility of democracy with economic planning. The contemporary American conservative ideologist is in a difficult, if not impossible position. He tacitly accepts a good deal of the liberal program of the twentieth century even while he rejects the ideological foundations on which the program rests. He resists further change in the direction the country has been moving—they find themselves in opposition to the liberals *and* conservatives—who at least consider a change in the status quo. This is a high price to pay for adherence to the dogma of lassez-faire.

Young argues the near-irrelevance of traditional right-left conservative-liberal categories in connection with foreign affairs. Instead, Young examines the beliefs of Hans J. Morgenthau in "realism" in H. Stuart Hughes in "utopianism" (*An Approach to Peace*). Young concludes that Morgenthau and Hughes are similar on some assumptions. They share a belief in the disutility of nuclear weapons and agree that the weapons are a handicap rather than help in the conduct of foreign affairs. The first major difference between them concerns a course of action; Morganthau would create a supernational power strong enough to control nuclear weapons. Hughes's only hope is that unilateralism will not be necessary—if disarmament and a reduction in international tension occurs in the national interest of both major nuclear powers. A second major difference occurs when Morgenthau defines enemy in terms of attitude toward the United States with hostile countries checked by an arms control scheme. Hughes would oppose arms control and strive for leadership of a regional power bloc. Young suggests it would be difficult for the United States to abdicate the large role it presently plays in foreign affairs and assume a leadership position of a regional bloc. This is further complicated by the increasing role or foreign policy in domestic affairs.

"American political thought is passing through a transitional period. The period of ideological quiescence appears to be ending; at the same time, the traditional analytical categories are hard put to be of help in analyzing the change." With cross-sectional concern for equality, serious questions arise as to the applicability of a liberal-conservative continuum to the analysis of contemporary American politics. Politics has hitherto been largely concerned with disturbing the relatively scarce benefits of industrialization. In an age of affluence this problem is no longer so acute. Ideologies may have certain positive functions, and failure to perform them can lead to a period marked by political sterility. "What is needed is a revival of *programmatic* thinking about American society and politics aimed at a reconstruction of the American consensus." Young maintains that failure to understand the practical and moral limitations of power lead to the corruption of the intellectual both in his actions and his failure to act. —FRED KRINSKY, *University of Southern California*.

The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. BY DAVID MCLELLAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 170. $8.50)

The meaning of a man's words must be understood in the context of his other words, the words of his friends and foes, and the social and economic and political conditions that may have affected him.

It is to the understanding of Marx in the context of his contemporaries that David McLellan begins to make an important contribution; that it is not more of a contribution may be due, one suspects, to the heavy hand of an editor who may not have seen the potential of this book as permitting more than 160 pages of text—with the result that innovating arguments consistently break off just when they become intriguing and demand greater demonstration. The price of the book—$8.50—is similarly outrageous: those who really could make use of the book will be students who can't afford it, while the specialists on this subject either have access to the treated works in the original German or should give up such specialty if they are educated under the latest fad of substituting statistics for language training.

Substantively, McLellan develops the problem of the debt which Marx may be said to owe to four Young Hegelians: Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and Moses Hess. In doing so, he corrects some misconceptions of other commentators and suggests a new configuration of the parameters of meaning within which the thought of the early Marx must be evaluated.

Marx's debt to Feuerbach's transformation of Hegelian thought from Idea-orientation to greater Man-orientation is perhaps the best-known connection between Marx and any other follower of Hegel—and, according to McLellan, an overemphasized one. By the time Feuerbach produced the first edition of *Das Wesen des Christentums* (to which, McLellan points out, Engels attributed a great deal too much influence on all the Hegalians), Marx had already come under the influence of Bruno Bauer who helped make Marx an atheist and whose statement that the religious question is "eliminated for all time" Marx echoes in his well known beginning of *Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.*

McLellan certainly seems justified in arguing that at the time Marx was more impressed by Feuerbach's "humanism" and that it was Engels who emphasized unduly Feuerbach's materialism while the latter was still trying to maintain a tenuous balance between idealism and materialism. A critical reading of the *Theses on Feuerbach* tends to support this. Further, there are some useful indications here as to the origins of Engels's later scientistic materialism in *The Dialectics of Nature* which lays the groundwork for a transformation of Marxian anthropology culminating in the Soviet endorsement of Pavlovian behaviorism.

It is in his treatment of Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner in separate chapters that McLellan focuses on two major previous commentaries with which he disagrees: that of Sidney Hook and R. Tucker, respectively.

Stirner, it is well argued by McLellan, forced Marx to go beyond Feuerbach, substituting a praxis-oriented humanism that actively transforms the world in man's image for Feuerbach's more quietist view of the sensible world as composed of mere objects of observation. By contrast, Tucker, as McLellan avers in his disappointingly bland way, ignores Stirner's influence, while Hook similarly scants Stirner's impact on *The German Ideology* by seeing Feuerbach as the last influence preceding Marx's formulation of his historical materialism in that work.

Similarly, McLellan takes Hook to task for what McLellan demonstrates to be a lopsided view of Marx as merely reacting against Bruno Bauer—lopsided because it ignores Marx's earlier debt to Bauer whose rapid shifts in intellectual development are as politically comprehensible as they are philosophically indefensible.

In his *From Hegel to Marx,* McLellan points out, "Hook takes the intellectual position that Marx had accepted by 1844 or 1845 and contrasts with this position the various ideas of the Young Hegelians . . . especially . . . Bruno Bauer." (McLellan, pp. 50–51, fn. 1.) In essence, McLellan argues that Hook's treatment is "vitiated" by his inability to view Bauer's writings in terms of their changes over time, overlooking for example that what Marx viciously attacks in 1845 as Bauer's rejection of a philosophy of action happened to be enthusiastically espoused in 1841–43 by the younger Bauer. Given such a radical shift, even the earlier Bauer would have taken up cudgels against the later Bauer. If, as McLellan holds, Marx had already been influenced by the earlier Bruno Bauer it is quite understandable why he later seeks to disassociate himself from Bauer's subsequent intellectual metamorphosis.

Disappointingly brief is McLellan's last chapter in which he treats of the influence of Moses Hess on Marx and Engels. Particularly intriguing, especially in view of Bolshevik attacks on the early Marx's still idealistically philosophical humanism, is McLellan's emphasis on the difficulties Hess encountered in converting Marx to a communistic viewpoint in those early days of collaboration on the *Rheinische Zeitung* in contrast to his earlier and greater success with Engels.

In summary, it may be said that this is a useful little book for the groundwork it lays toward a more complete understanding of the meaning of Marx's ideas especially in his early writings. What is missed here, because of both blandness and brevity, is the creative grand sweep so typical of earlier commentators and of members of the Marxian tradition themselves as well as the incisive if sometimes vicious polemics of some of these. As a result it may be possible for some readers to coast smoothly through this present book without being shocked enough to recognize the truly innovating seed-work that this may be.—RALPH P. HUMMEL, *Fordham University.*

The Reach of Politics: A New Look at Government. BY JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN. (New York: Horizon Press, 1969. Pp. 302. $10.00.)

Speculation about politics is admittedly old, says Professor Feibelman, and mentions the names of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Marx. He implicitly requests inclusion on this list with his attempt" . . . to determine the nature of politics." (P. VII.) This takes the form of a speculative exploration of the "reach of politics, a theme which he pursues well beyond the presently known political forms, tracing politics from their traditional beginning point in human nature almost literally *Per Ardva Ad Astra* to the edge of the metagalactic universe. The entire book is an effort to sustain the argument that only by accepting such a conception of the reach of politics will it be possible for mankind to survive.

James K. Feibleman is a professor of philosophy (Tulane University) and believes that philosophers have something to contribute to the political welfare of mankind. His reason for offering *The Reach of Politics* now is that " . . . there are new facts to be adduced; and whenever there are new facts there is apt to be a new theory lurking somewhere in the background needing to be brought forward for examination." (P. VII.) He denies that the kind of theoretical speculation that produced *The Republic, The Politics, The Prince* and *Kapital* are either impossible or unnecessary in our age. The more abstract the theory, the greater will be the impact, though it may take some time before practical means of application are found.

The "new facts" to which the author refers are those of human aggressivenss. They may be "ugly" facts, he concedes, but in order to be cogent, a theory must not go against them and must account for them. Their interpretation requires the abilities of the detached thinker, but the facts themselves are most commonly found in the marketplace. (P. 6.) If the interpretation does conform to the facts, we can confidently anticipate application since:

> If the statement—"there is an abstract truth"—is true, then the statement—"there are concrete situations to which it can be applied"—is an analytic truth; that is to say, the truth of the second is contained in the truth of the first. (*Ibid.*)

We have to concern ourselves with facts, abstract truths and applications.

Professor Feibleman sums up the facts of human nature in seven characteristics, ranged under three general attributes. The three general attributes are: I. authenticity; II. incompleteness; and III. aggressiveness. Under I, the characteristics are: 1. historicity; 2. infinity; and 3. improbability. Under II, we find: 4. privation; 5. discontinuity; and 6. inequality. Finally, under III, man is: 7. intolerant of opposition. (Pp. 21–23.) Since this is not the most usual way of stating facts, Professor Feibleman's own language may serve, if not to clarify, at least to amplify his meaning. Thus, he explains improbability:

> The existence of the individual is highly improbable. If we reckon with the number of circumstances which must have had to occur, and occur together, in order than an individual could exist precisely as he does, such concurrence, and consequently the individual himself, is, on any calculation, unpredictable. Yet the fact is he does exist.

Or, again, consider privation:

> Privation, fourth of the individual's characteristics, is the absence of value where value could legitimately have been expected. Instead of fullness in this regard there is emptiness; instead of perfection, want . . . (P. 21.)

Except for historicity, all the characteristics are formulated negatively, making it difficult to grasp their significance as facts about human nature. From this negative matrix, however, professor Feibleman draws some inferences that are important for his theory.

These seven characteristics in the particular configuration both explains and justifies the pervasiveness of human aggression. He concludes, "The individual is intolerant of opposition and hence aggressive because his authenticity gives him the right to be so and his incompleteness, the necessity." (P. 23.) Aggression is directed against the environment in order to achieve the reduction of the individual's needs, ranging from the ordinary physiological needs to the need for ultimate survival. But, total needs reduction is only possible through the total domination of the environment. By himself, an individual cannot achieve much and even what he can achieve brings him into conflict with others, and out of this conflict of aggressive individuals emerges the need for the state. The state comes into existence through the transfer of individual aggression, and its task is to facilitate needs reduction and maintain the conditions in which the individual may do so for himself. This analysis of the origin of the state forms the cornerstone of Professor Feibleman's abstract truth. The elaboration of it may be omitted, for it is the application that interests him.

The state is not the final level or organization necessary to provide for man's needs reduction. As the custodian of individual aggressiveness, it is itself aggressive and, while its aggression affords some indirect gratification for the individuals who have surrendered their own right to exercise it, international conflict now threatens annihilation. If the state can no longer provide the necessary framework for needs reduction, we must ask what the author regards as the "prime question of the reach of politics." "How far in his political connections," he asks, "does the individual have to extend himself in order to reduce his needs?" (P. 280.)

The answer has a familiar ring:

> There can be no hope for mankind without the establishment of a global superstate, and there can be no global superstate until men learn how to reach beyond local organizations and affiliations, beyond the family, the community, the nation, the international hegemony, and on to the very boundaries of a common humanity (P. 277.)

The concluding section of his book even invites us to consider the extension of our political connections beyond this to a possible "cosmic superstate." He almost seems to hold out to us the hope of ultimate survival by the prospect of a total domination of this expanded environment.

This is the elevated perspective from which we are asked to take "a new look at government" and the Archimedean point from which we are to apply leverage to alter our present politics. I think he is right to believe that the differences which are important to us from where we stand would vanish, but the price we pay for that distance may be a certain dizziness rather than clarity. This level of abstraction is not likely to assist the working political scientist and might prove even less useful to the working politician. Some vision may be necessary for politics, but this extended reach of politics is more likely to seem like hallucination.—James S. Nyman, *Trinity University (San Antonio)*.

Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy. By Charles Wellborn. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. 200. $6.50.)

Charles Wellborn's *Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy* is a valuable and, as the saying goes, "much needed" treatment of the philosophy and political thought of an important American figure. Unlike Rossiter and Lare's brief introduction to *The Essential Lippmann,* which leans to a consideration of recent writings, or the Childs and Reston collection, *Walter Lippmann and His Times,* which largely considers Lippmann the journalist and foreign policy expert, this work attempts to consider the whole of Lippmann's thought over the past half-century and to analyze (and briefly to evaluate) his basic assumptions and values.

Wellborn examines Lippmann's thought in regard to four central topics: the nature of man, the nature and problems of democracy, the meaning and function of law, and the role of religion in (political) life. The author also provides an insightful biographical sketch, and concludes with an extended discussion of Lippmann's understanding of the "public philosophy." Wellborn attempts to show how Lippmann's thought has developed in each of these areas, usually avoiding a simple tracing of ideas from book to book and considers the relations between the various topics as well as the internal coherence and consistency of the various works. Wellborn also professes an interest in Lippmann because "in a strikingly coherent way he has been able to articulate the times" and because "he has consciously encountered, accepted, been influenced by, reacted against, or aided in formulating virtually every major movement in American philosophy and politics in this century." So we are promised an examination not only of Lippmann's thought but of his relation to the times.

Several of the topics the author discusses are very well handled. Most important, the treatment of Lippmann's concept of the public philosophy, his version of natural law, is quite illuminating. Wellborn states, correctly I think, that Lippmann "has failed to deal with his own natural law theory in any truly definitive way . . .," and goes on to provide just such a systematic treatment, showing how the concept developed in early works, notably *The Good Society* (1937), and amplifying the terse argument of *The Public Philosophy* (1955) in a convincing fashion. Several criticisms of Lippmann's theory are also considered at length, and an attempt is made to show how Lippmann would answer the criticisms. Those hostile to natural law theory are not likely to be won over by Wellborn's reformulations, but the public philosophy does emerge as a less dogmatic, more flexible argument for the need of continuing principles in public life. The inherent conservatism often imputed by critics is also brought into question.

Related points which are discussed perceptively include Lippmann's changing and yet partially consistent interpretations of human nature and his conception of the role of elites in society. The biographical sketch also struck me as a particularly good in its brief discussion of Lippmann's early socialism (brought to an end by a job with the Socialist administration of Schenectady in 1912), his experiences in and disillusionment after World War I, and the relation of these experiences to later works, particularly *Public Opinion* (1922).

In most instances, however, the author slights his professed intention to treat Lippmann as a commentator on as well as a participant in the events of his time. He concedes that "almost all of Walter Lippmann's numerous writings are clearly *livres de circonstance,*" but fails to treat the implications of this statement, as well as to trace in adequate detail the relation between most of Lippmann's political positions and his political theory. Lippmann's oppositions to the New Deal and to the war in Viet Nam, for instance, receive only passing treatment. In a few instances, Wellborn's unwillingness to relate Lippmann's more abstract ideas (usually expressed in his books) to the social and economic conditions on which he was commenting (in books but primarily in articles and editorials) affects, I think, his understanding of Lippmann's intention. For example, Wellborn discusses *Drift and Mastery* (1914) largely in terms of a reaction against Lippmann's earlier irrationalism. But surely "mastery" at the time implied not only the primacy of reason but a control of social events, which many progressives including Lippmann felt were outdistancing political institutions. Lippmann is a particularly fascinating thinker because, as Wellborn suggests, he has been extremely sensitive to social currents, has written on immediate political controversies, and has also attempted to develop a systematic political theory. The failure of this work to develop a sustained treatment of the relation between these various levels of Lippmann's thought leaves important gaps in our understanding of his place in American political thought.

Wellborn is also often reluctant to press Lippmann in another area of political theory, that of conceptual analysis. Thus Lippmann's definition of freedom as "knowing [and doing] what we ought to do . . ." is let slide, and his virtual equation of democracy with majority rule is treated much too kindly. Such historical generalizations as the deriving of modern totalitarianism from the Jacobins, a la Talmon, are also presented rather uncritically.

Finally, Wellborn's emphasis on Lippmann's religious positions seems to me to be somewhat strained and perhaps exaggerated. The author argues that Lippmann has made a "pilgrimage" from an early humanism to "semi-theological investigations," in which he has come to rely on the Christian faith as the main support of the public philosophy. But at the same time it is admitted that

Lippmann has personally never endorsed Christianity. Wellborn's closing argument that Lippmann has come to accept the Christian view of man, but not yet the Christian view of God, capped by the phrase, "the pilgrimage continues" is perhaps an unwarranted conclusion to this part of his study.

Twentieth Century Pilgrimage thus strikes me as an uneven book. It is too short to pursue many of the questions raised, and the treatment is sometimes uncritical. Yet the analysis of Lippmann's philosophic positions is often perceptive. Herbert Croly, his mentor on the *New Republic,* foresaw (when writing to Learned Hand in 1930) that Lippmann might fail to tie his thoughts together: "Unless he stops journalism soon he will only continue to write introductions and prefaces as long as he lives." Charles Wellborn has made a useful contribution towards a systematic understanding of the wide-ranging and pervasive thought of Walter Lippmann.—EDWARD A. STETTNER, *Wellesley College.*

Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century. BY J. A. W. GUNN. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Pp. 337. $8.75.)

Tracing the development of the expression "public interest," Gunn basically limits his context to political thought in England from the threshold of the Civil War to the early Eighteenth Century. Believing that sophisticated recent studies of the concept are too remote from its employment in actual political controversies, this political scientist turns to history to "break the circuit of that academic discussion which feeds upon itself . . ." (p. 327). If study of usage can clarify the public interest, Gunn has chosen the appropriate setting. The term "interest" rises from its pre-Interregnum function as a tag of abuse to its modern status of respectability in the vocabulary of political appeals. Similarly, the increasingly popular expression "public interest" gradually displaces rival expressions such as the "common good." Half the book documents the genesis of the individualistic understanding of the public good in pre-Restoration polemics, including extended coverage of Hobbes and Harrington. The second half examines post-Restoration usage of the public interest in religious and economic policy debates and in selected formal political treatises.

As a novel understanding of the public good confusedly moves toward orthodoxy, Gunn overwhelms us with detailed analyses of an impressive range of writers. To disentangle key developments, we can employ a distinction which Gunn finds convenient yet often obscures: Usage of the public interest can be examined with two broad questions regarding first, how it should be described (its essential content) and second, how it is to be attained or preserved (its discovery and implementation). Although brevity distorts the account, we can now synthesize Gunn's illuminating remarks on the rivalry between the traditional and individualistic understandings of the public good.

Often expressed as the "common good," the traditional understanding was popular with those contented with their political roles in a status quo: if royalists in the political wilderness were drawn to individualistic positions, royalists in power "soon forgot such language" (p. 53). Traditionalists described a common good which was quite remote from the qualitatively inferior plane of the assignable interests of private men. Since the good of the organic whole defined the measure of private interests, the ordinary man should be satisfied in sharing in that good—without presuming to project his awareness of private wants (*e.g.,* relief of the Leveller's pinching shoe) to his unaided capacity to discern the common good in public policy. Usually described in terms of domestic order and international power, attainment of this good required specification by rulers enjoying state secrecy, insulation from private interest pressures, and a broad prerogative. Implementation especially required that both rulers and ruled be socialized out of selfishness by means of moral training of youth and persuasion of adults.

Malcontents found comfort in a rival understanding of the public good. Their preference for the expression "public interest" reflected an unblushing intent to bring it closer to private interests, thus accommodating domestic political grievances such as insecurity of lives, liberties or estates. Initially cautious in redefining the public good in terms of private interests, pamphleteers insisted only that the public interest "be construed in a manner that was inclusive of the interests of private men." (p. 32) Yet, their meaning approached the often discredited description of the public interest as the "sum" or private interests. Clearly sympathetic, Gunn emphasizes that "an individualistic rendering of the public interest was not as muddled an idea as has usually been claimed." (p. xi) Far from being naïve optimists, individualists did not say that all individuals could always follow their own understanding of their interests and spontaneously converge to a "natural" harmony with the public interest. Only *some* sorts of private interests were legitimate components of the public interest. This was especially intelligible when this public interest consisted in generalizable rights: "Each man's concern for preserving his own rights necessitated certain general conditions to be shared by all citizens." (p. 337)

Implementation now required a system that would gratify all legitimate private interests (or rights), yet control all wants divergent from the public interest. But such control now stressed linkages to selfishness more than cultivation of selflessness. The new task required first, analysis of the political arena in terms of "interests," and second, manipulation of the environment to channel self-interested calculations and activities of rulers and ruled toward identities of interest. Pessimistic of man's altruistic capacities, writers turned away from efforts to control the *causes* of selfishness to focus on salutary redirection of its *consequences*. For Gunn, this evidently reflects their more realistic perspective rather than a change in the reality of political motivations.

Gunn's Hobbes advances a model of "beneficial royal egoism" (p. 70) in which the self-interested policies of an average monarch approach the public interest by "the action of one, and not many egos." (p. 78) When Harrington builds a republic for basically Hobbesian man, a legislature representative of all interests expresses the public interest, while institutional engineering steers the many public and private egos toward its attainment. Gunn uncritically admires Harrington's "feat in raising political discussion above fatuous [?] pleas for good men . . ." (p. 116) Later, William Penn advocates toleration on what he called a "concord of discords" (p. 182): United in support for the regime, tolerated Noncomformist and Catholic "interests" could be "balanced" by Anglicans against each other. The review of economic debates argues that even mercantilists substantially shared the liberals' solicitude for private economic interests in describing and attaining the public interest. Pursuing the emerging orthodoxy in post-Restoration treatises, the final chapter confines Locke to about four pages for his reticence and conventionality on the public interest.

Notwithstanding lengthy converage of obscure pamphlets and forgotten books, Gunn's interpretations and generalizations on usage expand our understanding of the concept. But since Gunn forsees no consensus on proper predications of the public interest, he could have improved a competent book by expanding his observations on opportunistic biases in interest appeals.—TERRENCE E. COOK, *Washington State University.*

The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'. BY JOHN DUNN. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 290. $10.00.)

Mr. Dunn appears to take the lowest opinion ever expressed by a Locke scholar of the intellectual quality of the *Treatises* and their author: they are the "incoherent and carelessly written work" (p. 64) of a man who remained "for his entire life profoundly and exotically incoherent" (p. 29). In accordance with its antithetical vein, three chapters of Dunn's book bear the title "The Coherence of a Mind." In virtue of "a series of theological commitments" many of Locke's statements become intelligible (p. xi) and indeed "make a simple enough sense" (p. 213). Incoherence seems to become coherent because Locke's "expansive moral insensitivity" and the apparently "corrupt motives for writing the *Treatises of Government*" (p. 260), did not induce him to abandon "the majority of mankind to the careers of naturalistic deprivation." Strauss and Macpherson deserve well for having exposed a Locke who had the courage, however decorously veiled, "of his own filthy morality" (p. 205). The appropriate historical question is still: "Why should Locke have chosen to cast himself as the ideological hangman of the new [capitalist] order" (p. 213) and have based property on labour (p. 211)? The true answer is: "The ferocious moralism" of Puritanism was still consistent in Locke (p. 228).

With the help of evidence from outside the *Treatises,* Dunn relates Locke's outlook to the Protestant ethic of "the calling," reflecting a "Puritan egalitarianism" according to which "men were equal as Christians" as well as on "the level of energy and commitment" required in each particular role (p. 226). Gross social inequality is unaffected by this egalitarianism, but the latter becomes meaningless because the coerciveness of wage labour is insignificant in comparison with "the boundless repression demanded by the calling" (p. 264). Such an apologia for the existing order does not amount to "an unequivocal charter" for a minority (p. 236). In denying "authority which is both intrinsically human and legitimate" (p. 127), Locke conferred "on the individual a moral status" which alone in his time "would enable him to call into question the moral legitimacy of his society" (p. 261). In practice, this means no more than the *duty* to resist the imposition of a particular interpretation of religious duties, "the forcible appropriation of real physical goods," and the use of "religious sanctions for the corrupt desires of the powerful" (p. 246).

An interpretation is not necessarily impaired because it reflects its author's ideological outlook. One kind of ideological perspective often highlights what other kinds obscure. Here, however the distortion attendant upon the author's perspective is at once revealed by the fact that he turns into a mutilated adjunct what is the predominant thematic concern of the *Treatises*: the foundation on rational principles and the delineation in practice of the exercise of the specifically political rights and duties which men and governments have towards each other. Dunn bluntly asserts that

Locke's treatment of sovereign power is "notably inconsequential" (p. 13); that his constitutionalism is "facile" and 'evasive" (p. 12) and that it "muddies much of the already opaque exposition of the *Second Treatise*" (p. 14). The verdict that Locke's constitutionalism amounts to no more than "a few genteel pieties" (p. 206) is far from being borne out by Dunn's disparagement of Locke's concern with parliamentary control "of a kind" (p. 53) by means of the rule "no taxation without parliaments" (p. 54)—a disparagement based on Locke's (admittedly considerable) concessions to executive prerogative. Dunn seems to overlook that even the discretionary power to suspend laws is effectively counterbalanced if the executive is not permitted to legislate alone. Locke clearly endorsed in II. 94 this principle as the inevitable lesson of history. He was, indeed, the apologist of existing institutions as well as the purveyor of principles to call into question their performance and further adequacy. But much as these principles might owe to his religious convictions, they reflect even more his observation of the political process and aim at elevating its moral status by securing the rule of law "in its true notion." (II, 57).

His criticism of positive law does not indicate that the divine purposes are necessarily predicated on "corrupt legal orders" (p. 220), or that his thought "is in essence wholly opposed to the legalistic perspective" (note 2, p. 149), but that, to be just, positive laws must conform to natural law. To achieve this the better, Locke justified, alongside the mutually checking interplay of constitutional powerholders, also that between them and the extra-constitutional, that is revolutionary, authority of the people at large.

No doubt, formally, the argument of the *Treatises* rests on a theological premise. Given that God, the creator of man, has prohibited suicide, political authority as such can only derive from God because it involves power over other men's lives (p. 88). Dunn himself admits that the mature Locke no longer invoked God's positive law (p. 98) for the embodiment of divine purposes which alone legitimate political arrangements (p. 93). Nevertheless, Lockean society is only "formally de-christianized") its evaluation in the *Treatises* is "saturated with Christian assumptions" (p. 99). This too, however, is obscured by the "explicit procedures in the *Treatises* . . . to a considerable extent," for "Locke claims to be considering the human condition . . . in terms of reason" (p. 98). Yet Dunn rejects the assumption of esoteric writing (p. x) and stipulate that "a rigidly *conventional* background" needs no elaboration (p. 88). He thereupon proceeds coolly as if that which is not elaborated were attested by the text as it stands. Dunn extrapolates from II, 54 and 57 that "the duties which . . . [men] owe to God demand that they possess a certain sort of freedom" (p. 121), although neither God or any religious duty are mentioned there. He also contends that in II, 11 the right to resist the aggressor is not argued in terms of a "plausible naturalism" but in terms of securing against the violation of "the Hebraic unity of the tribal family" (p. 168). The text quoted in note 3 shows that the biblical injunction serves as an exemplificiation of a rule of reason. Where the disclosure of the "theological matrix" is not concerned, Dunn likewise makes his points less by detailed textual analysis than by summary reference to sections or mere quotation. The same applies to his ascriptions of a normative, sociological, logical, legal, or jural character to statements. (For some examples where it is far from self-evident that the text he relies upon bears him out, cp. p. 133 and II, 121, lines 16–7; p. 52, lines 4–6, has no foundation whatsoever in II, 158 [or elsewhere]; cp. also pp. 134–5, note 3 and II, 120, lines 4–5; p. 115, lines 18–22, the two following quotations in the text and that in note 2, p. 116; p. 128 and note 2; p. 145 and note 2; p. 168 and note 3; cp. also note 2, p. 181, lines 12–3 and lines 29–33 for one instance in this reviewer's self-defense and lines 24–6 for the unproved dismissal of Laslett's reading of II, 219.) Dunn not only disregards textual evidence, like I, 86, 112, which contravenes his assertion of Locke's "overwhelming, immediate and unhesitating acceptance of biblical commands" (note 1, p. 94). He equally ignores the *Treatises* (I, 41–3) when he quite correctly, affirms that, for Locke, charity remained a component of justice (p. 214).

Lack of exhaustive consideration and analysis of the text (not to mention his treatment of other interpreters) is accompanied by the often erratic quality of the author's exposition. A particularly striking example is to be found in the statements about the state of nature. Despite its "ahistoricity" (p. 103), it "may appear in history less often in its purer forms . . ." (p. 110) and its practical relationship with the state of war would not seem to be precluded by the logical impossibility of this relationship (p. 165 and note 2, p. 181).

Thus, not all the shortcomings of this book emanate from the attempt to foist a social theology on the *Treatises*. Yet it is this unconvincing attempt which ultimately outweighs the fact that in accordance with the title of the book and the subtle *aperçus* about the interplay between ideas and social history (pp. 208 ff.), Dunn occasionally throws light on some puzzling passages and, citing evidence from Locke's private papers, places in correct perspective views expressed in the *Trea-*

tises such as those concerning "the industrious and the rational." It is all the most regrettable, therefore, that Dunn should not have contented himself with using his finding about the social significance of Locke's religious outlook (whether or not it deserves the adjective "puritan") to give proper weight to all those aspects of the argument of the *Treatises* in which this outlook demonstrably reverberates and which lend themselves in principle to the conception and realization of social welfare policies. Indeed, Dunn himself prejudges, at least indirectly, his more ambitious target when he says that ". . . there has as yet to be a synthetic study which re-examines Locke's intellectual life from the perspective of his religious concerns. It is an astonishing lacuna." (Note 2, p. 195). In view of the peremptory presentation of his thesis, this is an astonishing aside; it perhaps augurs that we may still expect from John Dunn a no less scintillating but an in every sense more balanced study of the subject—hopefully, clad in more moderate language.—M. SELIGER, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.*

Casyndekan Machiavelli. BY THE STAFF OF CASYNDEKAN, INC. (Colorado Springs: Casyndekan, Inc., 1969. Pp. 154. $3.75.)

Any new treatment of Niccolo Machiavelli is likely to evoke the interest of traditional political theorists if not most political scientists. If "Machiavelli has been computerized" is given as a description of the "treatment," initial interest is even more keen—given the profession's recent experimentation with computerization in methodology. Indeed, the publisher's first words to a reader of *Casyndekan Machiavelli* tend to enhance the excitement: "Congratulations. You are now involved in the newest breakthrough in computerized learning and information retrieval."

The work consists of 146 pages of computer printouts, six printed pages at the end under a heading of "Conceptual Framework and Definitions," besides the XIII pages of introductory and explanatory material. On p. IX it is stated that the system "is designed to assist a reader to identify quickly the most relevant ideas contained within an author's work." It is then explained that 27 conceptual categories are established under which the most relevant ideas will be gathered. These relevant ideas consist of 116 statements ("information items"), 76 of which have been gleaned from Machiavelli's *The Art of War* and 40 from *The Prince*. Those items selected to fall within each of the 27 concepts are also designed to fall in the chronological order of priority as mandated by "computer synthesis" as having "the most definition weight under the particular heading" (p. XI). On p. 149 it appears that it was the staff which found 116 information items "to be applicable" to the selected concepts, but it was the computer by unexplained decision-making which assigned the "definition weights" within each category as well as assigning the statements to the various categories.

After examining the plan and design and description of the system, one may be forgiven the impulse toward frustration when one wonders what standards that computer used to select items for each category and what kind of scales it used to arrive at "definition weight." For example, under the category "capability," one wonders why the statement "whoever engages in a war must use every means to put himself in a position of facing his enemy in the field, and beating him there if possible" is given such great weight as to be the fifth entry while the light-weight 99th item under "capability" is: "A prince . . . must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful . . ." Leaving aside the problem of the enigma of category selection and definition-weighting by the computer, one may proceed, nevertheless, to the impressionistic reading of the narratives appearing under the categories. After a few such readings, the impression of "repetition" is all-pervading, and the impulse to do scalograms and to look for coefficients is strong. This impulse may be resisted even while applying a slight dose of old-fashioned analysis.

Perhaps the most obvious finding is that there was one statement by Machiavelli which the computer found to be powerful medicine indeed, i.e., "Some princes have not immediately sent an army to oppose the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incursion into the enemy's country, thereby obligating him to return and defend himself." Of all the 27 categories, this statement appears in 25. It is also given great weight: In 15 categories it is statement number one, in 6 categories it is number two, and it finds its lowest weight as number five under the concept "security." In 2 categories the statement does not appear at all, and how can that be explained? For these two categories are: "Decision-Making Environment" and "Leadership."

Another old-fashioned analytical approach is somewhat productive. Forty of the "information items" are taken from *The Prince*. Of these 40, 39 are recorded under the concept "Objective." Which one is missing?—Satement Number 113: "There are three different kinds of brains. The one understands things unassisted, the other understands things when shown by others, the third understands neither alone nor with the explanation of others." A guide may perhaps be imagined which would exclude this statement from the category "Objective," but one wonders how such a guide would *include* the following: "Towns and fortresses . . . may be strong either by nature or by art." If the latter is "a decision-making situation," as definitionally stated on p. 151, why isn't the former?

Of the 40 *Prince* statements, 30 appear under the concept "Energy" and 31 appear under "Means." The same 22 appear under both, and the "definition weights" do not vary greatly. Again, 23 of the 40 appear under "Leadership," and 22 under "Economy," with 14 of these identical.

To old Machiavelli hands it may be of interest to note a sampling of Machiavelli's *Prince* statements which were not selected by the staff as "information items: (1) "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin than his preservation"; (2) ". . . some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and wellbeing"; (3) "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interest . . ."; (4) ". . . the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country"; and (5) no allusion is made to the lion and the fox.

The publisher asserts that the value of *Casyndekan Machiavelli* in the classroom "is apparent." This reviewer does not find it to be apparent, and even doubts the value of that computer as an objectifier of Machiavelli.—ELBERT M. BYRD, *University of Maryland.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Judging Delinquents. BY ROBERT M. EMERSON. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 278. $8.95.)

Judging Delinquents is a surprisingly provocative book. Juvenile courts are not at the center of the political arena nor have they been studied by political scientists interested in the judicial process. But this is an important book because it raises fundamental questions about American justice and illuminates promising but untouched areas of research. Although Emerson is a sociologist whose work is almost entirely descriptive and in the social anthropological tradition of Ervin Goffman, political scientists interested in courts and the distribution of justice have much to learn from him. Despite the fact that Emerson studies only a single court in an unidentified metropolitan center, his book is full of hypotheses begging systematic examination.

The opening chapters describe how the court structures its relationships with its political environment and the other governmental and social institutions with which it must work. These chapters are unusually sensitive to the opportunities as well as constraints imposed by the court's political and organizational context. Emerson is happily innocent of the silly arguments about a non-partisan judiciary and notices that the judge's past political connections help him in obtaining certain resources for his court while also making him sensitive to only some currents of community opinion about juvenile crime.

The heart of the book deals with the process by which juveniles are judged. Emerson sees it as a process involving the assessment of "moral character." On one side are "pitches"—arguments by adult sponsors like parents and ministers in favor of the defendant. Opposing them are "denunciations" mostly by the police but occasionally by private complainants. The court seeks to establish the moral character of the juvenile to determine whether he is normal and therefore safe to be left on the streets or whether his moral character is hopelessly flawed and therefore requires committment to a juvenile detention center or, if a psychiatrist will vouch for the juvenile's psychotic state, to a mental institution. In the assessment, the specific act of which the juvenile has been accused is less important than his background, his prior actions, and his demeanor in court. If he is penitent he is more likely to be treated leniently than if he vigorously denies his guilt or impugnes the motives of the police and other authorities. Most of the ritual surrounding in- and out-of-court processing is interpreted by Emerson to be aimed at assessing the defendant's moral character and degrading his status rather than for determining the truth of the accusation against the juvenile.

Emerson's description of this juvenile court's operation bears a striking resemblance to Soviet justice (see Harold J. Berman, *Justice in the USSR,* N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1963 and George Feifer, *Justice in Moscow* N.Y.: Delta Books, 1965) although the author does not seem to be aware of the parallel. In both court systems, the objective is to assess moral character rather than guilt for a specific misdeed. In both, confession and moral degradation play a major role in the court-room ritual. In both, denunciation is a core technique and the court is protective of the denouncers.

Emerson's book raises many questions which ought to be on our research agenda. One concerns the conditions which have led to this focus on character assessment rather than guilt. One possibility is that it is a peculiarity of this or all juvenile courts which seek to "treat" and to help juveniles rather than punish them. Court personnel realize that committment to penal institutions will reinforce the delinquent's criminal tendencies rather than save him from further wrongdoing. But they have neither the resources nor the methods to "treat" wrongdoers. Social science does not yet provide certain enough diagnoses to winnow the chronic from the acute cases of delinquency or to separate those requiring one kind of treatment from those requiring another. Consequently, the court attempts a crude form of moral assessment that can lead to a justification of its decisions to "help" by probationary supervision or committment to a penal institution those beyond help.

However what Emerson describes is not an insignificant fragment of the judicial process. Much of the criminal process resembles elements of the juvenile court's work. Almost all accused are put to a crude test of moral character when judges decide to release them on bail or recognizance. More thorough examinations of character are made when sentences are imposed. Since the charge to which many defendants plead guilty has little relation to the acts allegedly committed, criminal courts do not typically spend much time searching for the truth through the adversary process but rather attempt to assess the moral character of defendants in an effort to determine what sentence (or probation) to impose.

The book points the way toward more systematic research. Emerson has shown us some of the dimensions of court behavior that exist. His description is like a telescopic picture of a planet—it reveals irregularities which we need to examine more closely in order to measure their frequency and the conditions which are associated with their existence. We have no indication of how the process Emerson describes varies with size of community with the degree of court specialization, with variations in legal codes providing more or less flexibility to the court for handling juveniles or adults. We do not know whether more active intervention by defense attorneys makes a significant difference in the process or its results. Other significant variables which ought to be examined include the normative culture of the community, the attitudes and backgrounds of participants in the process, and the range of criminal offenders subjected to such proceedings.

Emerson consequently opens a field of inquiry which few sociologists and almost no political scientists have examined. His book is a rich lode of researchable propositions; it should have a wide audience.—Herbert Jacob, *Northwestern University.*

Making Federalism Work. By James L. Sundquist with collaboration of David W. Davis. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1969. Pp. 293. $6.95.)

Making Federalism Work should become "must" reading for all concerned with problems of the poor in rural or urban settings. It is a carefully prepared treatise on the anti-poverty war, not totally devoid of political innuendos but sound in substance and seemingly accurate in historic fact.

As a basic resource document on the action phases of the poverty program and model cities, it must be heralded as among the most informative, current publications available.

Early in the Kennedy administration when I went to Washington to work with one of the forerunners to the poverty program I soon learned to appreciate the wisdom in the words, "orderly governments are very rarely creative; and creative goverments are almost never orderly." This quotation (source unknown) was brought to mind as the author traced the legislative and administrative programs of the poverty war. A sample of his subtle wisdom is illustrated in his statement, "to coordinate is not necessarily to simplify."

The name of the game in Federalism is 90% coordination. Everyone in Washington does it; but few, if any, can define it. Every program has several centers of coordination with as many officials responsible as there are centers. The author brings this point to light in each discourse on Federal programs running the risk of appearing to be adversely critical when, in fact, he is being constructively descriptive.

The author spends little time bemoaning the growing gaps between the affluent and the poor, black and white, establishment types and the "forgotten man." As a result, his product is not a philosophic discourse on the inherent contradictions in American society. It is, rather, an analytical treatment of the inherent contradictions in American federalism. The "knot hole" through which he views the process of federalism is "coordination" which he says, "In terms of result, coordination means consistency, harmony, mutual reinforcement, the absence of conflict and duplication . . . Coordination may be spatial . . . It may be sequential . . . It may pertain to both space and time . . ." Recognizing the breadth and depth of meaning of coordination, he identifies the tools to use, draws the blueprints and constructs the models. Then, as must be the case in pursuing elusive goals, recognizes that perfect coordination is non-existent; that systems of relationships evolve out of the pressures of interaction among segments of the bureaucracy; and that there is an identifiable rationale to the confusions of government administration.

If I were to find fault with the author I would choose his attempts to enunciate "principles" for the conduct of the Model Cities programs and the structure of its administrative arrangements. These attempts were vague at best. Their value lies in the implied message—that even the best of mind's cannot comprehend the depths of confusions we face in our Federal confrontations with poverty in the midst of affluence.

Three of the "principles" can be cited as illustrative: (1) "The model cities mechanism must be a reasonably balanced *bi*cameral structure."
(2) ". . . the city demonstration agencies and the neighborhood resident organizations must be nonoperating."
(3) ". . . the representative character of the neighborhood resident organizations must be rigorously protected."

While it is a noble gesture to enunciate principles and recommendations after having conducted a thorough study of urban and rural poverty circumstances and programs, no model cities program has lived long enough to produce proven principles of operation. Many observers feel that the "jury is still out" on the bi- versus unicameral systems. And, with the diversities, contrasts, and conflicts of interest in poverty neighborhoods, the question of who is representative can be considered moot.

In the second principle, it is axiomatic that the farther one moves from control of operations, the greater is the dilution of power—a key essential in the coordination process.

From experience in working with agencies having responsibility for coordination, this reviewer is convinced that much depends on authority, defined responsibility and lines of communication between the coordinating agent and the services being coordinated.

Largely because of stresses between cooperating agencies in Federal, state and local administrative and political structures, coordinating agents have found it difficult to keep pace with changes in community organization, at the local level, dictated by rapidly shifting power bases in federally funded anti-poverty programs. One consequence is that the hiatus between service systems and consumers of service persists and the author properly calls for different, imaginative uses of instruments of coordination buttressed with more appropriate legislative policy.

Making Federalism Work reaches for clarity in thought, policy and action to strengthen the federalism which, as a nation we need increasingly. In the author's words, "The federal system is too important to be left to chance." I agree—Shelton B. Granger, *Macalester College.*

Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II. By Davis R. B. Ross. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, Pp. 315. $10.00.)

The nation's veterans' organizations have long been known as one of America's most powerful and astute lobbying groups. For today's veterans, this reputation was established in bruising battles with the White House in the 1930's, when overwhelmingly Democratic Congresses were induced to override the vetoes of a popular Democratic President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since World War II, however, the character of veterans politics has changed dramatically. Acknowledging that this change may be partially explained by an overall shift of political power, and thus the focus of group efforts, to the Executive, Davis R. B. Ross suggests that it may also result from a better reintegration of World War II veterans into civilian society.

Professor Ross contends that, up to World War II, nations tended to follow a basic pattern. Soldiers were sent gloriously off to war; but, with the peace, deeds of valor were forgotten, feelings of gratitude were discarded, and mutual animosity arose between veteran and citizen. The archetype for this pattern is the experience of Ulysses and the suitors, which provides an integrating thread for Ross' presentation.

The rapid reintegration of World War II veterans into American society breaks the Homeric tradition. Dr. Ross' political history is both an attempt to explain why the tradition is broken and an episodic description of policymaking between 1950 and 1946. His explanations, unfortunately, are weak. Without sociological insights, he speculates only that a strong economy and a huge package of benefits combined to make the transformation from military to civilian life easier. One might suggest that such speculation should also have considered the proximity of the First World War to the Second and the effects of the older veterans' attitudes—as evidenced by their organizations' extensive recruitment efforts—on reintegration. Indeed, since the efforts of the existing groups in behalf of the new veterans were unique to the American experience, they might help to explain the unique reintegration of well over ten million men.

Still, such explanation is not Professor Ross' major emphasis. He prefers instead to dwell on descriptions of policy-making events which he presents with considerable insight. His chapter on the G. I. Bill of Rights is particularly good, clearly demonstrating the interrelationships of many different personalities in the policy process. The idea he traces to the President. The American Legion wrote the bill and shepherded it through Congress, working hard to gain support from other veterans' organizations and congressmen alike. The details were rewritten by the House committee, on the floor of the House, and by the Conference committee. The G. I. Bill was a product of many minds. Here, as in other of the policy confrontations described, the author is able to identify two basic philosophies operating to shape the program: the New Dealers who believed veterans should be treated like other citizens and broad new programs should be created for a whole society, and the veterans who believed in programs exclusively for veterans. The former tended to be the administration position, the latter, the congressional.

In developing his descriptions, Ross has referred to a broad range of source materials, including interviews with participants, correspondence among the principals, news reports of the period, public documents and a variety of scholary sources. His use of news reports is especially effective in setting the public mood behind the events (See, for example, pp. 134ff. on VA Administrator Frank T. Hines' relations with President Truman). While generally Ross does an excellent job of utilizing his sources, he is occasionally guilty of misrepresenting data in ways that support his biases. In one instance, he reports that John Rankin's amendment to the G. I. Bill "passed with a narrow ten-vote margin (87–77)." (p. 115.) A footnote, however, indicates that the subsequent teller vote proved more favorable to Rankin (111–80).

Dr. Ross' descriptive efforts are extremely useful in the area of administrative decision-making. His account of the creation and implementation of the point system used to determine priority for discharge (pp. 166ff.) is unusually instructive as is the insightful analysis of General Hines' leadership problems as Veterans Administrator and Retraining and Reemployment Administrator.

Much of Ross' analysis is still applicable. The orientation of the Veterans Administration has not changed noticeably. Professor Ross describes the VA's role as that of a "service agency." (p. 121.) "The VA," he writes, "stood not as a partisan of specific policies, but as a highly skilled legal adviser to the real policy-makers—the Legion and Congress." (p. 120.) In his conclusion, the author notes that the groups have influence but that their influence diminishes as controversy increases. He fails, however, to point out that for most lobbies considerable difference exists between positive and negative influence. While veterans' groups have very limited power to get laws passed, their ability to block veterans' legislation is considerably greater.

Ross' conclusions about Congress' role also fail to note an important distinction. He writes, ". . . although Congress altered proposals for veterans prepared by the Executive and interest groups, the national legislature played a reactive rather than initiative role." (p. 283.) These proposals from the Executive, however, did not come from the VA and usually pertained to other agencies—mustering out pay, for example, was a concern of the Defense Department. New programs for the VA were suggested by interest groups and initiated in Congress. Veterans' affairs was and is an area of congressional initiative.

On the whole, the book, although at times cluttered with detail—a paragraph is devoted to explaining General Omar Bradley's activities immediately prior to receiving a telegram telling him of his appointment to head the VA (p. 140.)—makes a significant contribution to our understanding of intricate policy processes and some of the pitfalls of bureaucracy.—WILLIAM H. HARADER, *Indiana State University.*

With All Deliberate Speed. ED. BY JOHN H. MCCORD. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 205. $7.50.)

This book is a collection of essays (by law students and practicing attorneys) dealing with legal aspects of racial discrimination. It originally appeared as an issue of the *University of Illinois Law Forum* and has now been published in book form, apparently without additions or changes.

The emphasis of the selections—dealing with such topics as discrimination in education, public accommodations, housing, and employment—is upon analysis of legislation and cases and upon prescription of new ways of interpreting legal doctrine.

Two of the selections struck me as particularly interesting. Robert Carter's analysis of the school segregation cases is closely reasoned and persuasive. His basic argument is that the logic of the *Brown I* opinion involves a constitutional obligation on the part of the state to alleviate racial segregation in schools regardless of its cause. "Whether the state commands the segregation, builds upon it, or merely accepts it, the same invalid classification, the injury, or inequality takes place" (p. 61). As he further indicates, though, "unfortunately *Brown* has been read otherwise. Instead of an expansive reading, courts have sought to limit and restrict its impact" (p. 63). He documents his arguments about the ought and is of the *Brown* decision in terms of court decisions and statistics indicating the relative degree of non-compliance in the South.

The question that immediately occurs is why *Brown* had such a limited impact in solving the problems of *de jure* and *de facto* school segregation. The answer clearly involves, among other things, the decision-making patterns in lower federal and state courts, the activities of the President and Congress, the relationship between changes in legal doctrine and changes in attitudes and behavior in the American political system. Carter is aware that these issues are relevant to the problem he is discussing, but excludes them from his analysis:

> The question arises why what is recognized as a public and personal necessity [equal education] is not yet within reach of large numbers of our citizenry. The answer to that question would require an analysis of all the complex social and political forces that shape this society—a task obviously beyond the scope of this article. (p. 59)

This emphasis upon legal doctrine—the absence of relevant materials from the social sciences—is a point to which I wish to return.

The selection by Blumrosen dealing with an apparently successful agreement remedying racial discrimination by the Newport News Shipbuilding Company is also very instructive, for it seems to suggest a pattern by which the federal government, by effective mobilization of its resources and bargaining, can deal with discrimination by some large private employers. Blumrosen says: "If we use this [the Newport News agreement] as a model for changing industrial relations systems, we can move quickly throughout the land to end employment discrimination" (p. 99). Unfortunately, as the author himself admits, certain characteristics of the situation made it exceptional, if not idiosyncratic: the company had not, like most southern firms, generally followed the practice of restricting black employees to low-skilled jobs; the company lacked any highly structured seniority system for promotions, and hence changes in promotion practices to end discrimination did not encounter strong resistance from an entrenched seniority system or from a powerful union; finally, the company was at least 75% dependent upon government contracts, and hence highly susceptible to the pressure of threatened contract termination. In addition, Blumrosen notes that the successful negotiation of the agreement "consumed an important part of the time of the entire office of conciliation [of the EEOC] during the 1966–67 year." For all these reasons, the generalizability of the case, rather confidently suggested by the author, seems somewhat questionable.

Overall, the volume is highly policy-oriented, prescriptive, and at times polemical. The general impression that a political scientist gets is that of how little lawyers and social scientists talk to one another. The general thrust of the volume is upon "the role of legal institutions in securing the civil rights of the black minority" (p. v). Yet the growing literature by political scientists and sociologists dealing with such topics as the means by which litigation is developed and pursued, courts are lobbied, the process of judicial decision-making, the problems of implementation that are encountered both within the legal system itself and in dealing with other public and private institutions and individuals, the role of attitude structures in the implementation phase, and the potentialities of and limitations upon the use of law to change attitudes are almost completely ignored. The kinds of issues discussed in this research are certainly not unknown to many of the authors of these pieces—indeed their activities have been the subjects for some of the research. At the same time, such research by social scientists, and some of the issues it raises, is relegated to the realm of "complex social and political forces" that are "beyond the scope" of many of these articles.

Lamentations about the lack of dialogue between lawyers and social scientists are by no means new. But the difficulty is exemplified by many of the works that appear in this volume. The stress in the articles upon the analysis of cases and legislation both makes it of limited interest to political scientists and greatly reduces the utility of the material for understanding the potentialities and limitations of the law and legal institutions in promoting social change.—JONATHAN D. CASPER, *Yale University.*

American City Planning Since 1890: A History Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Institute of Planners. BY MEL SCOTT. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 745. $17.50.)

As twentieth century American cities began to experience the complex problems of large-scale urbanization, city officials and businessmen turned to urban planners for advice and help. The resulting involvement of urban planning specialists in city affairs has become a matter of great interests to political scientists. The most recent major exploration into the urban planning process is Mel Scott's *American City Planning.* This important work deserves careful consideration from political scientists and will undoubtedly serve as background reading in many urban affairs courses.

Scott's work is a perceptive, well-written history of American city planning since 1890. The American Institute of Planners commissioned the study for their fiftieth anniversary which was celebrated in 1967. Although the volume failed to meet AIP's deadline and was twice as long as originally envisioned, the final product is an impressive distillation, analysis and review of an important field of local government activity. It is not an official history of the American Insitute of Planners or the planning profession; it is a broad study of the major period, events, influence, persons and trends in city planning since the reform era and the city beautiful movement.

The chief virtue of *American City Planning* is its scope and comprehensiveness. Scott undertook the difficult task of considering all major, relevant factors in the development of city planning in the United States. His task was formidable simply from the standpoint of reviewing all that has taken place in the name of city and metropolitan planning. Scott identifies and brings together the many disparate factors into a meaningful analysis which will serve as an important resource for urban affairs professors, researchers and students. Combining the perspectives of the urban planner and the social scientist with sensitive treatment of materials, he successfully synthesizes an amazing amount of information and a large number of veiwpoints.

Although *American City Planning* is a remarkable achievement, the general historical approach and the effort to encompass all that was done in city planning in chronological order place fundamental limitations on the work. Perhaps this is to say that it is impossible to satisfy all audiences in a single volume on such a subject. The author's own comments on the development of the book reflect the frustration of such an undertaking. However, in reviewing the book from the perspectives of political science and public administration, it seems that the project should have been narrowed in order that fuller attention could have been paid to specific issues of particular importance.

As a result of the strong focus upon the chronology of planning developments, some issues important to political scientists receive little attention. For example, Robert A. Walker's thesis that planning was ineffective because it was an autonomous function separated from the political leadership of cities receives little treatment and is submerged in a section dealing with wartime planning. Although Walker's work was published in 1941, it does not seem appropriate to have it discussed as part of wartime events. The issues surrounding planning organization certainly deserve more attention than they received. Furthermore, political scientists would appreciate Scott's observations on the exercise of political influence in planning organizations. A related criticism is that Scott's own ideas on the nature of planning are not explicit. They must be drawn from the lengthy treatments of the several chronological periods in planning. In fact, the first chapter takes the reader immediately into the reform era without any conceptual or introductory analysis of critical ingredients of planning.

Another weakness of the chronological approach is that more than two-thirds of the text examines planning prior to the 1950's. It was not until after 1950 that planning first began to grow at a remarkable pace and the federal government started investing important amounts of funds into planning. One wonders whether the weight given to the early periods was appropriate when relatively little planning was being carried on during those periods. The final chapter attempts to consider all planning in the United States during the 1960's, a ten-year period of immense activity. It seems that Scott should have given more attention to the past twenty years in order to achieve a better balance in the total presentation of planning history.

Mel Scott's *American City Planning* is a significant achievement which should receive wide attention. Criticisms of the work stem largely from the fact that it is a history of planning, and as a history, it organizes analysis around periods of time rather than critical issues or topics. *American City Planning* deserves praise because it is a meaningful contribution on an important topic. It gives life and meaning to the early days of city planning and provides many insights into the nature of the planning process. Political scientists interested in urban affairs will find it an indispensable work for both teaching and research.—B. DOUGLAS HARMAN, *The American University.*

Sparks at the Grassroots: Municipal Distribution of TVA Electricity in Tennessee. BY VICTOR C. HOBDAY. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1969. Pp. 266. $8.50.)

Intergovernmental relationships have comprised a major product of American governmental organization for two centuries and are implicit in the federal system. While these relationships are not a unique phenomenon to the American system, they are a significant and apparently ever-growing aspect of this polity. For this reason, perhaps, the literature of American intergovernmental relationships has expanded tremendously, aided by both the nature of current governmental problems—pollution law enforcement, poverty, and all the rest—and by the degree of institutionalization afforded these relationships through specific federal programs and agencies.

The literature of intergovernmental relations is neither solely recent nor limited in scope. It obviously includes the *Records of the Constitutional Convention* and *The Federalist Papers* as well as W. Brooke Graves' *American Intergovernmental Relations* (New York: Scribners, 1964). It also embraces numerous studies of specific aspects of federal-state, federal-local, state-local, and local intergovernmental relations. *Sparks at the Grassroots* falls into this latter classification and is essentially a study of the relationships arising from the electric power sales of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The book derives its importance from the sense of realism it imparts as it examines the relationships between the TVA, the local electric power boards, and the municipal governments of Tennessee in the distribution of electric power.

Sparks at the Grassroots is not a history of TVA, though one chapter supplies what amounts to a historical background. Thereafter, however, it raises questions relevant to electric power distribution, including such matters as the implementation of a basic policy of local autonomy through local distribution; the rate structure and concept of lowest possible rates; service conflicts both of areas and types of users; and the not to be unexpected problem of tax equivalents to local governments.

Although Victor Hobday handles these issues with considerable objectivity, there is strong indication that the decades of TVA power distribution have not been ones of universal happiness. For example, there is the central theme that TVA's theory of partnership between the Authority and local governments—the issue of local autonomy and decentralization—has in fact tended toward superior-subordinate relationships rather than a partnership. No doubt TVA could have created an organization for electric power distribution directly to the consumer. At its beginning there were those who favored such a course. Instead the Authority sought to decentralize distribution by a policy of power contracts between TVA and specially established and appointive local power boards which then distributed power to the consumer.

Sparks at the Grassroots stresses that these boards operate outside the context of the general municipal governments and that they are agencies "largely autonomous and more amenable to TVA control than politically chosen bodies might be." Doubtless this arrangement has made for more efficient administration of the power program, but it has done little to strengthen the municipal governments or to implement at a local level—as contrasted with the overall performance of TVA—the democratic ideals for which the agency is so widely admired. Certainly TVA has encouraged, assisted, and cooperated with state and local governments in the region in areas such as community planning, tributary area development, industrial promotion, planning, and recreation. These efforts Dr. Hobday does not deprecate, but finds that in power distribution the effort toward democracy has been less marked.

The decision to structure distribution of electricity through appointive local agencies appears to this reviewer to have had some impact upon many of the federal-local relationships outlined in the book. For example, power contracts with the local agencies are written not only to provide the lowest rates, but also to preclude diversion of electric power revenues to nonelectric municipal purposes. It seems implicit in conflicts between cities and cooperatives over service to suburban areas, though not in the conflict over TVA service to large industrial users. It is inherent in the sparks produced by tax equivalents which are rather vaguely defined as "a fair share of the cost of government to be borne by such [local power] system."

The author argues that "The idea that TVA and the municipalities are partners tends to break down under scrutiny. The guidelines and limitations laid down in the comprehensive power contracts leave small room for local power systems." If this conclusion is valid, it would seem likely that the contribution "for faith in democratic institutions" of which C. Herman Pritchett wrote a generation ago is less evident in application to TVA power distribution than for the overall programs of the Authority. Certainly it would indicate a reluctance, perhaps with reason, to attempt to achieve efficient distribution of electricity through a traditional governmental framework.

Yet, when all is said the Tennessee Valley Authority has made a strong case for itself in both power and nonpower programs. In the former it has brought into being a unified power system of 110 municipal systems, 50 cooperative systems, and one private company. It has provided electricity at "yardstick rates" in the region, and its efforts have seen the enormous expansion of power use and consumers. It has assisted effective flood control in its region, contributed to rehabilitating and conserving land, and encouraged regional resource use planning. Dr. Hobday recognizes this contribution: ". . . the Authority merits a high rating for efficiency in accomplishing its primary objectives," and "The TVA power program has been a success story that provides an outstanding example of government for the benefit of people . . ." This volume deserves a wider audience than it may have. It is a careful if concise analysis of one segment of the development and maintenance of an enduring federalism.—ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, *University of Alabama.*

A Strategic Approach to Urban Research and Development: Social and Behavioral Considerations. COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL URBAN RESEARCH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1969, Pp. 100. $3.50.)

Long-Range Planning for Urban Research and Development: Technological Considerations. Committee on Urban Technology, NATIONAL RE-

SEARCH COUNCIL. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1969. Pp. 94. $3.50.)

In 1967 the Department of Housing and Urban Development made a contract with the National Academy of Sciences in which NAS was asked: 1) to suggest how industry could utilize "new technologies" toward the end of overcoming urban problems; 2) to specify long-range social, scientific and institutional research and development questions; 3) to examine HUD's research role; 4) to consider the "behavioral and social science" research role of the colleges and universities; and 5) to give thought to "the applicability of a 'total systems approach.'" (COSBUR, pp. 81–82.). The committees decided that the first of the directives should be the primary concern of the Committee on Urban Technology (CUT), and the remaining four ought to rest with the Committee on Social and Behavioral Urban Research (COSBUR). Since it would be virtually impossible to summarize both reports in the space provided, the focus of the following remarks shall be upon the COSBUR Report and its findings relative to HUD directives four and five above.

COSBUR's major premise appears to be rejected in its expressed notion that

> *The social and behavioral sciences . . . can provide a sounder* basis than now exists for dealing rationally . . . with social problems that preoccupy and oppress the nation. . . .

COSBUR is certainly optimistic regarding the abilities of social and behavioral science, but its optimism is somewhat diluted. Indeed, the Committee is very quick to indicate the inadequacies of the social and behavioral sciences. "It would be incorrect," according to the COSBUR Report, "to assume that

> . . . the methods of rational analysis and the structure of knowledge developed in the behavioral and social sciences can contribute powerfully in the formulation of policies aimed at the attainment of national aspirations . . . Yet . . . the Committee see(s) no realistic alternative . . . Scientific knowledge and the habits of tough-minded, systematic analysis are not substitutes for wisdom, but they can serve as powerful handmaidens to sound policy thinking and judgment. (COSBUR, p. 11)

The CUT Report goes considerably further than COSBUR. The latter takes the position that the social and behavioral sciences can (within certain limitations) rationally arrive at descriptions and explanations of socio-economico-politico phenomena, thus permitting the formulation of various viable policy alternatives; the former suggests that once these alternatives are established the universities, municipal governments, and HUD should give the "highest priority" to the development of the "social engineer," who will apply the "understanding and knowledge gained from the social and behavioral sciences." (CUT, p. 2)

Systems theorists will find great comfort in the Reports, especially in the COSBUR document. The Committee utilizes a rather broad notion of the systems approach—"An urban system is the total set of urban units among which there are more or less orderly flows of raw materials, finished products, information, and people"—contending "There is little doubt that it should be applied to urban problems." (COSBUR, pp. 19, 18) However, the Committee fully realizes that the "Various parameters of social units and the variables by which the parameters are made operational are interconnected . . . (and it is imperative that a multidisciplinary social science research effort be made) to search for those linkages and to assess their interactive effects." (COSBUR, p. 18)

The Committee boldly suggests "it is quite possible that urban programs (today) may be designed for the population of the last decade rather than for the next." After succinctly posing other interrelated problems, such as in-migration, within-migration, and natural increase of population, the Report suggests that HUD should encourage research which will develop a "typology of cities in terms of . . . age . . . family . . . racial and ethnic characteristics of the population." (COSBUR, p. 28)

There are many additional research problems posed both implicitly and explicitly, such as those concerning fertility, mortality and morbidity, probability of rapid demographic changes, neighborhoods, family life, the character of local governments, discovering and measuring needs and preferences, fiscal policies and public services, the effects of legal controls, and the social and institutional settings of housing program. (COSBUR, pp. 28–44) Specifically COSBUR asks that we direct our attention to the

> behavior of political leaders, voters, professional administrators, and special interest groups in situations in which local government is called upon to create or administer new resources with the intention of producing desired social change.

Relatedly the Committee poses the very complex but exciting question: What is known about how these same actors "articulate their perceptions of the necessary and desirable . . .?" Also, it asks: how do "variations in local government structure, community history, and social values facilitate or frustrate the ability of individuals and groups to make their preferences influence public policy"? (COSBUR, pp. 36, 37)

There appears to be a strong strain of concern running throughout the Reports that, to the extent possible, HUD should examine its goals in such a way that the assumptions and propositions underlying those goals can be isolated and restated in empirically testable terms. In this way

HUD would be able to gauge the effectiveness and wisdom of the means it employs, as well as the ends themselves. What COSBUR and CUT seek is a movement away from intuitive guessing toward empirical testing. (See COSBUR, pp. 17 and 12; CUT, p. 11)

The Committees (COSBUR in particular), however, have too casually observed a very fundamental question. Both COSBUR and CUT are vitally concerned with the problems of goal identification and goal attainment (see CUT, p. 11, and COSBUR, pp. 12–14), but they do not struggle with the problem of determining legislative intent. They do not suggest what HUD ought to do when faced with a grossly ambiguous set of legislative goals. Since HUD's actions will be judged from time to time from the standpoint of upholding legislative intent, it is incumbent upon HUD to determine the nature of that intent. Somehow some systematic procedures must be worked out and employed by social and behavioral science for administrators by which reliable and valid approximations can be made of the true intent of Congress.

HUD did not specifically direct the National Academy of Sciences to study problems of legislative intent (see Appendix A in COSBUR). However, failure to attack the problem of goal ambiguity is the major disappointment in an otherwise powerful and probing study.—Ronald C. Green, *Indiana University of Pennsylvania.*

The Quality of Urban Life. Edited by Henry J. Schmandt and Warner Bloomberg, Jr. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc. 1969. Pp. 590. $20.00.)

The earliest urbanologist, Aristotle, remarked that men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain in these cities in order to live the good life. This insight has been frequently repeated in the mass of recent literature which deals with the quality of urban life. The social indicators movement, the ecology revolution, post-behavioralism: each of the phenomena are in their own way indicative of a growing concern with the special qualitative problems which face us as we begin rounding out the twentieth century. Desiring to stimulate and involve more people in the argument about the quality of urban life, Schmandt and Bloomberg have gathered a series of diverse essays on this diverse subject. All but a few of the essays appear here for the first time. The collection is Volume III of the *Urban Affairs Annual Review,* a series which earlier has covered the general question of urban research and the specific problem of poverty.

Following an introductory overview by the editors, the volume presents nineteen chapters divided into four major sections. Three essays look at the issue of urban life quality from an historical perspective. Four essays attack the problems of the criteria for urban quality and the relationship of planning and technology to the question of control over the urban environment. There are seven essays which focus more narrowly upon specific areas of urban quality problems—mental health, performing arts, mass media, education—and upon the issues of political leadership. The last five essays, grouped under the broad heading of "urban order: present and potential," discuss some political and institutional issues related to the enhancement of the quality of urban life. Each section is briefly introduced by the editors.

The general quality of the essays is very uneven. As might be expected in a volume which covers so wide a range of subject matter, uniformity of approach or continuity of development is absent. The editors admit that they have not attempted to offer a "tightly knit, cohesive group of contributions unified around a central theme" (p. 22). In a newly developing field such as this one, however, such an effort would have been particularly worthwhile. Another absence, also acknowledged by the editors (p. 248), is any detailed, explicit discussion of the relation of a city's architecture, zoning, and physical layout to the quality questions. While it is true that this discussion can be found in several other places (notably in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*), the volume would have been notably improved by the inclusion of at least one essay dealing in detail with this question.

At least three of the essays can be singled out as being of particular interest to the political scientist (at least to *this* political scientist). In one, H. L. Nieburg presents a provocative analysis of the growing influence of technological approaches to urban social problems, and criticizes the support for status quo power which these approaches frequently provide. He sees emphasis upon systems analysis, R and D, computers, gaming, etc., as attempts to side-step the real political issues which face us in the challenge of the poor and oppressed. According to Nieberg, the "tech-fix" approach to urban problems is illusory because it fails to take seriously the pressures for power and political participation among segments of society previously exploited and excluded.

If these pressures are to be taken seriously, the quality of urban leadership becomes a crucial subject. This subject is explored in a sketchy essay by Charles R. Adrian. Relying upon typologies which he has developed elsewhere, Adrian outlines various motivations for leadership (professionals, hobbyists, ideologues, etc.) and various images of local government functions (booster, caretaker, broker, etc.). Two factors emerge from his analysis which indicate directions for future change. First, the quality of Negro community leadership will markedly improve as the political implications of "Black Power" are more widely comprehended. Second, more and more applicants for municipal government positions are young persons basically unsympathetic to traditional bureaucratic values and dedicated to changing the system.

According to James Q. Wilson, the central issue for urban dwellers worried about the quality of life is a concern for improper behavior in public places. Expressed in various ways (crime, violence, indecency, etc.), this concern deals with the sense of a failure of community. Wilson's essay (which originally appeared in *The Public Interest,* Summer, 1968) explores the meaning of urban community and some of its political implications for patterns of segregation, local control of neighborhoods, poverty programs, and "Black Power." He notes that the central city is increasingly "coming to be made up of persons who face special disabilities in creating and maintaining a sense of community" (p. 463)—affluent whites without children, poor whites (frequently elderly) unable to flee to the suburbs, and blacks. Wilson is particularly insightful in discussing the reciprocal relations between politics and community.

Other essays which deserve particular notice include a listing of criteria for judging the quality of urban environment, by Hans Blumenfeld; a study of the role of mass media in affecting urban quality, by Gene Burd; a disappointingly abstruse analysis of urban management, by Nathan D. Grundstein; and a novel, suggestive discussion of the role of private foundations as urban reformers, by Leslie Paffrath.

A final word deserves to be said about the price of this volume. Though the topics covered are of sigificance, and though at least several of the essays are meritorious, twenty dollars for less than six hundred pages does seem a bit unreasonable. A fine bibliographical section is included, but not a much-needed index. If Sage Publications intends wide distribution of their *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews,* they will have to strive harder to make their volumes more competitive with professional journals and other anthologies—in both quality and price.—PETER J. HENRIOT, *Seattle University.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Communist Party-States: Comparative and International Studies. ED. BY JAN TRISKA. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. Pp. 392. $9.00.)

The study of Communist political systems has not found the path into the discipline of political science an easy one. Like many "area studies" it has been set aside from the movements affecting the rest of the discipline. The questions asked, the theory employed (if any), and the methods used were in most cases relevant only to the narrow problem under investigation. Little attempt was made to integrate the questions or the answers into the broader study of political science.

While such statements apply to other "area studies," they are most pertinent in the field of communist studies. Communist political systems have been considered unique and essentially incomparable. The totalitarian concept as it was often used implied by definition that such systems could not be studied in terms used in other areas of the discipline. Consequently, the study of communist political systems was assigned to the theoretical and methodological backwaters of the discipline.

In the 1960's, increasing attempts were made to apply the concepts and methods of political science to the analysis of communist systems. It would be an overstatement to say that the results obtained were earth-shattering; however, scholarly investigation was moved off dead center and new insights and possibilities for further investigation appeared. It is in this perspective that the book *Communist Party-States* should be evaluated.

The book, edited by Jan Triska, is a product of Stanford Studies of the Communist System. The thirteen articles, written by both faculty and graduate students at Stanford between 1963–67, are new material for most readers. Some of the studies have received circulation in mimeograph form, but the audience has been limited.

Most edited works lack any real theoretical focus; few such works apply consistently throughout the study a particular methodological approach; one rarely finds a collection of articles that are integrated. These comments also apply in a superficial way to the book under review. However, to say these things without proper qualification would be to create and attack a straw man. In essence, as laudable as these goals are, they were not the objectives of this book. The objective as succinctly stated by Triska was to "develop and build theory and methodology in political science into the study of communist affairs." The goal therefore, was one of utilizing varied approaches and testing various theories in order to examine the relevance of the wider discipline of political science for communist studies.

Although it was not the intention of the authors to orient their work toward a common theoretical or methodological problem, six of the articles are concerned in some fashion with interaction between and the integration of the party-states. The theoretical fathers of this investigation are Deutsch, Etzioni, Haas, and Russett. The principal approach is to look at various indices of interaction or transaction between the states. Such a focus reflects the availability of data, but it more or less limits investigation to the process of integration as opposed to the condition of integration. To focus on the latter aspect would require attitudinal data which is not readily available. The authors, particularly Maurice Simon, are aware of this methodological and conceptual problem. However, no effective solution is presented for dealing with it.

The articles dealing with integration and interaction approach it from various directions. David Finley examines the role of Comecon, the Warsaw Pact and the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research as vehicles for the integration of the party-states. Edward Miles and John Gillooly examine the processes of interaction among the party-states by looking at various economic, social-cultural-technical, formal treaty making, and political-military-diplomatic indexes of interaction. Charles Cary focuses on the role of treaty-making and the development of complete and congruent treaty networks as mechanisms for the system's leader to provide more effective integration of its system. In a very interesting article Bruce Sievers examines the integrative capacities of political communities both national and international. He does so by focusing on both attitudinal and transaction orientations of the four split nations: Germany, China, Korea, Vietnam. David Ronfeldt and Daniel Tretiak study the extent of Cuba's integration into the communist political system by analyzing the increase in shared values and mutual responsiveness between the two. Finally, Maurice Simon attempts to find consistent and persistent patterns of interaction between the Communist system and developing Afro-Asian states by examining various measures of economic, legal, military and cultural interaction between these states and the communist system.

This series of articles provides some interesting insights into how integration theory can be fit into the framework of communist studies. Also, they are suggestive of the various ways that data can be used to test hypotheses based on such theory. Despite this, however, the results obtained from such endeavors are not outstanding or surprising. Scholars using other, more impressionistic, methods and lacking the theoretical sophistication of these authors have suggested and marshalled arguments to support many of the hypotheses tested in this book without forcing their efforts into integration theory. For example, it comes as no great surprise that the communist international system is composed of two sub-systems or that Yugoslavia is not a fully integrated member of the system (Miles and Gillooly). Moreover, one would suspect that somewhere in the depths of "Foggy Bottom" there is recognition of the fact that some of the underdeveloped states have very consistent patterns of interaction with the communist states and others do not (Simon); it comes as no great surprise that Cuba has increased its level of alignment with the communist states generally and with the Soviety sub-system particularly even though the latter relationship has undergone difficulties at times (Ronfeldt and Tretiak). In short, the value of these efforts is not to be found in the results obtained but in the attempt to apply theory and collect data to communist studies in an innovative way.

Even though integration studies provide the major concern of this book, several other topics were examined as well. Two of these works—one by Dennis Pirages and the other by Ole Holsti—deserve special comment. Pirages, utilizing hypotheses generated from studies of the effects of modernization on the political system by Lipset, Deutsch, and Lerner, attempts to determine whether an increase in the level of socio-economic development in communist party-states is, in fact, associated with greater responsiveness of the decision-making structure and a less coercive compliance structure. He finds that the more developed party-states—Czechoslovakia and East Germany—have less responsive elites and a more coercive compliance structure while the less developed states—Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland—have the opposite access patterns. He further seeks to show that those states that have not developed increased access capability in relation to their high level of socio-economic development will be faced with a declining rate of economic progress and, indeed, by economic stagnation. From the data presented and from the obvious impressionistic news out of Czechoslavakia this seems to be the case.

Holsti looks at the relationship between intra-bloc conflict (specifically Sino-Soviet conflict) and inter-bloc conflict. He hypothesized that the former will be greatest when the latter is least and vice-versa. The study is particularly interesting because of its effort to correlate internal attitudinal orientation with certain objective external events. To examine the former, Holsti used content analysis of official documents during the relevant periods. Content analysis as an approach will undoubtedly be used more and more; it provides one way of measuring micro-level phenomena in communist systems. The data generated in the analysis tend to confirm the hypotheses, but Holsti urges caution since other variables such as personality, ideology or domestic politics may affect the phenomena under study.

In conclusion, the book is a useful one for students of communist political systems. It systematically attempts to employ theory developed in political science generally to communist politics specifically; the authors attempted to test the hypotheses developed and operationalize the concepts employed in a scientific manner. On the other hand, the results obtained from the analysis are not very surprising. The work in this regard more or less confirms, by empirical investigation, hypotheses that have been suggested by more impressionistic methods earlier. However, this is probably more the fault of our inadequate development of theory in political science than it is the fault of any of the authors.

In short, this book as Triska implies is useful more for what it attempts to do than what it actually produces. It will be a valuable source for students studying various empirical approaches to the study of communist politics.—ROBERT BLACKWELL, *Emory University*.

Elections and Political Stability. BY A. J. MILNOR. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969. Pp. 205.)

The subject matter of this interesting and accessible book is less inclusive than its title may suggest. It is mostly about legislative election systems and contains descriptions of the major kinds of systems, several case studies of their operation, numerous propositions about their consequences for "representativeness" and "stability," and some general theorizing about relationships among electors, election systems, and systemic properties of political aggregates.

The most innovative ideas in the book appear in the first chapter where the author conceptualizes elections as exchange processes. Two classes of exchanges are proposed. The first is called "instrumental," occurs between voters and parties, and is relatively straightforward. The second is not defined clearly but appears to refer to the systemic implications of the voting choice and perhaps also to voters' attitudes toward a political system as they affect partisan choice. The exchanges are further defined as "commitments" by the participants and related to "demands" upon and "capacities" of governments.

These concepts are used to form a classification of states and a number of hypotheses of which the following is an example: ". . . if the voter casts his ballot for parties whose proposals lead away from the political system, his vote becomes a form of negative systemic exchange and his particular policy interest becomes less specific." (p. 7) The hypotheses may or may not be logically undisprovable since it is not always clear what the author intended to include in the definitions of the concepts. However, the exchange model is interesting enough to make one regret that it is very rarely mentioned after the first chapter.

Most of the book contains relatively concrete discussions of the plurality, majority and proportional representation systems. Each of these is analyzed in comparable fashion. Arguments of "advocates" and "critics" are exhaustively described and evaluated. Detailed and generally clear descriptions of the mechanics of the systems are presented and supplemented with case studies. The study of Britain makes especially effective use of data from recent elections to illustrate distortions produced by the plurality system in translating votes into seats. Unfortunately, case studies for other systems lack such numerical examples which would have been especially useful to clarify the complexities of proportional representation. An instructive use of data from the 1962 election in France, recast in the 1951 electoral system, is mysteriously placed in an appendix at the end of the book where its impact is minimized. There is also an interesting comparative analysis of Soviet and Western elections and very interesting case studies of Tanganyika and Malaya in the chapter on developing states.

Besides the descriptions and illustrations, the author makes valiant efforts to sort through a staggering variety of propositions about the consequences of each system. Some of these recast familiar arguments, such as the reduction in number of parties and legislative moderation produced by plurality systems. But the author usually qualifies these and concludes that each electoral system may produce quite different results under different conditions. Sometimes these qualifications create clarification and sometimes not, since the qualifications are not always completely clear. An example may illustrate how Milnor proceeds.

Initially, the author says that "the single-member district forces the representative to pursue a moderate course . . . In the process of representation a moderate politics does indeed result." (p. 35) But a "precondition" is added that "no crystalized segment systematically be able to exclude from power sharply dissident but less cohesive elements." (p. 37) Indeed, "in a divided system a single member district system . . . might not produce a legislature much more united than that provided by proportional representation," (p. 61) and he concludes that "in the long run" a plurality system may be free from "dissenting ideological movements" because the political system was moderate at its inception (p. 103)

In general, the descriptions of the electoral systems and the case studies are the strongest parts of the book. Efforts at theory building and proposition formation are less successful, including less abstract efforts than the "exchange" model. The logical status of the frequently mentioned "preconditions" for election systems are particularly ambiguous. They do not seem to be necessary conditions for the existence of different systems, but are associated with phrases like "successful application of the system" (p. 23) or "essential . . . to work effectively and efficiently." (p. 90) Yet these phrases require much more refinement than the author provides if the associated propositions are to have testable consequences.

Finally, some mention should be made of the models of electoral behavior which lie behind the traditional dialogue about "representativeness" of electoral systems which the author discusses. These models, if not too murky to be identifiable, can be considered highly suspect on empirical grounds. They usually posit such characteristics in the general electorate as high levels of political information, relatively fixed "interests" to be converted into policy, consistent "ideological" positions on a liberal-conservative dimension, responses primarily to policy alternatives presented by candidates, and so on. Unfortunately, Milnor does not provide an explicit model of his own, does little to revise older models in light of contemporary research, and cites very little of the recent survey literature on electoral behavior. He does, however, make numerous statements about public attitudes and behavior which are rather questionable. We find a suggestion that elections in the United States "seem largely candidate oriented" (p. 77), a proposition about consequences of "a breakdown in the linkage between the coalition in the legislature and the popular ideological distribution," (p. 189), another proposition that "in normal elections voters will cast their ballots for the party that comes closest to their own policy preferences," (p. 191) and others. Perhaps one cannot blame the author for failing in something he did not undertake to do. In any event, re-evaluation of the "debates" over electoral systems in light of current knowledge of voting behavior remains to be done.—THEODORE W. MECKSTROTH, *Ohio State University*.

Politics in Modern Greece. BY KEITH R. LEGG. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp. 367. $10.00.)

The advent of the military regime in Greece has put to the test the small fraternity of American scholars, many of them of Greek origin, who write on Greek political affairs. Some of those scholars, shocked by the military takeover of April 1967, have chosen a more or less partisan stance which, however justified ideologically, has served very poorly the need for a sober, unemotional and, to the extent it is humanly possible, objective assessment of an admittedly complex political reality. Keith Legg, of Greek origin in spite of his anglicised name, has largely resisted the temptation.

Politics in Modern Greece evidences the detachment which is the mark of the true scholar. Legg, observing that "the Greek political system simply cannot be understood using any single model of political development" (p. 3) has followed an eclectic course which bypasses the rigid application of theoretical models and typologies having little relevance to the Greek political system. Still, his familiarity with contemporary political theory enables him to identify correctly the structural weaknesses of the system as it existed before the military coup. He discusses with almost savage candor the shallow organization and the feudal character of the political parties (pp. 130–132), the clientage and patronage relationships between politicians, voters, and bureaucrats (166–168), the structural deficiencies of the legislature (170), the superficiality of the legislative process (170–171), the preoccupation of the Deputies with patronage-oriented activities (176–185), the "combative" nature of parliamentary control (173), the heavy representation of "traditional occupations" in the Greek legislature (278–283), the imprecision of crucial constitutional provisions (95), the lack of basic consensus "on the meaning of Greece or the nature of the regime" (82), or the penetration of the political system by foreign powers (70–77). By and large, this criticism is factual and valid.

On occasion, Legg appears overly harsh or too dogmatic. For example, his analysis of the economic system (168–170) does not show that he has taken into account the progress registered during the Karamanlis years (1955–1963); his emphasis on "mistrust" among Greeks (35) is somewhat overdrawn; and his discussion of the language and religion as dividing elements between rural and urban, privileged and underprivileged, the small literate elite and the large majority (85–92) is highly misleading if taken literally by an unfamiliar reader. On some rare instances, Legg allows some chaff to go through this sieve as on p. 245 where he asserts that the new Greek Constitution includes "a means 'to prevent politicians from making mistakes'" and identifies as his source an article of the *New York Times*. One might have expected a more direct reference to the related articles of the Constitution, if indeed there are such articles.

Legg's book makes a very strong case—albeit unintentionally—for the need to set in motion the long-delayed process for political modernization. After reading his book one can hardly doubt that such a need existed prior to the military coup as the present regime also claims. Legg makes a further observation of truly cardinal significance: "Both the Left and the military are concerned with policy, especially with modernization and economic development" (187). He implies that the "traditional patterns of personal politics" could not accommodate "the growing marketization and urbanization of Greek society" (186). In his view, "the military establishment and the left-wing political organization, the EDA" were the two extraparliamentary structures which espoused the objective of political modernization. This reviewer tends to agree largely with Legg's observation, although several political leaders, most notably Karamanlis since 1961, had been conscious of the need for political modernization as a companion process to that of economic development. The author, however, does not explore adequately the implications of his identification of the "Left and the military" as the two most likely agents of modernization.

Since the early twenties, the Left in Greece has been identified with the pro-Communist, pro-Soviet orientation in politics. There has never been a broad, popular movement of the Social democratic persuasion. Modernization by the Left in Greece meant all along a non-democratic, Soviet-type system. This alone would have made the Left an unwelcome agent of modernization for a large number of Greeks. But the Left in Greece has been burdened with other liabilities, especially since the Second World War: the excesses committed during the Occupation, the December 1944 Communist uprising, and the 1946–49 Communist-led guerrilla campaign; the pro-Western orientation of the majority of the Greeks within NATO; the fear of the "Slavs"; the control over EDA by the exiled leaders of the Communist party. Andreas Papandreou, the son of the veteran liberal statesman, who returned to Greece after a distinguished career as a professor of Econometrics in the United States, grasped the quest for political modernization and moved to gain the necessary power for carrying out such a program. From among the two potential agents of modernization—the Left and the Army—he opted for the first. Considering the liabilities burdening the Left, his was a serious political error. To win the allegiance of the Left, Andreas had to take a hostile stance against the Left's familiar targets, namely the Palace, the "Establishment," NATO, the CIA, the "Americans," and the "Army." This alignment of an important liberal (bourgeois) politician with the Communist-dominated Left introduced a disturbing element which further weakened the traditional democratic system. Eventually, the disintegration of the democratic process opened the way for the second extraparliamentary agent of modernization—the Army—to move in and try its hand.

As noted earlier, the Left as the agent of modernization suffered from several liabilities. The Army, by contrast, has many assets as a traditionally highly-respected institution. But, it too has several liabilities; among them one may list the inexperience of its leaders with the nuances of politics, or their over-experience with command-compliance relationships. But the most serious liability is the dictatorial nature of the regime they have imposed, because such a regime goes against the principles and the emotional preferences of the great majority of the Greek people.

Legg's book may not answer all the questions it raises or tackle all the issues it touches; but it is a treasure-house of illuminating data and insights, and a must for those who wish to understand the postwar political developments in Greece.—D. GEORGE KOUSOULAS, *Howard University*.

Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics. BY CARLOS A. ASTIZ. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 316. $12.00.)

This book is an ambitious attempt to relate social class to political influence in Peru. The basic theme is that a coastal plutocracy of sugar and cotton landowners, real estate developers, financiers, owners of small mining corporations, guano profiteers, and producers of fish meal, in alliance with the large landowners of the Sierra have dominated politics to the extent that they can protect their interests and prevent social reform. This theme is developed by two chapters evaluating class in Peru and by separate chapters on political parties, the military, the church, United States economic and political interests in the country, the possibilities of change, and on how the classes actually articulate their interests through the national and local governments.

In many ways Professor Astiz has written an exceptionally stimulating book. It is a depth study of who gets what, when, and how, and why in Peru. The writing is realistic, always directed to the central inquiry, and demonstrates methodological sophistication in relating class to political decision making. The author deliberately avoids a sterile description of institutions and a chronological listing of historical events. The book instead is analytical throughout and written with a sense of objectivity that has been hard to come by in books on Peru.

A book of this type, however, does raise the difficult question about how much research needs to be done before a conceptualization of a political system is completely accurate. The fact that the book results from a doctoral dissertation goes part of the way to make it satisfactory on this count.

The author did his research in Peru, exhausted Peruvian sources, embellished his ideas with references from all types of books and articles on Latin America, painstakingly laid out his chapters, and approached his subject matter with methodological zest. The complexity of topics is not glossed over, and the demands of a dissertation and the author's sophistication prevents him from adopting a completely static and deterministic viewpoint of Peruvian society.

The carefulness of Professor Astiz is seen in many chapters. He devotes considerable attention to describing the importance and interest articulation of the coastal plutocracy, the Sierra landed aristocracy, the industrial upper class, the middle classes, the Sierra rural Indians, the coastal landed workers, the urban workers, and the shantytown urban inhabitants. The discussion of political parties perceptively describes and accounts for the increasing conservatism of the APRA party, and also related how Acción Popular and the Unión Nacional Odriista parties have either been related to or been effectively neutralized by the ruling elites. Most important, the author describes historically the complex relations between the military and the coastal plutocracy, and recognizes that the military has at times gone its own way, especially due to the influence of the Center of High Military Studies.

With all this said, however, Professor Astiz has been proven wrong in his basic conceptualization that the enormous political strength of the coastal plutocracy and Sierra landed aristocracy would prevent social reform. Since the publication of the book, General, Juan Velasco Alvarado, the leader of Peru since the military coup of October, 1968, has decreed the governmental nationalization of coastal sugar and cotton plantations and has taken other measures that would indicate a revolutionary fervor on social problems. This raises the question of what was deficient in the book.

Some ideas can be mentioned. First, this reviewer would question the author's premise that the coastal plutocracy is so solidly united and that it has co-opted all of the important military men, party leaders, industrialists, mass media directors, and important bureaucratic leaders into its way of thinking through interpersonal connections, plush clubs in Lima, marriages, etc. Professor Astiz develops this idea in his important Chapter 9 by stating that the ruling elites themselves formulate policy in key interest groups (National Agrarian Society, etc.), then informally work it out with those who have been co-opted in the three plush clubs of Lima, and finally disseminated the policy in a biased way through the controlled media. Professor Astiz makes this assumption on the membership lists of the three plush Lima clubs. This doesn't go far enough, and what is needed is a sophisticated power elite study, and an exhaustive study of how the interest groups, which are barely mentioned, actually work. Chapter 9 should have been the beginning chapter of the book and a springboard for everything that followed. A power elite analysis perhaps could have combined a reputational study approach with a depth analysis of a few key decisions. The author does have a few pages on the land reform bill and the devaluation of the Peruvian soil, relating it to his premise of control by the ruling elites, but these cases are not developed with the methodological sophistication one finds in the usual power elite studies.

A power elite study would have also enabled Professor Astiz to determine whether the institutions of the presidency and congress have any independent influence in their own right. This idea is basically rejected since the two institutions are ignored in the book. Yet, Professor James Payne in *Labor and Politics in Peru* sees the office of the presidency as the center of political power and argues that oligarchical influence is absent on labor and many other issues.

A second criticism is that the study of the military is not specific enough in respect to factionalism, the class background of officers, and the role of the Center of High Military Studies. General Velasco Alvarado, for example, may be an unusual case in that he came from a working class family (Professor Astiz stresses the middle class origins of the military), but this has been one factor affecting his motivation. Finally, the importance of nationalism is not really foreseen by the author, even in his postcript chapter on the military coup and the nationalization of oil. Yet Velasco is riding a nationalist wave that he helped to create, and is using it to undercut the opposition and to build up support for further social reforms and his own popularity.—ROBERT D. TOMASEK, *The University of Kansas.*

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba. BY RICHARD R. FAGEN. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp. 271. $8.50.)

Social science research on Latin America often appears superficial and irrelevant. Political scientists seem especially guilty of focusing upon marginal issues. All too often we devote our time and talents to such projects as the analysis of laws that are never implemented. These and similar studies may contribute to "theory-building," but they do not shed much light on the major political developments of contemporary Latin America. The leading example of scholarly neglect is the Cuban Revolution, surely the most fascinating yet least understood development in Post-War Latin America. Fortunately, as the Revolution enters its second decade, we are beginning to get some very good social science studies to add to the uneven blend of journalism, descriptive history, and Cold War polemics which have been the primary sources of information and misinformation about Cuba. Richard Fagen, a political scientist at Stanford, may be included among those scholars determined to take a serious, systematic look at this radical experiment in social change.

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba is more than another attempt to classify the Revolution and explain why it took the path that it did. Fagen deals with these issues, but his interests lie deeper. In this book, he is principally concerned with a critical examination of what is, perhaps, the most distinctive and significant aspect of the Cuban Revolution—the sustained drive to create a "new Cuban man" and a communitarian society.

By focusing upon the transformation of political culture, the book not only goes to the essence of the Cuban experience, but it may also tell us a great deal about what is occuring in China. In fact, Fagen seeks the broadest possible comparability by placing his study in the framework of political socialization. In an introductory chapter he reviews the basic ideas and concepts of the socialization literature. He then argues that many of these are not directly applicable to the Cuban case. In the first place, the possibilities of survey research are severely limited, if not nonexistent. But even more important is the nature of socialization in Cuba. "Political socialization under the Revolutionary Government has not been used primarily for settling citizens into the ongoing system. It has been a directed learning process through which the elite seeks to create a new political culture." (p. 6) Thus, Fagen analyzes not subjective political orientations but several revolutionary programs designed to ". . . forge the new political culture in the crucible of action." (p. 7) The bulk of the book is devoted to studies of the campaign against illiteracy, the Committees for Defense of the Revolution, and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction. Data for these case studies come principally from Cuban newspapers, periodicals, and public documents. While recognizing the limitations of such sources, the author so carefully analyzes his data that the reader has confidence in the validity and reliability of the inferences. To supplement information collected in the United States, Fagen made three trips to Cuba between 1966 and 1969. The appendix contains an elaboration of field notes taken on one of these visits as well as translated selections from three of Castro's speeches relevant to the programs studied.

The 1961 campagin against illiteracy was more than an adult literacy program. To begin with, the 700,000 newly literate Cubans learned of the Revolutionary government in a positive manner. Furthermore, over 300,000 young Cubans participated directly in the Revolution as literary instructors. Fagen speculates that, ". . . it is probably safe to say that the campaign affected in some real way the lives of most Cubans who by 1961 were old enough to have even minimal political awareness." (p. 55) Finally, such a massive effort, challenged the leadership capabilities of the revolutionaries. From it evolved a leadership style unique to contemporary Cuba.

The educational content of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction (EIR) was explicitly political. Outside of Cuba, the CDR are known as neighborhood security organizations. Fagen examines their surveillance role, but he also finds that the CDR system is an important instrument of mass integration, socialization, and mobilization. While cognizant of the excesses and opportunism of some CDR officials, he evaluates their accomplishments as follows:

> One has only to compare the situation in 1960 with the situation eight years later to be convinced that the CDR have contributed very significantly to protecting the institutions and property of the revolution, to teaching citizens what is expected of them in the new Cuba, to mobilizing the population for participation in revolutionary activities, and to bringing together under a common organizational umbrella persons of the most diverse political and social characteristics. (pp. 99–100)

From 1960 until 1967, the EIR trained selected revolutionary cadre in the official ideology of the Revolution. Fagen skillfully traces the relationship of these schools and their curriculum to the struggle for power within the revolutionary movement, a struggle culminating in the ascendancy of both Marxism-Leninism and the Communist party. In dealing with the EIR, he also analyzes the nature of social science research in revolutionary Cuba.

The concluding chapter assesses the Revolution's progress toward its goal of creating a new political culture. Clearly the program has encountered obstacles, but Cuba is making strides toward replacing a traditional Latin American society with one based upon radically different norms. Furthermore, the demonstrated ability of the revolutionary leadership to mobilize the masses in support of this new society is itself a significant achievement. In Huntington's institutional terms, Cuba has already reached an advanced level of political development.

Richard Fagen's book does not give the final word on the change in Cuban political culture. In fact, it deals with only selected aspects of the transformation process. Nevertheless, Fagen transcends the narrowness of the Latin American area specialist, Cold War Scholar, and empirical technician to initiate earnest consideration of the truly radical component of the Cuban experiment. Can the Cubans succeed in their attempt to build a genuinely communitarian society? Only time and honest scholarship will tell. Richard Fagen has taken the question seriously. For this he is to be commended.—TERRY L. MCCOY, *The Ohio State University*.

Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development. BY JAMES PETRAS. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 377. $8.50.)

Scholars who seek to understand why Chile, unlike most of Latin America, has enjoyed political stability and elected governments will wish to carefully study this new book by James Petras. Relying heavily on data generously provided by Maurice Zeitlin (degree of overlap and integration between landowners and businessmen), Dale Johnson (sample of Chilean managers conducted in 1964 and 1965), and Eduardo Hamuy (Santiago sample survey conducted before the 1958 presidential elections; 652 employee sample of a universe of 68,000 public functionaries), Mr. Petras examines industrialization and the attitudes of industrial managers, the roles of the right wing, the middle class (including detailed consideration of the programs and bheavior of the Popular Action Front (FRAP) and the Christian Democratic Party), the peasantry, and the bureaucracy. The author concludes that the primary factor which explains the exceptional stability of Chile's political development in contrast to most of Latin America is the special role and function of the bureaucracy in maintaining the political system.

Mr. Petras notes that bureaucracies are often characterized as having "traditional" outlooks, but in the Chilean bureaucracy a fusion of modern and traditional values has taken place. He writes: "Since the bureaucracy draws its members from almost all strata of the social structure, and since its political attitudes are neither traditional nor modern, but a mixture of the two, the Chilean bureaucracy has served to stabilize the political system by moderating political antagonisms. While parties and personalities in government have changed, and interest-groups have periodically intervened in politics, the bureaucracy has continued to be involved in political life for many decades. It has been the political anchor of the Chilean system, moderating the effects of frequent changes in government ministries, government coalitions, and party strength in the legislature." (p. 288)

The reader will find Chapters 2 (Industrial Managers and Industrialization), 4 (The Middle Class), 6 (Christian Democracy), and 8 (The Bureaucracy: The Politics of Integration) deserving of special attention—particularly as they relate to the final chapter of the book where Mr. Petras isolates "three keys" for explaining Chile's political stability (unified and organized ruling class; organizationally fragmented labor movement; and the political socialization of new political leaders).

For example, in Chapter 2 the author examines the degree of overlap and integration between the landowners and businessmen elites. Mr. Petras finds there is extensive overlap between the two sectors which "considerably weakens the thesis of sector conflict in Chilean development." (p. 53) [that the two sectors are represented by distinct groups] He continues: "It is safe to conclude that the Chilean economic elite is a very integrated group, which is probably one of the main reasons why serious conflicts have not emerged between large landholders and businessmen. It may also account to a large extent for Chilean stability. . . ." (p. 55) Petras also points that there is a lateral linkage between the state and the large corporation in Chile. The result is that state interventionism signifies "socialism for the rich" (p. 50). [the state protects national industry and helps to eliminate risks] Referring specifically to the Christian-Democrat administration led by President Frei (Chapter 8), the author contends that the government has done very little to ingratiate itself with the industrial labor movement and the peasants in the countryside. Instead, "In the cities the PDC throws a smokescreen over its socioeconomic links with the business elite by attacking organized workers striking for economic benefits" (p. 252) and "alienating militant peasants." (p. 223)

Although many of Mr. Petras' conclusions and assertions seem plausible and may be supported by forthcoming research by other scholars, at times the author exceeds the limits of his data. For example, Mr. Petras finds that there is a "high degree of concentration of economic power" (p. 51) in Chile and that the "economic elite is a very integrated group." (p. 55). First of all, one may question his rather loose definition of an economic elite ("those who wield decision-making power over more than one enterprise" [p. 51]). Even if the reader is prepared to accept this definition, the data presented in Table 20 (p. 52) hardly substantiate his concentration of power thesis. Less than one-half of the large firms' directorates serve on more than one firm and only 38 percent serve on more than two.

Similarly, Mr. Petras cites Ricardo Lagos' findings in *La concentración del poder económico* which show that 4.2% of the Chilean corporations control 59.2% of the capital of all corporations. Besides the fact that the book is nearly a decade old and Petras misspells the title (footnote 16, p. 52), Constantine Menges has questioned Lagos' findings, noting that

". . . the author's bias prevents him from seeing the limitations and pitfalls of his data." (*Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. XX, No. 2, 1966, p. 344.) When Mr. Petras discusses the degree of overlap and integration between landowners and businessmen, Table 22 (p. 54) indicates that only 25 percent of big businessmen own one or more large farms—hardly a shocking revelation.

One can cite numerous other shortcomings with Mr. Petras' data base which sharply limit the validity of his conclusions (e.g., Mr. Petras relies on Eduardo Harmuy's survey sample for several of his conclusions about the attitudes of the middle class. This survey was confined to Santiago and conducted over a decade ago; Dale Johnson's interview sample of manufacturing firms was almost entirely confined to Santiago offices. Even Mr. Petras concedes in his appendix that Mr. Johnson's findings are "tentative and exploratory" [p. 357]). Nevertheless, overall the book is well written and presents several provocative hypotheses worthy of careful consideration and further study.—WESTON H. AGOR, *Wisconsin State University.*

Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America: A Study of Chilean Political Culture. BY FRANCISCO JOSÉ MORENO. (New York: New York University Press, 1969. Pp. 197. $6.95.)

As the title indicates, this is a study of Chilean political culture which attempts to use the Chilean case to develop a theory of the conditions of political stability in Latin America. Professor Moreno, like many other students of Latin American politics, is struck by the persistence of constitutional government in Chile in contrast to the frequent and irregular changes of government in most other Latin American countries. Unlike nearly all others, however, he attributes this not to a tradition of tolerance and democratic pluralism but to the high degree of concentration of power in the Chilean presidency. He coins the ugly neologism "authoritism" for "a system in which there is a single center of legitimate political power the legal supremacy of which is sanctioned in the name of justice and whose actions are, therefore, not to be bound by written regulations." (p. 24) This is distinguished from authoritarian systems in which the concentration of power is not supported by any notion of legitimacy. "Authoritism" characterized the Spanish colonial regime, and it was because Diego Portales saw the necessity of investing the Chilean president with a similar high degree of power that the Chilean system has been relatively stable and successful.

To support his argument, Moreno traces the origin of the Latin attitude toward law from Roman origins through the Spaniards to colonial Latin America. Law is an ideal to be asserted but not necessarily observed. The ruler is freed from the restraints of law. (Here Moreno cites a passage of Thomas Aquinas which actually asserts the reverse.) A single center of authority with a monopoly of legitimacy held the Spanish colonial empire together with remarkable success, and its collapse was attributable more to Napoleon's violation of the principle of legitimacy than to any other single factor.

After an initial period of instability following Chilean independence, Portales recreated Spanish "authoritism" by establishing a strong presidency in the constitution of 1833, and the system continued to work as long as the presidents could control elections (through methods never explained in the book). It only ran into trouble when the Congress, influenced by liberal ideas, began to assert itself, leading to the Civil War of 1891, and to constitutional weakness which was not remedied until a new constitution reestablished a strong president after 1925. Even today, President Eduardo Frei has been less successful than he might have been because he has refused to use his "authoritistic" powers to overrule Congress when it has opposed him.

The reference to Frei's reluctance to violate constitutional norms suggests what is a principal weakness in the above analysis. How can one have *constitutional* stability and at the same time support the violation of "written regulations" (i.e. the constitution) by an "authoritistic" strong man in the interest of "an abstract concept of justice that takes precedence over written laws?" (p. 176) As Frei recognized when he was tempted to override the Chilean Congress on the issue of his trip to the United States in 1967 (one of the examples cited by Moreno), once the principle of the supremacy of the constitution is violated, we are back in a Hobbesian world where the strongest, in Latin America usually the military, wins out. Moreno alludes at one point to Vallenilla Lanz's book, *Césarismo Democratico,* in support of his thesis, but a look at the history of the rise and fall of "Democratic Caesars" in Venezuela which that work was intended to explain does not argue that this is a system to be widely imitated. It was only through the institutionalization of constitutional democracy in the last twelve years that Venezuela has been able to achieve stable effective legitimate government. A strong executive is necessary in the modern world, particularly in developing countries, but Chile has demonstrated that this is not incompatible with the rule of law and democratic constitutionalism. An interpretation which does not take in to account this strong commitment to and pride in constitutional democracy ignores an important element in Chilean patterns of legitimacy.

One cannot deny that the demand for a "dictatorship with popular support" (to use the recent expression of Juan Bosch) is a persistent one in Latin America—and Professor Moreno, a former Cuban citizen, seems to imply (but does not state) that Castro is closer to the "authoritistic" Latin American tradition than is constitutional democracy. Yet the argument for the populist strong man is not heard only in countries influenced by Spain. It appears wherever constitutional democracy is incapable of producing effective government. Chile thus far has been able to do so under democratic auspices and the fact that its president is stronger than most helps to explain this, although other factors seem to this reviewer to be more important.

The question of authority patterns in Latin America clearly merits empirical investigation and Professor Moreno's book suggests areas of possible research. However, this provocative but impressionistic book does not produce sufficient evidence to convince this reader that this is the crucial variable to account for Chilean stability in the past, nor that a good dose of "authoritism" is the answer to the problems of Latin America today.—PAUL E. SIGMUND, *Princeton University*.

Political Administration in Mexico. BY JULIO A. FERNÁNDEZ. (Boulder: University of Colorado Press. 1969. Pp. 80.)

The Peruvian Administrative System. BY RUDOLPH GÓMEZ. (Boulder: University of Colorado Press. 1969. Pp. 78.)

These two short monographs were written with the objective of providing a broad overview of politics and administration in Mexico and Peru. Their scope, therefore, was deliberately restricted to an analysis of the existing literature rather than to a presentation of new data or interpretations based upon detailed empirical research. Given these self-imposed limits, how successful are they? To answer this question in general terms, a distinction should be made between the two studies. Professor Fernandez' analysis of Mexico undoubtedly is the stronger work and, in many ways, it provides an excellent summary of contemporary Mexican politics. Although it concentrates much more upon the general political setting and policy-making process than upon administration as such, it does draw upon an extensive body of literature and integrates that material in an effective manner. The Peruvian study by Professor Gomez, on the other hand, tends to be disappointing for several reasons. While it rightly focuses upon the interplay between military and civilian politics, the study as a whole seems unnecessarily limited in terms of the literature upon which it is based and its sketchiness in several important areas detracts from its overall usefulness.

On a more substantive level, however, a criticism that might be made of *both* studies is that their reliance upon recent developmental models leads to analyses that often seem unnecessarily confining and sometimes confusing. It is not that the seminal works of Gabriel Almond and Fred Riggs, used here to provide conceptual frameworks, are trivial or unproductive of real insights. Quite to the contrary. But I would argue that such models often tend to disguise as many important issues and relationships as they illuminate. At least two major difficulties arise from establishing relatively static classifications of behavior which are seen to define a single continuum stetching from "tradition" to "modernity."

The first difficulty is how to classify a given system or behavior pattern within the set typology. Terms such as "rationality," "efficiency" and "secularization" are ambiguous at best. More importantly, perhaps, behavior itself is usually "mixed." This forces the analysis into a discussion of differences of degree, which are not only hard to distinguish but often superficial when placed within a larger context. Gómez, for example, characterizes the Peruvian administrative system as one in which certain bureaus receive more than they "need" (pp. 49-52), employees use the security of their position to adapt the administrative setting to their own benefit (p. 55), and many bureaucrats resist suggestions for reform (p. 58). Obviously, none of these statements is wrong. But they also characterize the American system and, Gómez admits this in part, the admission simply raises the question as to whether other models might not be more discriminating. Fernández seems to raise equally thorny problems to the extent that he concentrates upon the general question of political modernization rather than upon the more specific impact of Mexico's "dominant non-authoritarian" party upon the system.

A second difficulty relates to the question of change. There is a tendency in both studies (as well as the literature in general) to confuse the *appearance* of change (i.e., sheer motion) with fundamental change itself. Deep-seated change undoubtedly is taking place somewhere in Mexico and Peru, but it is not terribly helpful to speak about an entire nation being "in a constant state of flux" (Fernández, p. 21) or "in the process of becoming" (Gómez, p. 44) without carefully distinguishing between *adjustments* to behavior and the *basic alteration* of established behavioral patterns. For example, in spite of certain qualifying remarks, Fernández tends to speak about the "consequences of modernization" (p. 12) as if every modernizing force from industrialization to urbanization carries with it an inevitable challenge to traditional modes of behavior. This may or may not be. Likewise, Gómez speaks of social change in Peru and cites increasing school enrollment from the slum areas as an example. That the school system is *different* in one sense cannot be doubted. But whether this has led to a basic change in the underlying complexion of the school system or, more importantly, in the larger political system is an open question. In both cases the authors are making statements about relationships that are implied by the models; they are not, however, relationships that have been empirically verified. Indeed, if a good deal of evidence from Latin America is to be believed, many so-called modernizing forces have not brought about any fundamental alteration of the existing systems.

A more useful model might have been one that concentrated less upon "transitional" politics, with all of its problematic implications, and more upon what is fixed or stable in many Latin American countries: namely, the essentially closed, often coercive and illegitimate nature of the systems involved. Such a model has its own limitations. Yet it would avoid the problem of trying to classify and weigh the importance of traditional, as against modern, behavior patterns and would focus attention upon actual power relationships. In particular, it would tend to stress the extent to which both traditional and emerging elites have acted rather consistently, and often by force, to maintain a fundamental distance between themselves and the vast majority of the population. Gómez does recognize these factors in various places but his actual discussion of specific elites and their relationship to the system is extremely limited. The Church, for example, is dismissed in two paragraphs, the economy is briefly outlined but virtually no mention is made of the large landowners, and the APRA party is seen as providing a basic "cleavage" within society rather than as a force tending to maintain the status quo. The result is to omit from consideration important environmental forces which often fuse with and reinforce the *elitist qualities of the administrative system itself* and consequently to place that system in a kind of political limbo.

These points are less applicable both to Mexico itself and to Fernandez' study. It could be argued, however, that Mexico is less open and adaptive than presented and that greater attention could have been devoted to the continued or increased disparity between social classes, the close interplay between private and public power, the often alienative impact of administration at the local level, and the sharply repressive response of the Mexican government to the 1968 student riots.

Both studies would seem to be best suited for undergraduate use. The Mexican study is well recommended, the Peruvian analysis less so.—GILES WAYLAND-SMITH, *Allegheny College.*

Republican 'Iraq: A Study in 'Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958. BY MAJID KHADDURI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 318, $8.50.)

The changing kaleidoscope of Iraqi politics has often been considered a frustrating blur of complexity by observers and scholars of the Middle East. A fluctuating and fractionating myriad of military leaders, cabinets, constitutions, coups, ideologies, tribes, and sects have interacted with one another in an atmosphere of apparently consistent contradiction. Few observers and fewer scholars have attempted to unravel systematically this shifting web of social forces and personalities. The most successful attempt was Majid Khadduri's *Independent 'Iraq, 1932–1958* published in 1951 and revised and reissued in 1960. *Republican 'Iraq* is a sequal to this classic volume and is a study of Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958.

Republican 'Iraq presents a detailed and well-ordered taxonomy of Iraqi politics during the dynamic decade, 1958–1968. Important data unavailable in any other source are presented in a systematic (primarily chronological) fashion. Examples include the names of the members of the various cabinets and military groups, comprehensive biographies of key political leaders, and careful translations of major documents and proclamations. Documentation is meticulous and there is a pronounced and sound reliance upon primary sources. Invaluable information derived from personal correspondence and oral interviews has been thoroughly cross-checked and re-examined to insure accuracy and reliability. And there has been a conscious and singularly successful attempt at objectivity. The tendency to sensationalism and spectacularism increasingly present in studies of societies caught in the midst of rapid and disruptive sociopolitical change is admirably absent from this work.

Sprinkled throughout the study are highly perceptive insights into recent Iraqi political events. For example, the widely-publicized and frequently misunderstood Mahdawi Court (People's Court) "served as a safety-valve at a time when the public, or at any rate the mob, was still angry with the leaders of the Old Regime." (p. 81) In confronting problems of popular uprisings and social unrest, the traditional political elite reacted "by strengthening the police force, without dealing with the root cause of the problem." (p. 49) With regard to the scope and depth of the July 1958 Revolution, the author points out that it "could hardly claim that it had completely replaced the Old Regime by a new one. It took the Revolutionary regime a long time before it began to embark on the second or the constructive stage of revolutionary change." (p. 85) This kind of analysis, which was somewhat lacking in *Independent 'Iraq,* stems from the author's greater sensitivity to social forces and social change in the present study.

The volume under review is at its best in the sections of exceptionally fine and fair analysis of key Iraqi political leaders such as 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, and Tahir Yahya. The description of Qasim is particularly incisive and refreshing, especially when compared to earlier studies and evaluations. A surprising number of more and less reputable scholars have persisted in studying the leader of the Iraqi revolution from an essentially pseudopsychological stance. Qasim has not fared well in such analyses for he has been portrayed as everything from a "demented lunatic" to a "cowering paranoiac." Khadduri sensitively portrays Qasim as a leader who was in some ways ill-prepared and in other ways well-prepared to lead a revolution and a society. He emphasizes the buffeting Qasim received in the midst of a continuing and intense power struggle and his inability to control the social forces and processes of the day. The author points out well that Qasim:

> . . . applied so much energy to the cause of the Revolution that he scarcely had time to sleep. The aims of the Revolution, as he saw them, began to change from the aims of his fellow officers, as they understood them, and they began to turn against him. He thus became involved in a struggle for power, and his method was to play off one group against another. In the spare moments that he could afford to spend on other matters he turned to internal reforms. . . . At heart, he sympathized with the underdog, but he was unable to control the social forces which were shaping the development of the country. (p. 79)

The only reservations of this reviewer stem from the absence of any conceptual framework or theoretical emphasis. In the Preface, the author tells us that he intends "not merely to give a narrative of events but also to sketch the social background of the new leaders and to discuss their ideas and aspirations and the new social forces at work." It is extremely difficult to move beyond narrative without introducing some degree of conceptual rigor and theoretical emphasis. An example of difficulties arising from conceptual vagueness is the strong assertion that the "new generation" in Iraq cannot be identified as middle class. The justifications for this position confuse class origins with class existence, bourgeois and professional middle classes, and objective and subjective views of class. (pp. 6–7) The elusive, but critical, concept class is nowhere defined. Terms such as "ruling class," "feudal class," "ruling elite," "upper class," "governing elite," "ruling oligarchy," and "Arab ruling class" appear constantly and indiscriminately. It is not certain whether or not these important terms are all synonyms. Also, to exactly what group of individuals each term refers is unclear.

Perhaps a more explicit concern with theory would have revealed a series of more general Iraqi political patterns. A persistently personal and balancing conflict between individuals, factions, and groups may be suggested as a case in point. Khadduri's excellent discussion of "Qasimism" as a "policy of balancing forces" can perhaps be extended to other periods of Iraqi politics. Shifting and competitive tension marked not only Qasim-'Abd al-Salam 'Arif relations, but also Chadirchi-Hadid, Mulla Mustafa-Shaykh Ahmad, Sa'di-Jawad/Shabib, and Bazzaz-'Abd al-Rahman 'Arif relations.

Despite these brief suggestions, this study by the leading scholar of Iraqi political processes will long stand as the best analysis of these processes. Majid Khadduri has presented us with a solidly documented piece of research which should effectively and finally clarify much of the confusion and bury many of the myths that have come to obscure and distort Iraqi politics.—JAMES A. BILL, *University of Texas at Austin.*

Bürger und Politik. BY JÜRG STEINER. (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969. Pp. 292. DM 35.)

This book is Volume Four in the *Politik und Wähler* series edited by Ferdinand A. Hermens, René König, Erwin Scheuch, and Rudolf Wildenmann. This particular volume is concerned with the general concept of political participation in democracies and uses Swiss and West German survey data to test hypotheses about the relationship of political participation to social and psychological factors. Steiner's goal is to produce a theory of the ways that communicating about politics with others, voting, and holding political office are affected by the individual's integration in the society, sense of political efficacy, geographic and social mobility, and social status.

While Steiner has produced a far more modest work than his title suggests, it is one which is substantively valuable to students of Swiss, and, to a lesser extent, West German political behavior. It is also an informative work to those interested in German-Swiss survey research procedures and to those concerned with the general topic of political behavior theory.

Steiner's methodological section contains an especially interesting refinement over previous voting studies since Swiss voting records allow researchers to determine if a particular respondent actually had voted when he said that he had. By determining who actually voted and who did not, Steiner provides evidence as to the extent of misrepresented voting in the Swiss sample as well as offering some possible reasons why the people who erred in reporting their vote erred by a nine to one margin in the direction of too high a report.

On another methodological point the Swiss records are also interesting. Individuals who refused to be interviewed or could not be successfully interviewed were found to have a voting rate approximately ten per cent lower than those contacted who were successfully interviewed. A significant distortion in the direction of higher participation being reported for the sample than actually occurs in the population therefore results from this reluctance to be interviewed. When this sampling distortion is combined with the error produced by the twenty-five per cent of the sample who reported participating in the four votes of the Swiss data more frequently than the official records indicated they had, one becomes more appreciably more suspicious of the validity of survey results where there are no checks on respondent's veracity. Steiner thus indicates an area where many researchers have been content to accept past assumptions without being sufficiently critical of some serious possible errors.

Steiner's study, although quite brief (only 172 pages in the body of the text), is among the most methodologically explicit ones on hand. Steiner acknowledges it to be a research report and thus considerately reproduces his earliest hypotheses along with the refinement procedures he used. His detailed account of how he operationalized the concepts should be of particular interest to methodologists. After extensive preparation and thorough pretesting, Steiner conducted 823 interviews in three large and five small Swiss cities among the male population age 20 to 35. These Swiss interviews are used along with the results of a 1965 West German election survey to indicate the kinds of political participation that occur among the different types of respondents.

Steiner's substantive findings will contain few surprises to the reader of earlier works on political behavior research done by Americans. In fact, Lane's *Political Life*, Lipset's *Political Man*, and Milbrath's *Political Participation* are the three books most heavily relied on for evidence of his Swiss and German findings being applicable in other democracies. Some may be disturbed by a circularity of reasoning here since Steiner's original hypotheses were based on his readings of these preceding three, as well as other, books (cf. p. 21). In any event, as Steiner hypothesized, political participation with respect to voting is higher among those Swiss and German respondents: who are mentally involved in politics, whose social milieu supports the norms of voting, who feel their personal lives influenced by political events, and who feel both politically efficacious and less political cross-pressures. The preceding factors are interrelated with one another so as to have a mutually reinforcing effect. Finally, higher social status, lower geographic and social mobility, stronger social and political integration—all of these factors increase the influence of the mutually reinforcing factors affecting participation.

While recognizing that institutional differences exist among various democracies, Steiner feels that these differences can be treated as variables in his rudimentary theory of democratic political participation, which concludes his report. These first steps toward a theory of democratic political participation consist of relating his individually verified hypotheses to one another through both narrative and diagrammatic means.

There are minor difficulties involved in Steiner's study which make provisional acceptance of his rudimentary theory somewhat problematical. The bulk of his data, for example, is reported by simple cross-tabulation with neither explicit treatment of alternative explanations to his hypothesized findings nor with controls for third variables employed. The technical data on his scale and index constitution is not included in this volume and the curious reader is referred to a book in preparation by other members of the research team for such data. His use of statistics (only of the order of chi-square) is not as rigorous as some desire for even experimental work. Findings with a probability as large as .10, for example, are considered of "weak significance." Furthermore, the actual differences among the variable categories are frequently not of very large magnitude and no explanation, or even mention, is made of these being relatively small actual differences in voting, discussing politics, etc. Steiner hops from data he collected in earlier studies to data based on the present research and then to German and other democratic systems in a way that is frequently suggestive rather than conclusive. His prose treatment is frequently a "bare bones" one that leaves several relevant questions unanswered.

His work, though, is of importance and should be of interest to several groups of political scientists. The students of Swiss politics will find a great mass of original evidence about Swiss political attitudes and behavior, organized in a clear, straight-forward fashion. The methodologists should gain from Steiner's evidence as to the dubious nature of many of the responses to voting frequency questions when checks on the respondent's veracity are missing and from Steiner's systematic elaboration of his assumptions and techniques. The student of general political attitudes and behavior, and election time participation in particular, will probably find Steiner's rudimentary theory of political participation to be another small step forward on the way to a general theory of participation.—PAUL J. CASSIDY, *University of Denver.*

Nation-Building and Community in Israel. BY DOROTHY WILNER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 478. $10.00.)

Israel like many other new States became a state before it became a society. In the making of that society an extensive program of rural land settlement was carried out, designed to integrate new settlers into the social structure and to teach them the values of society. The program was carried out by a series of interlocked public land settlement agencies that attempted to make farmers out of immigrants with no background in farming. Unlike the pre-statehood villages, they lacked the ideology of land settlement that the early pioneers had. Yet, land settlement government officials made of these early pioneer villages models that new settlers were expected to emulate. The relationship between the public bureaucracy and three villages that were set up to settle immigrants from Asia and North America are the subjects of the book.

Anthropologist Dorothy Wilner has given us an excellent analysis of rural development in the state of Israel in the first decade of its development. Israel has always shown some unique aspects of political development. The State began as a political movement before it acquired territorial base. Once on the land, Israel proceeded to convert a predominantly middle class people into a rural farming population and urban proletariat. Trade unionism as a movement was transplanted from Eastern and Central Europe and flourished as an ideology before a working class emerged. But of all these, the establishment of a class of farmers, which was not in the tradition of the people, was the most unique transformation. The social units of rural settlement assume importance as vehicles of social, political and economic integration. Among rural developments the Kibbutz as a type of organization has been studied; but other types of rural settlement, for example, Moshvei Ovdim, have received less attention.

Moshvei Olim were villages set up by the government to settle new immigrants on the land. The Moshav Ovdim was a hybrid form of rural settlement, representing a mixture of cooperative marketing and purchasing, common insurance and village credit while leaving a good deal of autonomy of the individual about production and consumption. The family is the basic unit in the Moshav organization, which tried to achieve a balance of family freedom and cooperative endeavor.

For reasons more ideological (the return to the land was not without a Physiocratic mystique), groups of immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in Morocco, who had not been farmers were settled on the land and trained to be farmers. It is open to question as to whether the acculturation of these immigrants was facilitated or accelerated by making farmers of former tradesmen and craftsmen from a simple, isolated culture. The problems of acculturation of these familes in the Moshav and the tensions which arose with government administrations are discussed in this book.

For political scientists one of the values of this study lies in the emphasis given to the role of political movements and political parties as instruments of legitimation. It was because village settlers were identified with movements and parties that they became motivated to accept their transformation into farmers. Students of new nations will welcome this study, which illustrates how one sector of society, land settlement passed through a phase when it was conducted by social movements, then entered a phase controlled by party organizations and finally, came under the aegis of the government. The bureaucratization of hitherto voluntary sectors became the mechanism for social integration. The operation of land settlement bureaucracy also illustrates some of the problems of center and periphery which have concerned students of political development. This is a finely wrought work, with a richness of insight and detail that merits high scholarly commendation. Regrettably, it suffers from an awkwardness of style that robs it of greater "life," when the subject itself is so "alive." This work deserves close attention from students of political and social change in the new nations.—LESTER G. SELIGMAN, *University of Oregon.*

Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power. EDITED BY MAX HAYWARD AND WILLIAM G. FLETCHER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 200. $6.50.)

Once firmly in power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was never able to tolerate the existence of organized opposition for both ideological and practical reasons. After all, the legitimacy of one-party rule derived from the party's interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. Moreover, the party's thorough grasp on power was ensured and perpetuated through a consistent application of the principle of democratic centralism not only to the party but to virtually all other officially sanctioned organizations in Soviet society.

Yet, for a variety of reasons, and however reluctantly, the party found it advisable to establish an uneasy *modus vivendi* with the various organized religions in the country, all of which were in fundamental disagreement with the party's world outlook and some of which were organized upon principles very far removed from democratic centralism. In the heyday of Stalin's rule, therefore, a compromise arrangement was worked out whereby much of the earlier pressure was taken off the religious bodies in return for their submission to a measure of formal governmental control.

The collection of articles presently under review analyzes the post-Stalin era in terms of what seems to be the following argument: The painfully obvious ideological vacuum created in the Soviet Union over the past decade or so has in turn given rise to a good deal of intellectual ferment and some nationalist stirrings, both of which have often included taking a favorable attitude toward religion. Just how the party will finally cope with that at least worrisome and potentially explosive congruence of forces constitutes the dilemma of power.

An introductory essay describes the general socio-political setting by neatly summing up the major institutional, attitudinal, generational and foreign policy challenges to which the party has had to respond since Stalin's death because of pressures for change arising from within and outside of the Soviet Union. The very titles of the initial essays succinctly suggest the line of analysis and the thematic concerns growing out of the above considerations: "The Declining Role of Ideology and the Dissent," "Spiritual Elements in Recent Soviet Literature," and "Religious Ferment among Soviet Intellectuals."

In the ensuing articles attention is given to individual organized religions starting with an amazingly terse history of Russian Orthodox-State relations. Then follows a fascinating examination of the relatively recent split within the Baptist church occasioned by an unwillingness on the part of some members to tolerate the price paid by that denomination in making the earlier compromise with the State—in effect, State interference and control. A similar problem is next looked at within the Russian Orthodox context, where a much smaller manifestation of protest centered on the subservience of that body's leaders to the powers that be. Needless to say, such demands for subsystem autonomy strike at the very root of the party's concept of its role and function, so it comes as no surprise that the Baptist dissenters were imprisoned and the Orthodox protesters were disciplined by their church superiors for treading upon such dangerous ground.

Zvi Gitelman's contribution is entitled, "The Jewish Question." The focus here is almost entirely on religious observance, and it becomes convincingly clear that the practicing Jew suffers greater disabilities than any other believer as a result of the evidently discriminatory manner in which Soviet religious policy is administered. Of them all, this article is the most pessimistic with regard to prospects for the future inasmuch as Prof. Gitelman feels that the Jewish religious battle was lost as far back as the 1920's, in other words, even before the already noted compromise was worked out.

The last two pieces, dealing with the Caucasus and the regions where Islam predominates, zero in on the complex relationship of religion and nationalism there and anticipate a lengthy prolongation of the far from dismal status quo as far as religion is concerned. This brace of essays is suggestive of the serious analytical and heuristic problems posed by the dearth of a substantial literature on the Soviet nationality question in general.

The latter point conveniently leads into an overall evaluation of the book. While the earlier treatments of religion-State relations in the Soviet Union are either dated or rather narrow in their analytical purview, this volume is very up to date (dealing as it does largely with the 1960's) and is hopefully the first of many monographs to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the subject. In part, of course, that approach is but a reflection of the increasingly complex context in which the Soviet religious communities have come to find themselves over the past fifteen or so years.

In this volume one finds the beginning of a sociology of religion in an anti-religious State which nevertheless advocates a secular religion of its own. It will be interesting to see what kind of result will issue from this rather strange mix.—RICHARD M. MILLS, *Fordham University.*

Migrants in Europe: Problems of Acceptance and Adjustment. BY ARNOLD M. ROSE. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969, Pp. 194. $7.50.)

The ultimate achievement of the political integration of Western Europe will depend not merely upon the reaching of agreements among statesmen. but upon the willingness of the people of each of the composite states to accept the inhabitants of the other states as fellow citizens rather than as foreigners. In this posthumously published work, a foremost sociologist explores the impact—negative and positive—that the recent interstate migration of European workers is having upon European integration. In doing so, he tests three postulates concerning the ingredients of successful integration. He hypothesizes that successful integration (1) is directly correlated with the relative openness of the host society as manifested in the policies of its government, businesses, unions, and voluntary associations, (2) is inversely correlated with the degree of attachment that the migrant feels toward the society he has left, and (3) is directly correlated with the degree of similarity between the cultures of the states of immigration and emigration. The author systematically introduces a great deal of data reflecting on each of the above, and, on the basis of comparative performance, assigns to each state a weighted value. He concludes that the first correlation is proven, but that numbers two and three are not.

No reader will be more aware than was Professor Rose of the questionability of many of the indices that he employs. On a number of occasions he acknowledges the lack of precise data and the subjectivity involved in the assigning of weighted values. He clearly considered his work exploratory, not definitive, and he carefully conditioned his statements throughout. Yet, perhaps precisely because of the author's impeccable integrity in drawing attention to the absence of directly pertinent data and to the often resulting need for arbitrariness, there is—at least in the mind of this reviewer—some doubt concerning the validity of approaching the subject so quantitatively.

One example of the lack of directly pertinent data involves measuring the openness or receptivity of the host society. The author related a society's openness to policies of various organizations, and yet he noted that the key element is not a matter of policy but of what he termed "the true opinion" that the host population popularly harbors toward minorities Many might therefore have been tempted to rely on attitudinal surveys. But Professor Rose, with insight acquired through many years of analyzing minority problems, presents a trenchant critique of the validity of such polls and concludes that "the distinction between attitudes and behavior occurs in most areas of life, and not least in the public attitude toward minority groups." He therefore falls back upon policies as an index of societal receptivity. The danger is that while policies and programs may reflect "true opinion" and public behavior (and vice versa), they need not. Indeed, as Professor Rose points out in the case of the Netherlands, "true opinion" and policies may point in opposite directions.

An example of the danger of assigning weighted values based upon subjective considerations is offered in the matter of assessing the effect that similarities between one's former and present cultural environment will exert upon adaption. After noting that most European migrants came from predominantly Catholic cultures, the author assumes that a host state which is nearly totally Catholic will offer the least problem to integration, while a state that is nearly totally Protestant will offer the greatest problem. The former assertion may be true and the latter false. As indicated by the case of Switzerland, the greatest friction may well occur within states which are relatively balanced, and in which an influx therefore materially affects the state's overall composition.

It might also be noted that Switzerland furnishes significant evidence that integration is related to the degree of cultural similarity between the states of immigration and emigration. Thus, it is the German areas of Switzerland from which have come the loudest demands for severe limitations upon the number of foreigners. By contrast, the French-speaking Swiss have apparently perceived no threat of similar magnitude in the presence of their fellow Latins from Italy and the Iberian Penninsula.

But in any event, quite aside from methodology, there is much to recommend this work. The author has compiled an impressive amount of data on immigration and emigration policies, statistics, and attitudes. He has much of wisdom to say concerning the reinforcing matters of acceptance by the local people and the adjustment of the newcomer, the pertinence of which is not limited to Europe. Particularly incisive are his comments concerning the nature and importance of "decompression chambers" (i.e., institutions which permit the immigrant to make the transition from one culture to another in a number of small steps). His forementioned distinction between attitude and behavior, and his forthright treatment of the xenophobic traits of various European people should not be overlooked by anyone interested in nationalism.

As to the larger question which was raised by the book—What impact has interstate migration had upon a common European identity?—the author did not find any substantial willingness to think of the migrant as a fellow citizen, although he did find substantial distinctions in this regard between, for example, the Dutch and the Germans. Moreover, he did not feel that migration had increased hostility but had slightly decreased it. Looking to the future he opined that "integration and acceptance among Europeans, to the extent that it exists among Americans, will probably not occur without substantially more political and economic integration backed by cooperative intergovernmental policies." The belief that integration will follow closer economic and political ties is fully compatible with the prevailing thesis of the relationship between nationalism and social communication and will therefore be shared by many. However, even within those states which fall within the purview of this book there are data that cast doubt upon the contention. Is not a contrary trend indicated by the increasingly particularist orientation of the Scottish and Welsh people of the United Kingdom; the Breons of France;

the Flemish of Belgium; the French-speaking people of Berne in Switzerland; the Basques, Galicians, and Catalonians of Spain; the German-speaking South Tyrolians of Italy (who recently won important concessions); and the Slovenes, Croats, and Shiptars of Yugoslavia? In terms of vector analysis, it would seem that the more powerful force is away from the multinational polity. —Walker Connor, *Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.*

Emigrazione e comportamento politico. By Stefano Passigli. (Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 1969. Pp. 251. L. 4.000.)

A significant development has been the creation of multilateral treaties for a variety of purposes. Many of these agreements have provided for the difficult goal of European integration and consequently, certain aspects of life in the member nations have been modified. In Italy one result has been a new type of emigration, substantially different from the traditional pattern toward other European nations, which particularly evolved in the early 1960's.

Professor Passigli's main objective is to evaluate the political implications of this population flow and especially its impact on the political behavior of the migrants and their basic attitudes toward national politics, as well as toward those of the host society and the nascent European commmunity. In affirming his goal to formulate hypotheses worthy for research the author notes certain limits on his study such as the lack of a scientific literature, the difficulty of adequately quantifying the various aspects of the migrations, and the difficulty of identifying significant elements of the political behavior of a heterogenous social aggregate.

In order to differentiate this new type of population movement the author develops a typology which takes into account several variables and having distinguished between traditional transoceanic emigration, traditional European emigration, internal emigration, periodic (seasonal) emigration and new European emigration, Professor Passigli discusses the major characteristics of each of these classifications in a historical perspective. The focus of his analysis—i.e. the new European emigration —is unique in that as a movement it is less directed toward France and more toward Germany and Switzerland. It is more southern in origin, younger and, for the most part, wholly masculine. Also it may be characterized as mobile, heterogeneous and urban oriented.

The point of interest for the author is not as much the political behavior of the migrants itself as much as the influence that migration—a consequence of the process of European integration—exerts on political behavior. Migrant political behavior is taken as an indication of the influence which the process of community formation has on political phenomenon at the European level. In order to carry out his intentions Professor Passigli deems it opportune to examine in detail three elements: electoral behavior, political and associational participation, and values and attitudes, particularly toward the host society.

Traditional notions equate the migrants' vote with the Communist vote and it is assumed that the population flow is the cause of this phenomenon. The author discards this claim by showing that there is no direct correlation between emigration and the Communist vote and that the Communist Party vote has increased less in zones of emigration than in the rest of the country. He attributes the augment in the Communist vote to other causes such as rapid social and economic transformation caused by industrialization and other concomitant factors. thus he hypothesizes that this vote is an experession of earlier tendencies and a gain for all parties of the left.

The migrants take with them the traditional Italian low level of participation. Concerning poliical and associational participation it is claimed that politically homogeneous groups accept politics as an element of the group culture while politically divided groups express the opposite attitude. However, it is not enough to accept traditional concepts. It is necessary to extend the study of political behavior to include an analysis of fundamental attitudes and values. In an examination of studies in this field concerned with internal migration the author claims that the conclusions can be applied to the new European emigration with some reservations. There is a substantial acceptance of the new culture and, in a sense, a type of pre-socialization can be identified.

There are certain major hypotheses that emerge from this work. First of all, the population flow toward European countries is not homogeneous. Emigration does not generate a radical modification of the political behavior of this group, but merely reinforces prior tendencies. This is especially evident in a consideration of electoral behavior. Orientation toward the political realm reflects heterogeneity and participation through small groups. There are also causes for different political behavior and these especially influence the basic orientation toward politics. Bearing in mind all of these factors the author hypothesizes a series of relationships.

As for interactions with the new culture occupational roles and the extent of permanence in large concerns influence extensively the integration process. Lastly, it may be claimed that there is no direct relationship between political behavior and the degree of acceptance of the new culture.

Therefore, radical political behavior is not directly attributed to the fact of emigration, but it is compatible with a substantial acceptance of cultural values of the host society. In conclusion, the author recognizes that these hypotheses are plausible in varying degrees and that further work is necessary in this too little known field.

It seems that Professor Passigli might have given more depth and breadth to his perspective. He speaks of rapid transformation in Italy and a net gain for all parties of the left. Yet he does not place his subject-matter in the conceptual framework of the arrival of social democracy in Italy, nor does he deal with the *Centro-sinistra* governmental experiment. Also he might have discussed the historical and other reasons which explain the low level of political and associational participation in Italy.

It takes the author quite awhile to arrive at the heart of his study and, in many instances, throughout the work he shows a propensity to overquote (for example, pp. 214–225). His text is burdened with long and tedious footnotes (which, if so important, should have been included in the text) and tables which might have been incorporated into an appendix. The author shows familiarity with the literature in English as well as in Italian. Unfortunately, the citations in many cases contain errors in form as well as content and in a few instances, the author relies too heavily on the authority of basic textbooks. In spite of these shortcomings Professor Passigli has broken ground in a most significant and fertile field.—SONDRA Z. KOFF, *State University of New York at Binghamton.*

Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development 1899–1956. BY MUDDATHIR 'ABD AL-RAHIM. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 275. $8.75.)

The Sudan has always been something of an anomoly. Although an Arab state, only about a third of the Sudanese claim Arab descent and barely half speak Arabic as their mother tongue. It has never been a focal point of either Arab or Islamic history. As a result, the Middle Eastern scholar tends either to ignore the Sudan altogether, or relegate that country to the periphery of his intellectual interests The student of Black Africa, however, takes note of the Arab-Islamic character of the Sudanese political culture and immediately shifts his attention elsewhere. The largest country in Africa, therefore, has received scant attention from political scientists, particularly American. Fortunately, the British and now the Sudanese, themselves, are publishing a few worthwhile studies on the Sudan. This book, written by the head of the political science department of the University of Khartoum, is one such example. Concisely written, well organized, and thoroughly documented, Al-Rahim's book is a revealing case study of British imperialism in East Africa. As a Sudanese, Al-Rahim is naturally biased; but the evidence he presents is overwhelming—British rule in the Sudan was self-seeking, mendacious, and exasperatingly paternalistic.

After a brief, but adequate, introduction covering the geographical and demographic features of the Sudan, Al-Rahin examines carefully the Anglo- Egyptian Agreement of 1899. To the author, it is totally incorrect to call this a "Condominium Agreement." The question of sovereignty over the Sudan was not mentioned in the 1899 agreement and Egyptian participation in Sudan's government was always a function of British, not Egyptian, policy. In fact, "by 1932 Egypt seemed finally to have withdrawn [from the Sudan] (115)." Of course, Sudan's future relationship with her northern neighbor would dominate Sudan's politics right up to the day of her independence. But Great Britain, not Egypt, was the unqualified colonial power in Khartoum.

The most unfortunate byproduct of British colonial rule, according to Al-Rahim, was the infamous "Southern Policy" introduced by the British to keep southern Sudan separate from the Arab north. In fact, the author argues that Sudan's current difficulties in the southern region stem in large part from the implementation of this policy. Instead of integrating the south with the north, the British forbade Islamic and Arabic studies from the southern schools, favored Christian over Islamic missionaries, and fostered economic and administrative decentralization throughout the southern region (70–83).

While Britain was supporting this separatist policy in the south, she gave support to a policy of "Sudan for the Sudanese" in the north (in this case to weaken Egyptian influence in Khartoum). Thus British policy was to (a) separate Sudan from Egypt (b) foster Sudanese unity as a countervailing force to union with Egypt and (c) encourage separatism of southern Sudan from the northern provinces!

When the Sudanese national movement did emerge, it did so, therefore with considerable British support. As Al-Rahim writes, the task for the British was "to implement its policy of separating the country from Egypt and, at the same, demonstrate to Egypt and the world that this was in accordance with the wishes of the Sudanese people" (98).

If any party is responsible for the development of an indigenous "Sudan for the Sudanese" movement, however, it appears to have been

Egypt, rather than either Great Britain or the Sudanese nationalists. The refusal of Egyptian troops to support their Sudanese colleagues in the abortive revolt of 1924, the weakness exhibited by Egyptian nationalists when confronting the British in the inter-war period, Egypt's role as willing party to the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement, and then, later, Nasser's policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, his dismissal of half Sudanese Naguib, and Nasser's suppresssion of Egyptian communists all combined to strengthen the independence movement even, eventually, including Ismail al-Azhari, Sudan's first Prime Minister and leader of the National Unionist Party.

It was the threat of the Axis Powers, however, that moved Great Britain to begin decolonization in the Sudan. Much of Al-Rahim's book is taken up with this development, particularly with the establishment and operation of the Advisory Council and its successor, the Legislative Assembly. The book concludes with the formal transfer of power to an independent Sudan. An additional forty one pages is devoted to nine appendices and a select bibliography.

This reviewer finds no fault with this book, *insofar as it goes*. It is not a study of political development, of course, but who is to quibble over a sub-title? Originally a doctoral thesis for the University of Manchester, the study is to be praised as indicative of Al-Rahim's craftsmanship and scholarly ability.

The weakness of the book lies in the lack of any real theoretical or comparative effort. While this was not Al-Rahim's stated purpose, this reviewer feels it incumbent on any political scientist to write as a political scientist, which, since Aristotle anyway, has involved comparison. What is the comparison of the Sudanese Ansari to the Libyan Sanusuiyyah? Was the British "Southern Policy" in the Sudan comparable to the 1930 French-imposed Berber *dahir*? In terms of both of the above sentences what theoretical propositions may one derive to the role of religious movements in politics, or the effects of divide and rule colonial policies? Only in a footnote (2, p. 133) does Al-Rahim venture into the comparative realm. Even here, however, the reader can only squeeze out of the author the meager and well-trod statement, "it seems that there is in fact a high degree of correlation between traditional patterns of allegiance and in the Sudan but throughout the Middle East" modern-type movements and associations not only (134). Al-Rahim has built a firm base. Now the question is, can he build upon it?—Richard H. Pfaff, *University of Colorado.*

The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries. By Charles K. Wilber. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1969. Pp. 241. $7.50.)

In his preface, Wilber announces that he has written a book about economic development. But with the further indication that he has sought to analyze the strategy of development followed by the Soviet Union, it becomes clear that this work is really concerned with the complex amalgam of economic, political, and social forces which go into a national development program. He early expresses the hope that "the Soviet experience will provide some useful lessons, both negative and positive, for policy-makers in underdeveloped countries."

The first half of the volume identifies the Soviet model of development. That he is using the term "model" only in the sense of a rough abstraction is evident from his disclaimer: "Because the very essence of economic development is rapid and discontinuous change in institutions and the value of economic parameters, it is impossible to construct a rigorous and determinate model of the process." But he insists that the model he has found, far from being an irrational construct of Marxist theorists," does in fact possess a definite economic rationale. He describes this Soviet model as one opening a new chapter in world economic history —"the era of forced economic growth in agriculturally overpopulated countries."

Wilber gives early attention to the element of social change essential to the Soviet model of development, and notes that the USSR was successful in establishing the necessary institutions to bring about this social change. He credits the Soviet system with great accomplishment in developing facilities for education, health, and social services. In assessing the social cost of such developments, he notes that there may have been over five million deaths in the ruthless collectivization of agriculture, and the famine which resulted. While critical of this program, he reminds us that even in the United States there has been high human cost associated with economic development: he contends that in the nineteenth century solution of the problem of the American Indian who stood in the way of capitalist expansion, "a policy that can only be called genocide was embarked upon," and for good measure he also reminds us of the high human cost in the institution of Negro slavery.

The Soviet strategy of development from the beginning singled out industry as the leading sector in the program, which led to mimimizing investment in agriculture. This strategy became one of "dual technology," in which certain key sectors used to the maximum the most advanced technologies available, while auxiliary operations in the field of industry made greater use of available labor, thus saving scarce capital in the total program. Wilbur notes here the heavy emphasis upon vocational and technical training, in the formation of "human capital."

The second half of the book is concerned with the application of the Soviet model to the development of Soviet Central Asia—the five republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan. It is undoubtedly true that these Asian portions of the Soviet Union had, in 1928, all of the characteristics of an underdeveloped area. And the statistical evidence cited also supports the conclusion that the subsequent "development of Central Asia by the Soviet regime is an excellent example of substantial economic development produced quickly and under governmental auspices." But this reviewer has difficulty finding *this* experience very relevant to the development problems found in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for whom it presumably is being cited as an application of the Soviet model of development.

The Soviet Central Asian development experience discussed in detail took place under the direct sponsorship of the national government of the Soviet Union, and so involved the complex structures of a powerful, developed state in dealing with its remaining frontier areas. It may be hardly more relevant to the vast problems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, than would be a study of the economic development of Alaska, Puerto Rico, West Virginia, and other underdeveloped portions of the United States. The story Wilber tells is an interesting one, but it may tell very little to the "Underdeveloped Countries" which form the second part of his title. After all, central ministries in Moscow bring to bear quite different forces in development than are possible in Jakarta, Lagos or Brasilia.

With this major reservation, one can understand Wilber's conclusion that his study has shown that "the Soviet model provides an alternative (to capitalist development) which is not only feasible for underdeveloped countries, but also possibly attractive to their leaders." In pointing out questions for further investigation, he feels the most important of these is whether it has to be a Communist party that operates the Soviet model. His tentative conclusion is that "A halfway democratic socialist regime could probably supply whatever compulsion was necessary to implement the model."

More intriguing are his questions in the area of what this all implies for U.S. foreign policy. Should the United States accept social revolution in the underdeveloped world? "Or is the Alliance for Progress approach of evolutionary reform and capitalist development more in the long-run interest of the United States and the peoples of the world?" George Lodge and others have begun to wrestle with these important questions, in recent articles and books. The Wilber book is strongly recommended background reading for such inquiry.—VERNON L. FERWERDA, *Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.*

Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. EDITED BY GHIŢA IONESCU AND ERNEST GELLNER. (New York: Macmillan. 1969. Pp. 263. $6.95.)

In early stages of modernization the rise of a central authority is accomplished at the expense of inherited intermediary authority, as men transfer loyalty from the latter to the nation. The new political center in turn presses for their emancipation from corporate tutelage. Reflecting this process the ideology of nationalization glorifies the little man in his new equality, damning the old feudal shackles. Since societies undergoing this phase are still mainly agrarian, the model citizen is the yeoman and agrarian reform is usually the battle-cry and often also a fact.

Early economic development is served by political development, but subsequently conflicts with these early needs. Industrialization makes some little men economically autonomous, but many more become "wage-slaves"; many are threatened and even wiped out by "modern feudalities," the new corporate powers of finance and manufacturing. Since it is simple folk whom such distant abstractions jeopardize, conspiratorial explanations of their calamity naturally arise. Nostalgia for a pristine rural (though not feudal) past is aired. Conniving "interests" are contrasted with the "people," good and undifferentiated. Little men look to their historical ally, the central government, for relief and salvation. Not opposed to capitalism, so much as to overbearing private power; oriented toward the central government, but still addicted to the nativism and parochialism of simple folk; these men are on a left-right political see-saw, sliding both ways, though remaining ambiguous in these conventional terms to the end.

This strain between political and economic development was broadly manifested in early nineteenth century Western Europe, particularly in France, taking the historical forms of Radicalism and even Socialism, under Proudhon, Ledru-Rollin, and other far from obscure spokesmen. In fact, by mid-century, something of a "Radical international" already existed, possessing a common ideological language and symbolism, even in the New World. Unfortunately for social science, historiography discovered "populism" only in the 1860's and in Russia—of all places—where intellectuals, not little people, reacted to economic development (and ideological reactions to it) abroad, not at home. Rediscovered once again in an offshoot setting, though in a more authentic form otherwise, later in North America, populism came into use in ever more adumbrated manner in this century, to denote almost any popular assertion in politics, from Peronism to Maoism and negritude and beyond.

Probing the conceptual meaning of such a term would be difficult under any circumstances, and especially so if the historical prototypes are lodged in somewhat esoteric variants of the real thing. The contributors to *Populism* do rather well under the latter circumstances. The first five contributions are studies of specific historical variants; they illuminate such phenomena as the Greenback and Granger movements (Richard Hofstadter); "urban populism" in contemporary Latin America (Alistair Hennessy); *Narodnichestvo* (Andrzej Walicki); Eastern Europe's *peasantism* (Ghiţa Ionescu); and post-independence African politics (John Saul). If these studies do not much encourage broader conceptualization, the remaining five essays do just that, on various levels of abstraction and from several theoretical perspectives. As ideology, populism is conceived as assertions by predominantly agricultural segments of society, threatened by modernization, of faith in community and *Volk* against elites (Donald MacRae). From a basic premise, that "virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions," are extrapolated a number of traits commonly found in many creeds and movements termed populist (Peter Wiles). As a political movement, populism appears as expressive of "a collective awareness of disadvantage in relation to wealth," the point about the location of populist movements being not that they are rural, but that they are peripheral to economic power (Kenneth Minogue). The various forms of populism are similarly seen to have in common an "encounter between a small-producer social order and the superior power of large scale (usually capitalist) industry and commerce (Peter Worsley, who keenly suspects that historians may indeed have made rather arbitrary terminological choices in this area). An analysis of the social roots of populism discovers "a unity of situations" in recurrent patterns of social relationships. "Populism emerges as a response to the problems posed by modernization and its consequences. These problems are most importantly those of economic development and of political authority . . . [It] derives its particular character from two such tensions . . . the tension between backward countries and more advanced ones, and . . . the tension between developed and backward parts of the same country" (Angus Stewart). With insights like these, how much longer can arbitrary historical models of populism obscure the truly classic ones?—Gil Carl AlRoy, *Hunter College of the City University of New York.*

Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations. By E. J. B. Rose and Associates (London, Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 815. $12.50.)

Readers on this side of the Atlantic have been made very much aware of the fact that there exists a color problem in Britain. The strictures of Enoch Powell, the Conservative Member of Parliament, racial disturbances and more recently, the plight of Asians from East Africa, attempting to immigrate to England, have all contributed to this general awareness. What also may have caught the eyes of the general reader were the specific policies of the British with respect to non-white citizens of the Commonwealth: namely the Commonwealth Immigrants Bills of 1962 and 1968 which virtually put an end to the entry of non-white citizens of the Commonwealth.

Now a huge tome, the product of five years of research has made its appearance, describing and analyzing the entire racial problem in Britain. Published under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, London, the Report is written by E. J. B. Rose, former Director of the International Press Institute at Zurich, who is "fully acquainted with the English scene," in association with eight British scholars. It must be said here and now that the Report is a landmark in the study of British race relations, and is for Britain what Gunnar Myrdal's, *An American Dilemma* was to the United States. In fact, the authors have admitted to finding Myrdal's approach "appropriate" for their study although the situations in Britain and the United States were not identical.

Whatever differences may prevail historically and otherwise between the racial situation in the United States and Britain, a striking similarity can be noted in both countries, namely, the gap between theory and practice which constitutes the dilemma. In the case of the United States, the contradictions of the American Creed, espousing the liberty and equality of men enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, and the unequal treatment meted out to black people; in the British case, "the tension between the ethic of fairness embedded in our culture and system of law and the failure to live up to those standards in practice" (p. 11)—of course, again involving non-whites at the receiving end.

Although possessing thirty-three chapters divided into nine parts with four sections—(a) a de- book falls basically into four sections—(a) a description of the host society into which the immigrants are about to enter (b) the description of the sending societies, the history of the migrations and their development within Britain (c) the interaction of the British and immigrant communities and finally (d) the recommendations of the report which the authors hope will be converted into public policy.

The sending societies are the west Indies, including Guyana, India, Pakistan, and West Africa. Contrary to the general hue and cry from certain quarters in Britain that that country was being deluged by non-white peoples, the Report indicates that at mid-1968, there was a shade over a million immigrants, a word that has increasingly come to bear the connotation "coloured" in Britain, and predicts a total of two million by 1986. That the volume lays to rest many misconceptions on the part of the host society, is one of its merits. Even more meritorious is the wealth of hard data presented, especially in the areas of housing, employment and education. The weight of the data so illuminates the plight of non-whites immigrants in a white society that the report might well have been sub-titled, "A Chronology on the Suffering of Non-White Peoples."

Of special interest to American social scientists would be the attempt to measure the incidence of prejudice against non-whites in Britain. Four attitudinal questions were provided to respondents in five local government units known to contain relatively large proportions of colored Commonwealth immigrants. One question dealt with avoidance of immigrant neighbors, two with the denial of renting private and public housing to immigrants, and the final question asked respondents if they felt superior, equal, or inferior to colored people in Britain. Respondents who gave non-hostile answers on all four questions were classified as tolerant; those with one non-hostile reply, tolerant-inclined; those with two hostile replies, prejudiced inclined; and those with three or four hostile replies, prejudiced. The final tabulation according to this measurement, found 10% prejudiced, 17% prejudiced-inclined, 38% tolerant-inclined, and 35% tolerant.

When this Report appeared in *The London Times* of July 10, 1969, it carried the headline: "Only 10% have strong prejudice" as if to congratulate British society on its 'fairplay.' Even the authors of the volume fall into the error of placing too much faith in quantitative measurements of this type by stating that government's policies should be fashioned to concentrate on the 55%—those prejudiced-inclined and tolerant inclined. The authors should have been more aware of the gap after separating attitudes from acts. Non-whites are concerned with acts and the seemingly inspiring percentages are not likely to impress them. This is so because non-whites are more concerned with the problems of everyday existence, and experience tells them that the percentages and their experiences are incompatible.

The authors' recommendations are manifold and in the best intentions—among them integration as the goal (equality of opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity); special training for individuals dealing with non-whites, e.g. policemen, social workers; more assumption of powers by the central government; a clearer policy distinguishing immigration policy from race relations; etc. Lack of space prevents detailed comment on these recommendations but the success of any policies must be influenced by the actions of the non-whites, since the latter (like many elsewhere) have decided to take their destiny into their hands. A criticism of the Report, therefore, is that it is another case of well-intentioned white liberals making recommendations for non-whites as if the latter were inert masses.

As the Report is an indispensable reference work in the area of race relations, its bibliography could have been amplified and made more convenient by including those references at the end of each chapter. In addition a glossary of terms for the host of abbreviations of British organizations and committees would have been most useful, especially for American readers. American scholars will find the work of vital importance as a comparative reference in the study of race relations.

Although this reviewer cannot share the authors' guarded optimism about the solution of Britain's racial problems, it cannot be denied that by presenting the facts of the case to the British public, this book has stimulated serious debate. It is hoped that it is not to become an ornament on the mantel-piece like its American counterpart.—BASIL A. INCE, *University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez.*

A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of Ca sKya. BY C. W. CASSINELLI AND ROBERT EKVALL (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 425. $15.00.)

This revealing book goes into great detail describing the government of Sa sKya, which was, prior to the Chinese Communist takeover in 1950, a politically autonomous unit of about 16,000 people in the western-central section of Tibet. The primary source of material for this volume was obtained through interviews with four influential Tibetans who were intimately involved with both the political and social life of Sa sKya. This work deals primarily with the structure of the Sa sKya government and its policy. It demonstrates how the political phenomena within the country was correlated with the environment within which it occurred.

For historical background, the authors trace events from the invasion of Tibet by the grandson of Ghenghis Khan in 1239 up to 1950. Throughout the polity's entire history, the authors clearly demonstrate that the Sa sKya society and governmental structure remained unchanged even as the rest of the world began to modernize. By quickly touching on the geographic characteristics of Sa sKya, the authors show that the governmental power was based on its subjects' acquiescence, and facilitated by the small size of the domain. The beliefs and attitudes of the Sa sKya people are then dealt with as the authors attempt to show that the relationship between the governed and the governors was an integral part of the general belief system of the polity. The average member of the Sa sKya society viewed the government as a force external to society required to maintain harmony. Therefore, Sa sKya may have been typical of societies that have passed the stage where religion and government are identical but have not yet reached the stage where government is recognized as a useful instrument for innovation.

The central government of Sa sKya was rather centralized with a simple structure. It consisted of the ZHabs Pad and the Steward of the Religious Establishment, aided by a number of assistants who had little or no power. The whole system was highly centralized and allowed for only a minimum of innovation. However, it operated successfully because of the modest function assigned to it. On the local level, virtually no official had any measurable power. The only function the local officials served was to bring the concept of government much closer to the people. Be it central or local government that the people had contact with, the average member of the Sa sKya citizenry viewed the basic function of the government as that of maintaining order among subjects who were supposed to take care of themselves.

As the authors move more into the political aspects of the polity, the legal principles and practices of Sa sKya are examined. The legal system had a definite structure. All disputes were handled by the Law Officials. The recurring theme that appears in Sa sKya's body of laws was the life indemnities were to prevent feuds in general. If, however, a dispute did occur, one party would petition the government, and the Law Officers would aid in its settlement.

As mentioned, the ZHabs Pad governed Sa sKya. He had about two dozen assistants and in all his actions he was directly responsible to the KHri CHen. The governemental structure was very autocratic. But the power of the KHri CHen was in a sense limited by such things as Sa sKya's primitive conditions of technology, the people's attitudes towards the government, and the beliefs held by most of the people. The actual day to day governing was done by the ZHabs Pad. In general, the government was run rather efficiently primarily because it had very little to do anyway. The monasteries of the North and South also comprised another power base within the Sa sKya society. But, for the most part, they left the governmental functions in the capable hands of the KHri CHen and the ZHabs Pad.

The authors also treat such topics as the hereditary nobility found in Sa sKya, different aspects of property and land use and the general condition of the polity's economy. These subjects are dealt with in a comprehensive manner and further provide the reader with an appreciation of the undeveloped condition of Sa sKya.

Governmental policy and power are the last but perhaps the most important subjects covered by this volume. The authors point out that the policy followed by any government include not only the actions it takes but also those that it does not take. The political leaders of Sa sKya were indifferent to many things of a problematic nature such as expressions of ideas and the operation of the economy. Government officials were always fair game for public criticism although little could ever be heard. Indeed, the leaders of this polity were extremely tolerant in many respects. Their main concern appears to have been that the standard policies of the past be continued. But it should be noted that the basic presumption underlying the Sa sKya society that governmental power was to be used sparingly greatly weakened the influence of any political or religious power centre.

The authors are to be complimented for their tedious efforts in amassing the information for this volume. Their hours of untiring interviews have uncovered much interesting and original information concerning the functioning of this undeveloped polity called Sa sKya. Throughout the entire book, the authors have successfully shown how the belief system of Sa sKya, from its metaphysics to its concept of government, implied an acceptance of things as they were. In this respect, the book presents a very readable account of the histry of an undeveloped polity. However, the authors still have a host of unanswered questions. For example, would Sa sKya have been able to have leaped or crawled into the twentieth century and still have maintained its belief system; or, was it indeed worthwhile that a polity like Sa sKya should exist as it did for such a long period of time? In this respect, the book must be applauded as an interesting descriptive work but by no means analytical.—Peter S. H. Tang, *Boston College.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Die anachronistiche Souveränität. ED BY ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL. (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969. Pp. 304. DM 30.00.)

This collection of original papers reports on the progress and accomplishment of the international politics work group of the German Political Science Association. The papers are the product of a series of meetings and seminars held between 1966 and 1969 to explore theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.

Three articles of a theoretical character open the volume. Klaus Faupel proposes a general systems frame of reference with interactions between nation-states viewed as a system and with those within nation-states viewed as sub-systems. He advocates measuring sub-system characteristics through aggregate indicators which in turn may be used to explain variation in interaction patterns of the international system. Karl Kaiser examines the transnational character of Western society as it has developed since World War II and arrives at the same general hypothesis as Faupel, thus confirming the general tone of the whole volume as suggested by its title: national sovereignty is an inadequate and indeed "anachronistic" concept with which to describe and explain international relations in today's world.

The third theoretical article is the most ambitious and the most controversial of the essays included in the volume. Its author, Klaus Jürgen Gantzel tries to develop a formal mathematical model of arms races based on the work of Lewis F. Richardson and Kenneth Boulding. Fully aware of the limitations and inherent shortcomings of such model building, particularly with regard to the operationalization of some of its more abstract concepts such as level and intensity of hostility, he is convinced that it can nonetheless serve as a meaningful starting point for research by generating empirically testable hypotheses (p. 137).

The remaining papers attempt to apply some of the concepts suggested in these theoretical efforts to specific case studies of the relationship between national and international systems and policies. Gerhard Lehmbruch and Gerda Zellentin examine relationships between certain types of political systems and the international context in which they operate Lehmbruch looks at *Konkordanzdemokratien* (democratic political systems where decisions are made not on the basis of majority or party competition but rather cooperative bargaining as in Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium) and comes to the conclusion that the foreign policies of these systems exhibit common characteristics which can be traced directly to the nature of their domestic decision-making processes. Gerda Zellentin reaches similar conclusions in her study of economic and international interactions among East European communist nations.

The last four contributions deal with various aspects of the interdependency of internal and external policies and policy making. Kurt Tudyka and Peter Seibt examine the impact of interest groups on international embargos in West Germany and the United States, respectively. On a more general level Heino Kaack and Carl Christoph Schweitzer discuss the international interests and relationships of domestic political groups and their impact on foreign affairs in an effort to demonstrate the complexity of the interaction between domestic and foreign policy issues.

The papers contained in this volume are remarkable in many respects. They demonstrate, for example, the extraordinary influence of the American literature in the field on German scholars, as attested by the fact that well over 90% of the citations in the first three articles refer to American publications. At the same time, the volume reveals solid accomplishments in empirical theory and research by a predominantly young group of political scientists in a branch of the discipline that only recently has come into its own at German universities. Finally, the volume shows that sustained cooperation and coordination in research can lead to a homogeneous collection of essays of sufficient quality to contribute significantly to the development of an important branch of the discipline.—GUENTHER F. SCHAEFER, *State University of New York at Binghamton.*

Britain Faces Europe. BY ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. Pp. 228. $6.00.)

Great Britain's role in world politics may have changed drastically since 1945, but she is still accorded "great power" status by political scientists, if the volume of works analyzing and agonizing over her uncertain fortunes in any index. The political science literature on, say, Sino-Soviet relations is somewhat less extensive than that on Britain and the Common Market, a fact that confirms one's suspicion that Britain is still every American political scientist's second country.

Robert Pfaltzgraff's contribution is a workmanlike survey tracing the evolution of British opinion, primarily elite opinion, towards membership in the Common Market. It is a story of early hostility or indifference to the Common Market changing into support for British membership by the mid-1960's, only to encounter French rebuff. Beyond this specific policy consideration, Pfaltzgraff's aim is to document the manner in which Britain carried out a dramatic reorientation of policy, from the global involvements of the past to concentration upon regional—i.e. European—interests. The evolution of opinion on the Common Market is, in other words, a case study of political reconciliation to middle-power status.

It is a painful story, the general outlines of which are well-known. Pfaltzgraff fills in significant details which point to confusion and even political ineptitude on the part of the political leadership as sharing with Gaullist intransigence the responsibility for the failure of Britain's initial application in 1963. As Pfaltzgraff sees it, Britain's first application for EEC membership was rejected by France because the French Government believed, quite rightly, that British elite and mass opinion was itself divided over the issue of whether to join the Six. Britain's second application was rejected on more strictly economic grounds: Britain's economy contained structural weaknesses that would cause her to be a disadvantage to the Common Market, and British trade patterns, particularly with the Commonwealth countries, were incongruent with her newly avowed role as regional, as opposed to global, power.

Analysis of the complexity of Macmillan's position in the 1957–61 period in attempting to shape public opinion on British participation in the EEC constitutes the most interesting part of Pfaltzgraff's book. Macmillan's position was ambiguous in the extreme. He was forced to argue that Britain's economic health required participation in the EEC in the aftermath of an election victory in 1959 built around the slogan "You never had it so good." If eight years of Conservative rule had so benefitted the economy, why was it suddenly necessary to reverse long-standing foreign and economic policy in order to prevent economic disaster? Macmillan had to develop a favorable British opinion to support his application for membership without, at the same time, giving the Six the impression that Britain was eager to join, which would encourage the Six to stiffen the terms of entry. Finally, Pfaltzgraff shows that elite opinion in Britain had come to support EEC membership partly on the ground that this was a necessary step toward reducing Britain's excessive dependence on the United States. And yet Macmillan's Government applied for membership only after the Kennedy Administration had urged it to do so as part of a change in American priorities. Macmillan was unable to surmount these ambiguities and consequently failed to obtain the decisive support of either British public opinion or of the Six. Indeed, Pfaltzgraff shows that, in the period between the first application in 1961 and de Gaulle's veto in 1963, British opinion actually became less favorable to joining the EEC.

The failure of the application of the Wilson Government is less dramatic; what surprises one is that the application should have been made in the first place, in view of Labour's greater ideological hostility to the EEC and its insistence on conditions regarding agricultural policy that were even more beneficial to Britain than those requested by the Tories. From Pfaltzgraff's account, it appears that Wilson, desperately seeking a solution to Britain's by now critical economic woes, vainly hoped that verbal criticism of U.S. policy would allay de Gaulle's suspicion of Anglo-Saxons.

Pfaltzgraff, in his last paragraph, indirectly identifies Britain's failure to gain admission to the EEC as a failure of leadership. Unfortunately, his case study lacks the focus that might make this observation theoretically interesting. No general analysis of leadership in Britain, or in democratic systems more broadly considered, is offered. *Britain Faces Europe* is a case study that illustrates or tests no explicit theory either of leadership, opinion formation, international integration, the politics of negotiation, or any other relevant dimension of the subject. The existence of some relevant formulations (those of Haas, Deutsch, etc.) is acknowledged in the preface and then ignored.

The reader is also disappointed in Pfaltzgraff's exclusive reliance on documents and secondary sources. Since so much of his volume concerns the formation and change of political attitudes, survey analysis using interviews would seem appropriate.

Moreover, Pfaltzgraff considers the politics of the Common Market decision without relation to other aspects of British political life. This gives an abstract quality to the discussion and even leads to some inaccurate statements. For example, he asserts (page 202) that "The study of British Common Market attitudes reveals the absence of mass involvement or interest in the re-evaluation of Britain's international position." But this period was also the heyday of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the largest mass movement in twentieth century Britain—a movement concerned explicitly with the re-evaluation of Britain's international position.

Finally, the style of the book is pedestrian. Wordy tautologies abound. (E.g. "In supporting or opposing Common Market membership, domestic groups sought to enhance, defend, or preserve certain cherished interests and values." Page 202.) The pace is tedious. (Chapters 2, 3, and 4 conclude with nearly identical sentences to the effect that the Macmillan Government faced an unenviable and challenging task in trying to establish public support for its policies. See pages 59, 77, and 115.)

All of which is regrettable, since the subject of Pfaltzgraff's book is inherently interesting and he has done a good deal of research about the details. For those who seek more than details, however, either in the way of theoretical sophistication and insight or in the way of well-written political history, other sources will have to suffice.—FRANK E. MEYERS, *State University of New York at Stony Brook.*

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. BY ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969. Pp. 216. $2.45.)

The broad sweep and up to date coverage of this book make it useful as an introduction to the problems of the Atlantic Community. Nevertheless, this breadth, as well as the author's own policy positions, make it desirable to approach it with some care.

Professor Pfaltzgraff attempts to sketch in broad outline the present state of political, military, economic and technological relations between the Atlantic nations. Particular chapters discuss "the crisis of the West," "the strategic 'dissensus,'" "the technology gap," "Atlantic economic relationships," "Eastern Europe and the West," "The United States and Western Europe in the 1970's," and "a new Atlantic relationship." More specifically, the author takes up the connection of national strategic concepts with each other and with the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; hardware and non-hardware solutions to the problem of Allied participation in the control of nuclear weapons; technological disparities, their social and economic causes, and the possibilities of collaboration. He also treats Atlantic patterns of trade, investment, payments, monetary problems, and relations with developing countries; the nature of change in Eastern Europe, exchanges and transactions between East and West, the impact of the Common Market and NATO on East-West contacts, and the state of European integration.

This wide concern brings with it minor penalties in the form of distortions of implication and emphasis. When he says that "the Alliance acquired an integrated command system and supply infrastructure," (p. 40) Pfaltzgraff implies a much broader and deeper scope of hierarchical authority and cooperation than has actually ever existed. Although the Kennedy administration adopted the theory of the "pause," it was hardly responsible for its "introduction," (p. 33) which could be traced at least as far back as General Gruenther's concept of a "cushion of time" and which owed a great deal to the thought of General Norstad. The statements that, "by and large, European strategic doctrines have not placed great emphasis on the use of conventional forces against a Soviet attack in Europe," (p. 37) and that, "for the most part, the smaller European NATO powers have not found fault with basic U.S. strategic concepts," (p. 49) give short shrift to the European resistance of the mid-1950's to American doctrines of massive retaliation and the possible costs of nuclear warfare in central Europe. Although European positions changed following the Kennedy administration's adoption of the perspective of flexible response, President de Gaulle was not alone in his position that the American government had moved too far in the other direction. While these are matters of a different order and larger magnitude, Pgaltzgraff's attitudes toward Eastern European detente and German reunification are exceedingly cautious.

At a more general level, a major thesis of the book is that many Atlantic disagreements are the result of "Atlantic technological, military, and economic imbalances," (p. 212) with imbalance conceived mainly in terms of disparities in size and dependency relationships. Such imbalances can be largely righted, Pfaltzgraff believes, through a series of expanded Western European and Atlantic institutions which will create a more fitting European partner and bind it to the United States.

These proposals heavily emphasize the areas of political and military affairs, armaments, and defense technology. For this reason it may be doubted that they can carry the burden which Pfaltzgraff lays upon them. As late additions to an already voluminous literature, they contain little which is new, and a number of the Atlantic recommendations have indeed already been tried, in one form or another, in NATO, e.g. "periodic meetings . . . of foreign, defense, and finance ministers" (p. 200) (the NATO Council of Ministers), "NATO operations analysis groups" (p. 199) (various NATO working groups of advisors and experts), a NATO armaments agency and an "Atlantic technological agency" (pp. 195, 203) (the various structures of NATO's armaments and science programs). Such programs have not produced "spillover." Although the results might be different in the "new Europe," the early fate of EDC, later results in WEU, and the present state of flux in the EEC, all would seem to advise a high degree of caution in moving into what promises to be very rocky territory. As Pfaltzgraff says, "the European integration movement has never stemmed primarily from motivations based upon military considerations." (p. 177) This is true and may well be one of the important factors contributing to the degree of success it has so far enjoyed.

The new institutions, Pfaltzgraff believes, might be assisted by American sharing of advanced technological knowledge with the European allies. At the same time, however, he urges an increased "European commitment . . . to provide aid and capital to developing areas" (p. 207) and to produce additional defense capability. This seems paradoxical since he presents figures showing that development aid by many European nations is already a higher proportion of Gross National Product than is true for the United States. (p. 104) Furthermore, he takes little account of the fact that, in spite of proportionately larger defense expenditures, a substantial part of American military capability is being used in ways large numbers of Europeans disapprove.

Pfaltzgraff concludes that there has been a "shift of European concern from the alleged Soviet military threat to the industrial-technological-economic challenge supposedly posed by the United States." (p. 70) and that the United States' "most immediate task is to restore European confidence in U.S. leadership." (p. 190) If this is true, then the United States might well turn from policy recommendations with pronounced political-military emphases to larger contributions of resources for modern industrial technology. Without such action, America's allies are likely to take their time in expanding the domain of Atlantic partnership, if not European unification. Given the nature of existing imbalances, the weak may increasingly do as they will while the strong do as they must.—Francis A. Beer, *University of Texas, Austin.*

Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods. By David O. Wilkinson. (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 191. $2.95.)

This book is written for the teacher of political science or the graduate student studying to be a teacher. It is the parent-book and key to the "Comparative Foreign Relations Series" edited by David Wilkinson and Lawrence Scheinman and published by the Dickinson Company. Beginning with three books on the foreign relations of the United States, China, and France, a total of nine country studies will eventually appear in the Series, according to the publisher. The book reviewed here consists of an outline, careful adherence to which was intended to make the country studies in the Series both parallel and comprehensive. It is, therefore, a means by which one political scientist can compare notes with others on methods of studying foreign policy and also a means for showing students how to write papers on foreign relations. The author of the first country study in the Series, Michael Armacost (*The Foreign Relations of the United States*) adhered closely to the outline of the editors. But the second one by Robert North (*The Foreign Relations of China*) departs drastically, which might mean that the information blackout over China made a rigorously parallel volume impossible, but which could also mean that North had had reservations about the utility of Wilkinson's outline.

The study of comparative foreign relations is a valuable but wholely academic or didactic study. Unlike national domestic policies which governments have the sovereign capability to implement, national foreign policies are often more expressions of hope later to be gratified or nullified by the actions of other sovereign states. And so study of foreign policy is by nature incomplete; it is a study of questions, not answers. It is background or preparatory study, leading to study later of the interaction between policies of two or more governments; and it should be undertaken early in a student's academic career. This is especially true of the approach to comparative foreign relations taken by Wilkinson.

Wilkinson emphasizes what might be best called the "geography" (in a broad sense) of comparative foreign relations. Most of his outline deals with the environment out of which the foreign policy of a particular nation springs and which strongly determines the strength and content of that policy. It deals with the human and natural things that are found *in* the nation, as a mountain range would be found *in* a nation. These things include the nations economic capability, its arms, its willfulness, its political culture, its political institutions, and its political processes. The international "out of doors" where the policy of one nation comes into contact with the policies of others is not overlooked by Wilkinson. He allocates to problems of interaction about one-seventh of the time of a student following his approach. But such passing notice can do no more than whet the appetite of the student who wants to know how the world works, and there is no reason why it should do more than that. The student who wants to be a master of international relations must master many demanding fields besides the "geography" of foreign policy. He must be abreast of the interaction of all the important states over all time periods relevant to the present. He must master exceptional tools, like foreign languages and theoretical explanations of the interaction of states. Approaching the study of international relations by way of comparative foreign policy is like approaching the study of sex by way of the comparative study of the male and female. Vital background, yes, but it is the study of the interaction between male and female that crowns the study of sex. Possibly North was influenced by this fact, because the departure North made from Wilkinson's outline allowed more attention to be paid to China's interaction with other nations and less attention to the conditioners of Chinese foreign policy. But there is a didactic necessity to partition the field of international relations in order to make it fit university calendars and organization charts, and I think Wilkinson *has* handled his part of the field well. For a methodological piece his book is surprisingly free of jargon, with the exception of one symbol he created needlessly and used frequently: V (meaning volition, and used in such opaque phrases as "Bursts of V"). Also the bibliography would be exceptionally valuable for students.

In laying down a formula for ideal country studies, Wilkinson makes frequent mention of the desirability of group research. He does not mention such values of group research as the motivation of students or overcoming the foreign language limitations of the individual researcher, but he makes a lot of the diversity in viewpoints that are brought to bear on a project by a group that includes persons with prejudices ranging from left-wing to right-wing. Possibly he has at some time experienced success in arriving at conclusions about foreign policy in such a deliberately antagonistic group, but the reader of his book gets the impression that arriving at conclusions about foreign policy are not so important for Wilkinson as being able to chart all the *possible* conclusions. Thus his polygot group could avoid conflict by returning as many minority reports as it had members.

Wilkinson's enthusiasm for groups is seated, I think, in an attitude that might be cited as one fault of his approach: an indiscriminate attitude toward "possibilities" of interpretation that almost guarantees contradiction and irresolution in studies structured according to his outline. He considers alternatives that are not even plausible, such as the following trial hypothesis (p. 62):

> On the whole, the fact that some states are strong and others weak has no striking and systematic impact on the objectives, the content, the quality, or the outcomes of their foreign policy.

Of course, it is conceivable by the mind of man that this may be true; but is it worth the ink of the printer? Should we not also consider the hypothesis that Lesotho seeks to conquer China? Admittedly, a student has to be jarred from his tendency to overlook alternatives, and his prejudices and snap judgments have to be dampened. But how can a student be trained gradually to professional discrimination if *in*discrimination has been promoted by his mentors?—W. HARTLEY CLARK, *Carleton College.*

The Politics of Regional Integration: The Central American Case. BY JAMES D. COCHRANE. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1969. Pp. 223. $4.00.)

In this volume the author describes the evolution of the Central American Common Market, presents some reasons for its modest success, and offers some arguments why it is necessary to be cautious in using universal economic integration models.

He examines the economic setting, the necessity for integration, the evolution of economic integration in the Market, the groups involved in the Market, the external and internal factors promoting integration, and presents a description of the Market's operation and an evaluation of its record to date. He is cautiously optimistic about its future and offers a number of reasons why it has a favorable record. He feels its success is due to a keen appreciation by its promoters, to the economic and political limitations within each of the countries; by strong encouragement and influence of experts who believe in integrated economies; by a feeling of integration or Union long prevalent in Central America; and by substantial cooperation by the United States and others.

Mr. Cochrane presents much economic data to illustrate the various economic problems of the Central American States and additional data to record the growth under the Market. The book does not go into a detailed political analysis of each country, but does present information to indicate why integration is a slow process. He is acutely aware of the relationship of Central America with the United States and well documents the official position of American Presidents since Eisenhower.

The author makes no bold predictions about the future of the Central American Common Market, but is content to say that integrated economies have a positive effect on economic growth and can be successful if properly developed. He presents no new theory but rather makes good use of existing information. He urges that each geographical region be examined as an individual entity with peculiar problems and peculiar solutions.

The book is based on what appears to be an exhaustive examination of material already published, but that does not restrict its value. It offers to the professor and student an easily understood, single volume treatment of the problem of regional economic integration. It is written in a highly readable form and should be useful for courses in economics, international trade, comparative government, and particularly appropriate for studies of international organization and Latin America—WAYNE E. JOHNSON, *Lincoln University of Missouri.*

The Organization of African Unity and its Charter. BY ZDENEK ČERVENKA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 253. $7.00.)

Economic and political organizations above the national level have appeared with increasing frequency during this century, and accordingly have become of major analytical concern to several social science disciplines and sub-disciplines. Until recently, this interest has been primarily although not solely sustained by two classes of association; the international United Nations type, which embodies a universalistic approach to the inclusion of member states but enjoys very limited authoritative scope, and the supranational European Economic Community variety, which is highly selective in its choice of members but at least potentially displays a wide range of independent governmental authority.

Regardless of their manifest structural and functional differences, both organizational types share one important characteristic: their policy-making apparatuses are to varying degrees dominated by the national governments of industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere. Yet, as the so-called "Third World" of economically deprived states now emerges from colonial and quasi-colonial control, new groupings of these states coalesce to pursue common interests and internally to resolve conflicts—in a world which overwhelmingly equates international political prowess with domestic industrial capability. This book has to do with one collectivity, the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Zdenek Červenka intends the book to be both a legal explanation of the OAU Charter and a political analysis of its formulation and implementation. He fulfills the first goal admirably, but largely fails to achieve the latter purpose. In his first chapter, Dr. Červenka discusses the events immediately preceding the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit Conference of African Heads of State and Government, which established the Organization. This chapter is unjustifiably short, and does not shed much historical light upon the complex political problems, and resulting inter-colony and inter-state alignments, which profoundly affected the creation and subsequent operations of the OAU.

The second chapter describes the Summit Conference itself, including the drafting of the OAU Charter and several resolutions pertaining to it (prominently, the Resolution on Decolonisation and the Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination). But again, only the most cursory treatment is given to the probable motives, strategies, and political interactions of the Conference's most decisive actors; men like Tubman of Liberia, Nkrumah of Ghana, Selassie of Ethiopia, and Nyerere of Tanzania.

Chapters Three and Four provide excellent legal evaluations of the main provisions of the Charter and the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation, and Abritration. Červenka also frequently, albeit briefly, alludes to the informal political imperatives and rivalries of the participant elites, which continue to condition their exceedingly limited aims and principles, rights and obligations, official activities, and legitimate areas of conflict-resolution within the OAU. But the intricacies of intra- and extra-Organization politics are never pursued as systematically and deeply as the OAU's legal details, and the reader is afforded few insights into the consistent incompatibility of national political requirements with the demands as well as advantages of extensive international cooperation.

The major external relations of the OAU are discussed in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, consisting of the connection between the Organization and the United Nations, the vagaries of the South West Africa Case in the International Court of Justice, and the bitter-sweet coexistence of the OAU and several other African regional groupings. As the author correctly points out, OAU members maintain that the primary activities of the UN in Africa should be to combat colonialism and racism and to serve as a source of economic assistance. Červenka then enters into an unfortunately sterile legal speculation over whether the OAU is a regional organization within the terms of the UN Charter, only to conclude that the question is not really legal at all: ". . . it has become obvious that OAU Members do not want to commit themselves formally or legally to such a relationship with the United Nations, and they continue to avoid any official interpretation to that effect." (p. 113). The more basic question of for what political reasons member states unanimously shun OAU integration within the UN Organization is left moot.

Although the account of the sixteen year-long South West Africa Case is concise and enlightening, Červenka cannot demonstrate that the OAU has had even a marginal impact upon its outcome. The same may be said concerning Chapters Eight and Nine, in which the Rhodesian and early Nigerian-Biafran crises are described and where the role of the OAU becomes notable through the complete inability of the Organization to help resolve these tragic disputes. No thoroughgoing explanation of this seemingly panoramic incompetence is offered in any of these chapters.

The greatest present significance of the OAU indirectly appears throughout the volume but is best elaborated in Chapter Seven, on the Organization and other regional associations, and Chapter Ten, the Conclusion. As President Julius Nyerere announced in 1967: "Our only way to unified sovereignty is through sovereign States which exist and which our people accept." (p. 166). That is, notwithstanding the past efforts of Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah quickly to transform independent African states into a supranational political entity, the vast majority of African national leaders prefer the slower but surer path of incremental regional and continental unification, first in the socio-economic sector and probably much later in the politico-governmental sphere. A comprehensive awareness of this fact, *and* the diverse reasons for it, must come before any fair and empirically demonstrable evaluation of the structures, processes, successes, and failures of the OAU. In this book, the Organization's legal status is expertly put forth and its politically determined limitations are adequately, if unsystematically, identified. On the other hand, a more fundamental understanding of the political vicissitudes which accompany the unshaken attempts of African elites to bring transnational unity to their continent still remains to be accomplished.—Rodger Yeager, *West Virginia University.*

Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair. By Ishwer C. Ojha. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Pp. 234. $5.95.)

Mr. Ojha's book is done a disservice by its preface in which the claim is set forth that the book will free the study of Chinese foreign policy from the static uni-dimensional framework of analysis in which it alledgedly has been languishing. While it is not difficult to share Mr. Ojha's concern for the state of the art, this book is not the answer. Measured against its objectives it falls unfortunately short.

The book's claim to originality lies in the initial sections which deal with the historic roots of current Chinese foreign conduct. Unfortunately, this is the weakest section of the book. In it the author argues that contemporary Chinese foreign policy bears the strong impress of what he calls the "nationalism of cultural despair." More specifically he asserts that the pschodynamics of Chinese diplomacy is rooted in traumatic search by the Chinese for a new system of values to replace those made irrelevant by the impact of the west. Mr. Ojha argues that to understand Chinese diplomacy one must understand the cultural agony which resulted both from China's humiliation by the west and the alienation of its leaders from the old value system.

Placing his analysis in a comparative framework, the author traces the similarities between the processes at work in China and those at work in the Ottoman Empire and other modernizing polities. What flows from this analysis is the conclusion that Chinese foreign policy is rooted not in the heritage of empire but in the relatively recent past. Thus the hallmarks of that policy, a preoccupation with status and sovereignty, can best be explained by an examination of the period after 1840, focusing on the strains of modernization. This material while persuasive is certainly far from novel, and is often marred by irritating oversimplifications as well as stylistic aberrations.

The book improves markedly in the subsequent chapters where the author applies his framework to the study of post-1949 foreign policy. In a chapter on the Chinese leaders' attitude towards international law and organization, he describes it as one of ambivalence. As challengers of the status quo, with aspirations towards achieving genuine equality in the international arena, they are led to challenge those aspects of international law and organization which reinforce the dominant position of the superpowers. However, where their international status is not in question, and the treaties or agreements to which they are subject have been freely negotiated on the basis of mutual consent, they are extraordinarily responsible in observing their contractual committments.

In subsequent chapters on Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-American relations, and on the Chinese handling of border disputes, Professor Ojha further documents this theme. What the Chinese seek he argues is not a new tribute system but full "participatory equality" in the world order. He challenges the thesis that the Chinese are uniformly bellicose, citing the peaceful settlement of the border dispute with Burma as an example of the way in which the Chinese are prepared to solve disputes reasonably once their claims are treated with respect and their sovereignty recognized.

Professor Ojha views Chinese foreign policy as fundamentally rational. Dubbing it "the politics of weakness" he argues that the Chinese have sought to strike a balance between their desire to pursue a vigorous foreign policy and their clear recognition of their limited capabilities. This realization has dictated a flexible, pragmatic and cautious diplomacy. If obsessive elements persist, they relate more to the symbolism of status than anything else. One aspect of the "politics of weakness" is the substitution of support for indigenous "people's wars" for a direct policy of confrontation. The injunction by Chinese leaders to other revolutionary movements to practice "self reliance" is part of practicing a vigorous foreign policy "on the cheap."

In describing Chinese foreign policy as a flexible and cautious pursuit of their "place in the sun," Professor Ojha has placed himself with the vast majority of students of Chinese diplomacy. His reconstruction of Chinese motives is persuasive and often perceptive. On the whole however, his book breaks little new ground, and his new framework does not really come to grips with the issue of how to measure the relative weight of ideology, national interest, historical tradition, or internal politics, or military capabilities as determinants of the concrete foreign policy decisions of the People's Republic over the past twenty years.—VICTOR C. FALKENHEIM, *Franklin and Marshall College.*

Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and The New State. BY W. SCOTT THOMPSON (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 462. $13.75.)

W. Scott Thompson's *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966* is the first and only major publication on this topic to have appeared since Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957. However, it fails to make an outstanding contribution to an understanding of the problem of formulating and executing foreign policy in Ghana. Thompson's main concern is to examine Ghana's "interaction with its neighbors and its continental aspirations, as well as its attempts to obtain influence with the great powers or to aid one or more of them." The author demonstrates no great argumentative skills, offers no special approach in his critical framework but utilizes a great deal of ideological double talk and double think.

Thompson's volume is divided into three parts. In the first, "Opportunities, 1957–1960," he surveys the general problems confronting Ghana as it plunged into international politics, from the eve of independence to 1960. Thompson also examines the factors influencing Ghana's foreign policy during these formative years. He argues that Nkrumah was a megalomaniac, wanting to rule over a larger territorial unit than Ghana, and that he hence sought to incorporate neighboring states. Thompson also asserts that Ghana took a pro-western stance during its early post-independence phase and that such a stance was calculated to gain financial aid in the form of investments for the country. Thompson points out that such an approach was possible because: (1) The "interests" of the Ghanaian masses were "inchoate": (2) the nationalist elite was oriented toward western business; (3) Nkrumah had to work with British civil servants; (4) the few (12 at the time of independence) Ghanaian foreign service officers were British trained and indoctrinated and they had considerable influence during the earlier stages; (5) the influence of expatriate advisors on Nkrumah. Thompson also points out that Nkrumah moved cautiously during the early stages, even gaining prases from *Time Magazine*. An effort was even made to exchange ambassadors with South Africa. Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. were late in opening embassies in Accra, with Israel, for instance, preceding the U.A.R. Thompson asserts that Nkrumah's priority was the area of diplomacy (about which he knew nothing and was hence at times an embarrassment to the "professionals") rather than Pan Africanism. Nkrumah's public remarks, according to Thompson, were calculated to please the west because his main purpose was the industrialization of Ghana and he was convinced he an earlier stage that the money for this would have to come from the west. With the emergence of more independent African states in 1960, Ghana's influence in Africa and the rest of the world began to wane. Ghana's African policy lacked focus, especially after the death of George Padmore, Nkrumah's West Indian advisor. According to Thompson, Nkrumah's efforts did not result in unity anywhere on the African continent because his actions seemed to negate his professed ideals and policies.

In the second part of his book, Thompson discusses what he terms "Diplomatic Cockpit." He attempts to demonstrate that even though Nkrumah had a great opportunity to influence the international political system during the period of the Congo crisis, due to his inability to rightly assess developments, he exaggerated his importance and that led to the failure of Ghana's foreign policy re the Congo. The author demonstrates that Nkrumah fostered divisive tendencies in Africa (which he neither anticipated nor desired) because of his distorted perception of events. These splits dissipated much of the energy and efforts towards unity, and took a lot to heal. This same period saw a steady erosion of western influence and a simultaneous consolidation of communist influence in Accra, with Ghana slowly drifting eastward. At home, the militants in Nkrumah's Convention People's Party were gaining the upper hand in positions of influence and were involving Ghana in what Thompson labels as "unrealistic" African policies.

In the third and final section, Thompson considers "Union Government and Scientific Socialism, August 1962-February 1966." He argues that the Kulungugu assassination attempt on Nkrumah sent him "askew" and dislocated Ghana's foreign policy. It strengthened the stranglehold of the radical elements in Nkrumah's party. While Nkrumah was insistent on Union Government, his "sabotage" activities towards other African states (yet to be documented by the author) resulted in his being excluded from the mainstream of cooperative developments in Africa. In fact, Thompson argues that Sekou Touré was playing the role that aptly belonged to Nkrumah. Assassination attempts, he further argues, led to the tightening of the security apparatus, resulted in closer links with the U.S.S.R., and further strengthened Ghana's ideology of scientific socialism.

Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966 is bascially critical in its approach and very negative in its conclusions. Thompson's technique is the by now typical formalization of emotional accusations against Nkrumah. Arguments accusing Nkrumah of being authoritarian and omnipresent in Ghana's institutions were not examined to see whether they are valid and rest upon acceptable foundations. Instead Thompson easily embraces them and argues that Ghana's foreign policy reflected Nkrumah's character and his perception of how the international system worked along with his reactions to external events, which were almost invariably wrong. He further asserts that Nkrumah had dictatorial powers, both explicit and constitutionally, and could set the policy virtually without regard to domestic pressures. Thompson offers no "correct" perceptions to counter Nkrumah's "wrong" perceptions, however. When one pieces the indictments against Nkrumah together, they appear to be very strong and may have been very good cause for his overthrow: (1) Even though Nkrumah's passion and devotion to a cause are considered to be sincere by Thompson, he argues that Nkrumah's Ghana followed the wrong course. (2) Nkrumah, as a statesman, was a liar (p. 385). (3) Nkrumah was short-sighted in his approach to diplomacy (yet Thompson offers no long-term approaches that Nkrumah could have followed). (4) Nkrumah was a saboteur (p. 308). (5) Nkrumah felt hostility towards the west- (instances of hostile actions and statements are hardly documented, other than the publication of his *Neo-Colonialism* at a time when Ghanaian diplomats were negotiating for aid). (6) Thompson asserts that Nkrumah was erratic and his erratic behavior (presumably schizophrenic) resulted in an erratic foreign policy. Indeed, there are hardly any official sources cited to support the above indictments. Ghanaians have been highly emotional towards Nkrumah since the coup which toppled his government and one wonders whether an objective study could be made, based solely on interviews (as the many footnotes in this book seem to indicate).

In my opinion, Thompson fails to validate his "modest" hypothesis that "foreign policy-making and implementation are intricate systems composed of many subsystems which are unlikely to serve the interests of the state when they are uncoordinated," in relation to Ghana, for we fail to see the significance of subsystems when we are made to believe that the system itself is one man. The confusion about *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966* is that the answers to the following significant questions remain unanswered: (1) How was Ghana's foreign policy under Nkrumah formulated—and how differently is it being formulated now? (2) Who formulated the policy? (3) What were the influences on the policy makers? (4) Were decisions rationally made or were they determined irrationally? (5) How different was the Ghanaian approach from that of other African countries and what accounts for the differences, if any? Unfortunately these questions cannot be answered in the near future nor could Thompson's "modest hypothesis" be verified or disputed because of the air of suspicion about "academic research" generated by this book in certain circles. Civil servants liberally relaxed Ghana's "fifty year rule" on access to certain classified public documents only to have them abused, and to be disappointed; the rumoured subsequent disappearance of some of these has been another grievance. As a result, the research doors are constantly being closed to genuine research. It is unfortunate that ideological sentiments camouflaged as scientific research can be made to pervade what appears at first sight to be a rather impressive book. —Kofi Ankomah, *Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration.*

Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making. By Harvey S. Perloff. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. 237, $8.50.)

The most notable characteristic of this book is that the author was a member of the Committee of Nine.

Those who are familiar with the literature on the Alliance for Progress will find the first half of the book repetitive; it is at best a checklist of general problem areas faced by the Alliance.

The second half of the book, bolstered by case studies on Colombia and Chile in an Appendix, presents guidelines for the future of the Alliance. Here again there is little to harvest. The prescription calls for a long term assistance program funneled through international agencies, increased planning and administrative efficiency, and more money. Dean Perloff fails to consider the effects of social revolution, nationalism, the inevitable different perceptions of national interests by donors and receipients, and cold war politics, on Latin American political stability, a condition without which no rational program can succeed. The guidelines become impractical when subjected to the vicissitudes of who gets what, when and how.

This book is too general to be of utility to the specialist. It cannot compare with the quality reflected in Simon Hanson's *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress: An Appraisal,* or Herbert May's *Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for Progress: A Critical Examination.* It is a well written, easy to understand book for the layman.—Leonard Cardenas, Jr., *Louisiana State University.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 7–11, 1971, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

December, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology"

Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., University of North Carolina, "A Causal Approach to Non-random Measurement Errors"

James S. Coleman, The Johns Hopkins University, "Political Money"

Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley, "Personality and Conformity: The Learning of Political Attitudes"

Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside, "Correlates of Public Sentiments on War: The Vietnam Referendum"

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Creating Political Reality"

Robert Melson, Michigan State University, and Howard Wolpe, Western Michigan University, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support"

Eric Nordlinger, Brandeis University, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic Change in the Non-western States"

Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908"

Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics"

Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan, and Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"

Jerzy J. Wiatr, University of Warsaw, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland"

March, 1971

James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, Florida State University, "Marijuana Use, Social Deviance and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "The Division of Political Labor between Mothers and Fathers"

Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures"

Gerald H. Kramer, Yale University, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964"

Frank Levy, University of California, Berkeley, and Edwin M. Truman, Yale University, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View"

Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago, "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy"

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government"

Theodore R. Marmor, University of Minnesota, "Income Maintenace Atternatives: Concepts, Criteria, and Program Comparisons"

Robert Melson, Michigan State University, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker"

Adam Przeworski and Glaucio A. D. Soares, Washington University, St. Louis, "Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote"

Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "The Democratic Guarantee: An Index and Some of Its Analytic Arguments"

Duff Spafford, University of Saskatchewan, "A Note on the 'Equilibrium' Division of the Vote"

Michael Taylor, University of Essex, "Party Systems and Governmental Instability"

Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College, City University of New York, " 'Rice' and 'Feudal' Communism in India"

June, 1971

Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Prescription and Description in Political Thought: The Case for Hobbes"

James A. Caporaso and Alan Pelowski, Northwestern University, "The European Economic Community as Time-Series Quasi-Experiments"

Daniel W. Fleitas, Florida State University, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal Information Elections"

John E. Jackson, Harvard University, "Senate Roll Call Voting: Statistical Models"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam"

David E. RePass, University of Minnesota, "Issue Salience and Party Choice"

Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University, and Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley, "Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes: Psychological Sources of Political Beliefs"

Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Voter Involvement: The Case of France"

Jack E. Vincent, Florida Atlantic University, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly"

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By Glendon Schubert

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Schubert discusses the Constitution as a *functional* institution: "in a very fundamental sense, to speak of the revolutionary components of American Society today, including the relation between radical ideologies and constitutional ideals, is to define the 'living Constitution,' for in this broader sense the Constitution of the United States is not the document but rather it is the way in which Americans live in relation to each other."

Glendon Schubert is University Professor of Political Science at York University and has written extensively on the judicial branch.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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